Why I Reject Open Theism—and Why It Makes the Problem of Evil Worse

Over the past several weeks I’ve written a number of articles explaining why I believe Open Theism struggles to make sense of the biblical data. That was one of the main reasons I ultimately rejected Open Theism after leaving Calvinism back in 2010.

At the time, I gave Open Theism a serious look. I studied Greg Boyd’s work and appreciated many of his insights. I liked his pastoral tone and his passion to defend God’s goodness. In fact, for quite a while I kept Open Theism “on the table” as a possible fallback option—something I could embrace if Molinism ever proved inadequate.

But during my graduate studies at Biola University, in the "God and the Problem of Evil" class under the teaching of Dr. Clay Jones (as I wrote my final paper for the course) it became clear to me that Open Theism does not solve the problem of evil. In fact, it makes the problem much worse. That realization sealed the deal for me and left Molinism as the only option available.

Open Theists have typically supported me as a Molinist because they agree with my critiques of Calvinism. I’ve long considered them friends and even “theological allies.” Because of that, I haven’t spoken much against Open Theism in public. To my recollection, until recently, I’ve never fully explained why Open Theism fails so badly when it comes to the problem of evil. But since some of my Open Theist allies have recently criticized my work on Molinism, the time has come to publicly explain why I could never embrace Open Theism and why I don't think any Bible-believing Christian should either.

Here is a counterfactual with a clear truth-value: had my Open Theist colleagues not publicly critiqued my work on Mere Molinism, I would not have written this article. Their objections provided the impetus to articulate why I reject Open Theism and regard it as exacerbating, rather than alleviating, the problem of evil.

In this article, I’d like to unpack why Open Theism—despite its noble intentions—collapses under scrutiny. It paints a picture of God that is not only unbiblical but, in some ways, even harder to defend morally than the views it was meant to improve.

How a Well-Intentioned Theology Creates Even Greater Problems

Many are drawn to Open Theism because they believe it helps solve the problem of evil. The reasoning goes like this: if God doesn’t foreknow the future choices of free creatures, then He can’t be blamed for the evils they commit. The Holocaust, school shootings, child abuse, war crimes, and atrocities—all of these horrors caught God off guard. But He’s doing His best. At least, they say, He didn’t plan them.

At first glance, this seems like a morally appealing solution. It paints God as a loving but limited Father who suffers with us and wishes He could have stopped the crash. He didn’t cause the pain; He simply couldn’t foresee it.

That picture definitely tugs at the heartstrings—but I believe that it collapses under scrutiny.

I understand the emotional pull. The idea of a God who suffers with us, who responds in real time, who is never the author of evil—that’s deeply comforting. But comfort isn’t the same as truth and "facts don't care about our feelings." When we trade truth for sentiment, we lose both.

The more you probe the implications, the more disturbing the picture becomes. This isn’t the maximally great God revealed in Scripture. It isn’t even theism in any traditional sense. The god of Open Theism might be well-intentioned, but this view also implies that he’s shockingly inept, tragically naive, and utterly unworthy of worship. Ironically, the Open Theist’s attempt to save Christian theism from moral collapse ends up affirming the core claim of atheism: that a maximally great being does not exist.

Let’s take a closer look.

The God Who Didn’t See Auschwitz Coming

According to Open Theism, God did not know Adolf Hitler would freely choose to enact “the Final Solution.” Thus, he also didn’t know that six million Jews would be slaughtered as a result of Hitler's free and evil choices in concentration camps. This deity simply could not foresee the gas chambers, the crematoriums, or the death marches.

Sure, He knew it was a possibility (however unlikely), or perhaps He even suspected that it might happen. Surely He hoped for the best. But ultimately, He was surprised.

Now imagine this deity witnessing the first million people brutally murdered. Then another million. And then another. If He doesn’t intervene, either He couldn’t or He wouldn’t. And neither option is compatible with the traditional understanding of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.

If He knew and allowed it, He is morally monstrous (unless, that is, He knew that specific futuregoods would certainly follow from these free and evil actions—but Open Theism denies Him this kind of justified true belief about the future). If He didn’t know the horrendous evils taking place over relatively long periods of time, He is incompetent. Either way, He is not worthy of worship.<1>

Prophecy and the Problem of Knowledge

Things get even worse when we examine prophecy.

Scripture is filled with detailed prophecies about specific future actions of free creatures. These aren’t vague predictions like Nostradamus or weather forecasts. They’re precise, personal, morally relevant, and free in the libertarian sense.

But if God doesn’t know the future, how does He predict it?<2>

The Open Theist has only two options:

1. God doesn’t really know whether the prophecy will come true. He’s making His best guess based on probability (and He could be wrong).

2. God ensures that the prophecy will come true by causally determining all the necessary details, including the evil acts.

Either way, the attempt to avoid divine culpability for evil collapses. If God guesses, He might be wrong (which means false prophecy—worthy of the death penalty). If He determines all things to perfectly fall into place so that His prophecy comes to pass, then this deity causes evil!

In trying to evade the moral problem, Open Theism either turns God into an absurdly lucky gambler or a deterministic micromanaging puppet master—ironically, the very thing they originally set out to reject in the first place.

Case Studies in Prophetic Foreknowledge

Let's consider a few biblical examples:

• Joseph Sold into Slavery (Gen. 50:20): Joseph’s betrayal is evil, yet God meantit for good. That requires advanced knowledge of libertarian choices—not causal control.

• Judas’s Betrayal (Psalm 41:9; Acts 1:16): Judas’s sin is foretold centuries in advance, yet freely committed.

• Peter’s Denial (Luke 22:34): Jesus predicts three denials before the rooster crows. Specific, timed, sinful acts along with three sets of other libertarian agents!

• The Crucifixion (Isaiah 53; Acts 2:23): The most unjust act in history—predicted with astonishing detail.<3>

• Destruction of Jerusalem (Luke 21:6): Jesus describes a violent, tragic event down to its architectural consequences.

• Cyrus (Isaiah 44–45): Named by God around 150 years before his birth, Cyrus is specifically called to overcome evil and restore Israel nearly 200 years later.

• Jeremiah (Jer. 1:5): God declares He knewJeremiahbefore he was formed in the womb and appointed him as a prophet to the nations.

These are not probabilistic forecasts or educated guesses. They require knowledge of what free creatures would in fact do in relation with other free creatures—knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs). And that’s exactly what Molinism provides.<4>

A Deadly Double Standard for Prophecy

Deuteronomy 18:20–22 lays out God’s standard which I referred to above: if a prophet speaks a word in God’s name that does not come true, that prophet must die. The test of true prophecy is 100% accuracy.

But if Open Theism is true, then God Himself can get predictions wrong. And a prophet could be executed for trusting a God who doesn't even know these future events with certainty.<5>

That’s not just absurd, it's unbiblical and morally abhorrent. It’s a hypocritical god (note the "little g") holding humans to a standard that he can’t keep. This is not the maximally great being revealed in Scripture.

The Bigger Problem of Evil

Let’s return to the core motivation. Why are Open Theists so passionate? For many, it seems to be because they believe their view solves the problem of evil. They think it exonerates God by limiting His knowledge.

But in reality, it makes the problem so much worse.

If God doesn’t know specific future evil is coming, then he allows suffering with no redeeming and guaranteed plan. He permits horrors with no providential purpose. Evil becomes gratuitous, not instrumental—and something that He could prevent but chooses not to.

By contrast, Molinism holds that a maximally great being (God) permits evil only if He knows that it will ultimately contribute to the greatest feasible freedom-permitting eternal future. Evil is still evil. But it isn’t pointless (Genesis 50:20; 1 Corinthians 4:17).

The Problem of Natural Evil

Open Theism also stumbles badly on the problem of natural evil—events like earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, and, most recently, the horrific flash flood in Texas this weekend that killed so many young girls at camp.

As a Molinist, I can be sickened, horrified, and heartbroken when I see such tragedies unfold, yet also comforted knowing that the God of middle knowledge sovereignly created the best feasible freedom-permitting world—one where evil is ultimately defeated, and every soul not transworld-damned is saved. God knew that allowing this tragedy was necessary for greater future and eternal goods that justify it, even though those future goods might be presently hidden from us (2 Corinthians 4:17).

But what about the god of Open Theism?

The Open Theist asserts that God cannot know the future free choices of libertarian agents—but they also affirm that He does know the deterministic events of the natural world. Surely this god knew, well in advance, that a deadly flood was going to strike Texas on July 4, 2025. He also knew that these parents were planning days in advance to send their daughters to that camp on that exact night.

Yet, this god—who supposedly values human flourishing—did nothing to stop their plans from moving forward.

This deity could have warned the parents through a weatherman, prompted sickness to keep the girls home, or otherwise intervened in multitudes of ways to protect them. Since Open Theism denies that God has access to future eternal goods resulting from the tragedy, the only benevolent course of action would have been to prevent the girls from getting to the camp. And yet this god failed to do so.

This is not the God of Scripture. It is not a being worthy of worship.

The maximally great God of Molinism, however, remains trustworthy—even in the face of unimaginable pain—because He alone knows how all things work together for the future good of free agents who love Him (Romans 8:28).

The Problem of Divine Hiddenness

Open Theism also fares poorly when it comes to the problem of divine hiddenness.

John Schellenberg and others have argued that the existence of non-resistant non-believers is strong evidence against theism. But here Molinism shines! In Chapter 16 of my book Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism (and in my co-authored academic article with Jacobus Erasmus), I explained why God, knowing the future eternal goods that are guaranteed to result from allowing a person to remain in non-resistant non-belief for a time, is justified in delaying His self-revelation.

But the god of Open Theism doesn’t have that kind of knowledge.

If God doesn’t know how the story of libertarian agents ends, He can’t weigh future goods against their present disbelief. Therefore, if He truly is loving and good, He would immediately reveal Himself to every sincere seeker the moment they become open to Him.

We know from experience, and even Schellenberg’s own arguments, that non-resistant non-believers exist. I'm confident that I know some of these folks personally. But on Open Theism, their existence is inexplicable.

So we can formulate the problem like this:

1. If Open Theism is true, there would never be non-resistant non-believers.

2. Non-resistant non-believers exist.

3. Therefore, Open Theism is false.

Once again, Molinism explains what Open Theism cannot: why God justifiably remains hidden—for now—because He knows the future good of each soul who would freely love Him into the eternal future.

Enter Molinism: A Better Way

Molinism affirms that God possesses middle knowledge: He knows what any free creature would do in any possible set of circumstances possible for Him to create. This allows God to sovereignly order history without micromanaging or causally determining human choices.<6>

God isn’t surprised. He doesn’t guess. He doesn’t override freedom. He simply knows.

This means:

• God is omniscient (He knows all truths, including CCFs).

• Humans are libertarianly free and responsible agents.

• Evil is permitted only if it contributes to future and eternal goods.

• Prophecy of the future is trustworthy and precise.

• God is maximally great and morally perfect.

Conclusion: When Open Theism Collapses into Atheism

I don't doubt that many Open Theists are sincere Christians who love Jesus and affirm the gospel. Let me be clear: Open Theists are my brothers and sisters in Christ and they are saved! But the God they describe, although they don't seem to realize it, is so diminished in power, knowledge, and goodness that he no longer qualifies as God in any meaningful or biblical sense. Open Theism, to its credit, attempts to protect God’s goodness by limiting His greatness and rejecting his maximal greatness. But the result is a god who is surprised by evil, powerless to stop it (or chooses not to), and unable to guarantee redemption through it.

That’s not just bad theology. At its logical end, Open Theism collapses into functional atheism.<7>

If such a limited deity exists, he may be supernatural—but he is not God in any meaningful or biblical sense. He is far from perfect. He is not worthy of worship.

To affirm Open Theism is to deny the existence of a maximally great God. And once you’ve done that, atheism—the affirmation that a maximally great being does not exist—is the only logical conclusion.<8>

Let that sink in: if Open Theism is true, then so is atheism.<9> What's the advantage of becoming an Open Theist? I don't see it.

Molinism, by contrast, preserves God’s sovereignty, omniscience, omnipotence, omni-benevolence, and moral perfection while affirming the genuine and libertarian freedom of  humanity. It offers the best answer for Christian theists when faced with the problem of evil posed by atheists.

Because the God of middle knowledge did know that evil was coming.

And He knew exactly how to redeem it.

If you’ve embraced Open Theism out of a desire to honor God’s goodness, I get it—I really do. But I invite you to take a closer look. The God of Molinism doesn’t just permit evil; He redeems it. Like a jiujitsu master, God uses the momentum of evil against itself through His perfect knowledge.

In Summary: Why Open Theism Fails

In the end, Open Theism collapses under scrutiny because it portrays a god who is anything but maximally great and worthy of worship. Specifically, Open Theism makes God:

• a moral monster, standing by while ongoing atrocities like the Holocaust and sexual abuse of children unfold—even long after it’s obvious what’s happening—with no guarantee that such horrors will contribute to any future greater goods;

• culpable for evil, since He must either causally determine sinful acts to fulfill prophecy (or else gamble on absurdly lucky guesses to get them right);

• hypocritical, holding human prophets to a standard of perfect predictive accuracy—even executing them for mistakes—while He Himself can be mistaken about the future;

• tragically reckless, allowing people to walk into predictable, deterministic disasters (like floods and hurricanes) without so much as a warning, despite knowing full well they’re coming;

• inconsistent and short-sighted, withholding His self-revelation from non-resistant seekers at crucial moments, even though He lacks knowledge of how their future choices will ultimately unfold;

• and ultimately, impotent to redeem, permitting evils that risk being entirely gratuitous—suffering with no ultimate purpose or guarantee of redemption.

By contrast, Molinism vindicates God’s sovereignty, omniscience, moral perfection, and redemptive power—while preserving genuine human freedom. The God of Molinism not only permits evil, He masterfully redeems it, ensuring that all things work together for the good of those who love Him.

Indeed, the God of Molinism is worthy of worship!

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

Important Notes

<1> Open Theists will protest here, arguing that “God didn’t foresee Auschwitz, but He could still act to redeem and limit the damage in real time.” While I appreciate that sentiment, it still leaves God powerless to guarantee any particular redemptive endgame or to prevent gratuitous evil. If God can only react in real time, then He could not know whether any evil event—like the Holocaust—would ultimately bring about more good than harm. As a result, the Open Theist’s God allows vast amounts of evil (it seems far-too-much evil against the Jews, far-too-many murders of innocent babies at Planned Parenthood, too many kidnappings, sexual abuse, and murders) with no guarantee that it serves a good purpose, which undermines the very moral motivation that led them to Open Theism in the first place.

<2> Open Theists sometimes argue that biblical prophecy is not always predictive of a single, settled future but conditional and contingent on human response (e.g., Jonah’s warning to Nineveh). And they’re right that many prophecies are conditional. But the prophecies cited above (e.g., Cyrus, Judas, Peter) are explicitly detailed, specific, personal, and unconditional. These examples cannot be reconciled with a view where God is merely guessing or hoping humans cooperate with His plans. It's vital to realize that there are two kinds of prophecy (i.e., the difference between the Ghost of Christmas Future in A Christmas Carol and Doctor Strange in Avengers: Infinity War).

<3> Skeptics sometimes argue that Isaiah 53 isn’t about Jesus—but the earliest Christians, including the inspired author of Acts, clearly saw it that way. Acts 8:30–35 shows Philip interpreting Isaiah 53 precisely as a prophecy of Christ’s suffering and crucifixion. So the question is not whether we can read that into the text—it’s whether God did. While the Gospels do not record Jesus explicitly saying “Isaiah 53 is about me,” He repeatedly applied the servant’s role to Himself. For example, in Luke 22:37 Jesus quotes Isaiah 53:12 and applies it to His imminent arrest and crucifixion: “For I tell you that this Scripture must be fulfilled in me: ‘And he was numbered with the transgressors.’” Similarly, in Mark 10:45 Jesus declares that He came “to give his life as a ransom for many,” echoing the servant’s sacrificial suffering described in Isaiah 53:5,11. Together these show that Jesus understood and embraced His mission as the fulfillment of Isaiah’s prophecy (special thanks to Suzanne Stratton—my mom—for pointing this out to me last week).

<4>Open Theists sometimes counter that God could “lead” or “guide” human agents in real time to ensure prophecy without needing to know future free choices. But this undercuts their claim to preserve libertarian freedom. If God manipulates circumstances to such a degree that constrains human choices into just one acceptable path to fulfill His word, then this is extreme micro-management and functionally determinism. Molinism better preserves both freedom and God’s sovereignty by holding that God knows how humans would freely choose in any possible scenario and sovereignly actualizes the one world where His plan is fulfilled without violating freedom.

<5>Open Theists might argue that God only inspired “conditional” prophecies, leaving open the possibility of failure. But Deuteronomy 18 explicitly states that the test of true prophecy is absolute accuracy. If God is genuinely uncertain about the future, then his prophets could wrongly speak in his name—yet be unjustly executed for trusting his word. This is not only absurd, but exposes this god as either unjust or incompetent, neither of which aligns with the biblical view of God.

<6>

Although no analogy is perfect, a really good analogy is the fictional superhero Doctor Strange in

Avengers: Infinity War

and

Endgame

. Strange knew the one best feasible freedom-permitting possible future where evil is ultimately defeated and the most people are saved. Strange sovereignly actualized this one particular world (out of 14,000,605 possibilities) and guaranteed the "endgame" without causally determining or micro-managing anything. He simply gave Thanos the time stone and allowed everyone to act freely. Read more about this analogy here.

<7>

This statement is not meant as a rhetorical jab but as a

logical consequence

of the arguments developed throughout the article. It reflects a reductio: if Open Theism entails that no maximally great being exists—i.e., a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent—then what remains is not a meaningful version of theism, but

functional atheism

. The god of Open Theism, however sincere its proponents may be, is ultimately too limited to deserve the title "God" in the classical, biblical, or worship-worthy sense.

<8> To be clear, I’m not claiming that Open Theists consciously reject God or the gospel. I believe many Open Theists are sincere Christians who simply fail to see the logical implications of their theology. But the god they describe is no longer maximally great—and therefore not worthy of worship. As such, the view functionally denies the God of classical theism even while affirming Him verbally.

<9>

This may sound provocative, but it is not reckless. It highlights that once we deny God's exhaustive foreknowledge, especially His knowledge of future free actions, we unravel divine sovereignty, undermine prophecy, and ultimately downgrade God below the standard of divinity itself.