The Generally Reliable Liar and the Transfer of Trust Principle

Most of us know someone who is a known liar. I have known several people over the years who could not be trusted. It seems as if some folks always lie. They even seek to deceive when there seems to be no need to do so. 

The worst kinds of liars, however, are those who are generally reliable and seem to be honest the majority of the time, but who will also, on seemingly random occasions, tell a tall tale in an attempt to deceive. These kinds of liars are much worse than those who seek to deceive all the time. Indeed, if you knew someone would always lie to you, then, in a sense, they would be trustworthy -- and you would always know the opposite was true. As Michael Scott once said: 

"Satan is a master of lies. Everything he says is the opposite!""Satan is a master of lies. Everything he says is the opposite!"

Worse than Scott's view of Satan is a trickster who is honest over fifty percent of the time, but who also seeks to deceive on occasion. For example, suppose there is a well-known liar named Gary. Gary is a lot of fun to be around and is normally honest, but everyone knows that he occasionally tells tall tales and other stories that are just plain false. 

Next, suppose that Gary tells a story about some important events that happened last night. This report might be true. In fact, this is the first you've heard of these events so you have heard no reports to the contrary. However, since you received this information from Gary — a known generally reliable liar — you immediately have good reason to doubt the story he told. Since Gary is not trustworthy, his report is not trustworthy (even if it happens to be true). 

With Peter van Inwagen's "transfer of powerlessness principle" in mind, we can refer to this as the transfer of trust principle (which of course applies to untrustworthiness). 

Next, suppose Gary was given the power to fine-tune and intelligently design Paul’s cognitive faculties and also has direct access to determine all of Paul’s mental activity (via primary or secondary causes/efficient or deficient means) — from Paul’s thoughts, intuitions, deliberations, and ultimately to all of Paul’s important beliefs.

Question: Based upon the transfer of trust principle, should Paul’s theological thoughts, intuitions, deliberative processes, and important beliefs be trusted?

Of course not. Why? Because they are all caused and determined by a generally reliable liar who is known to use his power and influence to deceive Paul on occasion (even if he is reliable a majority of the time). Gary has provided reason to not trust him. Therefore, if Gary determines all of Paul's thoughts and beliefs, then the rest of us have just as much reason to doubt Paul as we have reason to doubt Gary. 

Sadly, many Christians -- typically Calvinists -- think God is like Gary the generally reliable liar. This low view of God (as A.W. Tozer would say) logically follows from the following propositions:

1- God determines all human beliefs.

2- All humans (including all Christians) hold some false theological beliefs. 

3- Therefore, God determines all humans (including all Christians) to hold some false theological beliefs. 

Since no human -- from Sunday school teachers to mature PhD theologians -- is theologically infallible, it follows that all mature humans hold at least one false view about God or some important doctrinal issue. If this is the case and God determines all things, it follows that God determines each of these committed and spirit-filled Christ followers to read scripture, interpret scripture incorrectly, and reach at least one false belief (if not many more) about God. Indeed, the idea that God is "generally reliable" would also be determined by a supernatural agent who is known to use his power and influence to make every human hold false beliefs about him. Thus, we have reason to doubt that this deity is "generally reliable" (like the EAAN, what we would have reason to doubt is whether we are rationally justified in believing that this deity is "generally reliable," not the proposition that "this deity is generally reliable" per se), and that our cognitive faculties are reliable when it comes to theological issues and ultimate reality. 

What's more (and much worse), if one reads scripture and concludes that God determines all humans (including all Christians) to believe falsehoods about God, then this interpretation of scripture leads to the conclusion that God is a deity of deception. However, if a deity of deception is the author and inspirer of scripture, then we have reason to doubt scripture in the first place. That is to say, if one's interpretation of scripture leads to the conclusion that God is a deity of deception, then it follows that if that same deity of deception inspired scripture, we have reason to doubt scripture (the entire worldview blows up). 

This is a low view of God and horrible theology! The first premise of the above argument ought to be rejected. Consider a counterargument:

1- If God determines all things about humanity, then God determines all Christians to hold some false theological intuitions and beliefs.

2- If God determines all Christians to hold some false theological intuitions and beliefs, then God is deceptive, His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted, and Christians cannot have assurance of salvation.

