Panpsychism: Conscious Rocks and Socks

I recently read Galileo's Error: Foundation for a New Science of Consciousness by Philip Goff. I actually listened to it on Audible over the course of four days (mostly while walking my dog or working out). After listening to the first few chapters I decided to purchase the hard copy in order to read it more carefully. 

I had no idea what to expect when I started listening to Goff's book narrated by Maxwell Caulfield. I did not know what worldview Goff held or what position he would be advancing. In fact, I enjoyed the surprising twists and turns the book provided. Goff begins by making many arguments similar to the ones I have advanced against the idea that all that exists is purely the material or physical. Over the course of the first three chapters he argues against the views held by a seeming majority of atheists and mentions Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett by name. Indeed, he provides great reason to reject their materialistic views which ultimately destroy the first person perspective and the notion of "the self" (see, The Vanishing "I"). Goff is clear that it is incoherent to affirm a view that claims that "consciousness is an illusion." After all, an illusion is a state of consciousness. That's like saying that "illusions are illusory!"

That is logically incoherent, and thus, this view advanced by many well-known atheists must be rejected. 

I think substance dualism provides the best explanation of all the data. This view affirms that things other than nature exist, nature exists, and that human nature is comprised of both the physical/material and the non-physical/immaterial (you are an immaterial soul with a material body and -- as countless near death experience testimonies confer -- can survive the destruction of your material body). While Goff might think substance dualism is preferable to materialism, he is not satisfied with it for two main reasons:

1- Ockham's razor. 

2- The interaction problem.

In his debate with Goff on Capturing Christianity, Joshua Ryan Farris -- author of The Creation of Self: A Case for the Soul -- noted that Goff's interaction objection, while a challenge for the substance dualist, seems to be just as much of a problem for the panpsychist. This is the case because at least locally there’s a need to make sense of the bridge between physical and mental events even in panpsychism. And for anyone affirming property dualism or non-reductive physicalism, this is a problem or at least a question. So it's either a problem for all or a problem for none.

Kenneth Himma titled a paper in a similar manner when describing the issue: What Is a Problem for All Is a Problem for None: Substance Dualism, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem.

While I do not personally think the interaction objection is strong (see, Ghosts, Zombies, and Substance Dualism), Ockham's Razor is a good principle to keep in mind. Indeed, after providing the Kalam Cosmological Argument to a lecture hall of philosophy grad students at the Florida International University, one of the objections offered from the students was "Why assume monotheism after reaching the Kalam's deductive conclusions?" I answered: "Simple: Ockham's Razor! Why postulate additional causes of the universe when simply postulating one is enough to get the job done." 

Another good way to illustrate the power of Ockham's Razor is the following:

Suppose you attended a birthday party with twenty of your friends. Several hours after the party everyone is sick to their stomach. It is possible that each and every one of those in attendance was exposed to a "stomach bug" before or after the party, but it makes much more sense to prefer the simpler explanation: something rotten was in the birthday cake! 

With that said, however, just because a simpler explanation is often true, it is not a guarantee that it is true. As noted above, it is logically possible that each person was infected by other means. If there are independent and unrelated reasons to think these other means exist, then the simpler explanation might not be as simple as originally assumed. If there are independent reasons for thinking a supernatural God exists (see the cumulative case) and reason to think that Christianity, in particular, is true, then we have reason to think that "things like God" (such as immaterial human souls) also exist. Thus, in a case like this, one ought not be so quick to wield the blade of Ockham. 

What Is Panpsychism?

Since Goff successfully demonstrates that materialism is incoherent and he is not satisfied with dualism, what options are left? He adopts a rare and seemingly odd (but growing) view called panpsychism. This is the view that “consciousness is fundamental,” and in a sense, then, everything is conscious (including rocks and socks)!

Although he admits that this view sounds crazy, he noted that Einstein’s theory of relativity, different theories of quantum mechanics, and even the theory of evolution sounded quite counter-intuitive too, so we ought to give panpsychism a chance. Indeed, I believe it is fair to say that Goff would affirm that substance dualism ought to be preferred over materialism, but that the counter-intuitive worldview of panpsychism ought to be preferred over substance dualism. This is the case because he believes that materialism is incoherent and dualism isn’t as simple as panpsychism.

One thing that Goff noted is that his view gives libertarian freedom a shot on naturalism. Indeed, I have argued consciousness is a necessary condition for libertarian free-thinking, but it is not sufficient to provide libertarian free-thinking. However, Goff is still quite skeptical that this kind of freedom is compatible with his worldview (so am I). Indeed, one of the world's greatest advocates for Goff's view of panpsychism is Galen Strawson. He believes not only that we do not possess libertarian freedom, but that libertarian freedom is logically impossible (see my response to Strawson here). 

If this is the case, panpsychism might fall prey to a version of the FreeThinking Argument as consciousness alone does not entail libertarian freedom. After all, Calvinist determinists believe that humans possess intentional states of conscious awareness, but they maintain that everything we think of and about -- and the manner in which we experience sensations of deliberations (leading to all of our beliefs) -- is determined by antecedent conditions (see my co-authored paper with JP Moreland on the problems with that view here).

Should Christians Reject Panpsychism? 

Does a Christian need to oppose the odd view of panpsychism? It seems to me the answer is no, not technically. Indeed, Christians do not even have to reject the view that humans are purely physical beings (although I think they should). Christians can also affirm idealism -- the view that all that exists is immaterial (and that the physical world is as real as "the spoon" in The Matrix). In fact, as I have discussed elsewhere, I am quite open to this view, and if Goff is looking for monistic simplicity, then this view seems much more intuitive than conscious rocks and socks. But of course, it seems to me that God has the power to create fundamental particles with intentional states of consciousness (even though we have no good reason to think that particles possess consciousness). 

I think atheists might be attracted to panpsychism because they can reject the incoherence of materialism (that a seemingly majority of atheists affirm), and also try to avoid postulating God and souls created in the image of God (which I argue would then lead to a moral obligation to live according to the Law of Christ). Of course, Goff does not say that this is the reason he prefers panpsychism. To reiterate, he says his view ought to be primarily preferred because it does not violate Ockham's Razor. However, in a recent debate with Joshua Ryan Farris on Capturing Christianity, it seemed to become clear as to the real reason that Goff rejects the idea of God and things like God (such as immaterial souls created in the image and likeness of God). 

Problems of Evil

Goff was clear that he rejects the idea of God because of various arguments under the banner of the "problem of evil." He says:

Why create the North American long-tailed shrew that paralyzes its prey and eats it alive slowly over several days before it eventually dies of its wounds?  

I can think of several reasons as to why a maximally great being would create a world in which all kinds of natural evils (not to mention moral evils, gratuitous evils, and degrees of divine hiddenness) -- such as the one mentioned by Goff -- would come into existence:

1- A perfect God has "eternal weights of glory" in mind. 

Goff is aware of this particular instance of natural evil and does not like it. Indeed, he seems to think that this is the kind of thing that ought not be. Well, suppose that after one becomes aware of this outrageous evil he closed his eyes and awoke in a state of affairs where no human -- or animal -- ever suffers again into the infinite future. Would such a person take this suffering-free state of affairs (where everything is awesome) for granted and choose to rebel and leave it for something far-worse than the world where the North American long-tailed shrew causes affliction? Or would this person be too smart for that -- because of all the pain, evil, and suffering that they had experienced and witnessed in the past? It seems to me that one who has learned from all these "light momentary afflictions" (2 Corinthians 4:17), would be too smart to take this paradise for granted, unlike those who might be created in an affliction-free state of affairs (such as Adam, Eve, Satan, and a third of all the angels). See my short video discussing this matter here: Free Will and Sin in Heaven. 

We can summarize this via deduction with the following argument:

1. If God (a maximally great being) is omni-benevolent, then he desires genuine loving intimacy with humans.

2. If God desires genuine loving intimacy with humans, then he would create humans with libertarian freedom (because): 2.1. Genuine loving intimacy between God and humans necessarily requires that humans possess libertarian freedom.

3. If God creates humans with libertarian freedom, then he must allow humans to experience suffering (because): 3.1. Suffering results from the choices of libertarian free humans. 3.2. God created a world in which he knew (given His omniscience) that unless he permitted all kinds of evil, some would not freely choose to eternally preserve the suffering-free state of affairs in the new heavens and new earth (2 Cor 4:17).

4. God is omni-benevolent.

5. Therefore, God allows humans to experience suffering.

This argument assumes that God is necessarily omnipotent (has the power to accomplish all things logically and feasibly possible), necessarily omniscient (knows the truth value to all propositions), and necessarily omni-benevolent (desires a true love relationship with all persons into the infinite future). When we are not short-sighted and are careful to keep eternity in mind, we see that this world, suffused with all kinds of pain, evil, affliction, and suffering, is actually the most loving world a perfectly intelligent God could have created. Peter van Inwagen made it clear when he said,

“It used to be widely held that evil was incompatible with the existence of God: that no possible world contained both God and evil. So far as I am able to tell, this thesis is no longer defended.”

I have expanded upon this argument in the recently published book, Faith Examined: New Arguments for Persistence Questions, Essays in Honor of Dr. Frank Turek. I encourage folks to check it out. 

During his debate with Farris (mentioned above), Goff was asked a great question by host Cameron Bertuzzi: What kind of world would he expect to find if a maximally great being existed? Goff's response was "Heaven right away!" 

But this is exactly what God did! God created a world in which no suffering existed. However, since a perfect state of affairs requires citizens who freely choose (in a libertarian sense) to live according to the Constitution of Heaven, given this libertarian freedom and agency, humans bring suffering into this world, but those who are willing, learn from all of the suffering in this world. We learn how stupid it is not to follow the Law of Christ. We learn how stupid it is to rebel against a maximally great God of love who is also perfectly intelligent. We learn just how stupid it is not to love all people all the time.  So, although there are no metaphysical strings deterministically preventing us from sinning in Heaven, we would never freely choose to be that stupid because we have learned from these "light momentary afflictions." That is to say, a perfectly omniscient God knows that although we could sin in Heaven, we never would sin in Heaven. 

2- Animals in Heaven.

With human eternity in mind, the question is raised: but what about the animals who are suffering? 

Great question! Based upon biblical data and systematic theology, I am convinced that all animals -- including the pesky North American long-tailed shrew -- go to heaven. I do think C.S. Lewis's Narnia-esque view might be a pretty accurate description of humans and other rational animals enjoying relationships with each other and God into the eternal future. If that's the case, then animal suffering is also mitigated in light of eternity.  To consider more about my view of animals in the afterlife, see All Dogs Go To Heaven.

3- Doctor Strange and a Maximally Great Being

The popular Avengers movies -- Infinity War and Endgame -- provide a wonderful illustration of why a good heroic person would allow all kinds of terrible suffering, as long as he had the "endgame" (let alone eternity) in mind. Doctor Strange was aware of 14,000,605 feasible worlds he could create. Out of all of them, he knew of only one in which the evil of Thanos would ultimately be defeated, and all the Saints (I mean Avengers who previously turned to dust) would be raised from the dead. However, this best of all feasible worlds would also be suffused with all kinds of pain, affliction, and death. With that in mind, millions upon millions of movie-goers cheered as Doctor Strange was raised from the dead -- along with all the Saints -- and Thanos was crushed "under their feet" (Romans 16:20).

In his debate with Farris, Goff said: "To the extent I'm open to the God hypothesis, it's going to be a creator who" is doing the best He can do -- "This is going to be messy. Sorry! It's this or nothing!" 

But that's exactly what Doctor Strange did -- and exactly what God did, too! Indeed, Jacobus Erasmus and I argued this much in our essay, A Molinist Response to John Schellenberg's Hiddenness Argument. We make it clear:

“For all we know, the actual world is the best feasible freedom-permitting world, even with its moral, natural, and gratuitous evils, as well as its divine hiddenness. For example: it is possible that the actual world is the one feasible freedom-permitting circumstance where evil is ultimately defeated and all are saved (the bracketed words leave room for hopeful universalism). If this specific feasible “maximal harvest world” exists, then a perfectly wise and loving God would either create it—no matter how much finite suffering, evil, or divine hiddenness existed—or refrain from creation altogether. ”

Bottom line: Goff's error (as opposed to Galileo's) is that the problem of evil is not a good reason to reject the God hypothesis and jump to the baseless conclusion that atoms, rocks, and socks are conscious. Indeed, if Christianity is true, we should expect all kinds of affliction. Thus -- far from being evidence against Christianity --, pain, evil, and suffering not only support the God hypothesis; it all supports Christian theism. 

Conclusion

I encourage you to consider Philip Goff's ideas and to read his books. He is a deep thinker and seems to be a nice guy. Indeed, although we have some disagreements, I consider Goff to be an ally of sorts as he makes a great case against the views advanced by a plethora of atheist scholars and influencers. 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

*A note of thanks to the two philosophers who proofread my draft and offered suggestions. 

I want to be careful not to put words in Goff’s mouth. He might not believe that materialism is incoherent. He might just think it is not as good as substance dualism or panpsychism due to what is known as “the hard problem.”

Defining these views is tricky, but it seems that Goff’s panpsychism amounts to the idea that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the material world.

This leaves open the meaning of “material.” It need not be that rocks and socks are conscious, but that they are comprised of more fundamental stuff that is conscious.