Does 1 Corinthians 10:13 Teach Libertarian Freedom? My Conversation with Colton Carlson

Introduction: A High-Stakes Exchange on Freedom and Scripture

Few biblical texts strike as deeply at the heart of human responsibility as Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 10:13:

“No temptation has overtaken you except what is common to mankind. And God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, he will also provide a way out so that you can endure it.”

For centuries, theologians and philosophers have debated what this verse implies about human freedom. Does Paul mean that Christians genuinely have the power to resist sin in the moment of temptation? Or is the “ability” he promises more limited—something constrained by God’s prior determination or by our strongest desires? This is not just an abstract puzzle. If Paul’s words are true, then Scripture grounds real hope in the believer’s struggle against sin. But if determinism is correct, then Paul’s promise collapses into empty comfort—or worse, deception. Recently, I had a lively exchange in the YouTube comments section after a discussion with Dr. Leighton Flowers on the FreeThinking Ministries channel. Colton Carlson, a layman who has interacted with me in the past (see

here

,

here

,

here

,

and

here

) raised objections to my argument that 1 Corinthians 10:13 entails libertarian freedom. What followed was a lengthy back-and-forth probing the logic, exegesis, and philosophy beneath this text. For the sake of clarity, I’ve preserved our dialogue here, with Colton’s words in

blue

and mine in

black

. The debate ranges from the meaning of “able” (

dunamai

) to the coherence of so-called “compatibilist-indeterminism,” to whether Scripture itself rules out exhaustive divine determinism (EDD). This is no casual exchange. At stake is nothing less than whether Paul’s inspired words preserve the believer’s genuine ability to resist sin—or whether they collapse into determinism, randomness, or incoherence. So grab a cup of coffee (or three) and join us for the ride.

Carlson’s Opening:

I really don't think that the 1 Cor 10:13 debate has anything to do with whether or not "if determinism is true, this verse doesn't make sense; so therefore, libertarian free will is probably the best contextual stance we can have on the text." Yet, this was a good bulk of the argumentation here in this video.

Instead, I think it's about whether there are good reasons to think that libertarian freedom is entailed by the verse. What if one holds to compatibilist-indeterminism? That would give these proponents of the 1 Cor 10:13 argument for libertarian freedom the falsity of determinism, but it would also deny them libertarian freedom by definition.

I literally have no idea why almost everyone comes to this verse with the idea that "Well, if determinism is true..." How about, "Well, what if indeterminism is true, and libertarian free will still isn't entailed by the verse?" That is the interesting point. Forsake the Calvinist/Molinist/non-Calvinist debate: the debate has to do with incompatibilism, or compatibilism. Full stop.

Side Note:

 Since Colton never defines ‘compatibilist-indeterminism,’ I will define it here in precise philosophical terms before engaging his argument. This way, we can proceed without ambiguity.

Academic Context & Definition

Compatibilism is a well-established philosophical position asserting that some kind of free will (not libertarian freedom) and/or moral responsibility can coexist with determinism.

An event is determined if antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the event.

Determinism is the view that antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all events--including all the mental and physical actions of every human all the time. I often clarify with the word "exhaustive" to highlight the fact that we are not talking about some things or most things -- but that ALL things, event, and outcomes are necessitated via prior conditions.

In other words, the compatibilist affirms the thesis that a person can still act "freely" (not in a libertarian sense) and be morally responsible for their mental and physical actions even though the entirety of their mental states and physical movements are completely causally determined by something or someone else. (See,

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

).

Let's continue defining important terms.

Indeterminism posits that not all events—including human actions and choices—are causally determined; instead, alternative outcomes are truly possible in the actual world. This does not mean that nothing can be determined in an indeterministic world. It simply means that not everything is determined via antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate all outcomes.

From these, we can synthesize the term “compatibilist-indeterminism”, which—or so we can define it for clarity—means:

A position that affirms some kind of free will is possible even in an indeterministic setting, but still denies the need for—theorizes without—the libertarian notion of agent-causation (i.e., the agent as uncaused first-mover).

This is akin to the idea which argues that indeterminism, while true, does not in itself guarantee libertarian-style freedom. So, as we proceed, keep the following definition in mind: 

“Compatibilist-indeterminism,” as we'll use the term, refers to the position that (a) determinism is false—i.e., not all events and outcomes are causally determined—and (b) yet moral responsibility and free will do not require the agent to be an uncaused first-mover in the libertarian sense. The agent’s choice may still be the result of prior states or causes, even if those states are not fully deterministic.

Some might suggest that what matters for freedom is not whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, but whether an agent’s behavior is appropriately “reasons-responsive”—that is, whether their actions trace back to reasons in the right kind of causal history. But this move doesn’t solve the problem; it only pushes it back a step. If determinism is true, then the agent’s reasons themselves are wholly the product of antecedent conditions—conditions that are either (i) mindless and non-rational (like the blind laws of physics), or (ii) divinely imposed in a way that guarantees even false theological and metaphysical beliefs. In either case, the “reasons” you respond to are not trustworthy sources of rational knowledge. They are necessitated outputs of forces that don’t care about truth or, in the case of divine determinism, do care that you affirm false beliefs about reality. That creates undercutting defeaters against every conclusion—including the belief that you are “reasons-responsive” at all.

Indeterminism by itself fares no better. If undetermined sub-personal events—like quantum fluctuations—enter the causal chain, they are just as mindless and non-rational as deterministic antecedents like physics and chemistry. They cannot ground genuine rational agency, since they contribute nothing that can track truth. If your “reasons” are decided for you by random noise rather than by you, then responsibility is undermined just as surely as under determinism.

Random events can break causal chains, but they cannot ground agency. A randomizer is not an agent.

This is why mere appeals to “reasons-responsiveness” are insufficient. Unless the agent himself is the first mover—the one who actively settles which reasons to endorse and act upon—his so-called reasons are either imposed (by necessity) or imposed (by chance). Only sourcehood avoids both horns. Only when the believer, as an active agent, actively chooses which alternative live possibility becomes actual, can we say he is genuinely responsible (rationally or morally). Without this, Paul’s assurance in 1 Corinthians 10:13 collapses into either hollow determinism or meaningless randomness.

In short: without libertarian sourcehood, Paul’s assurance reduces either to necessitation or to randomness—both of which rob the text of its pastoral and theological force.

With our terms clarified, consider my first response to Colton.

Stratton 

Colton, I think you may have misunderstood the structure of my argument from 1 Corinthians 10:13. The case for libertarian freedom here doesn’t start with, “If determinism is true, this verse makes no sense.” That’s a secondary application showing why EDD-Calvinism contradicts Paul.

1. If Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose among a range of options each compatible with their regenerated nature at a given moment, then Christians possess libertarian freedom.

2. At the moment of temptation, Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between giving into temptation or taking the way of escape God promises to provide.

3. Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom.

Determinism comes up afterward only to show that it directly conflicts with (2) and the final conclusion. You ask:

//What if one holds to compatibilist-indeterminism? That would give these proponents of the 1 Cor 10:13 argument for libertarian freedom the falsity of determinism, but it would also deny them libertarian freedom by definition.//

Great! At least we can all finally agree that determinism is unbiblical—that’s a good place to start. Now the question is: which indeterministic view makes the most sense? An agent possesses libertarian freedom if he is the first mover and nothing that actually exists or obtains prior to the choice is sufficient to causally necessitate the choice (or deterministically prevents the agent from doing otherwise). When Paul encourages Christians with the knowledge that they actually have the power to resist and avoid sin—so that they do not have to sin—it sure sounds like more than the kind of impersonal and mindless indeterminism we might find in the quantum realm.

This is indeterminism plus active agent-causation in an indeterministic setting.

That’s exactly what I mean by libertarian freedom. You said,

//I literally have no idea why almost everyone comes to this verse with the idea that “Well, if determinism is true...”//

Fortunately, that wasn’t my argument. I begin with a deductive syllogism from the text and then show how divine determinism is defeated by its conclusion. You ask:

//How about, “Well, what if indeterminism is true, and libertarian free will still isn’t entailed by the verse?” That is the interesting point.//

If compatibilist-indeterminism denies agent-causation, then the “indeterminism” is merely at the level of subpersonal or external events.

Those events may be undetermined in themselves, but they still leave the agent’s choice caused by prior sufficient random conditions.

In that case, the indeterminism is irrelevant to moral and rational responsibility and cannot ground Paul’s assurance in Scripture. Worse yet, if such indeterministic factors are random and non-rational, then they undermine theological knowledge—

because your theological beliefs along with all of your mental and physical actions would be traceable to random, mindless events that know nothing about theological truth and don't care if you possess theological knowledge).

That’s clearly not what Paul is describing. He grounds moral responsibility in the believer’s genuine power to take the way of escape (1 Cor 10:13) , and to take thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5), not in luck or happenstance. You exclaimed:

//Forsake the Calvinist/Molinist/non-Calvinist debate: the debate has to do with incompatibilism, or compatibilism. Full stop.//

That's simply false (it’s my argument and I know what it’s about). The debate is ultimately about determinism—and what is and is not compatible with determinism. Full stop.

I argue that rational responsibility and 1 Cor 10:13 are not compatible with determinism.

Thus, rational responsibility and Scripture are incompatible with determinism. So, if one affirms determinism, they hold an irrational view and oppose God’s inspired Word. That's when determinism becomes an idol (that's a scary place to be).

Bottom line:

the question remains—when Paul says “you are able,” does he mean genuinely able in the moment to do otherwise—such that neither outcome is necessitated by prior sufficient conditions? If yes, libertarian freedom follows. If no, Paul’s words become a false and empty comfort. Pastoral counseling should never be deceptive, and Scripture never is.

Carlson

I think you misunderstood; I never said that my comment was geared toward your specific argument for 1 Cor 10:13. That said, and as it stands, the vast majority of the video was specifically against a deterministic reading of the verse, and *because this interpretation doesn't work*, this gives, presumably, ancillary evidence towards a libertarian interpretation (or as you said, an application). That is my point.

And my further point is that the debate shouldn't be structured around "determinism vs libertarian freedom", but rather compatibilism vs incompatibilism. I never mentioned your argument in my comment, so you responding to me as if I did seems odd.

You said,

//Great! At least we can all finally agree that determinism is unbiblical—that’s a good place to start. Now the question is: which indeterministic view makes the most sense?//

Nothing in my comment said that I agree that determinism is false, or unbiblical. In fact, nothing in my comment suggests that I either accept or deny determinism. The point is what if determinism is false, not that it actually is false.

