1 Corinthians 10:13 and Libertarian Freedom: Another Response to Colton Carlson

In a recent exchange, in the YouTube comments under a video featuring Leighton Flowers, Colton Carlson offered a detailed attempt to defend a compatibilist-friendly reading of 1 Corinthians 10:13. He leaned on Vihvelin’s notion of “W-Ability” (dispositional ability plus opportunity) to argue that Paul’s words need not entail categorical ability (C-Ability) or libertarian freedom (LFW).

Below, I’ll first share Mr. Carlson's case in his own words, and then respond point by point.

Mr. Carlson’s Argument

"Now, getting back to the 1 Cor 10:13 argument. You keep providing your argument, as if that is the only 1 Cor 10:13 argument on the market. You realize that Paul Himes has the same argument right? Of course, a different syllogism, structure, etc. But it’s all the same argument: Paul’s words are preserved only if a C-Ability is entailed by the text, and if C-Ability is in the text, therefore LFW. So, if I were to look at your specific argument, I would deny premise (1). The antecedent of (1) only entails the consequence of (1) iff C-Ability is the kind of ability that is exercised by the agent. I reject that C-Ability is the only kind of ability that is compatible with the text; a dispositional analysis is just as compatible. Seeing as it is a compatibilist analysis, and not an incompatibilist analysis, libertarian freedom cannot be concluded. So I reject premise (1).

Demonstrate coherence. Why doesn’t Vihvelin’s W-Ability collapse into determinism? Well, because let’s stipulate that indeterminism is true. Vihvelin’s W-Ability is compatible with both indeterminism and determinism, so it is irrelevant if determinism is false. It also doesn’t entail sheer luck or mindless randomness because it upholds a version of agent-causation. Granted, the kind of agent-causation is not incompatibilist, entailing ultimate sourcehood. But so what? As Vihvelin explains, to agent-cause is “to act intentionally, that is, to act for a reason, and because of one’s reasons, and to act because of one’s reasons is to be caused to act by one’s reasons (one’s beliefs, desires, values, and so on)” (2013: 83). This is a working definition, but it suffices. Non-rational sub-personal events “decide” for the agent; the agent decides for themselves, for their own reasons.

Apply it to 1 Cor 10:13. First, I would like to point out that you said: //If the model can’t explain how the Christ follower genuinely has the categorical ability to resist in the moment of temptation, then it fails to do justice to Paul’s words.//

First, that’s question-begging. Just because an alternative model isn’t the C-Ability, and therefore requires indeterminism, it does not entail that all other alternatives should just be automatically ruled out. Obviously.

Second, before I begin, I want you to notice a key dialectical strategy. I do NOT need to show how the text entails a dispositional ability. I don’t even think the verse entails anything regarding metaphysics, personally (and neither do any specific commentaries either, I might add). To ask, then, for an interpretation that the text entails is silly, especially when I don’t think the text entails any form of metaphysics. Now, what I can do is to show that a competing alternative metaphysic is compatible with the text. It might be that the verse does not entail such an analysis, yet remain compatible with the chosen analysis. Moreover, compatibility claims do not, in and of themselves, demonstrate the truth of the items in which are claimed to be compatible; therefore, even if the dispositional analysis is false, it could still be true that 1 Cor 10:13 remains compatible with it. And that is what I argue: PAPDisp is compatible with 1 Cor 10:13, even if determinism were false, or even if PAPDisp is itself false.

Hence, I will argue that 1 Cor 10:13 is compatible with the dispositional analysis of free will. But notice that this invites an alternative interpretation utilizing a metaphysical analysis of the verse, one that is compatible with determinism. If the dispositional analysis is compatible with 1 Cor 10:13, then it would mean that it is metaphysically possible that the verse teaches (or entails) a dispositional analysis. If it is metaphysically possible that the verse teaches (or entails) a dispositional analysis (wholly apart from whether the verse actually teaches or entails a dispositional analysis), then it is not metaphysically possible that the verse entails libertarian free will, because if the verse entailed libertarian free will, it would mean that the verse is not compatible with any analysis that is compatible with determinism (and the dispositional analysis is, of course, compatible with determinism).

Now, look back at W-Ability, for it entails (i) and (ii). If both of these conditions are compatible with the text, then it would show that LFW cannot be entailed by the text. Further, if W-Ability is compatible with the text, then if PAPDisp is compatible with the text; and C-Ability (premise (1)) is false. Is (i) compatible with the text? Sure. Nothing in the text rules out that the Christian has a narrow ability to respond to temptation. They are psychologically sane, they have the know-how, let’s say, has what it takes, etc. So (i) is securely compatible with the text.

What about (ii)? Well, why can’t it be compatible with the text? The agent is able to decide based on their own reasons to choose to succumb or not succumb to temptation. There are no decisive obstacles that block the agent’s choosing either way; there are no masks, or finks; determinism is false, as we have stipulated, in the actual world (which, by the way, is the number argument against W-Ability; see Franklin 2018. But if determinism is false in the actual world, then this isn’t an issue).

So what would block the agent from having this opportunity to decide, for their own reasons, to succumb to or not succumb to temptation? Nothing. They therefore seem to be free. So we have everything we want: leeway (W-Ability), sourcehood (agent-causation), and we can further stipulate that both of these are necessary for responsibility. So the agent can be morally responsible. Nothing in the text, apophatically, states otherwise; any suggests otherwise would entail a weird eisegesis.

Okay, so there’s the argument.

To finish out your first comment, you say that my appeals to vague compatibilist-indeterminism don’t advance the conversation. I hope you are now satisfied! Of course, they aren’t incompatibilist, but so what? So I sure hope you don’t respond by saying that this model doesn’t work because it fails to secure the agent as the first-mover, or ultimate source, or that the C-Ability isn’t affirmed. That would be question-begging.

Now, your turn: provide independent and contrastive reason as to why the ability in the verse must mean C-Ability, and why the agent must be the first-mover. From the text, show that; exegete the text. I would love to explain the other points. I suggest that if we cannot move past this first initial post, this first “model”, then we must still move onto the other points."

- Colton Carlson

My Response

Colton, thanks for finally putting a model on the table. Now we can examine something concrete.

1. On “Compatibility” vs. “Entailment”

You say you don’t think Paul is teaching metaphysics, only that his words can be read compatibly with Vihvelin’s W-Ability. But this misses the point, Colton. I’ve never claimed Paul is giving us a metaphysical treatise, but a theological truth (which can, of course, carry metaphysical implications). I’ve claimed his promise—“when you are tempted, you are able”—is meaningful only if the believer has genuine, categorical ability at t (in this case, t is the moment of temptation). Paul isn’t saying: “It’s metaphysically possible you might resist in some other possible world where antecedent conditions happen to be different.” He’s saying: “At the moment of temptation, God provides a way of escape, so you may endure.”

That’s categorical assurance in the actual world, not dispositional possibility in counterfactual worlds.

Ask yourself: what pastor has ever preached that sermon when addressing 1 Cor 10:13?

2. On Your Rejection of Premise (1)

You also claimed to reject the first premise of my argument. But Colton, this doesn’t work. My first premise says:

“If Christians have the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between genuine alternative possibilities at t (consistent with their regenerate nature), then they have libertarian freedom.”

That’s definitional. To reject it is like rejecting that a bachelor is an unmarried man.

If one truly has the categorical power to choose between genuine live alternative options and actualize one of them, then by definition one possesses libertarian freedom.

What you’ve really done is equivocate. You’ve swapped in your weaker notion of “ability” (W-Ability: dispositions + opportunity), and then insisted my inference doesn’t hold.

But that’s just moving the goalposts.

Paul uses dunasthe—a present-tense categorical “you are able.” My premise reflects that meaning. Your redefinition doesn’t refute the premise—it misses it.

3. W-Ability Collapses into Determination

Your chosen model defines ability as a bundle of dispositions plus opportunity. But under determinism (the very context compatibilism exists to defend), those dispositions and opportunities are themselves necessitated by antecedent conditions (even in a world in which not all things are determined). Which means: • At t (the moment of temptation), whether the believer sins or resists is already necessitated. • If they sin at t, they literally could not have done otherwise at that moment (contradicting Paul’s promise). That hollows out Paul’s pastoral comfort into this absurdity:

“You could have resisted—if your necessitated bundle of dispositions had been different.”

Even stipulating indeterminism doesn’t save you here. If the bundle of dispositions is fixed by non-determined quantum events (or something similar) outside the agent’s control, then the “choice” at t is still either determined by mindless antecedent necessity or moved by randomness which necessitates the outcome. Neither grounds sourcehood—the Christian is still a caused cause.

4. The “Coherence” Problem

You tried to defend coherence by writing:

“W-Ability is compatible with both indeterminism and determinism, so it is irrelevant if determinism is false.”

But this is not an argument, it's an assertion. On the other hand, I’ve argued that even if indeterminism is true, the agent under W-Ability is still just a conduit of caused causes. You also asserted:

“It doesn’t entail sheer luck or mindless randomness because it upholds a version of agent-causation.”

But Colton, that’s precisely what I’ve already refuted.

Without ultimate sourcehood, your so-called “agent causation” collapses into either necessitated causes or random chance.

Slapping the label “agent” on it doesn’t change the metaphysics. It’s just event-causation in disguise. This is why Moreland and I stressed that if your sensations of “reasonings” are simply produced by antecedent necessity or sub-personal randomness, then they’re not really your reasons. They are causal currents passing through you (a passive cog). Calling them “your own” is question-begging. And when you shrug, “Granted, this isn’t incompatibilist agent-causation, but so what?”—that’s the whole issue!

If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have the freedom entailed by Paul's promise.

You’ve conceded the game, the playoffs, and the championship trophy.

5. On the “Question-Begging” Charge

You accuse me of “question-begging” when I say that any model which fails to secure categorical ability cannot do justice to Paul’s words. But let’s be clear: I don’t “automatically rule out” alternative models because they aren’t C-Ability. I rule them out after argument, because they collapse into either determinism, randomness, or disguised event-causation. So when I say, “if the model can’t explain categorical ability, it fails to do justice to Paul’s words,” that’s not begging the question.

That’s drawing a conclusion from careful exegesis of Paul’s promise (dunasthe = “you are able” at t) combined with the metaphysical implications.

In short: I don’t dismiss your model because it’s not C-Ability. I dismiss it because it fails—step by step—to preserve the very thing Paul promises believers in 1 Corinthians 10:13.

6. On Your “No-Entailment / Compatibility” Strategy

You say:

“I do NOT need to show how the text entails a dispositional ability… To ask, then, for an interpretation that the text entails is silly.”

It’s not silly at all, Colton. I’ve argued that Paul’s words do entail a metaphysical truth about human ability. Whether or not commentaries side with me is irrelevant.

The defeaters I’ve given stand until you actually refute them. Do not commit yet another fallacy by appealing to authority or majority.

Deal with my arguments. Then you claim all you must do is show that a competing model is “compatible.” But compatibility is trivial. Everything is “compatible” with something at a thin level.

What matters is explanatory adequacy and broad metaphysical compatibility.

Does your dispositional analysis actually preserve Paul’s categorical assurance? No—it collapses under scrutiny. Moreover, when you appeal to Christians being “psychologically sane” and having “know-how,” you’re smuggling in assumptions your model cannot provide.

If untrustworthy antecedent causes (natural laws, deities of deception, or random events) fix all their mental states, they are not rationally in control of their mental faculties—they are literally insane by definitional standards.

And when you say agents “decide for their own reasons,” the same problem resurfaces: if those “reasons” are the byproduct of causal antecedent necessity or sub-personal randomness, they’re not their own. They’re merely causal currents passing through.

Only if the agent is the source of their decision, choosing between live alternatives, does the description become coherent.

But that just is libertarian freedom. So your compatibility move isn’t just weak—it’s self-defeating.

7. The Real Issue: Categorical Ability

Here’s the argument from 1 Corinthians 10:13 you still need to face:

1. If Christians possess the opportunity at time t to exercise an ability to choose among a range of alternative options each compatible with their regenerated state, then Christians possess libertarian freedom.

2. At the moment of temptation (t), Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between either (i) giving into temptation or (ii) taking the way of escape God promises to provide.

3. Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom.

You deny (1) only by redefining “ability” downward into W-Ability. But W-Ability doesn’t secure what Paul promises about what they can actually do in the actual world at t – when they are actually facing temptation. This reduces Paul’s comfort to a hollow conditional.

On this W-Ability reading, Paul is a horrible pastor who delivers false hope—if not deception.

8. Back to the Text

Paul grounds his readers’ hope in the present-tense assurance: “you are able.” Not “you have the right dispositions such that, in some possible world, you would resist.” His words are pastoral, not hypothetical. If your model were right, then Paul’s message becomes:

“Every time you sin, you literally could not have done otherwise—but take comfort, you had the resources in other possible worlds.”

That’s not pastoral encouragement based upon truth and reality. That’s despair based upon absurdity.

9. Closing the Circle

So here’s where we are:

(i) W-Ability collapses into either determinism or randomness.

(ii) It’s “agent-causation” is just event-causation in disguise.

(iii) It fails to secure the categorical ability Paul affirms.

Your move, Colton, is clear to the reader: you’ve retreated to “compatibility.” Not only have I shown why your view is not compatible with the text, Paul himself offers confidence that, in the moment of temptation, the believer genuinely can endure and avoid sin. The regenerate Christ follower

can

avoid sin and

do otherwise

—by taking the way of escape God promises to provide.

It logically follows that when a regenerate Christ follower does sin, he or she could have done otherwise.

That is categorical ability—and categorical ability entails libertarian freedom.

10. On Your Conclusion

You write:

“So we have everything we want: leeway (W-Ability), sourcehood (agent-causation), and we can further stipulate that both of these are necessary for responsibility.”

No, you don’t, Colton. You absolutely do not have leeway or sourcehood in any robust sense. If the regenerate Christian is not the ultimate and rational source of his actions and the actualizer of possible alternatives, then there is no leeway at all.

If random and non-determined events (that are not rational) determine the mental and physical actions of the Christ follower, then when the Christian sins, he literally could not have taken the way of escape.

It wasn’t up to him—it was up to causal currents or mindless randomness. Colton, you’re stealing from libertarian freedom to argue against it. You’re importing the language of leeway and sourcehood while denying the very conditions that make them meaningful. You continue:

“So the agent can be morally responsible.”

But how is an agent “morally responsible” if he’s not rationally responsible?

Do we hold people responsible for the random flickers of quantum particles? Of course not. If a person’s mental activity is as arbitrary as the quantum realm—or necessitated by untrustworthy antecedents—then he has no active control over his reasoning, no ability to take thoughts captive, no rational ownership of his choices. And without rational responsibility, moral responsibility is incoherent. You add:

“Nothing in the text, apophatically, states otherwise; any suggests otherwise would entail a weird eisegesis.”

That’s not an argument—it’s an appeal to silence.

Paul’s words—dunasthe—positively entail categorical ability. You can’t retreat to “the text doesn’t say otherwise” when your interpretation strips Paul’s words of their actual force. You then say:

“Of course, they aren’t incompatibilist, but so what?”

That is the whole point, Colton. If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have freedom. I’ve shown why, step by step.

That’s not question-begging—that’s philosophical analysis.

Finally, you say:

“Now, your turn: provide independent and contrastive reason as to why the ability in the verse must mean C-Ability, and why the agent must be the first-mover. From the text, show that; exegete the text.”

Done. Paul says dunasthe—“you are able.” Present tense. Actual world. That’s categorical assurance. That is leeway in the actual world. That is what makes his pastoral promise meaningful. And no—we’re not moving on until this is settled.

If your model cannot preserve Paul’s categorical assurance in 1 Corinthians 10:13, then every further step you take is built on quicksand.

So yes—I’m grateful you’ve finally put a model on the table. But it collapses under scrutiny. Back to the drawing board, Colton. Until you can show which premise of my syllogism your W-Ability actually defeats, your case fails and Paul’s words stand firmly on the side of libertarian freedom.

Sidebar:

Here’s the short version for those who have been following along: • Colton’s model (W-Ability) reduces freedom to having the right dispositions plus opportunity. • If determinism is true, those dispositions are necessitated—so you could not have done otherwise. • If indeterminism is true, the dispositions are just as external to the agent—so your “choice” comes from random luck (not rationality). Either way, Paul’s words (“you are able”) lose their force.

The only way his promise works is if believers have categorical ability in the moment—which is just libertarian freedom.

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton