Do Future-Tensed Truths Exist? Why Molinism (Still) Makes the Most Sense

Introduction: The Future in Question

Can God know the future? Not just what could or might happen—or even what’s likely to happen—but what will happen?

This question cuts to the heart of theology and metaphysics. It impacts how we think about God’s sovereignty, omniscience, providence, and trustworthiness. It’s also a central dividing line between Calvinism, Molinism, and Open Theism.

In a recent article critiquing certain forms of Open Theism, I argued that a God who doesn’t know future-tensed truths—truths about what will happen—is not maximally great. In response, several thoughtful friends, including Warren McGrew, noted that not all Open Theists deny God's exhaustive epistemic knowledge of the future. Some affirm that God knows all possibilities and even probabilities, while denying that future events are ‘settled’—though they don’t necessarily mean ‘causally determined’ by that term. Others deny that any future-tensed truths exist at all.

This follow-up article asks a foundational question: Do future-tensed truths exist? If not, what does that imply about God’s knowledge? And if they do, can any model besides Molinism affirm both libertarian freedom and God’s perfect foreknowledge?

1. What Are Future-Tensed Truths?

Future-tensed truths are propositions about what will happen, even if those events haven’t yet occurred:

• “Tomorrow, Tim will eat tacos.”

• “In 2040, Tim's niece will become a doctor.”

• "Tim will choose to take the way of escape (1 Cor 10:13) when tempted to sin next week."

  
  

If any of these statements is true right now, then the future includes propositions with definite truth-values—and God either knows them or He doesn’t.

The Molinist affirms such truths and holds that God knows them via middle knowledge:

His awareness of what any free creature would freely do in any given situation. The Calvinist affirms God knows the future because He determines it. Many Open Theists, by contrast, deny that future-tensed truths exist at all. But if future-tensed truths don’t exist, the implications for God’s knowledge and trustworthiness are serious.

2. Two Deductive Arguments: Clarifying the Real Issue

Let’s begin with the conditional argument that sparked this conversation:

1. If God is omniscient, then God knows all truths. 2. If future-tensed propositions are true or false now, then they are part of the total set of truths. 3. ∴ If future-tensed propositions are true or false now, then God knows truths about the future.

This argument doesn’t assume that future-tensed propositions are currently true or false—it simply clarifies what follows if they are. That’s what makes it helpful: it diagnoses the real disagreement. Anyone who affirms classical omniscience and the truth-aptness of future-tensed propositions must affirm divine foreknowledge.

Open Theists typically deny premise (2)’s antecedent. That is, they claim that propositions about the future—especially those involving libertarian freedom—are not true or false yet. Thus, God doesn’t know such truths, not due to any limitation in His omniscience, but because those truths don’t yet exist to be known.

That’s a coherent position—but it comes at a steep price. And that’s where a second argument comes in:

4. All future-tensed propositions are true or false now. 5. ∴ Future-tensed propositions are part of the total set of truths. (from 2 and 4) 6. ∴ God knows truths about the future. (from 1 and 5)

This second argument does do metaphysical lifting: it asserts (4), thereby denying the core Open Theist claim. So the first argument is diagnostic, while the second is demonstrative.

And both are vital.

Why? Because rejecting future-tensed truths leads to deep logical and theological problems. For instance, to say “God does not know that X will occur” is itself a present-tense statement about a future event. But that presupposes that X will occur is already a proposition with a definite truth-value—otherwise, the sentence isn’t meaningfully deniable or affirmable.

In short, denying the existence of future-tensed truths often leads to treating them as if they do exist. Moreover, Scripture affirms that God knows what will happen—not just what might (cf. Isa. 46:10; John 13:19; 2 Pet. 3:17). His promises are trustworthy precisely because His knowledge is complete—not approximate.

3. The Abductive Argument: What Best Explains the Evidence?

Even if one rejects the deductive argument, an abductive case—an inference to the best explanation—still stands:

• Why can God predict future events with such precision, including freely chosen ones (e.g., Peter’s denial, Judas’ betrayal)?

• Why does the biblical narrative depict God’s plan unfolding exactly as intended, even amidst rebellion?

• Why should we trust God’s promises if He could or might be surprised by tomorrow?

  
  

Molinism offers the best explanation: God knows what any free creature would do in any situation. He orchestrates history toward the greatest possible outcome—not by coercing, but by creating the actual world in which the relevant counterfactuals are true.

