Hayden Carroll’s Creation Dilemma: A Strong Argument That Ultimately Fails

Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due

Over the past several years, I have had countless conversations with members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Some have been excellent. Others have consisted primarily of people repeating talking points they had heard elsewhere and simply referring to their own subjective feelings.

But something has changed.

I recently returned from another trip to Utah, and I was genuinely encouraged by what I encountered. I met numerous BYU students and younger Latter-day Saints who were eager to discuss philosophy, logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and theology. They were not content merely to recite slogans. They wanted to reason together.

And I believe Hayden Carroll deserves a significant amount of credit for that.

Whether one agrees with his conclusions or not, Hayden has become one of the most influential LDS voices among younger Latter-day Saints. Along with thinkers such as Blake Ostler and Jacob Hansen, he has helped cultivate a generation that is increasingly interested in intellectual engagement.

In my estimation, Hayden is among the top three LDS influencers currently leading young Latter-day Saints toward careful philosophical reflection.

I love that.

In fact, I appreciate it so much that I recently spent considerable time examining what I regard as one of Hayden's strongest arguments: what he calls the "Creation Dilemma."

The argument is creative. The argument is thoughtful. The argument raises legitimate questions.

But I do not believe it succeeds at hitting the specific target at which Hayden aims.

The First Problem: What Does This Have to Do With the Trinity?

One thing immediately struck me while listening to Hayden present this argument.

The argument is often marketed as a moral problem for the Trinity or even as a problem at the heart of Trinitarian theology. In fact, the title of his book is "The Creation Dilemma: Does the Triune God Truly Will the Greatest Good of Every Person?" 

But what exactly does the Trinity have to do with it?

The argument concerns:

• divine foreknowledge,

• creation,

• hell,

• moral responsibility,

• and divine goodness.

None of these issues are uniquely Trinitarian.

Even if the argument succeeded completely, it would not establish that the Trinity is logically incoherent. In fact, during my recent discussions with several of Hayden's followers in Utah, we discovered substantial common ground regarding the Trinity.

After discussing what traditional Christians actually believe about the Trinity, most of these deep-thinking LDS members agreed with me that the doctrine of the one Triune God—one WHAT and three WHOS—itself is not logically contradictory.

Indeed, we discussed Joseph Smith's First Vision.

As I've discussed elsewhere, if the Trinity is one supernatural being possessing three centers of consciousness, and if divine persons can manifest bodily form, then the Father and Son appearing in bodily form would not disprove Trinitarianism at all. If anything, it is exactly the sort of thing one might expect if Trinitarianism were true.

Thus, before we ever reach the Creation Dilemma itself, we should recognize that the argument is not really about the Trinity.

At most, it is an argument against certain views of creation, foreknowledge, hell, and divine goodness.

That is a much narrower target.

The Tu Quoque Problem

The second problem is what philosophers often call a tu quoque objection.

Before proceeding, a brief explanation is in order.

The Latin phrase tu quoque means "you too." It is often used to describe a situation in which an objection rebounds against the person making it.

I like to describe it this way: imagine a submarine launching a torpedo that successfully sinks an enemy battleship. The problem is that the submarine was too close to the blast. The very explosion that destroyed the battleship also destroys the submarine that fired the torpedo.

In that case, the objection does not merely damage the opposing position—it destroys the position of the person making the objection as well.

That is the kind of tu quoque argument I believe we encounter with the Creation Dilemma.

But not all tu quoque arguments are created equal.

Often, a tu quoque objection is fallacious. For example, I frequently argue that Calvinism and exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) face significant philosophical problems. Many Calvinists have followed Greg Welty's lead and responded by saying, "Well, tu quoque—Molinists have the same problem."

But notice: even if they were right, Calvinism would still have the problem. The objection would still pass against Calvinism. The torpedo would still sink the battleship.

In that sense, the original argument would remain successful.

Of course, I then go further and explain why the Molinist ship is still afloat. The same explosion that sinks the Calvinist battleship does not sink the Molinist battleship. But even if it did, I would not care. I simply want the truth.

With that distinction in mind, not all tu quoque arguments are fallacious. Sometimes exposing an inconsistency merely reveals hypocrisy. In other cases, however, it reveals something more significant: the objection proves too much. If an argument defeats not only the opposing position but also the position of the person advancing the argument, then something has gone wrong.

I believe that is exactly what happens with the Creation Dilemma.

The Creation Dilemma is often presented as a uniquely Christian problem. But it appears to apply equally well to traditional LDS theology. Even if LDS theology rejects creation ex nihilo, God still organizes reality and forms a specific kind of world as he fine-tunes and creates the universe.

God still initiates mortality. God still knows outcomes. And traditional LDS theology still includes the possibility of outer darkness. To be clear, many contemporary Latter-day Saints emphasize that very few individuals qualify as "sons of perdition." That point is irrelevant to the present argument. The Creation Dilemma does not require millions of souls in Outer Darkness.

It requires only one.

Traditional LDS theology has historically grounded the doctrine of Outer Darkness in several passages, especially:

Doctrine and Covenants 76:31–38 — describing the "sons of perdition" who knowingly rebel against God after receiving divine knowledge.

Doctrine and Covenants 76:43–48 — describing the unique and everlasting punishment reserved for the sons of perdition, who alone are excluded from Christ's universal redemptive work.

Doctrine and Covenants 132:26–27 — discussing those who commit the unpardonable sin and become sons of perdition.

Moses 4:1–4 — describing Satan's rebellion and expulsion from God's presence, often viewed within LDS theology as the paradigmatic case of perdition and final separation from God.

Whether one interprets these passages strictly or more broadly is beside the point. The relevant issue is that traditional LDS theology has historically affirmed the possibility of final ruin for at least some individuals. Once that possibility is granted, the structure of the Creation Dilemma appears to apply to Mormonism no less than to Christianity.

This means the moral question is simply pushed back one step. Instead of asking: "Why would God create someone who will be lost?" we ask:

Why would God organize and create a world in which an intelligence enters mortality and is ultimately lost in outer darkness (which is traditional LDS theology)?

The structure of the dilemma remains intact. God knew. God could have refrained. God proceeded anyway. Someone is finally lost in ruin. 

If the argument succeeds against traditional Christianity, it appears to succeed against traditional Mormonism as well.

This point is important because the Creation Dilemma is presented as a uniquely Christian problem. Yet the argument's structure does not depend upon creation ex nihilo. It depends upon God's knowing participation in the actualization of a world containing finally lost persons. 

Once framed this way, the dilemma appears to target any worldview in which God knowingly initiates a world containing agents who ultimately reject Him—including traditional LDS theology.

A Curious Tension Within LDS Theology

There is another difficulty. Throughout presentations of the Creation Dilemma, appeals to free will are often dismissed as a red herring. But this creates a fascinating tension with LDS theology itself.

According to the LDS account of the premortal existence, Lucifer proposed a plan that would guarantee universal salvation by eliminating genuine agency. God rejected that proposal and instead chose a plan that preserves agency even though some would misuse that agency and become lost in eternal outer darkness.

To be clear, I deeply appreciate the LDS commitment to libertarian freedom and human agency. In fact, this shared commitment has allowed me to build bridges with many Latter-day Saints and continue meaningful conversations about God, salvation, and the nature of reality.

But think carefully about what that means. The LDS story itself appears to affirm the following principle:

The preservation of genuine agency is sufficiently valuable that God is justified in permitting the possibility of moral failure rather than guaranteeing universal salvation through coercion.

But that principle is precisely the intuition behind the Free Will Defense.

Consequently, if the Free Will Defense is merely a red herring, then one must explain exactly why the same reasoning is acceptable when defending God's rejection of Lucifer's plan but unacceptable when Christians appeal to it in response to the Creation Dilemma.

The challenge here is not merely external. It appears to be internal as well.

Indeed, the traditional LDS narrative does not merely permit the Free Will Defense; it appears to celebrate it. God's rejection of Lucifer's proposal is often presented as a triumph of agency over guaranteed outcomes. If preserving agency is sufficient reason to permit the possibility of final loss in the premortal council, then one must explain why preserving agency suddenly becomes irrelevant when Christians invoke the same principle.

The Hidden Premise

The argument depends upon a hidden assumption that is rarely defended explicitly. The assumption is this:

Non-existence is preferable to existence whenever existence culminates in final ruin.

But why should anyone accept that? Most have the intuition that the well-known phrase, "It is better to have loved and lost, than to have never loved at all." Similarly, it seems to me that it would be better to have existed, than to never have existed at all.

Non-existence experiences no goods. Non-existence enjoys no relationships. Non-existence receives no opportunities. Non-existence freely loves no one. The argument repeatedly assumes that preventing existence is morally preferable to creating a person who may ultimately reject God.

But that is not a self-evident truth (even if we grant eternal divorce from God). It is a substantive philosophical claim that requires defense.

Without that assumption, much of the force of Hayden's button analogy evaporates.

The Judas Problem

Hayden frequently appeals to Judas.

After all, Jesus said:

"It would have been better for that man if he had not been born."

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Jesus was not speaking hyperbolically (as He often did). Let us grant the strongest possible interpretation and assume He intended the statement in a completely literal sense.

Even then, the argument does not succeed.

At most, Jesus would be telling us something about Judas's personal condition. He would be saying that, from Judas's perspective, his freely chosen destiny is so tragic that non-existence would have been preferable.

But notice what does not follow.

It does not follow that God wronged Judas by creating him.

It does not follow that God failed to will Judas's good.

It does not follow that God caused Judas's betrayal.

It does not follow that Judas's betrayal was necessary.

And it certainly does not follow that God ought to have refrained from creating the entire world.

Those are additional conclusions requiring additional premises.

Moreover, even if Judas's existence ultimately proved tragic for Judas, one must still ask why Judas's freely chosen rejection of God should possess veto power over the existence of Peter, John, Mary, Paul, and billions of others who would freely embrace God's love and enjoy eternal communion with Him.

The Creation Dilemma quietly assumes that the answer is obvious.

I do not think it is obvious at all.

Judas freely chose betrayal. On a Molinist framework, God knew what Judas would freely choose under particular circumstances, but God's knowledge did not necessitate Judas's action. 

The argument frequently conflates:

• God knowing what Judas would freely choose to do,

• God causing what Judas would do,

• God necessitating what Judas would do,

• and God desiring Judas's damnation.

Those are four different claims. Molinism rejects the latter three while affirming the first.

There is also another tu quoque problem for Hayden's argument here.

Even if Judas ultimately entered final ruin, the same difficulty appears to arise for traditional LDS theology. After all, on the traditional LDS account, God knowingly organized a world in which the intelligence we call Judas would enter mortality, freely betray Christ, and ultimately suffer the eternal consequences of that choice.

Thus, the appeal to Judas does not uniquely challenge Christianity. The very example Hayden employs seems to generate the same question for Mormonism:

Why would God initiate a world in which He knew that Judas would freely choose a tragic destiny?

Once again, the dilemma appears to rebound against the worldview from which it is launched.

Why Should the Lost Possess Veto Power Over the Saved?

This is where I believe the Creation Dilemma finally collapses. 

Suppose God surveys all feasible freedom-permitting worlds. Suppose every feasible world containing billions of redeemed persons also contains some who freely reject Him. What should God do?

Should God refrain from creating altogether? If so, why?

Why should those who freely reject God's love possess veto power over the existence of those who would freely love Him forever? Put differently, why should the freely lost be granted authority over whether the freely saved are allowed to exist at all?

Indeed, the dilemma appears to privilege the preferences of the rejecters over the preferences of the redeemed. It effectively grants the former authority over whether the latter may enjoy the immeasurable goods of existence, salvation, love, friendship, family, worship, and eternal communion with God.

Put differently, the argument assumes that the non-existence of the redeemed is preferable to the existence of the redeemed simply because some would freely reject God. That is not a self-evident moral principle. It is the very point under dispute.

That assumption is far from self-evident. In fact, it seems to require its own defense.

The burden of proof seems to rest on the defender of the Creation Dilemma. For the argument quietly assumes that non-existence for everyone is preferable to existence for billions of redeemed persons simply because some would freely reject God.

That is not a conclusion. It is a controversial hidden premise.

Be that as it may, this is where Molinism changes the conversation. The issue is no longer: Would I press the creation button? The issue becomes: Should the freely lost prevent the existence of the freely saved and all the eternal goods available to them?

That is a much deeper question. And, unless I missed something, it is a question the Creation Dilemma does not address.

Both Christianity and Mormonism Possess a Solution

Ironically, I believe both traditional Christianity and traditional Mormonism possess resources capable of avoiding the dilemma.

The first solution is Molinism.

If God possesses middle knowledge, then God does not merely choose isolated individuals. He simply chooses among feasible worlds (not to be confused with mere possible worlds).

The relevant question is not whether God could create a particular individual in isolation. The relevant question is whether a better feasible freedom-permitting world was available.

The Creation Dilemma never establishes that one was.

A Second Solution: Reconsidering Hell

There is another important point to consider. The Creation Dilemma gains much of its emotional force from a particular understanding of hell known as eternal conscious torment (ECT). On this view, the damned literally suffer in the tortures of Hell every moment into the infinite future.

But many Christians reject that understanding. 

I am one of them.

Not only does it seem that a growing number of protestant theologians are affirming annihilationism or "conditional immortality," there are other views of eternal conscious separation that are not scathed by this objection.

Personally, I find C.S. Lewis's portrayal in The Great Divorce deeply compelling. In Lewis's model, the doors of hell are "locked from the inside." The inhabitants remain free. They remain welcome to repent. They remain free to move toward God. They simply freely refuse to do so every day into the infinite future. They are not literally "tortured" into the infinite future, they simply freely choose to divorce themselves from the source of love (1 John 4:8) and the objective purpose of their existence.

Absolutely nothing deterministically prevents them from a personal relationship with God. They are not forced to be separated from God and paradise, but given their freedom and agency, they forever freely choose to do life their own way. 

Under such a model, the supposed "irreversible ruin" assumed by the Creation Dilemma disappears. It is not "irreversible." They can do it—they have the power to do it, but they freely choose not to. 

Notice what follows. If the inhabitants of hell remain free to repent, then the central premise of the Creation Dilemma—that God knowingly creates persons for an irreversible fate—simply no longer applies.

Yes, the separation remains tragic. But it is self-chosen and the damned are always free to bow the knee.

Likewise, many Latter-day Saints reject highly rigid conceptions of outer darkness and emphasize the extraordinary mercy available within God's plan. Once these alternative models are introduced, much of the force of the dilemma evaporates.

Hopeful Universalism and Molinism

Ironically, if Hayden's argument succeeds, it appears to point more naturally toward hopeful universalism than toward Mormonism.

I am open to what might be called Molinistic Hopeful Universalism.

Suppose there exists a feasible freedom-permitting world in which every person eventually turns toward God. Suppose some individuals require centuries of suffering in Hell. Suppose others require millennia of suffering in Hell. Suppose some require unimaginable ages of self-inflicted misery before finally repenting—suffering billions or trillions of years in Hell before finally "coming to their senses" (Luke 15:17) and returning to the Father. 

If such a world is feasible, I believe a maximally great God would actualize it. Indeed, if such a world were feasible for a maximally great being (God), I contend that a maximally great being created it and we are living in it now. 

The question is merely this: does that specific feasible world exist? We are not in an epistemic position to know. An omniscient maximally great God, however, does stand in an epistemic position to know. 

In that case, if that feasible world exists and was actualized, then every person eventually unlocks the doors of hell from the inside and enters eternal communion with God.

Again, for the sake of clarity let me be redundant: whether such a world is feasible is a separate question. But notice what follows. If such a world is feasible, then the Creation Dilemma disappears entirely. And if such a world is not feasible, then the Molinist response regarding feasible worlds becomes even more important.

Either way, the dilemma loses much of its force.

In Summary

Hayden Carroll has presented one of the strongest contemporary LDS critiques of certain Christian views regarding creation, foreknowledge, and hell. His Creation Dilemma deserves to be taken seriously. Indeed, I have taken it seriously, read the book in its entirety, watched many of Hayden's videos about his argument, and even interviewed him myself to make sure I understood his case adequately.

I have done my due diligence and concluded that Hayden has provided a very thoughtful argument. However, his argument ultimately falls short of his stated target for several reasons:

First, the argument is not really about the Trinity. Even if successful, it would not establish that the doctrine of the Trinity is logically incoherent.

Second, the argument appears to rebound against traditional LDS theology. If God knowingly organizes, forms, and creates a world in which He knew that some intelligences would ultimately enter outer darkness, then the same moral concern arises.

Third, LDS theology itself, to its credit, seems to affirm the value of agency that the Creation Dilemma minimizes. The traditional LDS account of God's rejection of Lucifer's proposal appears to function as a version of the Free Will Defense rather than a rejection of it.

Fourth, Molinism provides a principled solution that is available to both traditional Christians and Mormons. Once we distinguish between logical possibility and feasible freedom-permitting worlds, the relevant question is no longer whether God could have created a different individual in isolation, but whether a better feasible world was available.

To read more about Molinism, see the second edition of my book, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism.

Fifth, alternative views of hell significantly weaken the argument. If hell is not an irreversible fate but rather a freely chosen separation from God that remains open to repentance, then one of the dilemma's central assumptions disappears.

Sixth, and finally, even if Hayden's argument succeeded, it would seem to point more naturally toward some form of hopeful universalism than toward Mormonism. The argument simply does not establish the uniquely LDS claims Hayden hopes to support.

For these reasons, I conclude that the Creation Dilemma raises important questions, but ultimately fails as a refutation of Trinitarian Christianity. For my part, I remain convinced that Molinism combined with a maximally great and triune being provides the best explanation of all reality.

And so I return to the central question:

Why should those who freely reject God's love possess veto power over the existence of those who would freely love Him forever?

Until that question is answered, the Creation Dilemma remains an interesting challenge—but not a successful refutation of the Trinity or classical Christian theism.

Conclusion

With all of that said, Hayden Carroll deserves enormous credit for raising thoughtful philosophical questions. I am honored to now consider him a friend and a fellow philosophically inclined theologian. I encourage him to continue wading into these deep waters as we continue to "reason together" (Isaiah 1:18). 

Indeed, it seems to me that his Creation Dilemma is among the strongest contemporary LDS critiques of certain forms of Christianity. In that sense, Hayden's argument is a success.

But Hayden's argument does not refute the Trinity.

It does not refute Christianity.

And it certainly does not establish Mormonism (he admitted this much in our YouTube discussion).

What the Creation Dilemma does accomplish is forcing us to think more carefully about divine foreknowledge, creaturely freedom, feasible worlds, and the nature of hell. In that respect, the argument succeeds—not because it hits the target at which it is aimed, but because it exposes important questions that every serious theologian should wrestle with.

Fortunately, both Christianity and Mormonism already possess conceptual resources capable of addressing those concerns.

Stay reasonable (James 3:17).

— Dr. Timothy A. Stratton