Could the Believer Have Done Otherwise? A Response to Colton Carlson on 1 Corinthians 10:13

Introduction This written debate between Dr. Tim Stratton and Mr.Colton Carlson centers on the meaning of Paul’s promise in 1 Corinthians 10:13: that God always provides a “way of escape” when believers face temptation. At stake is whether this passage affirms categorical ability (C-Ability)—the genuine, libertarian power to do otherwise in the actual world—or whether it can be sufficiently explained by weaker notions of ability (W-Ability) consistent with compatibilism. Carlson challenges Stratton’s reading, arguing that the verse does not entail libertarian free will (LFW) and that Stratton equivocates on the meaning of “genuine alternatives.” Stratton, in turn, defends the necessity of agent-causal freedom, contending that without ultimate sourcehood, Christian responsibility, rationality, and theological knowledge collapse into determinism or randomness. What follows is an extended dialogue—sometimes technical, often pointed—that presses the foundational question: Could the believer really have done otherwise when facing temptation? This is PART 3 of their long discussion. Find PART 1 and PART 2 here.

CC: //Thanks for the continued ordering of issues; it’s organized and neat. Helpful. I will be clear, however. I can only keep up these long-winded rounds of exchange for at least a couple more volleys.//

TIM: I appreciate your willingness to continue the exchange, Colton. Written dialogue does tend to be lengthy, especially when we’re working through detailed philosophical distinctions. But I’ve been aiming for clarity and concision while making sure to respond to each of your points. If my replies are long, it’s only because your objections raise multiple issues that need to be addressed. My goal has consistently been to focus us on the foundational issue at the heart of our disagreement.

CC: //It would be MUCH better if we could sit, face-to-face, and have a virtual video discussing this issue.//

TIM: We’ve had face-to-face discussions before, and I’ve found that the written format actually works much better. Writing gives us both the chance to think carefully, avoid talking past each other, and express our arguments clearly without the pressure of an immediate response. This way, we can be more precise and ensure the conversation stays focused.

CC: //It can even be on your channel; it can even be recorded. It doesn’t even need to be a “debate”, just a discussion. If you are devoting this much time to responding to me already in written format, why not just discuss it on video?//

TIM: Several reasons: (i) writing actually saves time for me. (ii) Written dialogue is much more careful and clear (or at least it should be). (iii) In past interactions I’ve seen things that undermined my trust with you, and that makes me cautious about entering a live discussion with you. Written dialogue helps maintain clarity and accountability. (iv) Before I’d consider a video discussion, I’d want to see this written exchange reach a point where we’re both engaging rigorously and productively. Why would I waste time on video when I could be engaging with actual scholars who publish in the academic literature? No, Colton—we will continue this discussion here. And for what it’s worth, this format provides excellent content for my website as well.

CC: //1. You say that my entailment vs compatibility strategy misses the point. But how? I never said that you said (or claimed) that Paul is giving us a metaphysical treatise.//

TIM: The record above shows that you did say that you did not think Paul was teaching metaphysics in this passage. I reminded you that Paul did teach a theological truth which carries metaphysical implications. Paul teaches a theological truth, and theological truths necessarily carry metaphysical implications. To deny that is simply to avoid the consequences of Paul’s words rather than engaging them.

CC: //It may be a theological truth, which then “carry metaphysical implications”. But that is precisely my point: you want to claim that Paul is legitimately teaching that the believer has a genuine, C-Ability at t. Later, under point #6, you say: “I’ve argued that Paul’s words do entail a metaphysical truth about human ability”, and of course you mean C-Ability and nothing else. It is my contention that this is false.//

TIM: Your contention is a mere assertion that faces the defeater of my argument. That's an irrational contention unless you can show that this theological truth Paul promises does not have metaphysical implications. By the way: theology is metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality, and God is ultimate and necessary reality and all claims about Him, what He has done, what He has created, etc. is both theology and metaphysics. So, your claim that "Paul isn't teaching metaphysics" is nothing but a desperate attempt to avoid libertarian freedom and the categorical ability Paul describes.

CC: // Therefore, how do I miss the point?//

TIM: See above. Theology is metaphysics.

CC: //You claim the verse entails C-Ability; I don’t think it does.//

TIM: False. Replace the word "claim" with "argue and conclude," then you will be right. But you have not argued or concluded; you merely claim, but claims are not defeaters. Here you go:

Argument from 1 Cor 10:13 to C-Ability

1. Paul promises that when Christians face temptation, “God is faithful, and He will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear, but with the temptation He will also provide a way of escape, so that you may be able (dunasthe) to endure it” (1 Cor 10:13).

