Compatibilism: What Do You Mean By That?

Recently, my boss at Trinity Theological Seminary, Dr. Braxton Hunter, made a guest appearance on Cameron Bertuzzi’s Capturing Christianity YouTube channel. Hunter offered what he takes to be the greatest argument against Calvinism. Hunter provided an impressive case – basically off the cuff – as to why the Calvinistic view of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) cannot make sense of God’s inspired Word. The gist of Hunter’s case was an appeal to The Book of Romans to exhibit the absurdity of EDD-Calvinism. Consider the Apostle Paul’s words in Romans 1:20.

For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.

Hunter noted that if EDD is true – God determines all things – then God determines idolaters (which includes atheists) to not perceive what should otherwise be “clearly perceived” (and by the way God determined them to be idolaters in the first place). Thus, as I also pointed out in 2015, the atheist has a pretty darn-good excuse. God prevented him/her from grasping reality by determining them to affirm false beliefs (seemingly as judgment for the sins God also determined them to commit). Although this fairly short video should be viewed by all who care about these issues (click here to view), Hunter made one passing comment that raised the ire of some Calvinists. Hunter said,

The Bible is a collection of books that seems to be a story of choice all the way through. Two trees in the midst of the garden, we have a story of choice. "Choose me that you will live, you and your descendants".... "Choose you this day who you will serve. For me and my house will serve the Lord." A story of choice all the way through.

Calvinists will look at that and say "yeah it is choice, of course it's choice," but that's a choice that is determined by God on Calvinism . . .  Some Calvinists speak as though there's a third option between determinism and libertarian freedom and that's compatibilism.  Compatibilism just is determinism. Many times people new to this discussion think that compatibilism is a third option, like it's kind of libertarian  freedom and it's kind of determinism. No, it's determinism. It's all determinism.

Dr. Hunter is attempting to communicate that many Calvinists seem to think that compatibilism is a way to affirm an ability to choose between alternative options in a certain circumstance, and also affirm that God causally determines all things. Hunter is correct to point out that if compatibilism always describes reality (and humans never possess libertarian freedom), then something or someone else determines everything about humanity (all desires, wants, thoughts, beliefs, actions, behaviors, evaluations, and judgments of all people all the time). This even means that something or someone other than you determines exactly how you "guide" your thoughts. Any supposed "alternative option" was simply an illusion if exhaustive divine determination is true. 

This led to a vibrant exchange between Dr. Hunter and a few hard-core compatibilists. Hunter provided clarification but then the topic transitioned to another comment he made that again raised the ire of the same divine determinists.

Paul Manata, who I consider to be a brilliant Calvinist scholar, wrote the following:

"Braxton correctly notes that 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' have to do with whether determinism and free will, or the control condition on moral responsibility, are compossible. Compatibilists say 'yes'; incompatibilists say 'no.' So far, so good. But he strangely concludes from the preceding admission (cf. "therefore") that a Libertarian can be a compatibilist. No. Libertarianism entails incompatibilism, and incompatibilism is, if true, necessarily true; otherwise, necessarily false. So, if you affirm libertarianism, you're affirming incompatibilism, and are thereby committed to saying compatibilism about freedom/the control condition on moral responsibility, is necessarily false."

Stratton Enters the Scene

Although I agree that the thesis of compatibilism, if true, is necessarily true, and, if false, is necessarily false, I do not believe all of Manata's conclusions necessarily follow. This is because 'compatibilism' can mean different things to different people. Indeed, Manata even offered two different manners of understanding compatibilism in his first sentence. Here it is again: "Braxton correctly notes that 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' have to do with whether determinism and free will, *OR* the control condition on moral responsibility, are compossible."

Moreover, Guillaume Bignon, who I consider to be one of the world's leading compatibilists, seems to leave room for libertarians to be compatibilists when he says, "Most libertarians are also incompatibilists."  This seems to imply that some libertarians are also compatibilists. 

I shared my thoughts with Manata and a fantastic conversation ensued on social media (ultimately culminating with an hour long phone call). The rest of this article will attempt to discuss my point of view while also simultaneously attempting to be fair to Manata's position. My hope is that we can ultimately find common ground. 

Before entering into this conversation, the debate over what compatibilism meant all depended on the "and/or." Allow me to explain why I reached that conclusion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), authored by Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates, define compatibilism this way (2019):

“Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.”“Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.”

With this in mind, by “free will,” for example, one might mean that on some specific occasion — where all things are determined by antecedent conditions in this specific circumstance — nothing prevents a person from attaining their greatest desire at that specific moment. If that's the case, then one who believes we occasionally possess libertarian freedom in other circumstances (but not at the moment in question) can also coherently affirm the above thesis as offered in the SEP. There does not seem to be any contradiction in affirming that we occasionally -- but not always -- possess libertarian freedom and also granting this definition of compatibilism as far as I can tell.

McKenna and Coates continue:

“Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.”“Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.”

If a libertarian believes that desert responsibility (in a moral or rational sense) is not compatible with determinism (as I do), then it would be incoherent to affirm this sense of compatibilism that is sometimes offered. Thus, it is not incoherent for a libertarian to grant the former — that some kind of “free will is compatible with determinism,” but reject the sometimes expressed latter thesis by affirming that there is no “compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.”

Interestingly, in his book, Thinking About Free Will, Peter van Inwagen writes the following:

“Whatever you do, do not use ‘compatibilism’ as a name for the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This can only cause confusion. If you must have a name for this thesis, invent a new one” (p. 152).“Whatever you do, do not use ‘compatibilism’ as a name for the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This can only cause confusion. If you must have a name for this thesis, invent a new one” (p. 152).

I agree with van Inwagen. Indeed, I contend that the refusal of many to heed his advice has muddied the waters tremendously. Established scholars disagree on how compatibilism ought to be defined. Guillaume Bignon defines compatibilism exactly how van Inwagen warns against: “Compatibilism is the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility” (Excusing Sinners, p. 7). Carolina Sartorio defines compatibilism as “the thesis that Determinism is compatible with free will” (Do We Have Free Will: A Debate, p. 203). Finally, John Martin Fischer defines compatibilism as the “doctrine that both some central notion of freedom and also . . . moral responsibility are compatible with causal determinism” (Four Views On Free Will, p. 44).

In fact, Manata offered the following in our exchange on social media:

"

is a *technical term* introduced to name a *thesis* about the power or ability required to act in ways for which you may appropriately be held morally responsible, which can be had even if determinism were true."

Even if Manata's understanding of compatibilism should be preferred, the fact remains that there are scores of definitions from which to choose. If only folks would have listened to Peter van Inwagen and invented their own term. Since many ignored his advice, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy reported the following in Arguments for Incompatibilism by Kadri Vihvelin (2017):

“… it is important not to conflate the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism with the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism… It must be acknowledged that a change in definitions has crept into the literature, and many contemporary theorists understand ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’ as claims about moral responsibility (or 'moral freedom' or the freedom that 'grounds' or 'explains' moral responsibility) rather than claims about free will (Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2014. See Vihvelin 2011 for discussion). This entry will not follow that usage.”“… it is important not to conflate the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism with the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism… It must be acknowledged that a change in definitions has crept into the literature, and many contemporary theorists understand ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’ as claims about moral responsibility (or 'moral freedom' or the freedom that 'grounds' or 'explains' moral responsibility) rather than claims about free will (Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2014. See Vihvelin 2011 for discussion). This entry will not follow that usage.”

J.P. Moreland notes the vital difference between freedom and moral responsibility:

