Molinism & Jordan Peterson VS the Problem of Divine Hiddenness

The best defense against "arguments raised against the knowledge of God," as the apostle Paul says in 2 Corinthians 10:5, is good theology. As an analytic and systematic theologian, I have seen that when one grasps the fact that God is a maximally great being -- and one grasps exactly what that means -- then the multitudes of arguments raised against the existence of God have no teeth in their bite. 

In the final chapter of my book, Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, I provide arguments based upon perfect being theology that show how the Problems of Evil (as traditionally offered) are not really problems at all. In that same chapter, I briefly alluded to one manner of resolving a specific form of the Problem of Evil known as the Problem of Divine Hiddenness on page 262, in footnote 16. In addition, I have since co-authored a paper with Jacobus Erasmus arguing against atheist philosopher John Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument raised against the existence of God. Our paper was submitted 18 months ago and was FINALLY published this week in the journal “Perichoresis: The Theological Journal of Emanuel University.”

Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument may be stated broadly as follows:

1. If God exists, there will never be any nonresistant non-believers.

2. There are some nonresistant non-believers.

3. Therefore, God does not exist.

The above description of the Hiddenness Argument makes clear that it depends on the following principle:

• Necessarily, if God exists, then, for some time t and some finite person S who is a nonresistant seeker at t, God will ensure that (or provide sufficient evidence for belief in God such that) at t, S believes God exists.

Erasmus and I have argued that Molinism undercuts the principle (A) behind the first premise. Why? Since a maximally great being possesses middle knowledge he knows both (i) what a person would freely do in any circumstances they may find themselves in and (ii) God knows the repercussions of the person’s free actions, thus, there are feasible scenarios in which God knows it’s better that a nonresistant seeker does not become a mere believer immediately or, even perhaps, at all. In other words, given God’s middle knowledge, it’s possible that God will not ensure—or provide sufficient evidence for belief in God such that—certain nonresistant seekers become believers.

Although there are many such possible/feasible scenarios, consider one example Erasmus and I offer in our paper:

Becoming a believer at a later time may benefit both the nonresistant seeker and others.

Consider the possibility that God does not ensure that some nonresistant seeker S becomes a believer at some time t (the time that S becomes a nonresistant seeker) because He knows that (i) S will become a believer at some later time t* and (ii) it would be better that S becomes a believer at t* than at t.

For example, suppose that Jones becomes a nonresistant seeker at time t. Suppose further that the following two propositions are true and that God, through His middle knowledge, knows them:

(i) If Jones becomes a believer at t, then Jones WOULD get married in France, his home country, remain in France his entire life, and lead no one to faith in God.

(ii) If Jones does not become a believer at t, then Jones WOULD move to Africa, become a believer in Africa at time t* (a year later than t), get married in Africa, start a Christian school in Africa, have a tremendous positive impact on the lives of the many students in his school, and lead 305 people to faith in God, which otherwise would not have been the case.

With the big eternal picture in mind, it is clear that, in this scenario, it would be better that Jones does not become a believer at t. Indeed, it would be unloving and unwise for God to ensure that Jones becomes a believer at t and, hence, a perfectly wise and loving God would not do this. 

To support this claim with anecdotal evidence, if anyone seems to be a non-resistant nonbeliever today it would be Jordan Peterson. With this in mind, I spent much time communicating the gospel to my friend Alex who aggressively resisted my attempts to evangelize him. He would not listen to me or read any book written by a Christian. I eventually gave up and “wiped the dust off of my feet.”

A year later I ran into him and he told me that he was now a believer!

Needless to say, I was shocked and overjoyed and asked him how that happened. He responded by saying that he read Jordan Peterson’s “12 Rules for Life.” I responded by saying, “But Jordan Peterson isn’t a Christian!” Alex replied: “I know, but he got me so close to the cross that everything you said in the past now made perfect sense.”

It seems that Jordan Peterson is “the gateway drug” for Christianity!

Alex – a new Christian who had never heard of Molinism – then told me that God knew that he had to be “reached” by someone who was not writing from a Christian perspective. Jordan Peterson was that guy! Thus, because God has middle knowledge, He knows that it is good that He allows Jordan Peterson – at least for a finite period of time – to remain in a state of nonresistant non-belief (for the sake of those like Alex).

(Watch this video to see a glimpse of Jordan Peterson's journey that seems to be heading toward the loving arms of Jesus.)

The salient point is that in each individual situation regarding nonresistant seekers, an omniscient God knows whether it would be better for the nonresistant seeker to become a believer at that particular time – or not. However, since there are feasible situations in which it would be better for God not to ensure that a nonresistant seeker becomes a believer at a particular time, Principle (A) is false—it is not the case that, necessarily, God will ensure that any nonresistant seeker believes that God exists.

Of course, we, as human beings limited in knowledge, might not know the actual reasons why God does not ensure that certain nonresistant seekers immediately become believers, but this does not imply God (given His middle knowledge) lacks good reasons for doing so. Consequently, since there are possible scenarios that are inconsistent with Principle (A), it follows that Principle (A) is false and this, in turn, implies that the first premise of Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument raised against the existence of God is false and, therefore, the argument is unsound.

Bottom line: Christians who reject the idea that God possesses middle knowledge do not have the resources to defeat the key premise of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness Argument. Molinists, on the other hand, can “destroy” (as the Apostle Paul says in 2 Corinthians 10:5) all of these arguments “raised against the knowledge of God.”

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

*To watch a video presentation of the journal article click here (make sure to listen to the Q&A as I have a great dialogue with William Lane Craig and other scholars). 

** The following quote from our Perichoresis journal article provides a great place to start when dealing with any "problem of evil":

"For all we know, the actual world is the best feasible freedom-permitting world, even with its moral, natural, and gratuitous evils, as well as its divine hiddenness. For example: it is possible that the actual world is the one feasible freedom-permitting circumstance where evil is ultimately defeated and all are saved (the bracketed words leave room for hopeful universalism). If this specific feasible “maximal harvest world” exists, then a perfectly wise and loving God would either create it—no matter how much finite suffering, evil, or divine hiddenness existed—or refrain from creation altogether. "