2. If Paul’s promise is true, then at the actual moment of temptation (t), the Christian is able either (i) to give in to temptation or (ii) to take the way of escape.

3. To say that a Christian is able at t (dunasthe) entails that in the actual world, nothing external to the agent—whether natural laws, antecedent causes, or divine determination—prevents the Christian from exercising either option.

4. If nothing external prevents the Christian from exercising either option, then both options are genuinely open to the Christian in the categorical sense (not merely conditionally or dispositionally).

5. To have both options genuinely open in the actual world at t just is to have categorical ability (C-Ability) at t.

6. Therefore, Christians possess C-Ability at the moment of temptation (t), as promised by Paul in 1 Cor 10:13.

Here’s another argument:

Argument Against W-Ability in 1 Cor 10:13

1. Definition of W-Ability: On Colton’s account, W-Ability = (i) the agent has the natural ability (skills, dispositions, know-how) to A, and (ii) no decisive obstacles prevent the exercise of that ability.

2. W-Ability, however, does not guarantee that both alternatives are genuinely open at the actual moment t; it only says that if the agent were to try A (given their bundle of dispositions and circumstances), then they would succeed.

3. This makes W-Ability compatible with the claim: “At t, the agent could not have done otherwise, but had the right bundle of dispositions such that if they were to have chosen otherwise, they would have succeeded.”

4. Such a conditional does not match Paul’s pastoral promise. Paul explicitly grounds assurance in the believer’s present-tense ability (dunasthe) at t—that is, what the Christian is actually able to do in the real world right now.

5. If W-Ability were sufficient, Paul’s promise would reduce to: “When you face temptation, you have the right dispositions such that in some possible world, you could have resisted—but in the actual world, you may still be necessitated to fall.”

6. This reading empties the verse of comfort and turns it into false hope: the believer is told they “are able” when in fact, under W-Ability, they may not be able in the actual situation at t.

7. Therefore, W-Ability fails to capture Paul’s assurance in 1 Cor 10:13. Only C-Ability secures the categorical, actual-world freedom Paul promises believers at the moment of temptation.

CC://My strategy is to grant that C-Ability is compatible with it, but also that it is compatible with W-Ability. Importantly, I don’t think the verse entails either C-Ability or W-Ability, even if it is compatible with both.//

TIM: And I have *argued* that C-Ability is not just compatible but the only coherent way to understand Paul’s assurance in this passage. W-Ability collapses into either determinism or randomness, which fails to provide the categorical assurance Paul offers. I’ll unpack this further below.

CC: //Now, you critique the W-Ability by saying Paul isn’t saying “It’s metaphysically possible you might resist in some other possible world where antecedent conditions happen to be different.” I never said otherwise! The W-Ability doesn’t appeal to possible worlds where the antecedent conditions happen to be different. Go back and check; that’s not what the W-Ability entails.//

TIM

:

The W-Ability refers to (i) the agent having the intrinsic ability (narrow ability) and (ii) the external conditions being in place—i.e., the opportunity and absence of obstacles—so that an action can actually be carried out in the world. According to this view:

“S has what it takes to X . . . and has the means and opportunity, and nothing external stands in her way.”

But here’s the problem: if the agent is not the true source of her actions, then the claim that she “has what it takes” is hollow. On W-Ability, her actions are still fixed by external factors—whether deterministic laws of nature or random fluctuations (not her rationality). In such a case, she doesn’t genuinely

do otherwise

; things merely

happen through her

. Therefore, for W-Ability to genuinely ground rational responsibility, two conditions must be met: (a) the world must allow indeterminism, and (b) the agent herself must be the originating source of at least some of her thoughts and actions. But once you add (b), you’ve already crossed into what I mean by C-Ability: the categorical power of the agent to choose among alternatives in the actual world.

A Deductive Case Against W-Ability as Sufficient

1. Definition of W-Ability: On W-Ability, an agent has the ability to X if (a) she possesses the relevant internal dispositions and capacities, and (b) the external opportunity and absence of obstacles are in place so that she can carry out the action in the actual world.

2. Dependence on External Factors: If an agent is not the true originating source of her actions, then her actions are determined or fixed by external factors (e.g., deterministic laws of nature or random fluctuations), and thus fall outside her rational authorship.