". . . most philosophers working in the subdiscipline regarding action theory and agency approach questions of free will by focusing on the sort of control needed to underlie moral responsibility. I agree this is important, but I do not think that this is the conceptual or epistemic starting point for developing a view of agency, especially a libertarian one. The control approach leaves open the question as to why people have a concept of moral responsibility and a belief that they are morally responsible agents in the first place. And the control approach can, and sometimes does, limit free action to moral acts, especially momentous ones. But this is a mistake. The primary places we exercise free agency are in directing our attentive noticings toward various intentional objects and in moving our bodies. As I go through my day, I freely choose to think, see, and notice various things within or around me" (The Naturalness of Belief, p. 232).". . . most philosophers working in the subdiscipline regarding action theory and agency approach questions of free will by focusing on the sort of control needed to underlie moral responsibility. I agree this is important, but I do not think that this is the conceptual or epistemic starting point for developing a view of agency, especially a libertarian one. The control approach leaves open the question as to why people have a concept of moral responsibility and a belief that they are morally responsible agents in the first place. And the control approach can, and sometimes does, limit free action to moral acts, especially momentous ones. But this is a mistake. The primary places we exercise free agency are in directing our attentive noticings toward various intentional objects and in moving our bodies. As I go through my day, I freely choose to think, see, and notice various things within or around me" (The Naturalness of Belief, p. 232).

Indeed, as I explained to Manata during our phone conversation, when I was first informed that I did not possess free will (what I now understand to be "libertarian freedom"), my primary concern was not about moral issues. Rather, I was concerned if I was free to choose Coke over Pepsi, to choose a blue shirt instead of a red shirt, or to make a right turn instead of a left turn on my Sunday drive. Did something or someone else determine these things for me, or were they genuinely up to me? Life seemed completely meaningless if I could not even freely choose the little things. 

With all of this disagreement and confusion I am attempting to purify the previously muddied waters. Thus, I am granting (for the sake of argument) that if one refers to “freedom” as nothing is preventing me from fulfilling my greatest desire (which is also determined by something or someone else) at the moment in question, then compatibilism could be used to explain certain actions (like ordering tacos instead of burritos next Tuesday night). However, I am only saying that if this is the way one describes “freedom” then it is compatible with determinism (by definition). In that sense, I am a libertarian who affirms that this kind of "freedom" is compatible with determinism. In that specific sense, technically speaking, I am a libertarian who affirms the first part of what McKenna and Coates defined as compatibilism. I explained to Manata that it seems to me that Robert Kane affirms something similar:

“Those of us who are libertarians about free will (who believe in a free will that is incompatible with determinism) should, I contend, concede this point to compatibilists: Many freedoms worth wanting are compatible with determinism. What libertarians . . . should insist upon is that there is at least one kind of freedom that is also worth wanting and is not compatible with determinism . . . which I define as: ‘the power to be the ultimate source and sustainer to some degree of one’s own ends or purposes” (Do We Have Free Will?: A Debate).“Those of us who are libertarians about free will (who believe in a free will that is incompatible with determinism) should, I contend, concede this point to compatibilists: Many freedoms worth wanting are compatible with determinism. What libertarians . . . should insist upon is that there is at least one kind of freedom that is also worth wanting and is not compatible with determinism . . . which I define as: ‘the power to be the ultimate source and sustainer to some degree of one’s own ends or purposes” (Do We Have Free Will?: A Debate).

I contend there is a kind of freedom that makes desert responsibility possible and that this kind of freedom is libertarian freedom (not being determined by something or someone else). Thus, this vital kind of freedom is incompatible with determinism by definition. Make no mistake: I am an ardent incompatibilist in this vital sense. After all (as I explained above), if I evaluate all propositions and premises based upon my “greatest desires” of what I want to be true — and these greatest desires determine my ultimate judgments which determine my beliefs — then I have an undercutting defeater to my beliefs that follow from my extremely biased thinking for at least two reasons: 1- Subjective greatest desires provide horrible reasons to think a proposition is objectively true. 2- Subjective greatest desires that are determined by something or someone else (that is either non-rational or who is untrustworthy) are even worse reasons to think a proposition is true. If all things are determined by something other than me (which is what follows from EDD), then I think calling anything “free” is merely a rhetorical euphemism designed to avoid the real issue. If I am determined to fulfill my greatest subjective desire -- which was also determined and not up to me at the moment in question -- then it’s trivially true that nothing prevents me from fulfilling my determined and greatest desire (even though I was prevented from desiring otherwise via antecedent conditions). Big deal.

This so called "freedom" simply means that nothing was determined to stop something else that was determined. 

