Moral Purpose, Freedom, and Judgment: Why Atheism Can’t Ground the Nuremberg Verdict
- Dr. Tim Stratton

- Apr 13
- 6 min read
Updated: Nov 10

The moral argument for God’s existence has stirred up no small controversy in recent decades. From William Lane Craig’s classic syllogism to the robust work of thinkers like David Baggett, Jerry Walls, and Adam Lloyd Johnson the case for a divine foundation of morality has become increasingly refined and forceful.
But one thing is clear: no matter how it's formulated, the moral argument presses this unavoidable point—if there are objective moral obligations, then atheism is in serious trouble.
In this post, I want to take things a step further and tighten the screws on what I believe is often overlooked in these discussions: the necessity of objective moral purpose and human freedom—two essential ingredients that atheistic moral realism cannot account for. These concepts are the backbone of what I call Purpose Theory, a model that goes beyond moral facts and explores the why behind morality: why we exist, why it matters, and why we're accountable.
And to bring it all home, I want to revisit a historical moment that cuts through the fog of moral relativism with brutal clarity: the Nuremberg Trials.
The Classic Moral Argument… And Its Evasion
You probably know the syllogism:
If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
Objective moral values and duties do exist.
Therefore, God exists.
Atheist thinkers have long wrestled with this. Some, like Richard Dawkins, reject Premise (2) and deny moral objectivity altogether. Others, like Erik Wielenberg, want to affirm objective morality without invoking God. They argue for moral truths as
brute facts
— necessary, non-natural realities that require no explanation. Let’s be clear: The moral argument does
not
claim that atheists can’t behave morally. Of course they can—and many do (Richard Suttles is an amazing example). The point is not about moral behavior, but moral grounding. Atheists can believe in and act according to moral standards. What they can’t do is explain why those standards are binding, objective, and meaningful in a godless universe. But there’s a serious problem here: these accounts can’t explain moral
purpose
or
obligation
. And without those, you don’t get the kind of morality that makes sense of human rights, responsibility, or justice. In other words, you don’t get Nuremberg.
The Missing Piece: Objective Moral Purpose
For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that Wielenberg is right. Let's assume that "causing pain for fun is intrinsically bad" is a metaphysically necessary truth, existing in some abstract moral realm. So what? Why does it matter? Who are we that we should care? If humanity is a cosmic accident, a byproduct of blind physical processes, then
there is no objective target we were created to hit
. There is no "ought" grounded in purpose—only the cold “is” of indifference. Even if moral truths exist,
no one designed us to correspond to them
, and there's
no reason we must care about them
, let alone live according to them. In contrast, Christian theism teaches that God created humanity
on purpose and for a purpose
—namely,
to love God and others
. This gives us:
A teleological moral framework (we were made to love),
A standard grounded in divine intent (true apart from human opinion),
And an obligation to approximate that standard (it seems obvious that we ought to correspond to objective reality).
By “Purpose Theory,” I mean this: Morality is ultimately grounded in the idea that God created human beings on purpose and for a specific purpose—namely, to love. Right and wrong, then, are measured by how well we approximate to that divine design. Sin is not just disobedience to a command—it’s a failure to live in alignment with our objective ultimate purpose. Other secular theories—like Kant’s moral rationalism, evolutionary ethics, or the Ideal Observer Theory—offer creative attempts to ground moral objectivity. But all of them lack what theism supplies: an actual, personal, authoritative moral lawgiver who
designed us
for a moral end and who has the right to hold us accountable. Without design and destination, duty becomes directionless.
Why Libertarian Freedom Matters
It gets worse for the atheist. If robust naturalism is true, then everything about humanity—including our thoughts, desires, and actions—is determined by the blind, non-rational, non-moral, and mindless forces and events of nature. If that’s the case, then no one—not you, not me, not even Hitler—has the ability to do or think otherwise. And if we couldn’t do or think otherwise, then we’re not rationally or morally responsible. It makes no sense to condemn someone for doing or thinking what was
literally unavoidable
. Determinism undercuts accountability. Some might object that moral responsibility doesn’t require libertarian freedom. Compatibilists argue that as long as our actions flow from internal desires—even if those desires are determined by something else—we can still be held morally accountable. But this doesn’t solve the problem; it just shifts it. If your desires, beliefs, and reasoning are determined by mindless forces of nature, then they’re not truly
yours
in any morally meaningful sense. True moral responsibility requires the opportunity to exercise a power to choose between genuine alternatives—not just to do what you were determined to want. What's worse for the atheist is that if we are not literally free thinkers in the libertarian sense, then that means that the totality of human mental activity is determined by mindless stuff that knows nothing of metaphysics or morality and doesn't care if we do either. This means that the entirety of our thoughts and beliefs about metaphysics and morality is determined by stuff that knows nothing about metaphysics and morality. On this robust view of naturalistic atheism, humanity is not rationally responsible for our mental and physical actions. And if we are not rationally responsible, then we are not morally responsible. In short:
No libertarian freedom = no moral responsibility.
But Christian theism not only affirms objective moral purpose—it grounds libertarian freedom as humans are created in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26). We were created with the power to choose love—or reject it. That’s what makes us morally responsible. That’s what gives weight to praise and blame, justice and punishment.
The Nuremberg Verdict: A Test Case for Purpose and Freedom
Let’s return to Nuremberg. After World War II, Nazi leaders were convicted of crimes against humanity. Chief Justice Jackson famously argued that they violated the
“law above the law”
—a transcendent moral standard that applied to all humans, regardless of race, nationality, or political power.
This standard assumes three things:
An objective moral law, true independently of human opinion.
That humans were obligated to obey that law.
That they had the freedom to either obey or disobey.
But here’s the rub:
only Christian theism can make sense of all three.
Let’s put it into a syllogism:
The Nuremberg Argument (Refined)
If the Nazis were properly convicted at Nuremberg, then they violated an objective moral law grounded in purpose, freedom, and accountability.
Only theism—especially Christian theism—provides a metaphysical foundation for objective moral purpose, libertarian freedom, and moral accountability.
Therefore, if the Nazis were properly convicted at Nuremberg, then theism is true (God exists).
This isn’t rhetorical overreach. It’s a serious metaphysical claim:
atheism can’t support the moral framework necessary to call Nuremberg "justice."
And if your worldview can't account for why the Holocaust was objectively wrong in a morally significant manner, then you have a serious problem.
The Three Pillars of Moral Reality
When we talk about “objective morality,” we can’t just mean abstract principles. A robust moral framework requires three pillars (3 Ps):
Purpose – We were created on purpose and for the purpose of hitting a specific moral target.
Power – We have the freedom to choose whether to hit or miss the specific moral target.
Punishment or Reward – Our choices to hit or miss the specific moral target matter, eternally.
Even if an atheist affirms objective moral truths, a pressing question remains:
Why
be moral? Why sacrifice, suffer, or stand up for what’s right if the universe is indifferent and we all end in the grave? On atheism, moral action often comes with great personal cost—and no ultimate benefit. But if Christian theism is true, moral acts matter forever and echo in eternity. Justice is not just a nice idea—it’s a cosmic objective reality.
These three pillars are missing in atheism. But they are perfectly at home in Christian theism.
Here’s a visual comparison for clarity:
Moral Feature | Christian Theism | Atheistic Platonism |
Ground of Moral Values | God's necessary triune & loving nature | Abstract objects |
Moral Purpose | Designed to love | No design |
Moral Obligation | Divine intent / design plan | Brute metaphysical facts |
Moral Accountability | Divine eternal judgment | None |
Motivation to Obey | Love of God, correspond with reality /eternal significance | Personal preference, legacy for a finite time |
Freedom to Choose | Libertarian freedom (supernatural power) | Often denied or unclear |
Final Thought: Justice Demands More Than Abstract Truths
If the moral outrage of Nuremberg means anything—if Hitler was
really
guilty, not just in human subjective opinion but in objective fact—then the universe must be more than atoms in motion. There must be a Creator who designed us for love, gave us the freedom to love, and will hold us accountable for the way we live. In short:
Nuremberg points to God
. So yes, I believe moral realism is true.
But without purpose, power, and punishment, moral realism is a hollow shell.
That’s why atheistic moral theories—no matter how sophisticated—are ultimately bankrupt. And that’s why Christian theism remains the only worldview that can truly make sense of objective justice. Stay Reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton




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