3. Loss of Genuine Alternatives: If an agent’s actions are determined or fixed by external factors, then she cannot genuinely do otherwise in the actual world; events merely happen to her and through her rather than originatingfrom her.

4. Rational Responsibility Requires Sourcehood: Genuine rational responsibility requires that the agent herself be the originating source of at least some of her thoughts and actions, and thus able to deliberate and choose between genuine alternatives. (See the Free-Thinking Argument and Deity of Deception Argument)

5. Implication: Therefore, for W-Ability to ground rational responsibility, it must include sourcehood—that is, the agent must be the originating source of some of her actions.

6. Identity with C-Ability: But once W-Ability includes sourcehood, it has become what I mean by C-Ability: the categorical power of the agent to choose among genuine alternatives in the actual world.

7. Final Conclusion: Therefore, W-Ability by itself cannot ground rational responsibility. Either it collapses into empty event-causation without freedom, or it smuggles in sourcehood and thus becomes C-Ability.

Quick defense of each premise

P1 — Definition of W-Ability.

This is the standard dispositional/opportunity analysis: internal competence + external opportunity/no obstacles. It sets the target I’m evaluating without smuggling in C-Ability.

P2 — Dependence on external factors.

If the agent is

not

the originating source, then what fixes action are factors outside the agent’s rational authorship—either necessitating causes (laws + prior states) or sub-personal indeterministic events. That’s a true dichotomy relative to “not sourcehood.”

P3 — Loss of genuine alternatives.

Once external factors fix what happens at

t

, the agent lacks robust alternatives at

t

; any “could” reduces to a counterfactual conditional (“would have if antecedents were different”), not a categorical “can now.”

P4 — Rational responsibility requires sourcehood.

Epistemic/moral responsibility for action or belief requires that the agent settles between live options

for reasons the agent authors

. If reasons are produced/selected by external necessitation or randomness, authorship (and so responsibility) is undercut. (This is exactly what my Free-Thinking Argument and Deity-of-Deception Argument show.)

P5 — Implication for W-Ability.

So, if W-Ability is to ground responsibility, it must

include

sourcehood, not just dispositions + opportunity.

P6 — Collapse into C-Ability.

Once you add sourcehood plus live alternatives at

t

, you have the categorical power to do otherwise in the actual world—i.e., C-Ability.

C7 — Result.

Therefore, W-Ability

by itself

cannot ground rational responsibility: without sourcehood it’s mere event-causation; with sourcehood it just is C-Ability.

Pauline Implication

When Paul assures us that God provides a way of escape such that we may endure (1 Cor 10:13), he is pointing to an actual capacity the believer has at the moment of temptation. But if this capacity reduces to W-Ability—mere dispositions plus opportunity—then when a Christian sins, that “capacity” was never actually available. They could not have done otherwise, and Paul’s promise rings hollow. By contrast, if the believer truly has the capacity to resist and take the way of escape, then even when they fail, it remains true that they could have resisted. That is precisely what I mean by C-Ability.

CC: //2. You don’t think I can reject premise (1). You think it is definitional. But I deny that just because one exercises “an ability to choose between genuine alternative possibilities” that automatically, definitionally, entails LFW. Why would it?//

TIM: Colton, if an agent is the originating source of his mental and physical actions, then he possesses libertarian freedom by definition. To be the source means that nothing external—whether deterministic conditions or impersonal forces—fixes his choice. And if nothing deterministically prevents the agent from choosing otherwise, then he truly

can

choose otherwise. If you resist calling that “libertarian freedom,” that’s fine, but the substance remains the same. A rose by any other name smells just as sweet. If you affirm that humans are the source of some of their thoughts and actions, and that nothing deterministically blocks us from acting otherwise in those moments, then you have affirmed exactly what I mean by libertarian freedom—even if you prefer to avoid that label.

CC: //You never claimed that access to the genuine alternative possibility is in fact C-Ability. That’s not in your premise, is it?//

TIM: Colton, your objection shows some confusion about how the argument is framed. Look carefully at the structure:

1. If Christians possess the opportunity at time t to exercise an ability to choose among a range of alternative options each compatible with their regenerated state, then Christians possess libertarian freedom.

2. At the moment of temptation (t), Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between either (i) giving into temptation or (ii) taking the way of escape God promises to provide.

3. Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom.

