A Molinist Response to Wayne Grudem

Question

Tim, I’m sure you know that Wayne Grudem is no fan of William Lane Craig’s teaching on Molinism. In his popular theology textbook, Grudem mentions middle knowledge dozens of times and in Chapter 16, he gets down to business and presents four reasons why (he thinks) the Molinist position is not tenable.

I’m going to copy and paste a rather sizable amount of text from Grudem’s book (Chapter 16) below, but I’m only doing this much in case you need some context. What I’m looking for here is just your reaction to each of his four objections highlighted further down. I personally think Grudem’s objections are surprisingly flimsy (especially coming from America’s best-selling theologian), but I’d like to hear your impressions.

Thanks,

Gary

Dr. Tim’s Response

I hold Dr. Wayne Grudem in the highest regard. I have learned much from him and I think he gets many things right. In my book discussing “Mere Molinism” I referenced Grudem twice. On one occasion I agreed with him, on another I disagreed with him. In fact, I used his book on systematic theology as a text book in a Sunday School class I taught when I was still a pastor (back in my Calvinist days). Since I “converted” from Calvinism to Molinism, I have wanted to respond to Wayne Grudem in more detail for quite a while, but I’ve placed it on the back-burner as other projects always seemed more pressing. Your email provides an opportunity to finally address Grudem’s errors regarding Molinism.

For simplicity, I will respond to the text you have shared. Grudem's words will be italicized and in blue for the sake of clarity. 

"64 3. Middle knowledge (Molinism). The “middle knowledge” position is often promoted as an attractive alternative to both Calvinism and Arminianism, preserving the important aspects of each of them. But I am classifying it here as a third Arminian viewpoint because, according to middle knowledge, the ultimate factor that determines whether someone is saved is not God’s eternal choice of that individual person but the person’s own libertarian free will decision to believe in Christ."

Right away, Grudem starts off on the wrong foot. Calvinism and Arminianism are both soteriological systems. Molinism, on the other hand, is simply a model demonstrating how humans can be responsible and free in a libertarian sense (not determined by something or someone else), and how God can still be completely sovereign over and predestine all things. To clarify, Calvinism and Arminianism discuss God’s sovereignty specifically over salvation issues. Molinism is a model applied to God’s sovereignty over all things—including the libertarian free choices of humanity.

As I have demonstrated in Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, one can affirm all five points of Calvinism and logically and consistently affirm what I refer to as “mere Molinism” – the simple conjunction of two propositions: God has middle knowledge and humans possess libertarian freedom.

Although a case can be made that Arminius was actually a Molinist, the Arminians (those who continued advancing the ideas of Arminius after his death) who interacted with Dort did not seem to have any grasp of divine middle knowledge. Consider a section of my “Mere Molinism: Study Guide” (this is why understanding history is so important):

//Jacobus Arminius was a Reformer who died in good standing with the Reformers. At one point Arminius was accused of being “too Catholic,” and simply could not risk aligning himself with Luis de Molina since Molina was a Catholic Spanish Jesuit Priest. With this in mind, many historians think that Arminius took Molina’s work and attempted to repackage it and offer it in different words. Historians infer this explanation because Molina’s writings have been found in Arminius’s library.

Because of this, many believe that Arminius was actually a “closet Molinist” of sorts. Kirk MacGregor, however, contends that Arminius may have liked some of Molina’s views, but failed to express them correctly, or that Arminius was highly influenced by Molina, yet held a different view. Others contend that Arminius did understand Molina correctly, and would consider himself to be a Molinist. But those who were attempting to popularize Arminius’ teachings did not properly understand Arminius’ attempts at teaching Molina’s middle knowledge view.

Whatever the case might be, it is vital to note that the Synod of Dort was not responding to the real thing. It is of utmost importance to understand that the theologians at Dort did not respond to actual Molinism.

Consider the timeline of historical events:

-  Luther (1483-1546) and Calvin (1506-1564)

-  Molina’s response to a Roman Catholic audience (1535-1600)

-  Arminius’s (incorrect?) “repackaging” of Molina (1560-1609)

-  The Arminians publish Remonstrance (1610)

-  The Synod of Dort specifically responding to the incorrect “repackaging” offered by the Arminians (not against genuine Molinism) (1618-1619)

-  Centuries of confusion within the church (1619-present day)

With this historical backdrop in mind, it is clear that the Synod of Dort consisted of some Calvinistic Reformers responding to the followers (Arminians) of another Reformer (Arminius), who were offering a caricature of a system — not the real thing — deriving from a “Reformer” (Molina) who was attempting to bring reform in a different manner than the majority of the Reformers.