You said,

//An agent possesses libertarian freedom if he is the first mover and nothing that actually exists or obtains prior to the choice is sufficient to causally necessitate the choice (or deterministically prevents the agent from doing otherwise). When Paul encourages Christians with the knowledge that they actually have the power to resist and avoid sin—so that they do not have to sin—it sure sounds like more than the kind of impersonal indeterminism we might find in the quantum realm. This is indeterminism plus active agent-causation in an indeterministic setting. That’s exactly what I mean by libertarian freedom.//

Okay, so indeterminsitic agent-causation paired with ultimate sourcehood. Why does agent-causation have to necessarily be paired with ultimate sourcehood (i.e., an agent being the first-mover). Not sure why impersonal indeterminism is brought in the picture, because surely compatibilist-indeterminism does not entail some impersonal indeterminism in virtue of being compatibilist. Further, I am not sure why "indeterminism plus active agent-causation in an indeterministic setting" must entail libertarian freedom. Also not sure how that is even extrapolated from the verse specifically concerning ability (however construed).

You said,

//Fortunately, that wasn’t my argument. I begin with a deductive syllogism from the text and then show how divine determinism is defeated by its conclusion.//

Again, I wasn't discussing your specific argument. Still, isn't determinism only defeated if a categorical ability is entailed by the verse? What about a dispositional ability? Seems like a dispositional ability is clearly compatible with the text, even granting determinism is false. But if a dispositional ability is compatible with the text, than libertarian freedom cannot be entailed by the text.

You said,

//If compatibilist-indeterminism denies agent-causation, then the “indeterminism” is merely at the level of subpersonal or external events. Those events may be undetermined in themselves, but they still leave the agent’s choice caused by prior sufficient random conditions. In that case, the indeterminism is irrelevant to moral and rational responsibility and cannot ground Paul’s assurance.//

Most compatibilists (regardless of whether determinismism is true) uphold some version of agent-causation (Nelkin 2011; Sartorio 2016; McKenna 2013), so I don't see how this follows. Clearly, then compatibilist-indeterministic may help themselves to the same resources. A compatibilist-indeterminist stance can ground the exact assurance the Apostle is discussing; it just doesn't entail the necessity that the free will at issue is indeterministic.

You said,

//Worse yet, if such indeterministic factors are random and non-rational, then they undermine theological knowledge—because your beliefs and actions would be traceable to random, mindless events that know nothing about theological truth and don't care if you possess theological knowledge). That’s clearly not what Paul is describing. He grounds moral responsibility in the believer’s genuine power to take the way of escape (1 Cor 10:13) , and to take thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5), not in luck or happenstance.//

None of the random stuff follows, as I said above. God could exist, so there is a person. Agent-causation could exist for humans as well, it just doesn't require indeterminism to be true. We can then say indeterminism is in fact true, and that the free will that exists also doesn't necessarily have to be indeterministic; therefore, compatibilist-indeterminism. If true, libertarian freedom is false.

You said,

//That's simply false (it’s my argument and I know what it’s about). The debate is ultimately about determinism—and what is and is not compatible with determinism. Full stop. I argue that rational responsibility and 1 Cor 10:13 are not compatible with determinism. Thus, rational responsibility and Scripture are incompatible with determinism.//

But divine determinism isn't equivalent to Calvinism? And libertarian freedom is not equivalent to Molinism? So, it is true that the 1 Cor 10:13 debate has nothing to do with Calvinism or Molinism. Again, your argument has nothing to do with the 1 Cor 10:13 verse entailing libertarian freedom. You just provide the deductive syllogism. That's fine. But so what? The debate may be about determinism being true or false, but it's primarily about incompatibilism and compatibilism. But I can grant something further: the debate is about libertarian free will (incompatibilism) and compatibilism.

You said,

//So, if one affirms determinism, they hold an irrational view and oppose God’s inspired Word. That's when determinism becomes an idol (that's a scary place to be). //

Wouldn't this implication only work if libertarian freedom is entailed by the verse? If it isn't then none of that matters. So, again, we are back to whether libertarian freedom is entailed by the verse, or if compatibilist-indeterminism is compatible with the verse.

You said,

//Bottom line: the question remains—when Paul says “you are able,” does he mean genuinely able in the moment to do otherwise—such that neither outcome is necessitated by prior sufficient conditions? If yes, libertarian freedom follows. If no, Paul’s words become a false and empty comfort. Pastoral counseling should never be deceptive, and Scripture never is.//

I think this is a false dilemma, though. You haven't shown that the "you are able" piece must necessarily be understood as a metaphysical categorical ability to do (or choose, or think) otherwise. That's just shoved in the verse. I can grant that "you are able" as Paul instructed. But what sense of ability? Not sure, for Paul doesn't say! And if we hold to compatibilist-indeterminism, let's say, it gives believers the options (because indeterminism is true), but libertarian freedom, then, wouldn't be entailed by the verse. So, in this case, Paul's words wouldn't be false, nor an empty comfort; pastoral counseling wouldn't be deceptive, nor Scripture; yet, 1 Cor 10:13 wouldn't entail libertarian freedom.