Notice that premise (1) already defines this opportunity in terms of categorical ability (C-Ability). To make it clearer, we could reframe it explicitly:

1. If Christians possess the opportunity at time t to exercise an ability to choose among genuine alternative possibilities, then Christians possess C-Ability.

2. At the moment of temptation (t), Christians possess this opportunity (either to give in or resist).

3. Therefore, Christians possess C-Ability.

So, the conclusion follows directly. Unless you want to deny that Paul’s promise entails such an opportunity at all, the presence of C-Ability is unavoidable.

CC: //Now, having access to C-Ability (assuming we have free will), would entail LFW because we would (i) have free will, (ii) the free will is necessarily indetermined, and in virtue of (i) and (ii) we get (iii) incompatibilism.//

TIM: That depends on what you mean by

“incompatibilism.”

I’m a libertarian who also affirms that some of my actions are determined but still “free” in a compatibilistic sense. This is why I keep steering the conversation toward the central issue:

are

any

of my thoughts and actions not determined by something or someone else?

And if so, am I the first mover in those situations with the power to actualize one of at least two alternative possibilities? But unless you clearly define what you mean by

“compatibilism,”

I can’t tell what you’re affirming or denying. Some compatibilists mean only that we act freely when doing what we most want—even if those wants are determined by something or someone else. Others reduce it to moral responsibility, while still others focus on epistemic responsibility. Without clarity, we’ll just be talking past each other. For my part, I affirm compatibilist freedom in some cases. But libertarian freedom requires more: at least some of my thoughts and actions must originate by me as the first mover, not in deterministic laws or random events. That’s the core question—do agents ever have the categorical power to do otherwise in the actual world? So if by “incompatibilism” you mean a blanket denial that all compatibilist accounts are possible, that’s not exactly how I’d frame it. My point is simply this: unless some agent-causal, undetermined choices are real, Paul’s assurance in 1 Cor 10:13 collapses. Without that,

“the way of escape”

is either determined or random, but never truly up to the believer—making his promise hollow rather than hopeful.

CC: //That’s LFW. But your premise says none of that. It just jumps from “an ability to choose between genuine alternative possibilities” to LFW. //

TIM: Colton, just as the Kalam argument does not contain the word “God” in its premises or even its conclusion, yet rationally entails God’s existence, my premise works in a similar manner. The first premise is framed as an “if-conditional”:

If

Christians have the ability to choose between genuine alternatives at t,

then

a certain conclusion follows. Now, why does this entail libertarian freedom? Because to have genuine alternatives is to face a live possibility of doing otherwise in the actual world—something determinism rules out. And if the choice truly originates in the agent rather than in external factors, then by definition, that is libertarian freedom. So, the wording doesn’t need to say “LFW” explicitly. The entailment is in the logic, not the label—just as with Kalam and God.

CC: //Unless you are equivocating on “genuine” to entail C-Ability (which obviously you do), the consequent doesn’t follow definitionally. Why? Because surely the leeway compatibilist will also say (those advocating for W-Ability, for example) that they have a genuine alternative possibility, and obviously that doesn’t require indeterminism.//

TIM: Colton,

the key issue isn’t simply what compatibilists

say

about “genuine alternatives,” but whether their account actually secures them.

As I’ve demonstrated (as opposed to merely “said”), W-Ability collapses into either determinism or randomness. In neither case does the agent have the categorical power to actualize one of at least two alternatives as the true originating source. If determinism holds, the choice is fixed by prior causes. If randomness holds, the “choice” is just the product of sub-personal, mindless, chance events. Neither gives the agent genuine authorship. That’s why the mere claim of “genuine alternatives” under W-Ability fails—it lacks the grounding in sourcehood that C-Ability provides.

CC: //So let’s be less vague in your premises: you should say this: Premise (*1) “If Christians have the to choose between genuine alternative possibilities at t (consistent with their regenerate nature), then they have libertarian freedom.” Access to alternative possibilities does not automatically entail LFW; PAP doesn’t automatically entail LFW. You must qualify the kind of access to the alternative possibility to be necessarily incompatibilist.//

TIM: Colton, the issue here isn’t about merely having “access” to possible outcomes as things that might

happen

to us.

The real question is whether the agent has the power to

make

one alternative actual.

On my view, libertarian freedom requires agent causation: the agent herself, as an image-of-God bearer, can break the causal chain and bring about an outcome. By contrast, if everything is the result of deterministic laws or random fluctuations, then the agent is reduced to a passive cog—things simply happen

to

her and

through

her rather than

from

her. That’s not genuine access to alternatives; it’s just being carried along by forces outside one’s control. This is why I keep pressing the distinction. To say “we have genuine alternatives” without sourcehood is hollow, because no actual power of choice lies with the agent. As C.S. Lewis put it,

“Reasoning doesn’t happen to us; we do it.”

CC: //You say I am equivocating, but it’s not my premise. It’s yours! You specifically say: "You’ve swapped in your weaker notion of “ability” (W-Ability: dispositions + opportunity), and then insisted my inference doesn’t hold. But that’s just moving the goalposts. How? Because W-Ability? Where’s the argument that it’s weaker? No where. Where is the argument that “genuine” must automatically mean “C-Ability”? Definitely not in the premises! So, yes, your inference doesn’t hold. It’s not moving the goalposts; it’s goading you to be less vague in your premises. //

TIM: Colton, the issue isn’t that I’m being vague, but that you’re trying to flatten out a crucial distinction. You’re right that I draw the line between W-Ability and C-Ability, but I’ve also argued why W-Ability is

weaker

and insufficient to ground rational responsibility. It’s not a bare assertion—it’s tied to the logic of sourcehood. Here’s the argument in short form:

1. W-Ability is defined as dispositions + opportunity + absence of obstacles.

2. But if an agent’s “ability” is wholly fixed by external factors (determinism or randomness), then she does not genuinely originate her actions.

3. Without origination, she lacks the categorical power to actualize one alternative over another in the actual world.

4. Thus, W-Ability collapses into event-causation without responsibility unless you smuggle in sourcehood.

But here’s the deal: once you add sourcehood, you’ve crossed into C-Ability. That’s why “genuine” can’t mean W-Ability. On its own, W-Ability only gives you the illusion of alternatives. For alternatives to be genuine in the sense Paul describes—an actual “way of escape” open to the believer—they must be accessible in a way that is up to the agent, not merely happening through her. That accessibility just is what I mean by C-Ability. So, it’s not moving the goalposts. It’s clarifying the stakes: either you allow for sourcehood (and thus C-Ability), or you reduce to determinism/randomness with no real “genuine” alternatives at all.

CC: //Last, honestly, I think premise (2) is false just as much.//

TIM: That's definitely the one you

should

have tried to reject, since you were already committed to rejecting the deductive conclusion. It is, after all, the controversial premise—the real crux of the debate. So although you’re late to the party, better late than never. But simply denying premise (2) isn’t enough; you’ll need to provide an argument that Christians at the moment of temptation

do not

genuinely face a choice between giving in and taking the way of escape Paul promises. Without such an argument, rejecting (2) is just assertion.

CC: //So even if you change the necessary changes I suggest for premise (1), and subsequently change them in premise (2), then I would deny premise (2); there is no independent or contrastive reason for why Christians have the C-Ability when responding to temptation. //

TIM: Sure there is, Colton! I've already explained why above, but let me do it again for you.

1. Paul’s Explicit Teaching (1 Cor 10:13): Paul doesn’t just say “temptation happens.” He explicitly assures believers that God Himself is faithful to provide “the way of escape so that you may endure.” That’s not just opportunity in the W-Ability sense—it’s a divine promise that a genuine alternative to sin is available in the actual moment of temptation. To deny this is to gut the force of Paul’s encouragement to the Corinthians.

2. Theological Implication: If believers could not genuinely do otherwise in the moment, then Paul’s words are empty. Saying “there is a way of escape” would mean nothing if, metaphysically, the believer cannot take it. But if Paul’s promise is to hold, it must imply that Christians truly have the categorical power (C-Ability) to either fall or endure.

3. Contrastive Reasoning: You said there’s no “independent or contrastive reason” to affirm C-Ability here. But the contrast is right in the verse itself: (i) falling into temptation vs. (ii) taking the way of escape. That’s the contrast Paul places before the believer. And for this contrast to be meaningful, both options must be genuinely available at t. Otherwise, the “contrast” reduces to mere appearance.

4. Philosophical Consistency: W-Ability alone can’t sustain this promise. If the believer “has what it takes” but is locked in by determinism or randomness, then they lack real authorship over which path is actualized. Only sourcehood—the believer as first mover—makes sense of Paul’s assurance.

Thus, the independent reason to affirm C-Ability in this context is both (a) the explicit theological promise of 1 Cor 10:13 and (b) the logical necessity of sourcehood if Paul’s assurance is to mean anything. Without C-Ability, Paul’s words collapse into false pastoral rhetoric with no metaphysical grounding.