3- God is not deceptive, His Word can be trusted, and Christians can have assurance of salvation.

4- Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to hold some false theological intuitions and beliefs.

5- Therefore, God does not determine all things about humanity.

If an advocate of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is determined to reject the deductive conclusions, they must defeat one of the three premises. I doubt any Christian will want to reject the third premise. This leaves two more premises to consider. 

If an advocate of EDD objects to the second premise -- which raises a defeater against one's intuitions -- by stating, "I just don't share that intuition," then no rational objection has been offered and the premise remains strong along with the rest of the argument. As Jim Slagle notes in his book, The Epistemological Skyhook (p. 25):

According to determinism . . . the only methods by which we could examine such processes are products of these processes themselves. To appeal to the reliability of these processes in arguing for their reliability is an invalid procedure . . . to appeal to these processes in order to verify the reliability of these processes is simply, and blatantly, to beg the question.

Any argument based on a logical fallacy or an "invalid procedure" is no argument at all. Since a reason to doubt the determinist's intuition has been exposed, the determinist cannot appeal to his intuition to justify his intuition. That would be the epitome of circular reasoning. This leaves only one premise left to reject if EDD has a chance to remain standing.<1>

The committed determinist cannot reject Premise (1) because it is entailed by the view they seek to defend. If a Christian affirms the first premise, however, and believes that God determines all Christians to affirm false beliefs about God and ultimate reality, then there is no good reason to believe that God determines all Christians to affirm false beliefs about God and ultimate reality. It is simply a lesson in self-defeat. Thus, the belief that God determines all things -- namely, that God determines all Christians to affirm false beliefs about God and ultimate reality -- ought to be rejected.

It is far better to take responsibility for our false theological beliefs and admit we were not as careful about handling God's Word as we could have and should have been with our God-given cognitive powers when we were handling God's Word (as Spider-Man would say, "With great power comes great responsibility"). That is to say, when a mature believer studies Scripture and reaches a false theological belief, he or she could have done otherwise, been more careful, taken bad thinking captive, and inferred Truth.<2>

I invite you to do exactly that! Reject the low view of God — that God determines all things about humanity — and maintain your ability to reason together, trust God, and trust a maximally great being’s inspired Word.

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

<1> In a desperate attempt to escape the damning implications of EDD, some have tried to appeal to the epistemic views of internalism or externalism. Neither move will free the determinist from the quicksand in which they are sinking. The internalist who says, "but I have direct acquaintance with the reasons for my false theological belief, and thus, this provides justification for my false theological belief," still has the problem that God (a deity of deception on this view) determined the Christian to reason poorly, to be aware of his reasons, but not be aware that his poor reasoning process led him to affirm a false belief about ultimate reality. As I've made clear in Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, if EDD is true, then not only does God determine what you think of and about (this includes that in which one is directly acquainted), God also determines exactly HOW you think of and about it (how you reason). On this EDD view, every Christ follower affirms a belief about God, theology, and doctrine in which they are determined to believe is justified, but it is actually false. 

The externalist fares no better if God determines all things about humanity. After all, on externalism (combined with EDD), a deity of deception intelligently designed, fine-tuned, and created the cognitive faculties which are sufficient to necessitate all of the Calvinist's false theological beliefs. If an omnipotent deity of deception determines all things, then "cognitive malfunction" never really occurs. The deity of deception's creation functioned perfectly -- from the omnipotent fiend's perspective.  JP Moreland and I discuss these problems in more detail in the footnotes of An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument. 

<2> I am not saying that a false belief cannot be "reasonable." On my view, one's noetic structure can be functioning properly and indeterministically and yet still arrive at a false belief because one simply was not as careful as they could have been with their God-given powers (they could have done otherwise in that exact circumstance with no change in antecedent conditions). William Lane Craig discusses something similar in What Is Reasonable Faith. In this article he writes: "So who decides which faith is or isn’t reasonable?  Well, obviously, YOU do (emphasis mine)! Each of us does. As Pascal said, the game is already in play; you must lay a bet. How will you choose?"

Is this choice up to you, or is "your" choice ultimately up to a generally reliable liar?