You Are Able: Even in Greek

Recently, I had the opportunity to assist my colleague Dr. Tim Stratton in an online debate with Colton Carlson concerning 1 Corinthians 10:13 and its relation to libertarian freedom. In this article, I want to expand on that exchange—not merely to come to a friend’s defense, but to make a specific, academic point grounded in the Greek text itself. I will argue (in line with leading Greek scholars today) that 1 Corinthians 10:13–14 most naturally supports C-Ability (Categorical Ability). By contrast, W-Ability (Weak Ability, even as defined by Vihvelin) is not only exegetically implausible, but nearly impossible to read out of the text without either committing grammatical errors or importing a preconceived philosophical framework into the passage prior to exegesis.

The Text

First, let’s look at the passages in question – in Greek, then in the NASB ’95 translation. Relevant words pertaining to this debate will be in

bold.

Greek (1 Cor. 10:13-14)

πειρασμὸς ὑμᾶς οὐκ εἴληφεν εἰ μὴ ἀνθρώπινος πιστὸς δὲ ὁ θεός ὃς οὐκ ἐάσει ὑμᾶς πειρασθῆναι ὑπὲρ ὃ 

δ

ύνασθε

 ἀλλὰ ποιήσει σὺν τῷ πειρασμῷ καὶ τὴν 

ἔκβασιν

το

ῦ δ

ύνασθαι

 ὑπενεγκεῖν

δι

όπερ

ἀγαπητο

ί 

μου 

φε

ύγετε

 ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλολατρίας.

NASB ’95 (1 Cor. 10:13-14)

No temptation has overtaken you but such as is common to man; and God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are

able

, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be

able

 to endure it.

Therefore

, 

my beloved, flee

 from idolatry.

Terms:

δ

ύνασθε

(“able,” pronounced *doo-nahs-theh*),

το

ῦ δ

ύνασθαι

(“to be able,” pronounced *too-doo-nahs-thai*), and

φε

ύγετε

(“flee,” pronounced *fyoo-geh-teh*) suggests a present, categorical ability to act, with

φε

ύγετε

(pheugete) as an imperative linked to verse 13 by

διόπερ

(“therefore,” pronounced *dio-pear*). This supports C-Ability over W-Ability’s conditional framework, as I’ll demonstrate. With the text and key terms established let's turn to some definitions.

What is W-Ability and C-Ability?

W-Ability (Weak Ability):

The ability to do otherwise only if prior conditions had been different; given the actual present conditions, one cannot,

or

(related but not identical) the ability to do X means that if you tried to do X right now, you would succeed (known as “dispositional ability”).

C-Ability (Categorical Ability):

The inherent power of an agent, at the exact moment of decision and under identical circumstances, to intentionally select and enact one of multiple genuinely available courses of action, where the choice originates solely from the agent’s volition and is neither necessitated by prior causal conditions nor influenced by random events For more information, see the full debate (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, and Part 5). In that debate Colton Carlson called Tim Stratton’s reading of the passage “straight wildin’.” But is it? I think the Greek could prove that Colton is not only wrong about Stratton’s reading being “wildin’” but also about his own reading being plausible. Perhaps it is Carlson whose reading is “wildin’.”

Original Communication With Dr. Stratton

What follows is a nearly word-for-word copy (with some updates for clarity) of what I wrote to Dr. Stratton concerning their exchange on this topic:

Colton Carlson makes an understandable error in the Greek when he addresses Dr. Stratton’s point about the Greek being “present tense.” In so doing he misapplies it to his own argument.

Even IF he is right, then I believe it strengthens Dr. Stratton’s case, not Carlson’s on C-Ability vs W-Ability.  First, let me explain where Carlson goes wrong.

Carlson makes this claim

, “In English, as well as Greek, present tense means an on-going, or continued action… present tense portrays moments of time that are not necessarily restricted to the ‘just now.’”

But this is only partially correct. The present tense is usually an imperfect aspect but this particular word “

δ

ύνασθε

” is in the

Present

Middle Indicative

. Why is this important? Well, in the indicative mood the meaning is a reference to the present time. In other words, it is a reference to what is actually the case right now. Carlson is partially correct, but he overplays his hand by downplaying the default force of the indicative present in this verse.

“When an author or speaker uses an indicative verb, he portrays the verb’s action as a reality.” – Dan Wallace

Context indicates how a word ought to be understood and translated in nearly every situation. In this case, the context is very clear and strongly favors a present assurance. When temptations come, God ensures you are able to endure.

While Carlson is correct that present tense does not automatically indicate “just now, categorical ability” he either fails to realize or does not understand the default force of the indicative mood.

However, it is true that the word can bear a “gnomic” or timeless/habitual sense, but again, context is key in how we discern that. To what is the author referencing? In this case the Apostle Paul is referencing a pastoral counsel concerning sin in the real world. This means that even in a gnomic sense this power is meant to be understood as real and active in reality. So, it is unlikely, given the context, that the sense of “general habit” that Carlson argues is a good translative or interpretative choice. Given both Bill Mounce’s and Dan Wallace’s work on the subject of the indicative Dr. Stratton’s interpretation is on stronger footing when accounting for context and the grammatical defaults of the indicative mood.

Finally, even if I were to grant Carlson’s argument it might even bolster Dr. Stratton’s view, not Carlson’s. Even if there is some sort of gnomic sense to the term it would imply that every time a Christian is tempted, it remains true that they “are able.” And given the context it would then extend out to the ongoing reality of temptation. Whenever temptations occur, not just at time

t

but at every single moment a time

t

will occur, that one is able, really able, to respond to God’s provision of a way out. Paul then, wouldn’t be restricting ability to a single moment, but affirming a timeless pastoral reality: whenever temptation occurs, the believer has the ability. That’s basically C-Ability universalized across all temptations.

So, either way, the grammar and the context work against Carlson’s attempt to weaken the text. Stratton’s reading aligns more closely with both the indicative’s default force and the pastoral setting of the passage. The burden is on Carlson to show that Paul meant only a weaker, dispositional sense of ability, something the grammar and the context together make very difficult to sustain.

Bottom line: What we learn from this is that our English translations are very good. Generally, they are able to communicate not only the word but the intent, in context, of how the word is used in the letter. While understanding the correct translation of

δ

ύνασθε

may not prove C-Ability (though it does show that the ability is REALLY REAL, Carlson may say that W-Ability is also “really real” but then the rest of the argument is to be considered) Carlson’s view certainly isn’t justified and when all other factors are considered, the context of the book of 1 Corinthians in general, the pastoral tone of this particular part of the letter, and what we know about the translative history of Present Middle Indicatives it seems Dr. Stratton’s argument remains on solid ground.

The above was the totality of what I communicated to Dr. Stratton for the debate. However, there is even more to consider. The concluding paragraph may have seemed out of place in the original article. Allow me to expand on what I meant by “our English translations are very good” and why the translation carries real weight in how we can interpret the passage to entail C-Ability. We could focus on much of the Greek, and while

ἔκβασιν

(ekbasin ‘way of escape’) underscores the actual option to escape, the grammatical weight lies in

δύνασθε

’s (dunasthe) categorical ability to respond to that “way of escape.” The question is about the opportunity to exercise an ability to take the escape (or not), not the escape itself. So, let’s drill down into it.

The Grammatical Force

Let’s examine the Greek more closely. As noted above, the indicative mood normally presents the action as “real.” Both Mounce and Wallace emphasize this point, especially when the verb is paired with an articular infinitive

(“το

ῦ” + infinitive

). Moreover, according to Wallace, articular infinitives with "

τοῦ

" often denote actual outcomes, not hypotheticals. Conversely, Wallace’s grammar also indicates that if Paul had intended to express a hypothetical or counterfactual ability (something like “would have” or “might”), he had a clear option: using “

ἄν

” (an) with either an indicative or optative (wish, hope) verb. What I am saying here is that Carlson’s dispositional W-Ability (via Vihvelin) requires a counterfactual structure and that counterfactual structure can be expressed in the Greek (using

εἰ

+

ἄν

). This indicates that Paul could have said what Carlson believes he did say (in line with Vihvelin’s approach to W-Ability) much more clearly. Instead, Paul uses language that communicates actual present ability. Far from demonstrating that the language is both compatible with C-Ability and W-Ability, this seems to show that it is incompatible with W-Ability and strongly implies or outright entails C-Ability. Is it

possible

that W-Ability could be squeezed into the text? Perhaps, but possibilities come cheap. After all, it is possible that we are all living in a simulation. The question is not whether it is

possible

but whether it is

likely

. To that end, Wallace’s work seems to indicate that the way Carlson seeks to read 1 Cor. 10:13 is nearly impossible in the Greek. There is a way to communicate hypothetical or possible ability in Greek. It is right there. Why didn’t Paul use it? And given that Paul had these clear grammatical options to express what Carlson sees in the passage, but chose not to employ them, Carlson’s reading becomes far less likely. Thus, the natural entailment of the passage remains C-Ability. This is what I meant by “our translations are good.” The translators understand full well that the middle indicative means real power in the moment and that there is a possible way that Paul could have constructed the passage if he really meant “if you would have been able.” Paul could have used "

ἄν

" rather than using "

τοῦ

" before "

δύνασθαι

" (dunasthe). If a compatibilist wants to appeal to the Greek, then he/she should explain why Paul avoided the very particle ("

ἄν

") that could have more accurately communicated that reading. As I said in my original communication with Dr. Stratton, I believe Stratton’s argument stands even if one grants the

gnomic

(general or habitual ability) sense Carlson is advancing. However, I believe this shows that granting the gnomic sense is unnecessary. But what about context? Well, when coupled with the context of the following passage, in the Greek, things get even worse for Carlson’s reading. As I noted in my original comments to Dr. Stratton, nearly all translational and interpretive decisions must be weighed considering the broader context. Considering all this, the broader context and flow of 1 Cor. 10 decisively undercuts the weaker reading of the word “able.” 1 Cor. 10:14 says: “

Therefore

, my beloved,

flee

from idolatry.” The two Greek words I want to focus on here are

διόπερ

 (dioper) and

φεύγετε

 (pheugete).

διόπερ

stems from the Greek word

διό

(

διά

&

ὅς

) and means “wherefore” or “therefore,” basically this construction seeks to communicate “in light of all of this.” Paul is indicating that what is to follow is the logical entailment of all that he has communicated prior. And what is that logical entailment?

“Flee from idolatry.”

φεύγετε

(pheugete) is in an

imperative mood

which indicates a command, with an assumption that the recipient has an actual power to comply, especially in exhortative contexts. This is not Paul indicating that, given a set of circumstances, it might be possible to “flee” given a prior state of desires and perfectly coordinated antecedent conditions. Paul is commanding the readers to “flee”. Why? Because they are “able.” Paul is indicating that God has provided a way out and that “you are able to endure” – “therefore, flee.” If the “ability” in verse 13 were only W-Ability then the command in verse 14 loses moral force and risks making Paul’s statement one of mockery and derision rather than pastoral guidance.

Theological and Pastoral Implications

As Dr. Karl Pagenkemper, formerly of Grace University, and now of Crown University has said,

“if determinism is true, then every imperative in scripture seems like a mockery.”

The implications of this both theologically and pastorally cannot be overstated. If verse 13’s assurance doesn’t enable an actual power to be obedient to the command in verse 14, then Paul seems to mock his “beloved” by commanding the impossible of them. Paul’s theology assumes commands are actively obeyable—not merely a thing that might or might not happen to us—thus aligning with C-Ability and entailing C-Ability, which directly contradicts and disallows W-Ability. Perhaps one could object that imperatives in Scripture do not require libertarian freedom, that they function pedagogically, to reveal God’s standards and our dependence on grace. I am willing to grant that this may be the case in some contexts (such as the Ten Commandments), but it does not fit the flow or context of 1 Cor. 10:13-14. Paul explicitly grounds the command to “flee” in the assurance that believers “are able” because of God’s faithfulness to provide "a way of escape." If this were a mere pedagogical imperative, the “therefore” (

διό

) becomes a non-sequitur. On a compatibilist reading, the imperative becomes redundant or rhetorical window-dressing, but on the natural reading of the text it stands as a genuine pastoral exhortation, one that presupposes C-Ability and the libertarian freedom to actually do otherwise. The burden of proof is on the compatibilist to show that the text supports something not explicitly stated. Perhaps they could say that the imperative is necessitated by God's sovereign determination. God “provides” a desire to flee via regeneration. However, this is a problem for at least two reasons:

• 
  
  • 
    
    • 
      

      • The imperative implies active human action based on God's provision of a "way of escape" not God determining human action towards the way of escape. Taking the way of escape is not merely dispositional (i.e., They would do it if they did it), it is not something that merely happens to the Christian. They can take it – both in disposition and in reality. Thus, it does not square with the text upon closer examination.

• 
  
  • 
    
    • 
      

      • The compatibilist risks doing to Greek what the progressive scholar does to Greek: assuming an over-contextualized meaning to a plain Greek word. Similarly, progressives do this with ἀρσενοκοῖται (arsenekoitai, pronounced ar-sen-e-koi-tai, 'men who bed males') and homosexuality, re-translating the meaning of the word into something other than it plainly is by inserting “illicit” in the context. Compatibilists risk doing something similar if they insist that God’s sovereign determination enables a person to be ‘able’ to ‘flee.’ They insert a compatibilist reading (hypothetical or dispositional language like ‘if he would have’) in the text to make it plausibly compatibilist. In both cases, Paul had precise Greek terms available—πορνεία (porneia, pronounced por-NAY-ah, ‘illicit sexual activity,’ distinct from ἀρσενοκοῖται (arsenekoitai) in 1 Cor. 6:9 and 1 Tim. 1:10) for progressives and ἄν (ahn) for compatibilists—but chose not to use them.

Finally, if spiritual regeneration is what necessitates changed desires, this does nothing for the compatibilist reading of the text because Paul’s audience—the Church of Corinth—should already be regenerate. The imperative, then, is superfluous. God has either regenerated your desires or he has not, what need is there to add an imperative to the discourse? Perhaps as a teaching tool? But to what end? What can it teach that regeneration itself must not already enable in the first place? This risks circularity in reasoning. The Greek then, seems to entail C-Ability when considering the indicative mood of “able” in 1 Cor. 10:13 and the imperative mood of “flee” coupled with the “therefore” in 1 Cor. 10:14. Far from Dr. Stratton’s interpretation of the passage being “straight wildin’” as Colton Carlson claimed, it seems to be supported by the Greek and contextual evidence. There are, of course, compatibilist responses, but each response is freighted with presuppositions that are not readily apparent within the text itself. If one would apply Occam’s razor to Greek exegesis and this passage, the principle strongly supports C-Ability. Introducing W-Ability into the passage would be nearly impossible unless one has already assumed it beforehand.

Conclusion

The indicative in verse 13 asserts actual ability in the real world; the imperative in verse 14 presupposes it. Paul could have written hypothetically with

ἄν

(ahn),

but he did not. Instead, he grounds the exhortation in God’s faithfulness to provide an escape and the believer’s genuine active capacity to take it. Therefore, the grammar, context, and pastoral tone converge on C-Ability. The compatibilist reading not only strains the Greek but risks turning Paul’s encouragement into mockery. For these reasons, 1 Corinthians 10:13–14 most naturally entails categorical ability: God is faithful, and therefore, you are able.

Stay Reasonable.

Notes

This raises the question: What do you mean by “try?” Did the person have the opportunity to exercise an ability to try (even though they chose not to try)? This merely defers the issue. To try or not try is still C-Ability. Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Zondervan, 1996), p. 448. William D. Mounce, 

Basics of Biblical Greek Grammar,

 3rd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009) Daniel B. Wallace, 

Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament

 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 448, 590-592. Carlson may attempt to invoke “compatibilist-indeterminism” as a way to avoid libertarian implications. A full treatment of this view is unnecessary here, since it functions largely as special pleading and has been addressed in detail elsewhere (see Stratton & Moreland,

An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument

, 2022). Briefly, human action is either (i) determined by natural laws and events (mindless, and therefore epistemically unreliable), (ii) determined by supernatural agents (potentially deceptive and therefore epistemically unreliable), (iii) random (irrational and therefore epistemically unreliable), or (iv) grounded in the rational agency of persons created in the image of the God of truth (John 14:6; 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Cor. 10:5; Col. 2:8; Isa. 1:18). Only the fourth option grounds trustworthy rational inference and theological knowledge, and it requires libertarian freedom. Finally, “compatibilist-indeterminism” imports quantum randomness to avoid libertarian implications. But this move both burdens Paul’s words with metaphysical assumptions foreign to his audience and fails to alter the exegetical issue: the grammar still favors either W-Ability or C-Ability, and randomness does nothing to make W-Ability more plausible. Daniel B. Wallace, 

Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament

 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996) pp. 485-87 Personal Communication, Dr. Karl Pagenkemper, 2022 But provision here is nothing more than meticulous determination, the provision is a change of nature not a change of volition. Note too that the definition of “enable” changes from W-Ability to C-Ability. In W-Ability “enable” means God actively forces a change upon the believer via regeneration. In C-Ability “enable” means God works one person’s heart in such a manner that

they

have an active role in resisting temptation, not a passive one.