CC: //3. You bring up determinism, yet again. Why? Determinism, let’s say, is flamingly false. Why bring up "But under determinism (the very context compatibilism exists to defend), those dispositions and opportunities are themselves necessitated by antecedent conditions (even in a world in which not all things are determined)." //

TIM: First, I often bring up determinism because I want to be thorough for our readers—it’s essential to show how different views collapse under scrutiny. Second, you yourself have claimed to be a “thoroughgoing compatibilist,” which (at least in standard usage) means you’re committed to the idea that some kind of freedom or moral responsibility can exist

even if determinism is true

. So if I expose what’s not compatible with determinism, I’m engaging directly with the framework you’ve identified with. That said, you’re right that we could set

determinism

aside. But then the problem doesn’t vanish—it simply reappears under the name of

determination

. Even in an indeterministic world, you can still be determined by antecedent conditions, or by non-determined but non-rational causes (e.g., random quantum events). Either way, your deliberation and action are not

up to you

in the sense of originating

from

your agency. And if your dispositions and opportunities are themselves determined in this way, then “W-Ability” collapses into either determinism or randomness. That’s why I press the point: even if determinism is false,

determination still threatens genuine agency

. Being determined by brute randomness is no better for rational responsibility than being determined by causal necessity or a deity of deception. Either way, you’re not the source and the actual source is epistemically untrustworthy. The upshot is simple: unless the agent herself is the first mover—capable of originating a choice among real alternatives—there’s no meaningful “way of escape” in Paul’s sense (1 Cor 10:13).Top of FormBottom of Form

CC: //Irrelevant. I am assuming indeterminism. Please, stop bringing up determinism. It does nothing for you here. //

TIM: Fine, let's just talk about determination in a world where indeterminism is true. That does everything for me here.

CC: //But then you say "Even stipulating indeterminism doesn’t save you here. If the bundle of dispositions is fixed by non-determined quantum events (or something similar) outside the agent’s control, then the “choice” at t is still either determined by mindless antecedents or moved by randomness. Neither grounds sourcehood—the Christian is still a caused cause." But the bundle of dispositions isn’t fixed by non-determined quantum events outside of the agent’s control. It’s chosen for the agent’s reasons. I gave a definition of Vihvelin’s agent-causation (albeit an inchoate one). Deal with that. //

TIM: What does that mean, Colton? Do “reasons” actually choose things, or do

agents who can reason

choose? Reasons can guide and inform, but they don’t select; only an agent has the power to actualize one of several alternatives. That’s precisely what Paul means when he exhorts believers to “take thoughts captive” (2 Cor 10:5) rather than “be taken captive” by bad thinking (Col 2:8). Those are two genuine possibilities, and the agent is the one who must decide. You can actually choose to be more careful while engaged in deliberation. You can choose to take thoughts captive, or not; you can choose to examine your biases, or not; you can choose to examine your emotions and if you are letting your feelings get in the way of the facts, or not. These things are up to you as the source of your thinking. If they aren’t, then the actual source is untrustworthy which leads to your epistemic collapse. If, as you say, the agent is not determined to reason one way or another, then the agent herself is the source of her reasoning. When she chooses to deliberate carefully or carelessly, and then chooses to act on that reasoning, we have agent-causation in action—the agent as first mover initiating a causal chain not determined by anything prior. That

just is

libertarian free-thinking. So if you mean that the Christian chooses for her own reasons, then you’ve already affirmed the very thing you’re resisting: the agent’s categorical power to do otherwise in the actual world. In other words, welcome to libertarian freedom.

CC: //4. The Coherence Problem. You think you have refuted… something, but what? You cannot start the debate with saying “Without ultimate sourcehood, your “agent causation” collapses into either necessitated causes or random chance. Slapping the label “agent” on it doesn’t change the metaphysics. It’s just event-causation in disguise." That’s just impossibility to the contrary, or a transcendental argument. It pushes the conversation nowhere. How does a compatibilist-dispositional view of indeterminism entail random chance when it is the agent choosing, intentionally, for their own reasons? Why does the sourcehood have to be “ultimate”?//