According to MacGregor . . . the thesis that was first articulated and defended by the Reformed scholar Richard Muller in his book God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Baker, 1991). MacGregor said: “It is true that Arminius possessed a copy of Molina’s Concordia in his possession and that he quoted it twice in his own writings. The question raised is whether this makes Arminius a “closet Molinist” in the way Muller proposes.”

Prior to MacGregor’s biography of Molina, most scholars assumed—and many still do—that Arminius was really a Molinist. MacGregor disagrees and states that his research indicates that, in the best “closet” case scenario, Arminius may have thought he was a Molinist but misunderstood Molina drastically on several fronts. MacGregor argues for this case in the introduction and conclusion of his book on Molina and in chapter 2 of Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology. MacGregor contends that Arminius viewed the doctrine of middle knowledge as an effective weapon against the Calvinist view of deterministic predestination without fully grasping the doctrine of middle knowledge or its logical implications.//

Molinism should not be considered "a kind of" Arminianism. If anything, Arminianism borrows from Molinism. However, some advocates of Arminianism, such as Dr. Jack Cottrell and Dr. Philip Swenson reject the middle knowledge of Molinism because they think it makes things “too deterministic.” These folks hold to “simple foreknowledge” while rejecting the middle knowledge of Molinism. Some Calvinists hold or are open to libertarian freedom (see writings by Greg Koukl, Richard Muller, and Oliver Crisp). If these Calvinists—who are still completely determinists regarding salvation issues—affirm that God is omniscient prior to His creative decree, then it is likely they will also affirm God’s middle knowledge. Thus, as I explain in my “Mere Molinism” book, it is possible for both Arminians and Calvinists to be Molinists.

This shows that the lines Grudem is attempting to draw are not so black and white.

Grudem writes:

"This view is sometimes called Molinism, after a Spanish Roman Catholic priest named Luis de Molina (1535–1600), who promoted this view. The most prominent contemporary advocate of middle knowledge is William Lane Craig.65 Others who have recently defended middle knowledge include John Laing and Kirk MacGregor.66 According to the middle knowledge view, the future choices of people are not directly determined by God, but God knows them anyway, because he knows how each free creature would respond in any set of circumstances that might occur, and then he creates a world in which those circumstances will occur.67 Craig says, God’s insight into the will of a free creature is of such a surpassing quality that God knows exactly what the free creature would do were God to place him in a certain set of circumstances. . . . By knowing what every possible free creature would do in any possible situation, God can by bringing about that situation know what the creature will freely do. . . . Thus he foreknows with certainty everything that happens in the world.68 This view is called middle knowledge because it falls in the middle of the list of three kinds of knowledge that we can distinguish in God: 1. God’s natural knowledge: Knowledge of all things that God could do, including all the different kinds of worlds that he could create and what would happen in those worlds. (God necessarily knows this because he knows himself exhaustively and therefore knows all the possible things he could do.) 2. God’s middle knowledge: Knowledge of what every one of God’s creatures would freely choose, given different sets of circumstances. 3. God’s free knowledge: Knowledge of what is actually going to happen. (This is called God’s free knowledge because it is the result of his free choice to create the kind of world he did create and to influence circumstances in the world the way he actually does influence them.)

Craig quotes Molina in his explanation of middle knowledge: In virtue of the most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each free will, He saw in His own essence what each such will would do with its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or that or, indeed, in infinitely many orders of things—even though it would really be able, if it so willed, to do the opposite.69 Craig then gives an example: Whereas by his natural knowledge God knows that, say, Peter when placed under a certain set of circumstances could either deny Christ or not deny Christ, being free to do either under identical circumstances, by his middle knowledge God knows what Peter would do if placed under those circumstances.70 He further explains, While it is essential to God’s nature that he have middle knowledge, the content of that knowledge is contingent because creatures could act differently under identical circumstances. But if their decisions were to be different, then the content of God’s middle knowledge would be different.71 As for predestination of certain individuals to be saved, Craig says this: God in his goodness provides sufficient grace for salvation to all people in the world, and the only reason they are not predestined is that they freely ignore or reject the divine helps that God provides. In Molina’s view, we might say that it is up to God whether we find ourselves in a world in which we are predestined, but that it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world in which we find ourselves.

I love that last line offered by Craig. Let me repeat it for emphasis:

"In Molina’s view, we might say that it is up to God whether we find ourselves in a world in which we are predestined, but that it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world in which we find ourselves.""In Molina’s view, we might say that it is up to God whether we find ourselves in a world in which we are predestined, but that it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world in which we find ourselves."

However, Grudem's soteriological statement, while I do believe it is true, should not be confused with “Mere Molinism” (that sometimes humans possess libertarian freedom and God possesses middle knowledge). This is merely a possible application of Molinism to salvation issues in which a Molinist is free to disagree.

Grudem continues quoting Craig:

"Given God’s immutable determination to create a certain order, those who God knew would respond to his grace are predestined to be saved. It is absolutely certain that they will respond to and persevere in God’s grace. . . . They are entirely free to reject God’s grace; but were they to do so, then God would have had different middle knowledge than he does and so they would not be predestined. . . . Thus predestination and freedom are entirely compatible."

Amen to that! Grudem responds:

"Craig sees middle knowledge as an excellent way to reconcile Calvinism and Arminianism, because predestination is preserved (making Calvinists happy) and libertarian human freedom is preserved (making Arminians happy)."

Hold on a second. This is not a way to reconcile Calvinism and Arminianism. It is a way to reconcile the biblically supported truths that God predestines ALL things and that humans are free and responsible for SOME things.

Grudem says,

“I am convinced that a Molinist theory of middle knowledge can go a long way toward reconciling Calvinist and Arminian views.”74 (Craig points out that Molina’s purpose was “to avoid the Protestant error of denying genuine human freedom,” a problem that Molina claimed was present in the teachings of both Luther and Calvin.)75 In response to the theory of middle knowledge, we should be clear that the debate at this point is not about whether God knows how people would respond if various kinds of circumstances came about (I affirmed this in chapter 12, pages 225–31). God does have this kind of knowledge, whether we call it “middle knowledge” or something else. (And John Frame points out that such knowledge is already part of God’s necessary knowledge, or what Craig calls natural knowledge.)76 Instead, the question is whether this theory of middle knowledge provides a correct understanding of how God’s sovereignty relates to human responsibility, and in particular how God’s predestination of individuals to be saved relates to human choices to accept Christ or reject him. Regarding that question, several substantial objections can be raised against the middle knowledge position:

See the argument I give in my opening speech in my debate with James White. Here it is: 1- If scripture implies both (a) humans occasionally possess libertarian freedom and (b) all human activity is predestined before creation, then scripture implies Molinism.2- Scripture implies both (a) and (b).3- Therefore, scripture implies Molinism.

I follow this argument with 4 key contentions. The fourth contention is the following: “Middle knowledge is the only way to predestine a libertarian free choice.”

So, if one affirms both that God does not determine all human choices (even if salvation choices are determined), and one affirms that God predestines all things, then middle knowledge—Mere Molinism—is the only way to remain logically consistent.

However, once one affirms that God can be sovereign and predestine non-salvific libertarian free choices, the question is raised: Why can’t God do the same thing regarding soteriological matters?

Grudem writes: 

First, middle knowledge is a theory foreign to biblical descriptions of predestination. Middle knowledge promotes a theory far different from the way Scripture speaks about God choosing us as individuals to be saved. . .

The Bible is clear – in both the Old and New Testaments – that God possesses counterfactual knowledge. In 1st Samuel 23:6-14, God lets David know a truth to a counterfactual proposition. Namely, that if he were to stay at Keliah, then Saul would pursue him, and that if Saul were to pursue him, then the men of Keliah would give him over to Saul.

Consider Matthew 11:21which shows that Jesus knows what the people of Tyre would have done in another circumstance. Does God really know this?

There are many passages in Scripture affirming God’s counterfactual knowledge, but does He possess middle knowledge? This question hinges upon whenGod logically possesses counterfactual knowledge. Does God have this knowledge before His decree and creation . . . or does God create the world, and then gain knowledge of it? If it is the latter, then some flavor of Open Theism is true (I doubt Grudem wants to go there). If it is the former, then Molinism is true.

As Molina and others have noted, if God only knows these counterfactuals after the divine decree, then this obliterates human freedom. It also has the consequence of preventing God from knowing how free creatures would choose prior to the decree so that He cannot plan for them providentially in the decree.

Finally, consider Ezekiel 33: 5,11 as biblical evidence of Molinism in a nutshell:

He heard the sound of the trumpet and did not take warning; his blood shall be upon himself. But if he had taken warning, he would have saved his life . . . . Say to them, As I live, declares the Lord GOD, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn back, turn back from your evil ways, for why will you die, O house of Israel?

In these two passages in the same chapter, it is implied (and thus, rational to infer) that humans possess libertarian freedom and God possesses counterfactual knowledge. Since an omniscient God never gains knowledge, it logically follows that God possessed this knowledge prior to His decree and creation. That is what we call middle knowledge. 

Therefore, Molinism is biblical!

Grudem says:

". . . (not just choosing to create one of many possible worlds and then a specific set of circumstances in which we would choose to believe, but choosing individual persons): Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and blameless before him. (Eph. 1:3–4) For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified. (Rom. 8:29–30) When the Gentiles heard this, they began rejoicing and glorifying the word of the Lord, and as many as were appointed to eternal life believed. (Acts 13:48)

Second, middle knowledge is a speculative theory devoid of explicit biblical support. Scripture nowhere appeals to the unique features of middle knowledge theory as a solution to the question of how to reconcile God’s sovereignty and human choice or the question of election and reprobation I know of no passage in the Bible that says God created the kind of world that he did and arranged the kind of circumstances that happen in the world so that certain people would freely choose to be saved and others not. We already have abundant material in Scripture explaining God’s providence (see the previous sections of this chapter), and we do not need an additional theory such as middle knowledge simply in order to make room for an Arminian doctrine of libertarian free will."

This is disheartening. Although Arminians affirm libertarian freedom, historically speaking, libertarian free will is not the “Arminian doctrine.” If anything, with passages like 1 Corinthians 10:13 in mind, libertarian freedom is the Pauline doctrine (but as I noted in my debate with White, the concept of libertarian freedom can be traced back and supported by the words of Moses).

Speaking of “biblical support,” please see the argument I offered in my debate with James White. He was not able to refute it during the debate, nor has White been able to refute it in the following months. I explained what it means for a doctrine to be “biblical” and deductively concluded: “Therefore, Molinism is biblical.”

Grudem continues:

"Third, God cannot determine a set of circumstances without determining millions of human choices. William Craig says, “By knowing what every possible free creature would do in any possible situation, God can by bringing about that situation know what the creature will freely do.”

Grudem is confusing and conflating predestination with determinism. To clarify: An event is determined if antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the event or effect (often referred to as “causal determinism”). Exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is the idea that God determines all effects—especially all things about humanity, which would include all desires, thoughts, intuitions, beliefs, actions, behaviors, evaluations, and judgments. It is important to note that antecedent conditions are either sufficient or insufficient to necessitate all effects.

So, if God creates a world in which antecedent conditions are insufficient to necessitate all events, but God simply knows what would and will happen with perfect certainty, then God can predestine all things without determining all things. Yes, God determines and creates the existence of freedom-permitting circumstances. No, God does not determine and necessitate Satan’s rebellion, Adam’s fall, Hitler’s holocaust, or the adultery committed by the Calvinist (as an example). Indeed, God provides a way of escape to all regenerate Christ followers so that we do not have to sin (1 Corinthians 10:13).

Bottom line: God predestines all things but does not determine all things. We must be careful not to confuse and conflate these different concepts.

Grudem writes:

"Here Craig speaks about God “bringing about that situation.” But every situation in which people find themselves is itself the result of thousands, in fact millions, of individual human choices. As I sit at my desk writing this sentence, I am here as a result of my great-grandparents deciding to emigrate from Norway in the 1870s, then meeting and deciding to get married in the United States. I am also here as a result of other ancestors emigrating from Sweden and Ireland. But in another sense, I am here because of the influence of my professors at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, and they were there because some conservative faculty members at Princeton Seminary decided to found Westminster in 1929. And that action depended on each of their ancestors deciding to get married, deciding to come to America, deciding (in many cases) to follow Christ and teach their children to follow Christ, and so forth. And I have a job in Arizona because some pastors in Arizona decided to found a seminary here in 1987. In addition, my current “situation” is a result of Moses deciding to obey God and write the first five books of the Bible, and a result of the apostle Paul deciding to write his epistles which have so significantly influenced my thinking.

And the lives of Moses and Paul and the other biblical authors were a result of their parents and their grandparents and great-grandparents deciding to get married and to follow God. My current situation is also a result of the Founding Fathers of the United States deciding to declare their independence from Great Britain in 1776, and their lives are the result of—well, such reasoning could go on forever. It would be impossible to list or even be aware of all the human choices that resulted in the exact “situations” in which we find ourselves today."

That might be impossible for Wayne Grudem, but such a task is not impossible for an omnipotent and omniscient maximally great being. Indeed, it is impossible for a God who is necessarily omniscient to NOT know all of these things. Indeed, if God is necessarily omniscient, by definition, God knows all of these truths in all circumstances—including the circumstance prior to the foundations of the world.

Grudem continues: 

"Therefore, in order for God to “bring about a situation,” literally millions of prior human choices would have to be decided in a certain way, or else the situation would be different. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that hidden in the phrase that speaks about God “bringing about that situation” is the implied necessity for God not just to create a certain kind of world at the beginning but also to determine that millions of human choices would be decided in one way and not in another, in order to bring about the situation he wants at this moment. But such a process denies the kind of libertarian free will that middle knowledge advocates are claiming to protect."

Again, Grudem continues to confuse and conflate predestination with determinism. Let me reiterate that philosophically speaking, these are two different issues. A predestined act can be determined, but it does not have to be. This is because, an omniscient and omnipotent God can ensure an act occurs without creating antecedent conditions which are sufficient to necessitate the act. This is the beauty of divine middle knowledge and also exonerates God from being the author of evil (determining evil by way of cause and necessary effect).

Grudem writes:

"Fourth, middle knowledge is inconsistent with the essential claims of both Calvinism and Arminianism. On the one hand, Calvinists cannot agree with the idea that God ordains circumstances but does not choose individual persons for salvation, nor can they agree that God’s foreknowledge of human choices is contingent upon what each human being freely chooses (the person could have chosen differently)."

This is not necessarily the case. All the Calvinist must do to be a “mere Molinist” is to affirm that God ordains and determines the existence of specific persons in certain circumstances, and also affirm that Christian persons, for example, are not causally determined by God to sin (1 Corinthians 10:13).

So, when the Calvinist cheats on his wife, for example, this act of adultery—although not determined by God (it was up to the Calvinist adulterer)—was still predestined by God. That is to say, God knew prior to the foundations of the world, that if God created this world, the Calvinist would freely choose to cheat on his wife. So, although God creating this world is a necessary condition for the Calvinist to cheat on his wife, God creating this world is not sufficient to determine this act of adultery. If it were, the Calvinist’s wife should not blame her husband for destroying her family; she should blame God.

God, however, should not be blamed since not only did He not determine the Calvinist to cheat on his wife, God provided a way of escape, so that he did not have to fall into temptation and commit adultery in that specific circumstance. This is the epitome of libertarian freedom.

It is vital to note that since Calvinists are Christians, the Calvinist who fell into temptation is already saved. Thus, Molinism is NOT a soteriological system. It can, however, be applied to salvation issues, but it does not have to be. There is room for disagreement on that score.

Grudem continues: 

"Nor can Calvinists agree that “it is up to us whether we are predestined,” placing the ultimate factor that decides a person’s destiny not in God’s choice of the person but in the person’s decision to choose God. Middle knowledge says that (a) God knows that if person P is in a certain set of circumstances, he will trust in Christ, and then (b) God creates the kind of world in which exactly those circumstances will come about, and so predestines person P to salvation. But this is just a somewhat complicated variation on the standard Arminian view that predestination is based on God’s knowledge of who would freely choose to believe. Therefore, middle knowledge does not provide a better solution than Calvinism or Arminianism."

What Grudem needs to do is make a case that Molinism should not be applied to soteriological issues. While I think that case will fail, it would be much better than arguing against Molinism simpliciter. Consider his own slightly edited words:

Middle knowledge says that (a) God knows that if person P is in a certain set of circumstances, he cheat on his wife, and then (b) God creates the kind of world in which exactly those circumstances will come about.Middle knowledge says that (a) God knows that if person P is in a certain set of circumstances, he cheat on his wife, and then (b) God creates the kind of world in which exactly those circumstances will come about.

Thus, God predestines person P to cheat on his wife—although he was not necessitated or determined to commit this evil.

Grudem writes:

"In fact, the middle knowledge theory is in actuality just a variety of the Arminian position that election is based on God’s foreknowledge of our faith. However, it adds the additional details that God, first knowing how individual people would respond in certain circumstances, then creates the kind of world and arranges the kind of circumstances in which he knows that a person will “freely” choose to believe, and then he predestines that person to be saved. This is still predestination based on foreknowledge of a person’s faith."

No, this is predestination of libertarian free choices based upon divine MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE of all that would occur (both determined and indetermined) if God were to fine-tune and create the initial conditions of the universe in which we find ourselves.

He continues: 

"On the other hand, Craig’s view does not actually result in the kind of human freedom that Arminians want to defend. Craig refers to this freedom as the “possibility of man’s choosing in any circumstances other than as he does choose”79 or the freedom where “creatures could act differently under identical circumstances.”80 (I earlier explained this as “libertarian freedom.”) But on Craig’s view, God’s knowledge of the circumstances and the person’s own disposition guarantee that a certain choice will be made—otherwise, God could not know what the choice would be. But if God knows what the choice will be, then that choice is guaranteed to happen, and then it could not be otherwise."

Grudem is simply incorrect. Knowledge does not stand in causal relation. Knowledge does not stand in deterministic relation. Just as an infallible weather barometer that "knows" it will rain in Spain does not cause the rain in Spain, God simply knows how a person with libertarian freedom would and will freely choose in a specific freedom-permitting circumstance (where antecedent conditions are insufficient to necessitate one's choice). Libertarian freedom is not defined, as Grudem seems to assume, as “the ability to trick God.”

Consider a better understanding of libertarian freedom. Richard Taylor puts it this way: “In the case of an action that is free, it must not only be such that it is caused by the agent who performs it, but also such that no antecedent conditions were sufficient for his performing just that action.” We can understand libertarian freedom, then, as the ability to choose such that antecedent conditions are insufficient to causally determine or necessitate one’s choice. We can apply this definition to thinking:

“Libertarian freedom is the ability to think such that antecedent conditions are insufficient to causally determine or necessitate one’s thoughts and ensuing beliefs.”

This definition of libertarian freedom holds whether or not one possesses alternative possibilities from which to choose. I refer to this idea as weak libertarian freedom. However, if one does possess opportunities to choose among alternative possibilities in the real world (strong libertarian freedom), then it follows that one is not determined by something or someone else.  Strong libertarian freedom can be expressed in the following manner:

“The opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between at least two options, each of which is compatible with one’s nature in a specific circumstance where the antecedent conditions are insufficient to causally determine or necessitate the agent’s choice.”

That is another way of expressing the “ability to do otherwise.” Thus, the ability to do otherwise is not necessary to have libertarian freedom. However, if one does possess this opportunity and ability to choose otherwise (as implied in 1 Corinthians 10:13), then it is sufficient to demonstrate libertarian freedom. Ultimately, if one cannot demonstrate strong libertarian freedom, but can demonstrate weak libertarian freedom, one has demonstrated libertarian freedom and dispatched the idea of determinism.

With libertarian freedom properly understood, consider another example from the “Mere Molinism Study Guide” (coauthored by Timothy Fox):

This is a common fallacy regarding God’s foreknowledge known as the Modal Fallacy. Many incorrectly conclude that if God knows how one will freely choose, then one cannot freely choose. It’s often said that if one cannot do other than what God knows, then one does not possess libertarian freedom. 

But this confuses certainty with necessity. God is certain that Agent P will freely choose X in circumstance C at time t, but it is not necessary. It is a logical error to conflate certainty with necessity. These are two different concepts. 

Libertarian freedom is not defined as “doing other than what God knows.” Rather, recall that libertarian freedom should be understood in the following manners:

(1) Referring to an agent’s choice, action, evaluation, or judgement that is not causally determined by something or someone else. 

(2) The opportunity to exercise an ability to choose among a range of options (at least two), each of which is compatible with one’s nature in a circumstance where the antecedent conditions are insufficient to causally determine the agent’s choice.

With libertarian freedom properly defined, Molinism would entail the following:

• God knows Sally would freely choose X instead of not-X if He were to create her in non-causal deterministic circumstance C.

• God creates Sally in non-causal deterministic circumstance C.

• Now, God knows Sally will freely choose X instead of not-X in non-causal deterministic circumstance C.

Here’s the takeaway:

Just because the word “would” transforms to “will,” the word “freely” (in a libertarian sense) does not magically disappear.

Many people make the mistake of thinking that just because one is not free or able to do other than what God knows—that they are not free to “trick” God—that somehow their libertarian freedom is lost. This is an error which leads to false conclusions. Just because one is not free to “trick” God, it does not logically follow that one did not freely choose in the libertarian sense. God simply middle knows and foreknows how one freely chooses in a libertarian sense.

Grudem concludes:

"In conclusion, Molinism proposes a speculative theory that has no explicit biblical support, that is inconsistent with the biblical descriptions of God choosing individual persons, that is a complicated version of the Arminian view that predestination is based on foreknowledge of a person’s faith, that requires that God must determine millions of human choices that lead up to any specific set of circumstances, and that is inconsistent with claims that are essential to both Calvinism and Arminianism."

In conclusion, Grudem is just plain wrong. Molinism is just as biblical as the concept of the Trinity (as I argue in my opening statement vs White). Indeed, the same rationality and use of reason that leads to the conclusion that God is one “What” and three “Whos” is the same use of reason that concludes Molinism is true. If God can predestine a Calvinist to cheat on his wife without causally determining him to do so, then it is logically possible for God to predestine a sinner to refrain from resisting God’s love and grace without God causally determining him to do so. This is not based upon “foreknowledge of a person’s faith,” but rather, it is based on something philosophically different – middle knowledge of a person’s faith.

Finally, this does NOT require that God “determine millions of human choices that lead up to any specific set of circumstances.” No, all this requires is that God is necessarily omniscient prior to creation (and the divine decree). As long as God knows all things that WOULD occur -- including the libertarian free choices of humanity -- prior to His words "Let there be . . ." then God possesses middle knowledge. 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology, Second Edition (pp. 710-717). Zondervan Academic. Kindle Edition.

See Richard A. Muller, God, Creation, and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius, Baker Pub Group (1991)

See Eef Dekker, “Was Arminius a Molinist?”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2544137 (Accessed 7-23-21)

Kirk MacGregor, Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge, Zondervan Academic (2018)

Kirk MacGregor, A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology, University Press of America (2007)

Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (4^th Edition), (1991)

Loosely speaking, an agent is a libertarian “free thinker” if (i) the entirety of the agent’s mental activity is not determined by something or someone else, and (ii) the agent makes some mental choices.

The view that libertarian freedom necessarily requires alternative possibilities has gone out of style. Elenore Stump describes this idea in Moral Responsibility without Alternative Possibilities, chapter 8 of the book, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, Routledge; 1st edition (2019). William Lane Craig is clear that the libertarian need not affirm alternative possibilities in his article, I, a Compatibilist? Craig writes: “I am explicitly a libertarian about freedom of the will, and so there should be no doubt about that. I just deny the so-called Principle of Alternative Possibilities, that the ability to do otherwise in a given situation is a necessary condition of libertarian freedom.” https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/i-a-compatibilist?fbclid=IwAR3_Ot0cwEmKzQoB37vQXdBk0qcUyz23AYfhln4ZmPeZ0fd6LLpJp-dvVwU (Accessed 6-21-2022). Although I do argue that humans occasionally possess alternative possibilities, arguing for the weaker version of libertarian freedom is sufficient.

Although it must be true that if one possesses strong libertarian freedom, then they necessarily possess weak libertarian freedom, some believe that if one possesses weak libertarian freedom, then they must possess strong libertarian freedom. This debate is beyond the scope of my concerns. My focus is simply to show that based upon the definition of libertarian freedom offered, strictly speaking, alternative possibilities are not required (even if they are required in a broad metaphysical sense).

See my argument demonstrating that 1 Corinthians 10:13 implies libertarian freedom in Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, Wipf and Stock, (2020) p. 181.