This is why the Doctor Strange analogy is helpful. Strange didn’t determine the Avengers’ actions in Infinity War or Endgame—he merely foresaw the only path to victory. That’s middle knowledge in a nutshell.

But strip away that knowledge, and Strange becomes a gambler. A lucky guesser. Not a guide. Even if we grant the Open Theist claim that the future is ontologically ‘open,’ we must still ask: Are there truths now about what would or will happen? That’s the domain of counterfactuals and future-tensed propositions—and that’s where Molinism shines.

4. Two Arguments for CCFs and Divine Omniscience

Critics often challenge Molinism by asking, “Why think there are truths about what would or will happen?”<1>

Let’s respond with both a deductive and abductive case.

Deductive Argument: The Modal-Epistemic Case for the Knowability of CCFs

1. If God is omniscient, then God knows all truths.

2. If counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) are true, then they are among all truths.

3. If libertarian freedom is possible, then some CCFs are true.

4. Libertarian freedom is possible.

5. ∴ Some CCFs are true.

6. ∴ God knows these CCFs.

   
   

Clarification:

• Premise (1) reflects the standard definition of omniscience.

• Premise (2) is definitional: if CCFs are true, God knows them.

• Premise (3) affirms that in any circumstance C, it is true or false that person P would freely choose A.

• Premise (4) is supported by moral responsibility, rational deliberation, and the biblical witness.

Thus, if libertarian freedom is even possible, God’s omniscience entails middle knowledge.

Abductive Argument: The Best Explanation of Biblical Counterfactuals

1. Scripture contains examples where God declares what would happen under hypothetical conditions (1 Sam. 23:11–12; Matt. 11:21–23; 2 Kgs 13:19).

2. These are not vague projections or deterministic pronouncements—they are specific, counterfactual claims.

3. The best explanation is that God possesses middle knowledge.

4. Competing views, like Open Theism, typically reduce such knowledge to probabilistic expectations or divine guesswork.

5. Thus, middle knowledge best explains the biblical data and divine omniscience.

   
   

5. Open Theism and “Dynamic Omniscience”

Some Open Theists deny future-tensed truths altogether. Others, like Warren McGrew, affirm what he calls Dynamic Omniscience, which includes:

• God knows all actual and possible facts.

• Time is dynamic and tensed.

The future is not “settled.”

Depending on how ‘settled’ is defined, this version of Dynamic Omniscience may appear compatible with Mere Molinism. After all, I too affirm that the future is not “settled” in a deterministic sense, and that the future could be otherwise—yet God simply knows it won’t be. Indeed, a Mere Molinist can affirm that the future is open in the sense that absolutely nothing is deterministically preventing it from being otherwise.

But the key question remains: Does God know all future-tensed truths? If the answer is ‘no’—because no such truths exist—then this view departs from the classical understanding of omniscience. If the answer is ‘yes,’ then middle knowledge seems difficult to avoid, since such truths would include counterfactuals involving libertarian decisions—truths about what agents would freely do in specific circumstances.

Still, if one rejects middle knowledge, the view risks reducing omniscience to mere probabilism or hopeful anticipation.

If there is no fact of the matter about whether I’ll take the way of escape when tempted to sin tomorrow, then God cannot know it—He can only guess or causally determine it. And if He causally determines it, libertarian freedom and moral responsibility is gone. If He guesses, omniscience is compromised and God might be wrong.

6. Why Molinism Still Wins

Mere Molinism affirms what other views struggle to reconcile:

• Libertarian freedom: Human beings are not causally determined or random in their moral or rational decisions.

• Exhaustive foreknowledge: God knows all that will happen—including the free decisions of creatures.

  
  

Calvinism affirms foreknowledge at the cost of freedom. Process Theism affirms freedom but abandons omniscience. Open Theism (in most forms) attempts to preserve freedom but fails to secure God’s exhaustive knowledge of what will happen.

Molinism doesn’t merely split the difference. It provides a robust, biblically grounded framework that honors both divine sovereignty and human responsibility.

Conclusion: Truth, Freedom, and a Trustworthy God

The existence of future-tensed truths isn’t a mere metaphysical puzzle. It’s about whether the God we worship is trustworthy.

• Can He declare the end from the beginning (Isa. 46:10)?

• Can He know what will happen—or only what might?

• Can He guide history to the best feasible freedom-permitting endgame without robbing us of libertarian freedom?

If God is omniscient, then He knows future-tensed truths. If He knows them without determining them, then Molinism best explains how. If future-tensed truths don’t exist, then God is guessing—or worse, not truly omniscient.

So we face a trilemma: either . . .

(1) God determines all future events (Calvinism), sacrificing human libertarian freedom;

(2) God doesn’t know all future-tensed truths (Open Theism), compromising omniscience and making God a guesser; or

(3) God knows all future-tensed truths—including free decisions—via middle knowledge (Molinism), preserving divine omniscience, divine sovereignty, and human libertarian freedom.

I look forward to ongoing dialogue with my good friend Warren McGrew and his colleagues who affirm his view of Dynamic Omniscience. Perhaps we’re closer in some respects than it first appears. But until Open Theism can account for future-tensed truths and divine omniscience, Molinism remains the most biblically, theologically, and philosophically satisfying model on offer.

That’s where the debate now lies—and that’s the conversation I hope to continue.<2>

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

To be continued: In a future post, we’ll examine whether denying future-tensed truths undermines divine aseity and explore how truthmaker theory applies to counterfactuals of freedom.

Notes

<1> Philosophers like Robert Adams, Thomas Flint, William Lane Craig, and Dean Zimmerman have all defended the coherence of counterfactuals of freedom. See Adams (1977), “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly; Flint (1998), Divine Providence; Craig (1991), The Only Wise God.

<2>Preempting Objections from Open Theists

Objection: “You’re begging the question by assuming future-tensed propositions have current truth-values.”

Response: Not so. The blog offers both deductive and abductive arguments that derive this conclusion rather than assume it. The point is that if future-tensed propositions are even possibly true now, then God knows them. The challenge is for the Open Theist to show why it is impossible for such propositions to be true now, especially given biblical and metaphysical evidence. That's a steep hill to climb!

Objection: “Even if libertarian freedom is real, that doesn’t make CCFs true now.”

Response: True, that’s the very question at stake. But our modal-epistemic argument shows that if libertarian freedom entails that there is something that would happen under a given scenario, then there’s a truth about it. That truth either exists or it doesn’t. If it does, God knows it.

Objection: “The Doctor Strange analogy proves too much—it assumes a fixed or deterministic framework.”

Response: Not at all. The Doctor Strange analogy is explicitly libertarian: Strange doesn’t determine anyone’s mental or physical actions, he foreknows them in a complex web of possibilities. That’s precisely the Molinist model—not determinism, but sovereign orchestration through counterfactual and foreknowledge.

Objection: “You ignore A-theory of time and assume a B-theory framework.”

Response: False. Molinism is neutral between A- and B-theory. I am an A-theorist and I know other Molinists who are B-theorists (see Michael Jones — aka, “Inspiring Philosophy”). The claim is about God’s epistemic access to future truths—not metaphysical commitment to eternalism or the fixity of time.

Objection: “You reduce Open Theism to divine guesswork.”

Response: I’ve explicitly acknowledged more sophisticated models like McGrew’s. But the challenge remains: if God does not know what will happen, but only what might, then He’s not omniscient in the classical sense. Knowing all that could happen is not the same as knowing all that will happen.

Objection: “You’ve constructed a false trilemma.”

Response: My trilemma summarizes the dominant options available when it comes to reconciling divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom. If another coherent option exists, I welcome it. But to date, no non-Molinist model has offered an equally strong solution.

Objection:“The claim ‘God does not know that X will occur’ is not a future-tensed proposition—it’s just a denial of divine omniscience.”

Response: That’s a semantic dodge. The moment one asserts, “God will not know that X will occur,” they are making a claim about what God’s knowledge will or won’t be at some future time. That’s a textbook example of a future-tensed proposition. If that claim is true now, then at least one future-tensed proposition does have a present truth-value—namely, “God will not know that X.” But that’s precisely what Open Theism in its strong form denies: that any future-tensed propositions have current truth-values. Thus, the denial of future-tensed truths collapses into a self-undermining position.

This is logically akin to saying, “There are no English sentences longer than five words.” But that sentence is in English and has more than five words. It refutes itself just by being uttered.

In the same way, the claim “God will not know what Tim will do tomorrow” assumes the very kind of future-tensed truth it sets out to deny. This is why such objections don’t just fail—they implode.