TIM: If you are not the ultimate source of your theological beliefs, then something or someone else is. But if those sources are antecedent conditions outside of your control—whether deterministic laws, random chance, or blind causal chains—then you inherit their epistemic status. And if those sources are untrustworthy, then you have undercutting defeaters for your theological beliefs, rendering them unjustified. Without justification, you do not possess theological knowledge. But here’s the crucial point: you sure assume that you

do

possess theological knowledge. You assume your conclusions about Scripture are not just lucky guesses or blind causal outputs, but are the result of careful reasoning for which you are rationally responsible. That assumption presupposes that you are the source of your reasoning, not merely a conduit for whatever chain of causes led up to your current beliefs. In other words, unless you are the ultimate source of your reasoning, your reasoning collapses into epistemic luck—which is not knowledge! This is why “ultimate” sourcehood matters. If your reasons are themselves necessitated by something external, then they are not

yours

in the relevant sense. And if they arise by mere randomness, then they are arbitrary. Either way, they fail to ground rational responsibility. By contrast, if you as the agent have the categorical power to weigh reasons and choose how to deliberate—to take thoughts captive or be taken captive—then you secure epistemic responsibility. So the issue is not just “slapping the label agent” on top of event-causation. It’s about whether the agent truly initiates reasoning and action, or whether she is merely the endpoint of an impersonal chain of antecedent links. If the latter, then theological knowledge itself becomes impossible. But if the former, then you’ve admitted the very thing you’re trying to resist: libertarian sourcehood.

CC: //I can dish the same rhetoric back: “Slapping on “random choice” doesn’t change the metaphysics.”//

TIM: I invite you to do so. But here’s the crucial difference: “slapping on ‘random choice’” really does change the metaphysics, because a random belief or action is not the same as a rational belief or action. If my belief or action is the result of sheer randomness, then I am not its source; the cause lies in impersonal chance. Such randomness can’t ground rational responsibility any more than a coin flip can ground knowledge. By contrast, when I, as an agent, deliberate, weigh reasons, and choose,

I

am the source

of the belief or action. Reasons may guide, but they don’t cause outcomes apart from

my

agency. So if you equate agent-causal choosing with randomness, you’ve erased the very distinction that makes rational responsibility possible. Without agent-causation, everything collapses into either determinism (necessitated outcomes I couldn’t help) or indeterminism (random outcomes I couldn’t help). Neither grants me authorship of my reasoning or actions. That’s why the notion of “random choice” is a category error when applied to libertarian freedom. Randomness is blind causation without ownership. Agent-causation, by contrast, is

personal authorship

: the agent initiating a causal chain that isn’t determined by anything prior and isn’t left up to chance. It’s

up to me

. That difference makes all the difference.

CC: // Next, you criticize event-causation? Event-causation and agent-causation are not mutually exclusive. In fact, Kane’s view literally requires both! So if you are a fan of Kane’s ultimate sourcehood, then it’s peculiar to me why forsake the event-causal piece.//

TIM: I never said event-causation and agent-causation are “mutually exclusive.” Of course I affirm that event-causation takes place. My point has always been this:

if agent-causation is false

(and never occurs), then all we’re left with is event-causation, and that reduces human choice to either necessitated causal chains or randomness. Neither grounds rational responsibility. That’s not a straw man; that’s the heart of my critique. You mention Kane, and I’m happy to clarify: Kane’s model explicitly combines event-causation and agent-causation, but it’s precisely the

agent-causal component

that does the heavy lifting in preserving ultimate sourcehood. Event-causation alone doesn’t get you responsibility—it’s the agent’s power to break causal chains and act as first-mover that makes sense of “genuine alternatives.” Without that element, Kane’s view collapses into the very determinism or indeterminism I’ve critiqued. So, yes, event-causation is real. But if you deny agent-causation, then you’ve undercut the very possibility of theological knowledge, rational deliberation, and Pauline responsibility. That’s why I press the issue: the debate is not whether event-causation exists, but whether agents themselves ever truly

cause

in the categorical sense.

 CC: //Next, you say “Calling them “your own” is question-begging.” No. It’s your argument. Argue and support the premises with independent and contrastive reasons without simply asserting back that “Without ultimate or genuine sourcehood, that doesn’t work.” Great… that’s what you are trying to prove, so prove it. //

TIM: I’ve already done so, Colton. Let me refresh your memory. I’ve argued repeatedly that without the agent being the genuine originating source, her actions collapse into one of two categories:

1. Deterministic necessitation – where every choice is fixed by antecedent conditions stretching back beyond the agent’s control. In this case, the “ability” to do otherwise is only hypothetical. She could do otherwise if the past or laws were different, but since those are beyond her control, she cannot actually do otherwise.

2. Random chance – where the outcome is settled by indeterministic events (like quantum fluctuations) not directed by the agent. Here, the agent isn’t in control either; she’s just the stage upon which events play out.

Neither of these options supplies rational sourcehood. They explain what

happens to

an agent, not what an agent

does as a source.

That’s why calling such outcomes “your own” simply relabels event-causation without solving the problem. By contrast,

agent-causation

affirms that the agent herself—rather than antecedent causes or blind chance—is the first mover in at least some of her thoughts and actions. She can deliberate and actualize one of multiple genuine alternatives. That’s not question-begging; that’s distinguishing what

must be true

if rational deliberation and responsibility are real. So the argument stands: unless you smuggle in ultimate sourcehood, your position reduces to determinism or randomness, neither of which grounds rational responsibility or theological knowledge. That’s why I press the point.

CC: //Lastly, you say a telling statement that somehow you think it telling for me and not you: "And when you shrug, 'Granted, this isn’t incompatibilist agent-causation, but so what?'—that’s the whole issue! If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have freedom. You’ve conceded the game, the playoffs, and the championship trophy." I say the kind of agent-causation is not incompatibilist. Right, because I reject incompatibilism. Then you say “that’s the whole issue!” I laughed out loud… actually. Right! That is the whole issue! It’s your argument! Shoulder your burden without just asserting “If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have freedom.” But notice, to all the readers, that is exactly what you. If you bring ultimate sourcehood to the table, and then interpret the verse accordingly, then no other competing view other than incompatibilism will work here—obviously. Gee, I wonder why.//

TIM: Colton, you keep saying “that’s the whole issue” as if I’m unaware of it. Of course it’s the whole issue—that’s why I’ve been driving the point home. If ultimate sourcehood is necessary for freedom, then rejecting it just

is

rejecting freedom in the robust, libertarian sense. You laugh, but you’re essentially conceding that you’ve traded away genuine alternative possibilities for something that may still be called “freedom” but is nothing more than compatibilist re-labeling.

Here’s the problem:

if the agent isn’t the ultimate source of at least some of her thoughts and actions, then she’s just a conduit of prior untrustworthy causes—whether deterministic chains or random fluctuations.

Calling that “her choice” doesn’t change the metaphysics; it’s still event-causation all the way down. And if that’s all you’ve got, then you’ve abandoned the very thing Scripture seems to affirm in passages like 1 Cor 10:13: that believers

really could have done otherwise.

You challenge me to “shoulder the burden,” but I’ve done so repeatedly (over and over again) by showing that without agent-causation—without the power to break causal chains—responsibility, rationality, and moral accountability collapse.

Your system either yields determinism (where the agent is a puppet of antecedent conditions) or randomness (where the agent is a puppet of chance).

Neither gives you a responsible

agent

at all. That’s not an empty assertion—it’s the rational consequence of tracing your view to its logical end. So yes, I unapologetically affirm that without ultimate sourcehood, there is no genuine freedom. That’s not stacking the deck—that’s showing where the definitions, metaphysics, and implications logically lead. If you want to deny that, then you’re free to do so—but you’re also left with a version of “freedom” that can’t sustain knowledge, responsibility, or Pauline exhortation. In short: you can redefine the terms, but at the end of the day, you’ve conceded the game, the playoffs, and the entire championship trophy.

Conclusion

This is what it all comes down to: if the agent herself is not the ultimate source of at least some of her thoughts, beliefs, and actions, then responsibility and rationality collapse. Event-causation, however sophisticated, will always reduce to determinism or randomness unless grounded in agent-causation. And without sourcehood, “freedom” is nothing more than a re-labeled illusion—it looks like freedom on the surface, but underneath, it is just the movement of prior causes. By contrast, libertarian freedom secures what Scripture affirms and what rational accountability requires: that agents can deliberate, reason, and choose between genuine alternatives in the actual world. This is why 1 Cor 10:13 is not hollow rhetoric but a genuine promise—that believers really

could

take the way of escape. That truth can only stand if we affirm C-Ability: the categorical power of the agent as first mover. So yes, ultimate sourcehood is the heart of the matter. Without it, the foundation of knowledge, moral responsibility, and Christian exhortation collapses. With it, we safeguard both rationality and responsibility under God—not to mention theological knowledge! And that’s why I will continue to press this point—not because it’s convenient, but because it’s necessary. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton