What If a Deity of Deception Told You Determinism Is True?

An outspoken proponent of Calvinism, exhaustive divine determinism, and compatibilism, recently objected to my claim that the Held Hostage Objection was a silly reason to be a compatibilist (see, What If Science Proves Determinism).In summary, my response to this so-called "hostage crisis" is threefold:

• Science is the wrong tool for the job.

• The Free-Thinking Argument and the Arguments from Reason provide reasons to reject potential ignorant claims of scientists.

• If one is still committed to using the “wrong tool,” science still stands against exhaustive determinism.

I had shared these three reasons to reject the HHO on the YouTube channel “The Complete Sinner’s Guide” (make sure to watch the video and subscribe to the channel)! My critic quickly took to social media and wrote the following:

“What if we replace science with God? What if you died, and went to heaven, and God told you, ‘Hey Dr. Stratton, determinism was actually correct.’ Would you literally say that we weren’t morally responsible? Would you say you didn’t love your wife and family at all? Would you say you weren’t free? No, and I contend *that itself* is absurd. You would be

forced

to conclude that yes, we were free, morally responsible, and we did in fact love even though determinism was true and God determined everything. Which is to say, that compatibilism is the safest and most plausible abductive conclusion in this scenario.”

Hardly! There are multiple errors in the above paragraph. First, recall that J.P. Moreland and I have shown that if EDD is true, then the creator of the universe is a deity of deception (See, An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument). Next, consider this young man's question:

“What if you died and God

told you that determinism is true?”

1-

Why would — or 

should

 — you trust a deity of deception (on this side of death or the other)? The problem does not magically go away just because you died.

2-

If determinism is true, then it is incoherent for my critic to ask me

“What would you do in this hypothetical deterministic scenario?”

 After all, if the manner in which I respond to a deity of deception (DOD), is also determined by DOD, then this compatibilist is asking the wrong guy. He needs to ask DOD.

3-

Let’s bracket the above problems for a moment and suppose that I found myself in the afterlife face-to-face with a supernatural being. This deity says:

“Determinism is actually correct. I have determined all of your false beliefs about ultimate reality and I determine all people–including all my elect–to affirm false theological beliefs.” “Determinism is actually correct. I have determined all of your false beliefs about ultimate reality and I determine all people–including all my elect–to affirm false theological beliefs.” 

If I found myself interacting with this supernatural being, then I would think this is some sort of test. Since Scripture tells us to “test the spirits” (1 John 4:1) I would respond with the following: “Well, with all due respect, Mr. Non-maximally great being, if you have determined all things, then if you used your power to determine and necessitate (

force

) Hitler’s thoughts and actions, then Hitler was a puppet — a tool — that you used to commit the Holocaust. Why should Hitler be blamed for being a passive cog when you were the 

only

 active agent in the scenario? 

By the way, are you determining me to ask you this question, or am I free in a libertarian sense to think it and ask it?

 (See, Who Are You O Man?) If it’s the former, why should I be blamed for what you are making me do? If it’s the latter, then why are you lying to me and telling me that determinism is true? Moreover, if it were true that you determine all things, perhaps I could have some form of love for my wife, but it’s no different than the kind of love my dog has for me as opposed to the Best Kind of Love that is only possible if humans are not determined by others. And finally, I won’t say that some kind of freedom is not compatible with determinism, but it is certainly not a kind of freedom that allows for moral or epistemic responsibility. Only libertarian freedom can make sense of those important qualities that are worth wanting and having.” I would then ask one final question in this "battle of wits": “

Why do I disagree with you about determinism?

Indeed, the only way I 

can

 agree with such nonsense (which you claim to have determined me to think is nonsense) is only if you determine me to think determinism is true. Since you are obviously not doing so, it is clear that you are a 

deceptive supernatural being

 as opposed to a 

maximally great being

! I will wait to speak to the real and maximal God of TRUTH — the one who raised Jesus from the dead!” Similarly, what if this Calvinist dies, goes to the afterlife, and is told the following from this deceptive supernatural being?

• “Logic is false!“

• “2+2 = 75,000”

• “Triangles can have four corners if you draw them just right.”

• “Jesus of Nazareth was fully determined by the laws and events of nature.”

• “You are a married bachelor.”

• "Thoughts and beliefs are illusory."

• "God does not exist."

• “Christianity is false.”

Just as we don’t have to worry about those absurd “what ifs,” we do not have to worry about my critic's silly “what if.” Indeed, in logic, anything at all follows from an impossible antecedent.

4-

Finally, consider this critic's contention: “. . . compatibilism is the safest and most plausible abductive conclusion in this scenario.” This is the frosting on top of a hot mess. This young Calvinist appeals to his power of abductive reasoning

after

 Moreland and I have demonstrated that abductive reasoning is 

incompatible

with his view of exhaustive divine determinism. After all, if an omnipotent deity of deception determines, necessitates, and

forces

this Calvinist to affirm a false theological belief in a specific circumstance, then it is literally impossible for this Calvinist to infer a better or true theological belief in that same circumstance. That is to say, if one is determined to affirm a false belief in a specific circumstance, then inferring a better or true belief in this circumstance is

incompatible

with determinism. If it is impossible for this Calvinist to infer better and best explanations about theological matters, then he has no logical access to abductive reasoning on this theological matter. All he is left with is question begging assertions (See, Are Determinists Guilty of Begging Questions?). Circular reasoning is no reason to believe anything. Speaking of reason . . . Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

Click here to view a video where I discuss this exact topic.