Stratton

Let me briefly press in on a few points, Colton:

Your “compatibilist-indeterminism” is under-specified.

At the moment of temptation, are the believer’s antecedent states (desires, psychology, providential setup) sufficient to necessitate the outcome or not? If yes, then the Christian who sins could not have done otherwise — the “escape” wasn’t categorically available, contradicting Paul’s assurance in The Bible. If no, then antecedents leave both options live, which is precisely the libertarian condition: genuine sourcehood and leeway. Either way, the middle collapses back into determinism or into LFW. You suggest Paul might mean only a dispositional (choosing based upon one’s necessitated greatest desires) or conditional ability (God could have determined you differently). But this doesn’t square with the text.

Paul promises:

(i) No temptation beyond what believers are able to bear. (ii) God always provides a way of escape to the follower of Christ. (iii) Christ followers may endure it. A merely conditional reading — “you could if your strongest desire were different” (or if God determined you to do otherwise) — makes God’s promise hollow in every case where the believer sins.

For Paul’s comfort to hold universally, the ability must be categorical: the believer really can take the escape in the moment of temptation.

Regarding Agent-Causation: sure, compatibilists do sometimes speak of “agent-causation,” but usually in a thin, so-called "reasons-responsive" sense they claim is compatible with determinism (which I have written much about). That’s not what I am talking about. Paul’s assurance requires robust sourcehood: the agent as the first mover (and thinker), not merely a conduit of antecedent conditions. Without that, “taking the escape” is not genuinely within the believer’s power. This is why, on determinism, I refer to the person as a “passive cog” since they are always subject to other powers. You asked:

//why does agent-causation have to necessarily be paired with ultimate sourcehood?//

Here’s why.

If the agent is not the ultimate source, then their causal role is merely derivative — it’s the unfolding of prior sufficient conditions.

But derivative causation does not ground the responsibility Paul assumes in 1 Cor 10:13. Paul’s promise is that you are able — you can resist. That makes no sense unless the believer is the genuine initiator of the resisting act. If the antecedents outside the agent fully determine which “choice” the agent will make, then the “ability” reduces to the agent being a conduit of prior conditions. That is precisely what sourcehood is meant to block. Without ultimate sourcehood, the ability to take the escape is illusory. That’s why, as Moreland and I discussed in our paper, impersonal indeterminism (say, in the quantum realm) is insufficient. Indeterminism only helps if paired with robust agent-causation — the believer as first mover, able to actively choose between live alternatives. This is what I mean by libertarian freedom, and this is why Paul’s words cannot be captured by compatibilist-indeterminism. You write:

//Agent-causation could exist for humans as well, it just doesn’t require indeterminism to be true. We can then say indeterminism is true, and free will that exists doesn’t necessarily have to be indeterministic; therefore compatibilist-indeterminism.//

But what does “agent-causation” even mean if the so-called agent is himself nothing more than a caused cause? As Moreland and I argued in our paper, that is just event-causation wearing an “agent” mask. If the agent’s role is wholly derivative, then he is not the first thinker or mover, and he cannot be the genuine origin of resisting temptation.

To avoid randomness, you need the agent as the active settler of alternatives.

To avoid determinism, those alternatives must not be necessitated by prior sufficient conditions. Without both indeterminism and ultimate sourcehood, the “agent” is either a passive conduit (determinism) or the subject of sub-personal and mindless randomness. Neither option grounds the robust ability Paul promises. So when I speak of agent-causation, I mean the agent as a true first cause — the thinker and mover who actively settles between alternatives and chooses to actualize one of the alternative possibilities. Anything less fails to ground the kind of assurance Paul offers in 1 Cor 10:13.

Bottom Line:

The debate really is about determinism: whether the believer’s options are necessitated by prior sufficient conditions or not. Paul’s words make no sense unless determinism is false and the believer is categorically able to do otherwise (even when he doesn’t). So the question remains: when Paul says “you are able,” does he mean genuinely able in the moment to sin or not sin? If yes, libertarian freedom follows. If no, the text reduces to an empty comfort — something Scripture never gives. P.S. One more thing on Compatibilist-Indeterminism: You’ve suggested that “compatibilist-indeterminism” could account for Paul’s words in 1 Cor 10:13.

But when tested against the text, the option dissolves: If antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the outcome, then the believer who sins never truly had the escape available.

Paul’s universal promise (“no temptation,” “always provides,” “you are able”) is broken right where it matters most. If antecedent conditions are not sufficient to necessitate the outcome, then the believer really does face two live alternatives at the moment of temptation. That is precisely the libertarian condition: robust leeway plus the agent’s causal role as first mover.

So, “compatibilist-indeterminism” is not a stable third way.

It collapses back into either determinism (necessitation) or libertarian freedom (leeway). Only the latter preserves Paul’s assurance without turning it into empty comfort and deceit.

Carlson

Tim, you said,

//...this is why Paul’s words cannot be captured by compatibilist-indeterminism.//

Why not? You haven't shown why not. If determinism is truly the issue, then fine. Indeterminism is true. That doesn't mean LFW automatically is true.

You said,

//But what does “agent-causation” even mean if the so-called agent is himself nothing more than a caused cause? As Moreland and I argued in our paper, that is just event-causation wearing an “agent” mask. If the agent’s role is wholly derivative, then he is not the first thinker or mover, and he cannot be the genuine origin of resisting temptation.//

Once again, what if indeterminism is true? So a caused cause means nothing here.

