Why Paul’s Words in 1 Cor. 10:13 Demand Libertarian Freedom: A Response to Colton Carlson

Introduction

The debate over

1 Corinthians 10:13

, freedom, and responsibility continues. In this exchange, I (Dr. Tim Stratton) respond to Colton Carlson’s ongoing attempts to redefine “ability” in ways that obscure Paul’s plain assurance. Colton insists that his dispositional compatibilism can capture Paul’s promise, but as you’ll see, the very foundations of his view collapse under scrutiny. In what follows, I engage Colton point by point—addressing his appeals to authority, clarifying the difference between thin compatibility and true explanatory adequacy, and exposing the epistemic problems that arise when untrustworthy antecedent causes determine our beliefs. This isn’t just an abstract word game; it’s about whether Paul’s words offer

real pastoral comfort

or hollow philosophical jargon. So let’s dive in—back into the text, into the logic, and into the heart of what it means to say, with Paul:

“God is faithful… you are able… He will provide a way of escape”

(1 Cor. 10:13). To see our previous engagements leading to this one click here (1), here (2), and here (3). For clarity, Colton's comments are in

BLUE

and mine are in

BLACK

.

Colton Carlson (CC): //5. Back to the entailment/compatibility strategy. You say I commit to an appeal to authority or majority. How? I didn’t appeal to commentaries to *make a point in the sense of providing evidence*. It was more of an appeal to ethos; that is, I don’t think ethos is on your side. But that’s not the same as an appeal to authority. My deliberate intention to reveal (as a side issue) that your view doesn’t align with major commentaries. That’s not a fallacy. //

TIM

:

Colton, let’s be clear: you

did

appeal to authority. You said something to the effect of, “Most commentaries don’t support your view.” That’s not an argument from exegesis; that’s a numbers game. If you want to call it “ethos,” fine—but ethos doesn’t establish truth. The majority has often been wrong (just ask Athanasius standing contra mundum, or Luther at Worms). Appealing to consensus is not the same as appealing to Scripture. What matters is not how many commentators line up on your side, but whether the

text itself

demands your interpretation. As Paul reminds us, we are to “examine everything carefully; hold fast to that which is good” (1 Thess. 5:21). The Bereans were praised because they searched the Scriptures daily—not because they tallied the popular opinion. So yes, point to the scholars you admire, but until you actually demonstrate from the text why their view is correct, all you’ve done is commit the fallacy you deny. Truth is not decided by a show of hands.

CC: //You said, “But compatibility is trivial. Everything is ‘compatible’ with something at a thin level. What matters is explanatory adequacy and broad metaphysical compatibility."

It’s actually not trivial. If a compatibilist analysis of ability is compatible with the text, then that logically entails that LFW cannot be entailed by the text, even if it remains compatible with it. Think of Romans 9. Is determinism compatible with it? Perhaps. Probably. Is Molinism? Sure. Most definitely. But when I say (without endorsing this line of argument) that Romans 9 entails determinism, that means that Molinism is incompatible with the text. But, taking the modus tollens, if Molinism is compatible with the text, then determinism cannot be entailed by the text. Same thing here for 1 Cor 10:13. This is far from trivial; it’s logical.

TIM:

Colton, not every biblical verse functions like Romans 9. Romans 9 may invite debates over whether determinism or Molinism is entailed or excluded, but 1 Cor 10:13 is

pastoral assurance

—plain and simple. Paul isn’t speculating about logical space; he is grounding the believer’s confidence in the actual world:

“You are able… God is faithful… He will provide a way of escape.”

That is not thin compatibility; it is categorical assurance. And when Paul gives categorical assurance, a corresponding metaphysics is necessarily entailed. So when you claim that if compatibilism is “compatible” then LFW cannot be entailed, you miss the point entirely. Compatibility in name but not in substance is worthless if the model cannot capture the text’s promise. If your dispositional reading reduces Paul’s words to:

“Every time you sin you literally could not have done otherwise—but take comfort, you had the resources in other possible worlds,”

then you haven’t preserved compatibility—you’ve betrayed it.

The fact that your model makes Paul sound like a bad pastor is strong evidence it’s not truly compatible at all.

Thin compatibility is cheap; explanatory adequacy is costly. And 1 Cor 10:13 demands the latter.

CC: You said, "Moreover, when you appeal to Christians being “psychologically sane” and having “know-how,” you’re smuggling in assumptions your model cannot provide. If untrustworthy antecedent causes (natural laws, deities of deception, or random events) fix all their mental states, they are not rationally in control of their mental faculties—they are literally insane by definitional standards."

Where’s the smuggling?//

TIM: Colton, this isn’t just wordplay—it’s epistemology 101. The FreeThinking Argument and the Deity of Deception Argument both demonstrate that if untrustworthy antecedent conditions determine (even in an indeterministic world where not all things are determined) the entirety of your mental activity—including your metaphysical and theological beliefs—then your beliefs face an undercutting defeater that nullifies justification. Without justification, your so-called “theological knowledge” collapses into mere unjustified and subjective opinion.

So if you are not the true source of your reasoning, then something else is (see the law of excluded middle): the mindless laws of nature (untrustworthy), a deity of deception (untrustworthy), randomness (untrustworthy), or you—an image bearer of God, intelligently designed to aim at truth, but only if you exercise your reasoning powers carefully and responsibly. That, in essence, is libertarian free-thinking. JP Moreland and I have spelled this out in detail.

So when you claim, “But I still have know-how…,” you’re not escaping the problem—you’re borrowing from the very view you reject. You’re importing the necessary conditions for rational, justified belief from libertarian freedom while denying libertarian freedom itself. That is the smuggling. And you’ve been caught red-handed.

CC: //Where in the rulebook of logic do you get to claim a monopoly on certain words and definitions?//

TIM:

I never claimed to have a monopoly on definitions. What I do strive to do is define my terms with precision before the conversation even starts—and to consistently remind the reader what I mean by them throughout the dialogue.

That’s not word-policing; it’s just good analytic philosophy.

If we are going to debate concepts like “ability,” “sourcehood,” or “freedom,” then clarity is non-negotiable.

The problem arises when you use the same terms but load them with different meanings, often without acknowledging the shift. That’s not neutral—it’s equivocation. And equivocation muddies the waters instead of bringing clarity. So when I call out a weaker or redefined notion of “ability,” it’s not because I think I own the dictionary, but because the conversation depends on us being honest about what is really at stake and what we both mean when we use a specific term.

So no, I don’t claim a monopoly—but I do insist on conceptual consistency. Otherwise, we’re not arguing against each other’s actual positions; we’re just talking past each other.

CC: //If indeterminism is true, can’t I know how to play the guitar?//

TIM:

What a weird question. Not only do I affirm that indeterminism is true, but it’s also true that I play the bass guitar in a band. So yes—if indeterminism is true, you can know how to play the guitar. The real issue, however, isn’t about muscle memory on an instrument—it’s about whether you can rationally

infer

metaphysical and theological truths.

This is exactly where my arguments cut. You can pluck a guitar string deterministically, indeterministically, or even randomly and still produce sound. But knowledge—especially theological knowledge—isn’t like guitar strumming. It requires rational inference. If your reasoning process is determined by something untrustworthy (natural laws, deception, randomness) rather than you, the agent, then you’ve lost rational control over your beliefs. That’s what my FreeThinking Argument highlights.

So, yes, Colton—you can play guitar under indeterminism. But if you want to claim you know why indeterminism is true, or that compatibilism is the better metaphysic, you’re going to need libertarian free-thinking. Otherwise, you’re just assuming you can have justified beliefs while denying the very conditions that make justification possible. That’s the real “smuggling” problem.

 CC: //Seems like I can. I know how, I am psychologically sane, I have the physical capability, the mental stability, etc. Nothing about indeterminism seems to undermine these elements.//

TIM: Here you go again: attacking a position I do not hold. Colton, my argument is about when non-rational or untrustworthy antecedent conditions determine your metaphysical and theological beliefs – then you face undercutting defeaters for your metaphysical and theological beliefs. This means you cannot possess metaphysical, theological, and moral knowledge (unless your view is wrong).

Again, indeterminism can be true, and you can still have your beliefs determined by non-rational stuff or deceptive beings. Indeed, if you are not the source of your mental activity, then it logically follows that something or someone else is. If that someone or something else is untrustworthy (like mindless stuff, random events, or a deity of deception would be), then say hello to epistemic meltdown.

Notice, Colton, that this is not about whether you have the physical know-how to play guitar—that’s trivial. The issue is whether you can justifiably claim to have metaphysical and theological knowledge if your entire reasoning process is fixed by antecedent conditions outside your rational control. If your beliefs are determined by blind forces (even in an indeterministic world), then even when you land on truth, it’s accidental—you’ve blindly stumbled into it. That is not knowledge; it’s epistemic luck.

So, when you confidently assert, “But I have know-how, I’m sane, I’m capable,” you’re smuggling in the very thing your view cannot provide: trustworthy sourcehood of your reasoning. And without that, your model undercuts itself from within.

Bottom line:

if

you

are not in control of your rational faculties, but something or someone else is, then you are not sane at all.

Sanity requires being in control of one’s rational faculties.

CC: //So it seems like I have the N-Ability. Now, there is additionally no decisive obstacles standing in my way to exercise the said action of playing guitar iff there is a guitar in my immediate vicinity, or circumstances, or dispositional environment. Let’s say the guitar is in the other room (it is). Can I play it in a real sense? Sure. I have the N-Ability. Can I play it in the actual world? Sure. It’s the other room; I can just pick it up and play! That is the dispositional PAPDisp. Indeterminism doesn’t do a single thing about that fact. (Again, stop bringing in determinism here; don’t care. Indeterminism, for the sake of argument, is true in the actual world.)//

TIM:

Until you start focusing on the actual argument about metaphysical and theological knowledge (which includes moral knowledge), you’re going to continue to miss the point year after year. It’s not about guitars—it’s about whether you have the power, at the moment of temptation

t

, to resist sin and take the way of escape. Is that a real option whenever you face temptation? That’s the heart of Paul’s assurance. You can parade around examples of “N-Ability” or “PAPDisp,” but those examples never touch the actual existential and pastoral stakes Paul is addressing.

The guitar-in-the-other-room analogy is trivial; resisting lust, anger, or greed in real time is not.

When the text says, “God is faithful; He will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it,” the entire comfort collapses if

at the moment

of temptation you literally cannot do otherwise.

Bottom line: If you are not the one in control of your rational faculties and moral responses, then someone or something else is. In that case, Paul’s words in 1 Cor 10:13 collapse into false comfort. Genuine pastoral assurance requires that the believer is the active, ultimate source of their response when temptation strikes—that they truly could do otherwise. Without that, “the way of escape” becomes an illusion, and Paul’s promise turns into despair instead of hope.

CC: //7. I faced your argument. I have shown that premise (1) is equivocating on “ability” (which by the way, is the SAME response Bignon gave you back in 2021; I don’t think you have caught on).//

TIM:

And I explained Bignon’s problems in response and have gone on to write much more about this in depth and detail with some of the world’s leading philosophers since. In fact, the argument has progressed quite a bit since 2021. Stay tuned for the forthcoming volume on this topic—it just got picked up by an academic press.

Moreover, I present on this topic at philosophy conferences around the country and I’m doing so again this November in Boston at the EPS. I field the toughest questions from PhD philosophers who push back, and my arguments stand strong at the end of the day.

You can keep telling yourself that I’ve “never caught on,” but maybe you should look in the mirror and get out of your echo chamber.

Here’s the truth: dismissing my updated argument by parroting an old response from Bignon is not the same as refuting the current argument. At best, you’ve recycled an objection I’ve already answered. At worst, you’ve demonstrated that you’re not engaging with the argument as it stands today. If you’re serious about advancing the conversation, then interact with the most up-to-date form of the argument, not a version from years ago. Until then, the weight of evidence and reason remains on my side.

CC: //You say I “redefine ability downward into W-Ability”. I can define ability however I want. It’s your job, as it’s your argument, to show that the ability you mean is C-Ability, and that ability is necessitated by the verse (entailed, or taught, etc.). //

TIM:

Colton, of course you

can

define ability however you want—but the crucial question is whether your definition maps onto what Paul is talking about in 1 Cor 10:13. You don’t get to just stipulate a definition and then act as if the verse supports you. That’s the very point in dispute. If Paul is offering

pastoral assurance

in the actual moment of temptation (“you are able… God is faithful… He will provide a way of escape”), then the “ability” in view must be the categorical power to actually do otherwise at

t

, not merely the dispositional possibility that you

could

under different circumstances.

Your W-Ability collapses into a hollow abstraction because it says nothing about what the believer can actually do when the temptation hits. At best, it describes what would happen to the agent in some range of possible worlds, or what they could have done if conditions lined up differently. But that is not what Paul is promising. Paul grounds his assurance in God’s faithfulness in the here-and-now (in the real world)—that when temptation comes, the believer has the power to actually escape.

So yes, I’ll gladly shoulder the “burden” of showing that C-Ability is necessitated by the verse, because the verse itself requires it. If Paul’s words are reduced to W-Ability, his assurance becomes little more than a thought experiment. But if Paul’s words are taken seriously—“you are able”—then categorical ability is on the table. The believer really can do otherwise at t. That is what makes the comfort real, not hypothetical.

CC: // You said, "But W-Ability doesn’t secure what Paul promises about what they can actually do in the actual world at t – when they are actually facing temptation. This reduces Paul’s comfort to a hollow conditional. On this W-Ability reading, Paul is a horrible pastor who delivers false hope—if not deception.”

You don’t understand dispositional ability, and I say this respectfully. Dispositional abilities don’t appeal to a conditional. They are present in the actual world. Here it is again:

N-Ability: S possesses an N-Ability to A iff, in a wide range of possible worlds, holding fixed S’s intrinsic “bundle of dispositions” to exercise the necessary skills (physical or psychological), know-how, or competence in order to A, if S were to choose (or attempt) to A , then S would successfully A . //

TIM:

Great! Let’s talk about the “necessary skills” you mention. Do you actually have the necessary skills to infer

justified true beliefs

about metaphysics and theology if your entire chain of thought is fixed by non-rational antecedent conditions? If blind physics, random chance, or a deceiver-god determines all your mental states, then whatever “bundle of dispositions” you think you have is irrelevant—you don’t have control of your rational faculties, and thus no genuine skill in arriving at truth. A “skill” that can never secure justified belief in reality is not a skill at all—it’s just a mechanistic reflex dressed up in philosophical jargon.

Now, let’s turn back to the real text under discussion: 1 Cor 10:13. Paul’s pastoral point is not about guitars, possible worlds, or abstract dispositions. His point is simple: when you face temptation, God provides a way of escape, and you are able to take it. That means that at the decisive moment—t—you, the believer, have the categorical power to resist. Otherwise, Paul’s words are reduced to a cruel irony: “Don’t worry, you couldn’t have done otherwise—but hey, in another possible world you had the resources.” That’s not hope; that’s despair.

If you really believe that the Christian has the N-Ability and W-Ability in every case of temptation, then you’re already halfway to conceding libertarian freedom. Because if it’s you exercising your skill, not just something happening to you, then you could have done otherwise in the actual world. And that is precisely what I mean by C-Ability.

Bottom line: dispositional talk may sound fancy, but it doesn’t secure the actual-world assurance that Paul gives believers. Only libertarian freedom does.

CC: //W-Ability: S possesses the power (or ability) to perform otherwise than action A in any non-derivative situation x at time t such that S could have freely chosen to either A or not A in x at t iff (i) S possesses the N-Ability to A at t, and (ii) there exists no decisive (intrinsic or extrinsic) obstacles to S exercising her N-Ability to A at t such that if S were to choose (or attempt) to A, then S would fail to A.//

TIM:

If there are no obstacles preventing S from doing A or other than A, then that means that something or someone else does not determine S to do either A or not-A. That means that S is the true source and actually

could

do A or not-A.

That’s libertarian freedom!

Notice, Colton, that on your own formulation of W-Ability, if the agent really could do A or refrain from A in the actual moment of temptation—without decisive obstacles—then the agent must be the originator of that choice. Otherwise, what makes the difference? If “nothing” explains why one path rather than the other, then it’s random. If something else explains it, then it’s determined. But if the “image of God” agent explains it, then congratulations: you’ve stumbled right into agent-causal libertarianism.

Your definitions try to re-label the concept, but the reality bleeds through: the moment you say an agent can actually do otherwise at t without external or internal constraints, you’ve granted the very heart of libertarian freedom. W-Ability collapses into C-Ability the moment you insist that the possibility is real in the actual world.

So when Paul says, “God is faithful… you are able… He will provide the way of escape” (1 Cor 10:13), he’s not talking about skills that might cash out in some other possible world. He is giving categorical assurance that at the moment of temptation you yourself can genuinely take the way of escape. That’s libertarian, categorical, leeway freedom—no matter how you try to redefine it.

CC: //N-Ability appeals to a wide range of possible worlds in which the agent would do only to ascertain what the agent could do in the actual world. That is fundamentally different than simple conditional analyses, which you keep referencing for some odd reason, and I explained this already in my above comment.//

TIM:

And I explained your error in my above comments. It seems you missed it. Let me say it again.

Appealing to a “wide range of possible worlds” doesn’t magically deliver what you think it does. You can dress it up in modal language, but if in every actual temptation a person is determined (by antecedent conditions outside themselves) to fail, then all your talk of “what they could do” collapses into a vacuous hypothetical. That’s the difference between real categorical ability and hollow dispositional descriptions.

Paul is not writing to assure the Corinthians that in some abstract modal survey they would succeed under different circumstances. He assures them that when they face temptation in the real, lived world—this world, at this moment—they are able to take the way of escape. That’s why dispositional glosses fail: they reduce pastoral assurance to philosophical hand-waving.

Bottom line: Your model makes Paul say, “You couldn’t have done otherwise in the moment, but cheer up—if things were different, you could have.” I’ve never heard a pastor give that sermon.

CC: //The agent can in fact have the N-Ability to respond to temptation; they have the know-how, the spiritual resources let’s say, and the psychological capability. They also have the opportunity in a real sense, for both (i) and (ii) of a W-Ability are satisfied. Can you please show me how either (i) or (ii) of W-Ability aren’t satisfied from the verse, without appealing to incompatibilism, thus resulting in an independent and contrastive reason to prefer incompatibilism over compatibilism?//

TIM:

I don’t know how many times I have to repeat myself, but here we go again:

• Supposed “know-how” regarding theological/moral issues already faces an undercutting defeater if one does not possess libertarian free-thinking (see the Free-Thinking Argument and the Deity of Deception Argument).

• What are these “spiritual resources” you claim to possess if either a deity of deception or mindless sub-personal random events determine what thoughts you have about them and how you interpret those thoughts? If that’s the case, you are not using resources—you are merely being moved by them and through them.

• Tell me about this so-called “opportunity.” Is it an opportunity YOU as an agent actively possess (one that arises from you, not merely something that happens to you) to exercise a genuine ability to choose between alternative possibilities—making only one of them actual? If yes, then you’ve just affirmed libertarian freedom. If no, then so much for Paul’s pastoral comfort.

If not, then—even in an indeterministic world—stuff is simply happening to you. You may have the “ability” for different stuff to happen to you (like a puppet being jerked left or right), but there is no active agency in that picture. If this is what you think you are, then you have a profoundly low view of human persons. Your own beliefs entail that you are nothing more than a passive cog with passive states of consciousness. You don’t actively do anything.

In conclusion:

Colton, your entire strategy depends on redefining “ability” into something that looks compatible on paper but collapses in practice.

You speak of

know-how,

resources,

and

opportunity,

but when those terms are traced back to their metaphysical ground, they evaporate. If mindless laws, random events, or deceptive forces determine the content and use of your mental states, then your “resources” are not truly yours, your “opportunity” is not genuinely an option, and your “ability” is reduced to a hollow formality.

Paul’s pastoral promise in 1 Cor. 10:13, however, is not hollow. He assures believers that they are able—in the actual moment of temptation—to take the way of escape God provides. That requires more than passive dispositions or thin compatibility; it requires categorical ability rooted in real sourcehood and genuine leeway. Anything less makes Paul’s comfort a cruel joke, and his counsel an empty shell.

This is why W-Ability and N-Ability, when pressed, either smuggle in libertarian freedom or else collapse into despair. Only libertarian freedom preserves Paul’s pastoral assurance, secures rational responsibility, and grounds true hope. Without it, you may speak the language of ability, but you have stripped the word of its very meaning.

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton