Freedom, Responsibility, and Tacos: Why Compatibilism Is [NOT] True

It seems some of my comments have been the source of much confusion. Sometimes, something can be so clear in one's head, yet one fails to communicate exactly what is in one's head. I seem to be guilty of this regarding some of my claims about compatibilism. Although many have let me know that they grasp what I have attempted to communicate and argue regarding compatibilism, there are still far too many people -- especially advocates of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) -- who still don't seem to "get it." (As an aside, it seems that if EDD is true and a deity causally determines the EDD advocate to fail to "get it" then there is nothing the EDD advocate can do to "get it" (no matter how hard I try to explain). The opportunity to "get it" is beyond their reach and in the hands of someone else!) So, what is all the fuss about? Let's begin by defining some key terms. Compatibilism: the thesis that free will and/or moral (and rational) responsibility (in a desert sense) is compatible with determinism. Incompatibilism: The thesis that freedom and/or moral (and rational) responsibility (in a desert sense) is not compatible with determinism. Notice the "and/or" clause in the above definitions. Much of the confusion has arisen from the fact that I have made comments suggesting that I can affirm that the THESIS of compatibilism might be coherent depending upon one's definition of "freedom." So, in that sense, I can see how freedom (depending upon one's definition) might be compatible with exhaustive divine determinism (EDD).

I am a compatibilist (in one sense)

Freedom and determinism can "get along" in a certain sense. For example, suppose my DNA (which has been causally determined by things other than me) causally determines my taste buds to love tacos more than any other food. Thus, I have been causally determined by things other than me to have a "taco-loving nature." So, when I go to the restaurant and survey the menu, since I have a "taco-loving nature," then my nature does not allow me to do anything other than order the tacos at that moment (lucky me)! If nothing prevents me from ordering my greatest desire of tacos at the moment in question, then one can say that I am both free and determined to order the tacos at said moment. To be clear: I'm not affirming that I do not have the opportunity to exercise an ability to order something other than the tacos, but for the sake of argument I will assume this is the case -- that I can only order the tacos and that I cannot do otherwise. If this is the case, and nothing stops me from ordering my greatest desire of tacos, then, the compatibilist asserts that I have exercised free will even though everything about me was causally determined by something or someone else (things other than me). Fair enough. I can see how this could be the case. I can grant the possibility that this kind of freedom is compatible with exhaustive determinism. In this sense, I can be called a "compatibilist." Robert Kane agrees:

"Those of us who are libertarians about free will (who believe in a free will that is incompatible with determinism) should , I contend, concede this point to compatibilists: Many freedoms worth wanting are compatible with determinism.

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I am NOT a compatibilist (in another sense)

Be that as it may, I have made it clear that I do NOT think that moral and rational responsibility (in a desert sense) are compatible with EDD. After all, having a taco-loving nature and ordering tacos doesn't seem to be the kind of thing one should be praised or blamed for (unless one wants to make a case that eating tacos is objectively right, wrong, or just plain stupid). Desert responsibility (whether we are discussing rational or moral responsibility) is something far different than ordering tacos for lunch. Now we are discussing how one

ought

to think, what one

ought

to believe, what thoughts one

ought

to take captive, and what one

should

believe. We are discussing how one

ought

to move his/her body and how one

should

treat others. If we fail at any of these oughts or shoulds, we deserve blame. If we think or act according to these oughts or shoulds, we get a thumbs up or a pat on the back. Moreover, rationality cannot be on the same level as tacos. Sure, perhaps when I survey the menu I might only and always choose my greatest desire at that moment. But the use of reason entails the opportunity to exercise an ability (libertarian freedom) to think and ultimately believe things which are opposed to one's greatest desires at a specific moment. This is exactly what separates humanity from the animal kingdom. As I noted in Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, andMere Molinism:

"Choices based on “greatest desires” are not choices based on logic and reason. In fact, if the compatibilist

claims that he can “exercise his reason,” what he really means is that his “reason” is simply his “greatest desire.” But if choices are always—and only—aimed at the target of a person’s “greatest desire,” they are never aimed at the target of truth . . . .  Accordingly, the compatibilist

cannot rationally affirm or justify any of his beliefs as objectively better or worse than a competing belief—for even the evaluations of his own thoughts and beliefs will also be determined by his greatest desires! . . . . It follows that if the compatibilist

really has rationally inferred that compatibilism is a

better

explanation than libertarianism, then his view of . . . compatibilism must be false. As a result, the compatibilist

has inadvertently defeated his project by way of his project. Ultimately, according to the . . . compatibilist, the only reason he has chosen to reject libertarian freedom is because he has a “greatest desire” for exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) to be true. That is not a good (rational) reason to believe anything. Subjective personal preference is vastly different than selecting a view based on objective truth" (p 184).

If objective truth exists (to deny objective truth affirms it), then if one does not reason toward objective truth, then one has reasoned poorly and reached incorrect and objectively wrong beliefs. If something or someone else, however, causally determines Jack to affirm a false belief about X in the actual world, then Jack possesses no opportunity to infer a better or true belief about X in the actual world. Thus, it does not seem as if Jack should be blamed for his bad thinking or false beliefs --

something or someone else

is responsible. In this sense, I am an ardent incompatibilist. Desert responsibility (in a rational or moral sense) is NOT compatible with exhaustive determinism. To quote Kane once again:

"What libertarians . . . should insist upon is that there is at least one kind of freedom that is also worth wanting and is not compatible with determinism . . . which I define as: 'the power to be the ultimate source and sustainer to some degree of one's own ends or purposes.'"

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Let me be clear:

No possible world exists where God causally determines me to X, but I

ought to

or

should do

other than X.

That doesn’t even make any sense. Indeed, if “X marks the spot” (God causally determines me to X), and I did other than X, then I would have “missed the mark” and sinned! Responsibility (in a desert sense) is not compatible with determinism. Libertarian freedom is needed for that.

"Compatibilism is not true!" 

Allow me the opportunity to explain what I mean when I say that "compatibilism is not true." As I explained in a footnote on page 182 of

Mere Molinism

:

"The word “true” refers to the correspondence theory of truth. Thus, by “if compatibilism is true” means, if the thesis of compatibilism actually describes the way things are

."

So, I mean that the thesis of comatibilism does not actually

always

correspond to reality, and thus, compatibilism does not

always

describe the way things are.

That is to say, the proposition consisting of the conjunction of both (i) “everything about humanity is 

always

causally determined by something or someone else” and (ii) “humanity is still responsible in a desert sense” is false.

However, the above understanding of "freedom" could still be compatible with determinism in certain instances. Notice the vital difference between the mere

thesis

of compatibilism and the claim that the thesis 

actually always describes reality.

To miss this vital distinction will lead to multiple mistakes on the part of those who seek to oppose my arguments. To reiterate, and as I made clear in my book, I specifically argued that the thesis of compatibilism does not always correspond to the way things are.

Bottom line:

freedom and desert responsibility ought not be conflated. They are two different things. So, if one says that they are a compatibilist, make sure to ask "What do you mean by that?" Make them clarify if they are talking about freedom, or responsibility, or both. Then ask them to clarify what they mean by both of the terms "freedom" and "responsibility." Then share this article with the compatibilist to give him or her something to think about. Finally, invite them to discuss these philosophical and theological issues over tacos. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

Post Script (4-3-22):

After a discussion with Kirk MacGregor, I would like to add a bit more clarity. In

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(SEP), McKenna and Coates define compatibilism this way:

“Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.”

By “free will,” for example, if one means that on some occasion — where all things are determined by antecedent conditions — nothing prevents a person from attaining their greatest desire at that specific moment, then one who believes we occasionally possess libertarian freedom (but not at said moment) can also coherently affirm the above thesis as offered in the SEP. There is no contradiction with this proposition. McKenna and Coates continue:

“Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes

expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.”

If a libertarian believes that desert responsibility (in a moral or rational sense) is not compatible with determinism (as I do), then it would be incoherent to affirm this sense of compatibilism that is “sometimes” offered. Thus, it is not incoherent for a libertarian to grant the former — that some kind of “free will is compatible with determinism,” but reject the “sometimes expressed” latter thesis by affirming that there is no “compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.” Interestingly, in his book,

Thinking About Free Will

, Peter van Inwagen writes the following:

"Whatever you do, do not use 'compatibilism' as a name for the thesis that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This can only cause confusion. If you must have a name for this thesis, invent a new one" (p. 152)

I agree with van Inwagen. Indeed, I contend that the refusal of many to heed his advice has muddied the waters tremendously. Established scholars disagree on how compatibilism ought to be defined. Guillaume Bignon defines compatibilism exactly how van Inwagen warns not to: "Compatibilism is the thesis that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility" (

Excusing Sinners

, p. 7). Carolina Sartorio defines compatibilism as "the thesis that Determinism is compatinle with free will" (

Do We Have Free Will

: A Debate, p. 203). Finally, John Martin Fischer defines compatibilism as the "doctrine that both some central notion

of freedom and also . . . moral responsibility are compatible with causal determinism" (

Four Views On Free Will

, p. 44). With all of this disagreement and confusion I am simply trying to purify the previously muddied waters. Thus, I am granting (for the sake of argument) that if one refers to “freedom” as

nothing is preventing me from fulfilling my greatest desire

(which is also determined by something or someone else)

at the moment in question

, then compatibilism could be used to explain certain actions (like ordering tacos). However, I am only saying that if this is the way one describes “freedom” then it is compatible with determinism (by definition). In that sense, I am a libertarian who affirms that this kind of freedom is compatible with determinism. In that sense,

technically speaking

, I am a libertarian who affirms the first part of what McKenna and Coates defined as compatibilism. Given Robert Kane's comment above, it seems perfectly acceptable to affirm such a thing. With that said, I think this definition and understanding of freedom is lame for the very reason that it fails to explain rational and moral responsibility in a desert sense. I am an ardent incompatibilist in this vital sense. After all (as I explained above), if I judge and evaluate all propositions and premises based upon my “greatest desires” of what I

want

to be true — and these greatest desires determine my ultimate judgments which determine my beliefs — then I have an undercutting defeater to my beliefs that follow from my thinking for at least two reasons.

First, subjective greatest desires are horrible reasons to think a proposition is objectively true. Second, subjective greatest desires that are determined by something or someone else (that is either non-rational or who is untrustworthy) are even worse reasons to think a proposition is true.

If all things are determined by something other than me (which is what follows from EDD), then I think calling anything “free” is merely a rhetorical euphemism designed to avoid the real issue. If I am determined to fulfill my greatest subjective desire which was also determined and

not up to me

at the moment in question, then it’s trivially true that nothing prevents me from fulfilling my determined and greatest desire. Big deal. Some compatibilists might respond, “but we have guidance control!” Sorry, but appealing to “guidance control” doesn’t do anything to get the exhaustive determinist off of any hooks. After all, one’s “controllings” and the exact way one “guides” their thoughts are ALSO completely determined by something or someone else if ALL things are determined. So this appeal does not provide the “control condition” sufficient to ground desert responsibility. This is why John DePoe describes humanity as nothing but "passive cogs" on the exhaustive determinist view. Bottom line (and this is what we should all commit to memory):

No possible world exists where God determines me to do X, but I really should have (or ought to have) done other than X.

Think about that. If anything, we

should

do what an omnipotent God determines us to do -- even if it is evil. If we do otherwise (and do the "good" we ought to have done), something seems to have gone terribly wrong as we seem to have become more powerful than God. Moreover, this would lead to the absurd conclusion that if we were to do otherwise -- and not do evil (as we

ought

to do), then we would also miss the mark (sin). This is the epitome of absurdity. It makes much more sense to reject EDD.

Notes

<1>

Robert Kane and Carolina Sartorio, 

Do We Have Free Will? A Debate

 (2022) <2>

Ibid.