This entire line of argument means nothing. If agent-causation requires indeterminism, then great! A compatibilist-indeterminism may be, indeed, an agent-cause. It just doesn't require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.

You said,

//To avoid randomness, you need the agent as the active settler of alternatives. To avoid determinism, those alternatives must not be necessitated by prior suffficient conditions. Without both indeterminism and ultimate sourcehood, the “agent” is either a passive conduit (determinism) or the subject of sub-personal and mindless randomness. Neither option grounds the robust ability Paul promises.//

I think this is false. You still have a host of luck issues, even if agent-causation is correct, no matter the form; particularly in the form of moral luck. All parties have to deal with luck, in some form; so to me, this is irrelevant. Also, I agree that we need sourcehood and indeterminism, but why "ultimate" sourcehood? And how is that derived from the text? Does Paul say that? What translation are you using? :)

And again, false dilemma.

It's not the case that if determinism is false, and libertarian freedom is also false, we therefore just get a "sub-personal and mindless randomless." Why think that? Just because one denies ultimate sourcehood is necessary for agent-causation (while keeping some form of sourcehood still) doesn't therefore entail randomness from the agent's choices. What? How? Unless of course you want to say that ultimate sourcehood and sourcehood in general are synonymous; that would quite shocking, and also a very difficult claim to argue for. I can be the source, even if indeterminism is true; literally the only difference is that it doesn't require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.

You said,

//whether the believer’s options are necessitated by prior sufficient conditions or not. Paul’s words make no sense unless determinism is false and the believer is categorically able to do otherwise (even when he doesn’t).//

Why not? Think of a dispositional ability. I have the narrow ability to succumb or not succumb to temptation as a Christian. I have the Holy Spirit, presumably the physical and psychological know-how, spiritual resources such as the sacraments, the Word, prayer, the brethren, etc. I also have the opportunity to (especially if indeterminism is true!).

Nothing is preventing me from succumbing or not succumbing to temptation. I am not forced; there are no antecedent conditions prior to my choice to succumb or not succumb. I am free indeterministically. This seems like a very straight-forward, common-sense way of reading the text also. More specifically, Paul doesn't rule out anything like this, unless you are using an obscure "Tim Stratton" translation.

So, a dispositional ability is compatible with the text. Now, to be clear, a categorical interpretation could be compatible with the text for sure. But that's not the argument you are proposing, right? You are proposing that the text entails a categorical interpretation. I am saying that if the text is compatible with an alternative interpretation, one that is compatible with determinism (regardless of whether determinism is in fact true in the actual world; let's stipulate that it is false in the actual world), then LFW in the form of a categorical ability cannot be entailed by the verse, even if it is compatible with it.

So the argument for LFW from 1 Cor 10:13 is still unsound.

Last you criticize that if compatibilist-indeterminism is true, this would be the entailed verse (supposedly): "If antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the outcome, then the believer who sins never truly had the escape available. Paul’s universal promise (“no temptation,” “always provides,” “you are able”) is broken right where it matters most. If antecedent conditions are not sufficient to fix the outcome, then the believer really does face two live alternatives at the moment of temptation. That is precisely the libertarian condition: robust leeway plus the agent’s causal role as first mover."

This is kind of funny; if indeterminism is true, then by definition antecedent conditions are always insufficient to necessitate the outcome. So it is truly quizzical to me why you place that first sentence in this interpretation. This is truly bizarre! Seems like compatibilist-indeterminism is compatible (though presumably not entailed) by the text; but it is compatible with the text, the text cannot entail LFW.

If compatibilist-indeterminism is true, then of course determinism is false by definition. Therefore, "the believer’s antecedent states (desires, psychology, providential setup)" are insufficient to necessitate the outcome. But, libertarian freedom would still be false because compatibilsm would be true.

You said,

//If no, then antecedents leave both options live, which is precisely the libertarian condition: genuine sourcehood and leeway. Either way, the middle collapses back into determinism or into LFW.//

False dilemma. Determinism and LFW are not the only options in the debate, which is one of my primary contentions with the video (see my original comment). Antecedents may leave live options available (i.e., to succumb, or not to succumb to the temptation), but that does not entail libertarian freedom. Just because indeterminism is true doesn't mean the kind of free will present necessitates indeterminism.

If the kind of free will that is posited does not require indeterminism, even if indeterminism is in fact true in the actual world (which is what I am postulating), then libertarian freedom is false precisely because indeterminism is not necessary (though actual). Just because indeterminism is actually present doesn't entail libertarian freedom (which, I will remind you, I spend quite a bit of time detailing in my Volume 3 reply to you and the 1 Cor 10:13 argument).

Further, indeterminism being present doesn't entail "genuine sourcehood" in the way you are thinking of it. You are most definitely thinking of it in terms of what Kane calls "ultimate sourcehood", and the leeway you are positing is almost definitely "categorical". But indeterminism could be true, and that doesn't require the free will present is necessarily categorical, nor does it require that the type of sourcehood present is necessarily ultimate. None of that has been shown. You just simply assume it.

You said,

//You suggest Paul might mean only a dispositional or conditional ability. But this doesn’t square with the text. Paul promises://

No no. I never once stated a mere "conditional" reading or entailment of the verse. I said a dispositional, which is qualitatively distinct from conditional interpretations (see Vihvelin 2013; Nelkin 2011; Cyr and Swenson 2019; Clarke 2009, etc.). Further, what do you mean by "doesn't square with the text"? Do you mean isn't entailed by the text, or isn't compatible with the text? Because surely both a conditional and dispositional ability is "squared with the text" in the sense of being compatible with the text (remember, let's stipulate determinism is false still). I never said that a dispositional reading should be entailed by the text, but that doesn't mean it isn't compatible with it. But if it is compatible with it, then LFW isn't entailed by it because LFW entails incompatibilism.

You said,

//For Paul’s comfort to hold universally, the ability must be categorical: the believer really can take the escape in the moment of temptation.//

Why? You certainly give no reason. Let's say indeterminism is true. Okay, so the believer has live options, and access to alternatives to succumb or not. Okay, what type of free will is at play? Categorical or dispositional? The former being incompatible with determinism, and the latter being compatible with determinsim. Certainly the verse doesn't give a single indication as to what kind of free will is at play. At best, it demonstrates that indeterminism is possible true (for the sake of argument). But how does that get you to LFW? It doesn't.

You said,

//Regarding Agent-Causation: sure, compatibilists do sometimes speak of “agent-causation,” but usually in a thin, so-called "reasons-responsive" sense they claim is compatible with determinism (which I have written much about). That’s not what I am talking about. Paul’s assurance requires robust sourcehood: the agent as the first mover (and thinker), not merely a conduit of antecedent conditions. Without that, “taking the escape” is not genuinely within the believer’s power. This is why, on determinism, I refer to the person as a “passive cog” since they are always subject to other powers.//

Why does Paul's assurance require "robust sourcehood" (which I presumably think you mean something of the Kanean sort, i.e., "ultimate sourcehood")? Does Paul say in the verse you have to be a first mover, "not merely a conduit of antecedent conditions"? And even if the latter part is correct, how is the first part entailed by what Paul says? What specifically in the verse entails that piece, step-by-step? (Remember, determinism is irrelevant here; I am assuming it is false, so any argument showing determinism is false I will just agree with here.)

You said,

//If the agent is not the ultimate source, then their causal role is merely derivative — it’s the unfolding of prior sufficient conditions. But derivative causation does not ground the responsibility Paul assumes in 1 Cor 10:13.//

How is it the unfolding of prior sufficient conditions if we assume indeterminism is true? You are still assuming that if determinism is false, ultimate sourcehood is automatically satisfied. Why? I would argue that if the agent is not a source, simpliciter, then their causal role is merely derivative.

Finally, why does Paul, to you, seem to assume ultimate sourcehood? None of this is clear from the text. It just fits the systematic.

You said,

//Paul’s promise is that you are able — you can resist. That makes no sense unless the believer is the genuine initiator of the resisting act. If the antecedents outside the agent fully determine which “choice” the agent will make, then the “ability” reduces to the agent being a conduit of prior conditions. That is precisely what sourcehood is meant to block. Without ultimate sourcehood, the ability to take the escape is illusory.//

Again, just because determinism is false, doesn't mean that ultimate sourcehood is automatically true. That needs to be argued, specifically from the text. And again, determinism is false, let's say. You are assuming that sourcehood is synonymous with libertarian free will. That is a hard claim to argue for, specifically if we say that indeterminism is true already.

Why can't I be the source even if compatibilist-indeterminism is true? After all, determinism is false, and there are no antecedent conditions prior to my choices that necessitate those choices. Seems like I can choose between options, right? It is just the case that the kind of free will doesn't entail (or require) indeterminism (though it's actual).

Stratton

I want to clarify a few things, Colton: You said,

//Once again, what if indeterminism is true? So a caused cause means nothing here. This entire line of argument means nothing.//

But “caused cause” does still mean something, even if not everything is determined.

Think of genetics, upbringing, prior beliefs, or circumstances—they can all function as “caused causes” in a deterministic sense within a broader indeterministic framework. So the phrase isn’t meaningless; it still names a real phenomenon we must grapple with. You said,

//If agent-causation requires indeterminism, then great! A compatibilist-indeterminism may be, indeed, an agent-cause. It just doesn’t require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.//

But if the agent is genuinely the uncaused cause at t—if he himself settles which live alternative becomes actual—then by definition he is the source in this indeterministic environment. That is what I mean by ultimate sourcehood: the agent as first mover with respect to that choice.

If your “agent-cause” is still traceable back to sufficient antecedents, it’s not really agent-causation—it’s transmission.

And if nothing settles it, it collapses into luck. So your distinction between “agent-causation” and “ultimate sourcehood” doesn’t hold up at the choice-point. You said,

//I think this is false. You still have a host of luck issues, even if agent-causation is correct, no matter the form; particularly in the form of moral luck. All parties have to deal with luck, in some form; so to me, this is irrelevant.//

Yes, there are luck problems for everyone, but they are not all created equal. Some kinds of “luck” are background conditions (birth, natural endowments, moral environments) which shape but do not necessitate a particular choice. Other kinds of luck are present-luck problems—where the difference between sin and escape is entirely unowned, sub-personal randomness. That second kind is devastating, because if the movement between sin and the way of escape is not determined by antecedent conditions or determined by the agent (as first mover and source), then the movement is no better than the mindless quantum realm. That collapses rational agency into random noise. Do you really think that’s what Paul is promising his readers? A roll of the metaphysical dice when temptation comes? You said,

//Also, I agree that we need sourcehood and indeterminism, but why "ultimate" sourcehood? And how is that derived from the text? Does Paul say that? What translation are you using?//

Wait a second! You agree that this text requires indeterminism? That’s a huge admission, because it means you’ve rejected exhaustive divine determination (EDD). We are finally making progress here, Colton! As for “ultimate” sourcehood: it is derived in the same way we derive the triune nature of God.

No biblical author uses the term “Trinity,” but the concept is logically entailed by the data of Scripture.

Likewise, Paul may not use the term “ultimate sourcehood,” but his universal, in-the-moment assurance entails it: unless the agent is the categorical settler of which possibility obtains, Paul’s promise is hollow and deceptive. You said,

//And again, false dilemma. It's not the case that if determinism is false, and libertarian freedom is also false, we therefore just get a "sub-personal and mindless randomless." Why think that? Just because one denies ultimate sourcehood is necessary for agent-causation (while keeping some form of sourcehood still) doesn't therefore entail randomness from the agent's choices. What? How?//

As Moreland and I explained in our paper, the trilemma is unavoidable: (i) Antecedent necessitation (determinism) (ii) Sub-personal randomness (luck) (iii) Agent-settling as first mover (ultimate sourcehood). If you deny (3), you are left with (1) or (2). “Some other kind of sourcehood” collapses back into (1) if it’s reducible to antecedents, or into (2) if it is not settled by the agent. There is no middle option that avoids both.

That’s why it is not a false dilemma—it’s a true trilemma.

You said,

//Unless of course you want to say that ultimate sourcehood and sourcehood in general are synonymous; that would quite shocking, and also a very difficult claim to argue for.//

Hold my root beer and prepare for shock and awe! Yes, I use “ultimate” to clarify—just as I add “exhaustive” to divine determination when addressing EDD. By “ultimate sourcehood,” I simply mean: the agent is the first mover with respect to the choice at hand, not merely a transmitter of antecedents. Far from being difficult to argue for, this is the standard way libertarians articulate sourcehood. You said,

//I can be the source, even if indeterminism is true . . .//

Amen to that!

That’s exactly my view.

Indeterminism is true (not all things are determined), and within that context, the agent can be—and is—the source of some of his mental and physical actions. That’s libertarian free agency, plain and simple. Welcome aboard! You said,

//. . . literally the only difference is that it doesn't require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.//

This is where you need to explain with clarity and precision. If your “source” does not require indeterminism, then what stops antecedent conditions from necessitating the outcome?

If antecedents are sufficient, then you are not truly the source—you are a conduit.

If antecedents are insufficient and the agent does not settle, then the outcome is lucky randomness. The “only difference” you describe either (i) collapses into determinism or (ii) collapses into randomness. You said,

//This is kind of funny; if indeterminism is true, then by definition antecedent conditions are always insufficient to necessitate the outcome. So it is truly quizzical to me why you place that first sentence in this interpretation. This is truly bizarre!//

What’s actually bizarre is the suggestion that if indeterminism is true, antecedent conditions are always insufficient to necessitate anything. That’s simply false! My own view is that we live in a world where not all things are determined (thus indetermin

ism

obtains), but antecedent conditions are still sufficient to necessitate many things. To deny this is to conflate “some things aren’t determined” with “nothing at all is determined.”

That’s a basic category error.

Think of it this way: I can grant that the movement of subatomic particles is not determined in every case (indeterminism), while also affirming that the law of gravity, the formation of ice at 0°C, and the human body’s need for oxygen are all necessitated by antecedent conditions. To suggest otherwise is not just “quirky”—it’s a massive philosophical blunder. So, Colton, either you’re equivocating on “indeterminism” or you’re confusing it with “pure randomness.” If that’s what you mean, then say so clearly, because otherwise you’ve just misrepresented the live options on the table. You said,

//Seems like compatibilist-indeterminism is compatible (though presumably not entailed) by the text; but it is compatible with the text, the the text cannot entail LFW.//

But here’s the problem: we’ve already established that determinism and EDD (sorry, EDD-Calvinists) are ruled out by Paul’s promise.

That leaves two options:

either (i) the believer, as an active first-mover agent, decides whether to sin or escape, or (ii) something akin to quantum indeterminacy (random, sub-personal, and mindless luck) decides it for him. Do you honestly think Paul is telling the Corinthians that their victory over temptation boils down to a coin-flip in the quantum realm? No pastor, no theologian, no serious exegete has ever read the passage this way. To call that “compatible with the text” is to empty Paul’s assurance of all pastoral weight. It's horrible hermeneutics employed in order to avoid libertarian freedom. By contrast, the categorical reading—where the believer himself is the operative source of resisting or succumbing—fits perfectly: - It preserves Paul’s universal promise. - It maintains the meaningfulness of his pastoral exhortation. - It avoids collapsing into either antecedent necessitation (determinism) or meaningless randomness. So no, Colton. The text doesn’t leave room for your “compatibilist-indeterminism.” It forces the choice: either Paul is mistaken (which you absolutely cannot accept), or he’s teaching libertarian sourcehood—where the believer, as the first mover, actively decides at the moment of temptation (which you don't want to accept).

Those are the only live options.

Colton, you said,

//If compatibilist-indeterminism is true, then of course determinism is false by definition. Therefore, "the believer’s antecedent states (desires, psychology, providential setup)" are insufficient to necessitate the outcome. But, libertarian freedom would still be false because compatibilsm would be true.//

What do you mean by that, Colton? Compatibilism is typically understood to be the thesis that freedom and/or moral responsibility is compatible with determinism (where antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all mental states and physical actions). But you just admitted determinism is false. So “compatibilism” in that context collapses into incoherence. If determinism is false, then why argue about what is compatible with a false view? What you’re really saying is that determinism is false, and yet humans don’t have sourcehood agency or leeway ability. In that case, someone or something else must prevent the agent from choosing otherwise. But why should we accept that? What is that? Paul explicitly says you are able to endure and resist (1 Cor 10:13). If that’s not sourcehood agency, then Paul’s words are empty comfort at best . . . deception at worst. Colton, you said:

//False dilemma. Determinism and LFW are not the only options in the debate, which is one of my primary contentions with the video (see my original comment). Antecedents may leave live options available (i.e., to succumb, or not to succumb to the temptation), but that does not entail libertarian freedom.//

Is something deterministically preventing the believer from exercising the ability to do otherwise? If so, then

determination

(via God, supernature, or physical laws) explains the choice. If not, then two options remain: - Mindless randomness (like quantum events) determines whether the believer sins or resists. - The believer as source (first-mover) rationally decides and settles which alternative possibility is actualized. If it’s the first, Paul’s words collapse into nonsense—

no pastor has ever preached “don’t worry, sometimes you’ll escape sin, sometimes you won’t, it’s a quantum coin flip.”

If it’s the second, then that’s libertarian freedom. Those are your real live options, and the dilemma stands. You said:

//Just because indeterminism is true doesn't mean the kind of free will present necessitates indeterminism.//

I’m thrilled you’ve finally rejected EDD. You’re right: indeterminism is true—antecedent conditions don’t necessitate all events.

But let’s be precise.

If the believer is the source—the first-mover agent who decides whether to sin or take the escape—then that freedom both entails and requires indeterminism (since antecedent conditions are insufficient). That’s just what libertarian freedom is: agent-causation plus leeway, not random noise. You said,

//If the kind of free will that is posited does not require indeterminism, even if indeterminism is in fact true in the actual world (which is what I am postulating), then libertarian freedom is false precisely because indeterminism is not necessary (though actual).//

But we’ve already established that the kind of freedom Paul promises requires indeterminism: antecedent conditions are not sufficient to necessitate sin.

Thus, when a Christian sins, it’s not traceable to prior necessity—it’s on the believer as the source.

That’s precisely libertarian freedom: the believer is the source of his action in a world where not all things are determined. You said,

//Just because indeterminism is actually present doesn't entail libertarian freedom (which, I will remind you, I spend quite a bit of time detailing in my Volume 3 reply to you and the 1 Cor 10:13 argument).//

And you were just as confused then as you are now.

I have never argued that “indeterminism entails libertarian freedom.” Quite the opposite actually: libertarian freedom entails indeterminism. My argument is this: if the agent is the uncaused cause—the source—of his act (not traceable to antecedent necessity), then libertarian freedom is true. That requires indeterminism, but it’s not reducible to it. You said:

//Further, indeterminism being present doesn't entail "genuine sourcehood" in the way you are thinking of it.//

I’ve never argued otherwise, Colton.

You’re shadow-boxing here.

My claim is this: if someone is going to be the genuine source of their actions, then indeterminism must be true. That’s not the same as saying “indeterminism = sourcehood.” Don’t misattribute to me an argument I’ve never made. You said,

//You are most definitely thinking of it in terms of what Kane calls "ultimate sourcehood", and the leeway you are positing is almost definitely "categorical".//

Thanks for the news flash! You’re right: that’s exactly what I’m affirming. Ultimate sourcehood = the agent as first mover with categorical ability to actualize either alternative. That’s precisely what Paul’s words entail if they are to carry real pastoral truth-telling comfort. You said,

//But indeterminism could be true, and that doesn't require the free will present is necessarily categorical, nor does it require that the type of sourcehood present is necessarily ultimate. None of that has been shown. You just simply assume it.//

No, Colton.

I’ve argued for it repeatedly.

The text itself forces it. If the ability to resist is only dispositional (the necessary action aligning with your greatest subjective desires—which are themselves determined via antecedent necessity, kicking the can down the road), then in every case of sin the believer lacked the categorical power to resist—and Paul’s promise fails. If the ability is categorical, the believer always has the power at

t

to resist or succumb to temptation, which alone preserves Paul’s words. That’s not a mere assumption, Colton—that’s exegesis meeting logic. So, Colton, unless you want to collapse Paul’s words into either empty compatibilist incoherence or stochastic nonsense, the only live option left is what Paul actually implies: categorical ability grounded in agent sourcehood—that is, libertarian freedom. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton