Hold My Root Beer, Again: A Biblical and Logical Argument for CCF Truth Values
- Dr. Tim Stratton

- Jun 29
- 6 min read
Updated: Nov 5
In my last post, I argued that future-tensed propositions involving libertarian agents can have truth-values. That knocked over the first domino in a logical sequence refuting the assertions of many in the Dynamic Omniscience and Open Theism (DO/OT) camp. Now it’s time for domino number two: the claim that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) also have truth-values.
This is where things heat up. Dr. Alan Rhoda, a leading Open Theist philosopher, claims that “there is no good argument” for the idea that God knows what a libertarian agent would freely do in a non-actual scenario. In fact, he says that no such argument even could exist in principle. That’s a bold claim—but one we can meet.
I took that as a challenge and said, "hold my root beer."
After all, if we just defended the proposition “Peter will deny Jesus” as a true future-tense statement involving libertarian freedom (and we did), then defending “Peter would deny Jesus if placed in situation C” is only a small step further.
And as you’ll see, it’s a step we can take confidently—biblically, philosophically, and scientifically.
From Prophecy to Possibility: Future-Tensed Truths and CCFs
Future-tensed categorical propositions like “Peter will deny Jesus three times” refer to what will actually occur. But a CCF—such as “If Peter were in situation C, he would deny Jesus three times”—refers to what would occur in a non-actual set of circumstances. These subjunctive conditionals lie at the heart of Molinism and are the content of God’s middle knowledge—His knowledge of what free creatures would do in any given circumstance.
Of course, CCFs aren’t just rebranded predictions. They refer to alternate timelines or counterfactual histories. But if God knows what free agents will do (as we defended in part one), it’s a short, reasonable step to affirm that He also knows what they would do under different conditions.
Let’s start with the biblical data.
The Biblical Case for CCFs
1 Samuel 23: David and the Men of Keilah
In this famous passage, David asks God if the men of Keilah would hand him over to Saul. God says yes. David flees—and the betrayal never happens. So was God wrong? Of course not. This is a counterfactual:
“Will the citizens of Keilah surrender me to Saul?” The Lord said, “They will.” (1 Sam. 23:12)
This is a classic CCF: a truth about what free agents would do in a situation that never came to pass. God doesn’t say “probably.” He declares with certainty what would have happened. And He’s not mistaken. In fact, this divine knowledge saved David's life.
Matthew 11:21–23: Jesus and the Unrepentant Cities
Jesus declares:
“If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.”
Jesus isn’t speculating. He affirms a truth about what would have happened in a non-actual world. Again, this is a CCF—plain and simple.
Of course, some Open Theists might argue that these statements are just rhetorical or illustrative—not real counterfactuals with truth-value. But that won’t do. These interpretations fail to explain why God speaks decisively and with certainty about events that never happen—without appealing to determinism or mere guesswork. The only coherent explanation is that God genuinely knows what libertarian agents would freely do, even in non-actual situations.
These texts show that Scripture presupposes the truth and knowability of counterfactuals involving free decisions. That’s a serious problem for any view that denies God knows such truths.
It’s also important to clarify: these aren’t brute impulses, instincts, or coerced actions. These are moral decisions made under real deliberation—precisely the kinds of choices that the libertarian model seeks to preserve. The agents described are not puppets or automatons, but morally responsible persons weighing options and the power to take thoughts captive (2 Cor. 10:5) before bad thinking takes them (Col. 2:8). If God knows what they would freely do, then He knows truths about genuinely free decisions—decisions that matter.
Ezekiel 33:5 and 11
implies both God’s middle knowledge and libertarian freedom as it exemplifies the fact that God does not desire the death of the wicked and
invites
the wicked to choose otherwise: “
If
they had heeded the warning, they
would
have saved themselves (implies counterfactual knowledge). . .
Say to them, ‘As surely as I live,
declares the Sovereign LORD
, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that they turn from their ways and live.
Turn!
Turn from your evil ways! Why will you die, people of Israel?’”<2>
Rhoda’s Dilemma: The Argument from Parenthood
Let’s be honest: every Bible-believing Christian already knows at least one true CCF. Here it is:
If Alan Rhoda were to have another child—even if he never does—that child would freely choose to sin.
Every mature Christian, including every Open Theist, knows this is true. And they affirm that God doesn’t causally determine that sin.
This is a counterfactual of creaturely freedom. And it’s clearly true. We all know it.
Unless Rhoda wants to bite the bullet and say something like, “Well, it could be the case that my hypothetical child would be sinless,” he’s forced into absurdity. That would mean his hypothetical child might be the only other sinless human in history.
That’s not just absurd. It’s theological desperation. And if he refuses to affirm this CCF—because doing so would undercut his entire model of divine omniscience—then the dilemma is exposed. That’s game over for Open Theism.
The Fine-Tuning Argument and Middle Knowledge
The fine-tuning of the universe is rightly viewed as compelling evidence for intelligent design. But if quantum indeterminacy is real (and most physicists believe it is), then mere design is not enough. For intelligent, morally responsible agents to freely emerge, fall, and respond to grace, God would have to know—not just what could happen—but what would happen across an incredibly vast space of probabilistic outcomes.
That’s not natural knowledge. That’s middle knowledge.
God didn’t just roll the dice and hope for the best. He knew what finely-tuned initial conditions would lead to this world—a world in which people freely love, rebel, and can be redeemed. That’s not micromanagement. That’s omniscience.
So if you affirm the Fine-Tuning Argument in a non-deterministic universe, you’ve already taken a major step toward affirming Molinism. You’re implicitly affirming that God knew what would happen under indeterministic conditions.
That’s middle knowledge—or it’s blind luck. And our faith isn’t based on luck.
A Deductive Argument from CCFs
Let’s now put the reasoning in logical form. First, a clarification: When we say the Bible contains true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, we mean that Scripture affirms truths about what libertarian agents would freely do in non-actual situations (e.g., Ez. 33:5-11; 1 Sam. 23; Matt. 11:21–23).
Here’s the argument:
Scripture affirms true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) on multiple occasions.
If even one CCF is true, then CCFs are not uniformly false—at least some have truth-values.
If some CCFs have truth-values and God is omniscient, then God knows them.
Open Theism denies that any CCFs involving libertarian freedom have truth-values or are knowable.
Therefore, if the Bible is true and God is omniscient, then Open Theism is false.
The Bible is true and God is omniscient.
Therefore, Open Theism is false.
Conclusion: The Second Domino Falls
In part one, we knocked over the first domino: future-tensed propositions about libertarian agents are true before they occur. Now we’ve shown that counterfactuals of such agents are also true—and known by God.
That’s the second domino.
Together, they form the backbone of Mere Molinism: God is omniscient, creatures possess libertarian freedom, and God sovereignly orders history through His middle knowledge of what libertarian agents would freely do.
Dr. Rhoda claimed no good argument exists for CCFs.
I just offered several.
Now give me back my root beer.
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
— Dr. Tim Stratton
Notes
<1> Some Molinists interpret Jesus’s statement non-literally to avoid theological tension—e.g., if Sodom would have repented, why weren’t they given the chance? However, repentance alone does not entail salvation. On my view, saving faith requires a freely chosen, persevering love relationship with God—a love that “never fails” (1 Cor. 13:8). Thus, we can affirm that the people of Sodom would have repented, yet still infer they would not have ultimately persevered in faith. Their repentance would not have taken root (cf. Matt. 13:20–21). This preserves the literal force of Jesus’s statement while safeguarding God’s justice and universal salvific will.
<2> I refer to this passage of scripture as “Molinism in a biblical nutshell.” Here we have divine counterfactual knowledge and libertarian freedom supported in one passage.




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