Why I’m a Mere Molinist: Divine Greatness, Human Freedom, and Biblical Fidelity

In recent days, I’ve found myself in the crosshairs of both Calvinists and Open Theists. And honestly? I consider that a good sign. When two opposite extremes are each trying to pull you in their direction, there’s a decent chance you’re standing on a solid middle high ground. That middle high ground, for me, is Mere Molinism.

What Is Mere Molinism?

Mere Molinism affirms just two key claims:

1. The omniscient God possesses middle knowledge—that is, knowledge of what any possible free creature would do in any possible circumstance, logically prior to His creative decree.

2. Human beings possess libertarian freedom in the actual world—that is, the ability to choose between alternatives without being causally determined or random, such that the agent is the ultimate source of their decision.

This framework allows God to sovereignly orchestrate history without causally determining the choices of His creatures. Divine providence and genuine human responsibility are both preserved without contradiction.

Why Molinism?

Let me briefly explain why I believe this model is not only coherent, but theologically and philosophically superior to its rivals.

1. Mere Molinism Honors the Whole Counsel of Scripture

The Bible teaches:

• God knows all things (Psalm 139, Isaiah 46:10)

• God knows what would happen under different conditions (1 Samuel 23:10–13; Matthew 11:21–23)

• God predestines according to His purpose from before the foundation of the world (Ephesians 1:4–5; Romans 8:29–30)

• Human beings resist His will (Acts 7:51; Luke 13:34)

Molinism affirms all of this without forcing Scripture through the lens of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) or denying divine foreknowledge altogether.

Psalm 139 is especially telling.

It suggests that all our days were known to God before a single one came to be. But if libertarian freedom is real, and humans can choose to end a life early (including their own), then the only way for God to foreknow those days is if He knows what free agents

would

do in any circumstance. That’s middle knowledge.

2. Mere Molinism Preserves Divine Greatness

A maximally great being must be

omniscient

,

omnipotent

, and

omnibenevolent

. But if God:

• Lacks knowledge of what free creatures would do (Open Theism), or

• Causally determines every thought, action, and sin (Determinism),

…then one or more of those divine attributes is compromised. Open Theism sacrifices robust omniscience; determinism sacrifices love, justice, and omnibenevolence. Molinism keeps all three.

3. Mere Molinism Provides a Philosophically Coherent View of Freedom

Under Mere Molinism, humans are the

ultimate source

of their choices. Their mental and physical actions are not the result of an unbreakable chain of prior causes nor the whims of divine decree. They could genuinely have done otherwise, even though God knows with certainty what they will do. This is possible because truth isn’t made true by our choices; rather, truth corresponds to what a possible libertarian agent would do in a freedom-permitting situation—even if God never creates them. As I argue in my upcoming book:

"A statement is true if it corresponds to the way things are, the way things were, the way things will be, or the way things

would have been

if things were different."

That includes counterfactuals.

Anticipating the Objections

Objection 1: Is Molinism Just Calvinism in Disguise?

Some critics claim that Molinism is internally incoherent because it allegedly affirms both meticulous providence and libertarian freedom—two concepts they believe are mutually exclusive. The argument goes: if God chooses a world in which creatures will freely do X, then they must do X, and thus can’t do otherwise.

But this objection conflates epistemic certainty with ontological necessity, and explanatory priority with causal determinism. On Molinism, God knows what free creatures would do if created and places them in circumstances where they freely do exactly that. This isn’t coercion—it’s coordination. This isn't determinism—it’s predestination (those are two different philosophical concepts).<2> God’s choice of the freedom-permitting world is logically prior to creation, but the creature’s free choice is still metaphysically grounded in their own agency, not in divine decree.<3>

As I explain in the second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, just because the counterfactual “Sally would freely choose X” becomes “Sally will freely choose X” after God creates, doesn’t mean the “freely” part magically disappears. God actualizes the situation—He doesn’t override her agency. That’s the heart of the difference between providence and determinism.

That’s the key insight Molinism preserves—and why it remains distinct from Calvinism and coherent with human libertarian freedom.

Objection 2: Where Does Middle Knowledge Come From?

Open Theists like Dr. Alan Rhoda and Calvinists like James White (odd bedfellows to be sure) raise the question: Where does the information in middle knowledge come from? If it exists prior to our actual choices, they argue, then it wasn’t sourced in us—and if it wasn’t sourced in us, we aren’t the source of our own actions.

But this objection confuses epistemic priority with causal dependence. On Molinism:

• God’s knowledge is logically prior to creation

• God’s knowing does not causally determine what free creatures do

• God’s knowledge is grounded in what possible agents (within an omnipotent God's power to create) would freely do if placed in specific freedom-permitting circumstances (God has the power to create)

Indeed, middle knowledge comes along for the ride—for free—as a logical consequence of the Creator of the universe being a maximally great being and possessing both omnipotence and omniscience. That is to say, if our Creator is omnipotent, then He has the power to create libertarian agents in His likeness. If our Creator is also omniscient, then He knows what the free creatures (within His power to actualize) would freely do—even if He chooses to never create them.

God doesn’t “discover” truths outside Himself; as an omniscient being, He knows all truths—including those about hypothetical free choices. The grounding objection either assumes a controversial truthmaker maximalism or demands a metaphysical standard that most truths (past, future, or counterfactual) do not meet (see the forthcoming second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism).<1>

Conclusion

Molinism is not a theological compromise. It is a robust, God-honoring model that affirms both divine sovereignty and human responsibility. It preserves:

• The full scope of Scripture

• The full perfection of God’s nature

• And the full integrity of human agency

So when I say I’m a Mere Molinist, I mean this: I believe God is big enough to orchestrate creation without coercion. Loving enough to give creatures real freedom. And wise enough to know what every soul would freely choose—even if He never created them. Mere Molinism is the "Goldilocks zone" of theology. It's juuuust right! ;) Stay tuned. And stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18). Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

<1>

In particular, see Chapter 15 for an in-depth treatment of the grounding objection and Chapter 14 for scriptural analysis.

<2>

Open theists often make claims like this:

“You Molinists deny determinism explicitly, but you smuggle it back in implicitly through God’s selection of the world.”

I respond with the following:

“No—we carefully distinguish between logical/explanatory priority and causal determinism, and we preserve libertarian freedom by grounding it in metaphysical sourcehood. The objection falsely assumes that necessity transfers across conditionals involving free will. It does not.”

<3> Those who claim otherwise are guilty of violating modal logic. It's like saying:

"If I would eat the donut if offered it, and then you offer it to me, then I must eat it—and it’s not really up to me.”

But that’s clearly false. The conditional being true (“I would eat it”) doesn't mean I’m causally determined to do it if the condition is met. It just means that if I were placed in that situation, that’s what I’d freely do.

This is the fallacy: It assumes that truth about what a person would freely donecessitates that they must do it, with no ability to do otherwise.

But in reality, necessity does not transfer across conditionals with libertarianly free antecedents. In other words:

Just because “Sally would freely choose X” is true, and God actualizes the world in which she’s in that situation, doesn’t mean she’s necessitated to choose X. She still chooses freely in a libertarian sense.