The Control Condition

On a side note: some compatibilists might respond, “but we have guidance control!” It seems, however, that appealing to “guidance control” doesn’t do anything to get the exhaustive determinist off of any hooks. After all, one’s “controllings” – and the exact way one “guides” their thoughts – are ALSO completely determined by something or someone else if ALL things are determined. So this appeal does not seem to provide the “control condition” sufficient to ground desert responsibility. This is why John DePoe describes humanity as nothing but “passive cogs” on the exhaustive determinist view.

Not only does this “passive cog-ness” oppose the teachings of scripture, it also stands opposed to our direct experience -- that we have the active power to take thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5) before they take us (Col 2:8). Speaking of direct experience, Moreland makes a strong point:

Most of us are quite aware of the different what-it-is-like, the different phenomenological texture in having a passive thought (e.g., when someone is talking to me) and an active thought (one to which I exercise my active power and choose to attend). This difference is self-evident to introspective awareness. And such awarenesses provide nondoxastic, internalist grounds for the proper basicality of one’s belief that one has and can exercise active power. On this basis, I think that active power is epistemically, conceptually, and ontologically foundational and essential for there to be such things as knowledge of, a concept of, and the existence of libertarian acts. And it is on the basis of this account, and knowledge of relevant moral features that we have the concept of moral responsibility (The Naturalness of Belief).

Sure, you might possess passive awareness (big deal), but you do not have active control of what you are aware of on this view. You do not possess the ability or the power to “be more careful” while thinking things through if something or someone else determines all things about your mental life. 

Ultimately, since passive cogs (even passive conscious cogs) do not seem to be the kinds of things worthy of blame (in a desert sense). I contend this is what we should all commit to memory: No possible world exists where God determines me to do X, but I really should have (or ought to have) done other than X. In this sense, compatibilism is false, and necessarily false.  Think about this absurdity. If anything, we should do what an omnipotent deity determines us to do — even if it is rape. If we do otherwise (and do the good we supposedly ought to have done), something seems to have gone terribly wrong as we seem to have become more powerful than God. Moreover, doing other than the rape God determines one to do would lead to the absurd conclusion that if this individual in question were to do otherwise — and not rape (as he ought to do), then he would also miss the mark (sin) when he refrained from the rape God determined him to do. This is the epitome of absurdity. It makes much more sense to reject EDD. With the “ability to do otherwise” in mind, I believe we should not spend so much time focused on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which says “an agent is morally responsible only if the agent had the ability to do otherwise.” I am not opposed to the PAP, but it might be beneficial to instead dwell upon what I refer to as the Principle of Non-Prevention (PNP):

An agent is morally responsible for an action only if nothing prevented the agent from doing otherwise. With the PNP in mind, although both Molinism and Calvinism affirm exhaustive predestination of all things, if Molinism is true, there is nothing that actually exists that prevented Hitler from doing otherwise (that choice was up to Hitler himself). If EDD-Calvinism is true, however, God himself prevented Hitler from doing otherwise (by determining Hitler to commit genocide). That seems to be a significant difference between these competing views (which provides good reason to reject Greg Welty's Bullet Bill tu quoque objection raised against Molinism).

“Unhelpful Truths”

Some have told me that my attempt at purifying these previously muddied waters is unhelpful even if it is coherent. Indeed, Manata himself told me that although “one can ‘rationally affirm’ the sort of stuff you’re doing,” nevertheless, it is still 'unhelpful' because it “muddies the waters." I completely agree that the waters are muddy, but I am the one trying to clean these waters caused by the confusion Peter van Inwagen warned would occur. To mix metaphors, I am simply trying to get everyone on the same page so that we can finally understand each other.

I spend several weeks a year in Utah sharing the gospel with Mormons. If there is anything I've learned from these experiences it is that language is fluid and people use the same term to mean different things all the time. The words 'freedom,' 'gay,' and 'racism' are perfect examples. With that in mind, Philosopher Dr. Adam Lloyd Johnson told me:^<1>> 

“One can say ‘If someone uses the term compatibilism to mean XYZ, I agree XYZ is true and here’s why… However, if someone uses the term compatibilism to mean ABC, I think ABC is false and here’s why…’”“One can say ‘If someone uses the term compatibilism to mean XYZ, I agree XYZ is true and here’s why… However, if someone uses the term compatibilism to mean ABC, I think ABC is false and here’s why…’”

This is simply what I am attempting to do.

Dr. Jim Slagle, author of the fantastic book, The Epistemological Skyhook, emailed me the following:

". . . there's nothing wrong with what you're doing. And the reason why people seem to disagree on what compatibilism means is because there are as many definitions as there are people affirming it. But roughly, yes, it means that free will is compatible with determinism."". . . there's nothing wrong with what you're doing. And the reason why people seem to disagree on what compatibilism means is because there are as many definitions as there are people affirming it. But roughly, yes, it means that free will is compatible with determinism."

Philosopher Dr. Jacobus Erasmus offered the following response to this controversy over compatibilism:

“Ah, the great naming debate. It's perfectly acceptable for various understandings or definitions of "compatibilism" to float around. Usually, a man's definition of "combatibilism" is tightly coupled to his definition of "free will"; hence, since various views of "free will" twirl around society like a leaf in the wind, we should expect "compatibilism" to sprout assorted definitions. What you're doing, then, is expected from someone who thinks for themselves. There's nothing wrong with sprinkling nuances over your definition of the term.”“Ah, the great naming debate. It's perfectly acceptable for various understandings or definitions of "compatibilism" to float around. Usually, a man's definition of "combatibilism" is tightly coupled to his definition of "free will"; hence, since various views of "free will" twirl around society like a leaf in the wind, we should expect "compatibilism" to sprout assorted definitions. What you're doing, then, is expected from someone who thinks for themselves. There's nothing wrong with sprinkling nuances over your definition of the term.”

Dr. Thad Botham, a philosopher at Arizona State University and Notre Dame grad, sent me the following message:

"The more and more scholars use the term 'compatibilism' differently, the more likely the meaning of the term shifts. Best at the outset to define one's terms to avoid confusion. I agree with Kane that there are different types of freedom, where the type most worth wanting (the type necessarily required by being morally responsible, etc.) is correctly characterized by libertarians.""The more and more scholars use the term 'compatibilism' differently, the more likely the meaning of the term shifts. Best at the outset to define one's terms to avoid confusion. I agree with Kane that there are different types of freedom, where the type most worth wanting (the type necessarily required by being morally responsible, etc.) is correctly characterized by libertarians."

Luke van Horn, another philosopher who graduated from Notre Dame, wrote and expressed the following:

“I don't think there's anything wrong with what you are doing, and that there has been a lot of confusion in the literature because of what you're talking about. It's a good thing to make these distinctions and clarify definitions. I agree that libertarians can affirm ‘compatibilism’ about certain types of ‘free will’ and ‘responsibility.’ This is why we need to be careful to define our terms, as you are doing. And I don't see why it wouldn't be helpful to make these clarifications, point out areas of agreement, and sharpen our focus on what we are really disagreeing about.”“I don't think there's anything wrong with what you are doing, and that there has been a lot of confusion in the literature because of what you're talking about. It's a good thing to make these distinctions and clarify definitions. I agree that libertarians can affirm ‘compatibilism’ about certain types of ‘free will’ and ‘responsibility.’ This is why we need to be careful to define our terms, as you are doing. And I don't see why it wouldn't be helpful to make these clarifications, point out areas of agreement, and sharpen our focus on what we are really disagreeing about.”

He added:

“It would be helpful to begin from a standard definition of compatibilism as a thesis about free will and determinism, and only from there point out how clarifying key terms like ‘freedom’ can lead to interesting points of agreement where a libertarian can be a compatibilist.”“It would be helpful to begin from a standard definition of compatibilism as a thesis about free will and determinism, and only from there point out how clarifying key terms like ‘freedom’ can lead to interesting points of agreement where a libertarian can be a compatibilist.”

Danny Xia (from the YouTube channel PhilTalk) is a philosophy grad student who spends much time studying these issues. He sent me the following message:

“All in all, I think a lot of the perceived disagreement about free will is terminological, and thus an un-substantive debate. So . . . this is a good thing in my opinion that you’re seeking clarity as to recognize whether some of these disagreements are substantive or not.”“All in all, I think a lot of the perceived disagreement about free will is terminological, and thus an un-substantive debate. So . . . this is a good thing in my opinion that you’re seeking clarity as to recognize whether some of these disagreements are substantive or not.”

Finally, Dr. Matt Flummer from The Free Will Show (one of my favorite podcasts) shared the following with me:

“I think getting clear on terminology is definitely helpful. You're right that there's no 'official' definitions in philosophy which is again why you should always clearly define your terms. Once the terms are defined, then we can do conceptual engineering.”“I think getting clear on terminology is definitely helpful. You're right that there's no 'official' definitions in philosophy which is again why you should always clearly define your terms. Once the terms are defined, then we can do conceptual engineering.”

Of course, one is free to disagree with these philosophers, but we should all agree that it is vital to find out “what one means by that” before engaging a conversation exemplifying the art of talking past one another.

Conclusion

Some Calvinists may have unwittingly muddied the waters by ignoring Peter van Inwagen's words of wisdom. In fact, it seems that some (not all) continually strive to keep the water muddy. The danger is that if one comes to affirm the not-so-controversial definition of compatibilism -- that some kinds of 'freedom' are compatible with determinism -- then the controversial definition -- that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism -- gets smuggled in below the radar (completely undetected by the layman).

There is an official label associated with this technique. It is known as the Motte and Bailey fallacy, which is a form of argument and an informal fallacy where an arguer conflates two positions that share similarities (in this case, freedom and moral responsibility). The first is modest and easy to defend (the "motte") and the second is quite controversial (the "bailey"). The arguer advances the controversial position (in this case, the "bailey" is that moral responsibility is compatible with EDD), but when challenged, they insist that they are just talking about the more modest position (in this case, the modest "motte" is that some kind of freedoms are compatible with EDD). 

Bignon himself seems to have unintentionally made this move in an interview with Eli Ayala (12:21 -- 13:04): “Compatibilism is just the thesis that free will and determinism are compatible… it does not commit one to affirm libertarian freedom or determinism.”This definition provided on YouTube is much different and less controversial than the definition he offers on page 7 of his book (referenced above). 

I hope to see Calvinists strive for clarity moving forward. I am definitely not always perfect at this either, so where much grace has been given, much grace will be provided. 

Bottom line: I have defended Braxton Hunter’s statement, that it is "possible to be a libertarian and a compatibilist" (at least in one sense) by demonstrating that there is no logical contradiction necessarily found in this proposition. If one is going to ignore the above advice of Peter van Inwagen -- and cause confusion -- then one should expect careful thinkers to respond: “Well, if that’s the definition of compatibilism, then I am compatibilist in one sense and an incompatibilist in another sense.” It all depends upon what one means by that. 

Thus, the question, "What do you mean by that?" should always be asked to the one who claims to affirm compatibilism. 

With all of that said, Paul Manata has convinced me that since there is so much confusion abounding in these conversations today, although it is logically coherent for one to say "I'm a libertarian and a compatibilist," it is probably not helpful. Instead, moving forward (including the forthcoming revised and updated second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, andMere Molinism), although I agree with Kane that some kinds of freedoms are compatible with determinism, I will proudly label myself as an official incompatibilist. That is to say, I believe the kind of freedom that provides the control condition for moral and rational desert responsibility is libertarian freedom. And libertarian freedom, by definition, is not compatible with causal determinism. 

With that said, to strive for clarity moving forward, I agree with Peter van Inwagen and encourage my friends who are seeking to argue that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism to "invent a new term" -- and use it.^<2>> 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

*To view the corresponding video to this article click here.

Notes

<1> The list of philosophers supporting my endeavor were aware of the context of this article and granted me permission to quote them. I am thankful to be surrounded by a great cloud of really smart witnesses. 

<2> The term semi-compatibilism has been offered as the view that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, while making no assertions about the truth of determinism or free will. I have no problem with this term (although I have argued the view is false). The problem is that so many who seem to affirm the concept of semi-compatibilism simply refer to it as "compatibilism." These folks are just as guilty of water-muddying as those who refused to take van Inwagen's advice and "invent a new term" in the first place.