Animal Suffering, Alex O’Connor, and Defeating Defeaters

Over the last few years, I have actually become somewhat of a fan of Alex O’Connor.

Many readers will remember the teenage "Cosmic Skeptic" who exploded onto YouTube years ago. While I appreciated his intelligence and willingness to engage difficult ideas, I often found him unnecessarily abrasive and overly confident. But Alex has matured considerably over time. He has become more thoughtful, more nuanced, and more willing to admit complexity where complexity exists. In a world of internet hot takes and clickbait certainty, that kind of growth deserves recognition and respect.

With that said, I was extremely disappointed by his recent on-stage discussion with Dr. William Lane Craig in England (click here).

As the discussion progressed, Alex repeatedly spoke over both the moderator and Dr. Craig (who was struggling with laryngitis), overpowered the flow of the discussion, and at times seemed unwilling to let the conversation proceed naturally. He appeared emotionally invested in the issue of animal suffering in a way that occasionally shifted the discussion from a respectful and academic dialogue into something closer to a filibuster.

I say this not as a personal attack. We all have topics that hit close to home. Animal suffering clearly appears to be one of those issues for Alex. But conduct aside, I want to focus on the argument itself because I think Alex raises a serious challenge.

And I also think his challenge ultimately fails.

More specifically, I believe I can offer a strong defeater against Alex’s proposed defeater.

The issue is not merely that animals suffer. Rather, Alex argues that the sheer amount of suffering in the natural world seems inconsistent with what we would expect from a perfectly loving God.

Predation.

Disease.

Parasitism.

Starvation.

Animals torn apart alive.

Millions of years of animal suffering prior to human existence.

Alex's point is that many traditional Christian responses to suffering seem aimed primarily at humans alone:

• Libertarian freedom

• Soul-making

• Character development

• Moral growth

• Redemption

Animals do not appear to fit neatly into these categories. Zebras being suffocated in the jaws of lions do not seem to be building courage. Gazelles being eaten alive do not appear to be developing virtue. And so Alex suggests that animal suffering counts as evidence against God.

Now notice something important.

This objection does not refute the Kalam Cosmological Argument. It does not refute the Fine-Tuning Argument. It does not refute the Free-Thinking Argument. It does not refute the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. It does not even directly attack the existence of God simpliciter.

Rather, at most, Alex’s complaint functions as a proposed defeater against perfect-being theology and therefore places pressure on the intuition behind the first premise of the Ontological Argument. That’s the real objection here. It’s not against an intelligent and powerful personal cause and creator of the universe.

Alex's challenge can be summarized this way:

"If a maximally great being exists, then why would such a being create a world containing immense animal suffering?"

That is a serious question.

But I believe the argument quietly assumes far more than it demonstrates.

I. Steelmanning Alex's Argument

I have no interest in knocking down straw men. Alex deserves better than that.

His argument can be reconstructed in something like the following form:

1. If a perfectly loving and all-powerful God exists, then we would not expect enormous amounts of unnecessary suffering.

2. If suffering has no plausible morally sufficient justification, then it is reasonable to regard that suffering as unnecessary.

3. Human suffering may plausibly be explained by appeals to:

   • libertarian freedom,

   • soul-making,

   • moral growth,

   • redemption,

   • character development.

4. These explanations do not appear to apply to many cases of animal suffering.

5. Animals have experienced immense suffering through:

   • disease,

   • predation,

   • starvation,

   • parasitism,

   • extinction,

   • painful death.

6. Much animal suffering appears to lack plausible morally sufficient justification.

7. Therefore much animal suffering appears unnecessary.

8. Therefore enormous amounts of unnecessary suffering appear to exist.

9. Therefore animal suffering appears less expected under perfect-being theism than under naturalism.

That is not a silly objection. It ought to be taken seriously. But notice something important: The key word is not suffering. The key word is unnecessary.

Everything turns on whether animal suffering is truly gratuitous. And that is where I think the argument collapses.

II. Conceivable Does Not Mean Feasible

One of the most important distinctions in Molinism is often ignored:

Possible ≠ Feasible.

Many things are merely possible. I can conceive of a possible world in which everyone freely chooses Jesus. I can conceive of a possible world with no suffering. I can conceive of a possible world in which no child dies, no animal suffers, and everyone spends eternity enjoying steak dinners in heaven without a single cow complaining.

The question is not whether I can imagine such a world. The question is whether such a world is actually feasible for God.

This is where middle knowledge becomes relevant.

God does not merely know what could happen. God knows what every free creature would freely do in any possible circumstance. Thus, before creation, God knew every feasible freedom-permitting world.

Elsewhere, Jacobus Erasmus and I suggested the following possibility:

“For all we know, God created the one feasible freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated and all who are not transworld damned are saved.”

Read that again and read it carefully.

Not merely possible.

Feasible.

If such a world exists, then a perfectly loving and perfectly wise God would either create that specific world or refrain from creation altogether.

Now notice what follows. Alex repeatedly suggested:

"God could have used different laws."

"God could have used different fuels."

"God could have created non-sentient animals."

"God could simply have done things differently."

But these suggestions demonstrate only possibility—not feasibility with an eternal endgame in mind. And this distinction changes everything.

Suppose there exists only one feasible freedom-permitting world in which:

• evil is ultimately defeated,

• all animals flourish eternally,

• and all humans who are not transworld damned are ultimately saved.

If such a world exists, then altering the sequence of events leading to that endgame no longer results in that same “maximal harvest world” (as my friend Glenn Pinson puts it).

Change the sequence and you no longer arrive at the same destination. Sure, perhaps worlds with less suffering exist. Perhaps worlds with different laws exist. Perhaps worlds with different biological structures exist. But if those worlds culminate in less flourishing, fewer saved persons, or less ultimate victory over evil, then they are not the same world.

And a maximally great being would know this.

Moreover, a maximally great being—perfect in love, power, and knowledge—would create this one feasible world with the greatest eternal endgame in mind.

This leads to an argument I’ve been advancing for several years (it’s included in the second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism). I summarized this insight with the following deductive argument:

1. If God is omnibenevolent (perfectly loving), then He desires genuine eternal love relationships with humans.
   

2. If God desires genuine eternal love relationships with humans, then He creates humans with libertarian freedom because:
   

2.1 Genuine eternal love relationships (among other goods) necessarily require libertarian freedom.

3. If God creates humans with libertarian freedom, then He permits humans to experience all kinds of suffering because:
   

3.1 Evil and suffering can result from libertarian free humans.

3.2 God created a world in which He knew (middle knowledge) that unless He permitted all kinds of suffering, some would not freely choose (libertarian freedom) to eternally preserve the suffering-free state of affairs in the New Heavens and New Earth.

4. God is omnibenevolent (perfectly loving).
   

5. Therefore God permits humans to experience all kinds of suffering.

Notice what follows.

"All kinds of suffering" includes:

• moral evil,

• natural evil,

• divine hiddenness,

• seemingly gratuitous suffering,

• and yes, our awareness and knowledge that animal suffering is real!

Why does this matter? Because animal suffering does not merely affect animals; it also affects us. We observe it. We recoil from it. We grieve it. We learn from it. Alex himself passionately objects to animal suffering precisely because he recognizes that suffering-free flourishing is better than suffering.

Perhaps this revulsion is itself part of the lesson. Perhaps creatures must freely come to understand, appreciate, and eternally preserve a suffering-free state of affairs rather than taking it for granted.

Here’s the point not to miss: Animal suffering is not some rogue category that escaped Molinism. It was already included in the framework.

Interestingly, this response depends upon distinctively Molinist resources. Open Theism sacrifices exhaustive middle and foreknowledge, while exhaustive divine determinism relegates God as the causal determiner and ultimate source of every instance of suffering. Molinism uniquely preserves exhaustive providence alongside libertarian freedom.

III. "Then That's Exactly What God Did"

Alex repeatedly suggested that a maximally great being would not permit animals—even animals that no human ever sees—to experience unnecessary suffering.

Fine. Let's grant it. Suppose Alex is correct. Suppose a maximally great being would never permit unnecessary suffering. Then if a maximaly great being exists, that is precisely what happened and what continues to happen.

Because if God possesses complete middle knowledge of all counterfactual truths prior to creation, and if God actualized the one feasible freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated and maximal flourishing is ultimately achieved, then every event God knowingly permitted contributes to that eternal endgame.

This is not exhaustive divine determinism.

Indeed, I adamantly reject exhaustive divine determinism. Humans remain libertarian agents. Humans remain genuine sources of some of their mental actions including thoughts, evaluations, and beliefs. But, as I argue in the second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, God eternally knew every free choice and every ripple effect resulting from those choices.

Thus, Alex's objection quietly assumes something it never demonstrates:

That God could have achieved identical eternal goods through another feasible world involving less suffering. But how does Alex know that? How does anyone know that?

He repeatedly says:

"It seems implausible."

"I find it difficult to believe."

But seeming implausibility is not the same thing as actual improbability—let alone impossibility. Alex’s inability to imagine God's morally sufficient reasons does not entail that such reasons do not exist, especially when discussing a being possessing complete knowledge of all counterfactual truths.

The epistemic gap between ourselves and God would be immeasurable.

IV. Doctor Strange and God's Eternal Endgame

I cannot help but think of Doctor Strange in Avengers: Infinity War. Strange surveys millions of possible futures searching for a path to victory. After examining 14,000,605 possibilities, he finally discovers one.

Just one.

And because he knows the endgame, he permits events that initially appear horrifying:

Heroes die.

Friends suffer.

Hope is lost.

Half the population of the entire universe is extinguished.

Many viewers initially wondered: "What the heck is Doctore Strange doing?!"

Then came Avengers: Endgame.

(And yes—the resurrection imagery is difficult to miss when Strange was raised from the dead along with all the Saints/Avengers who would go on to crush Thanos under their feet.)

Suddenly everyone understood. Strange was not stupid. He was not a villain. He was a an intelligent, powerful, and loving hero.

Why? Because he knew the endgame and actualized a world—although full of suffering—which would ultimately lead to the defeat of evil.

Now before someone writes me another angry email, I understand where the analogy breaks down. Doctor Strange had to search and learn over a period of time. God, on the other hand, does not search or gain relevant propositional knowledge over a period of time.

God eternally knows every feasible freedom-permitting world prior to creation itself.

Strange found one path to defeat Thanos.

God may have eternally known that only one feasible world existed in which evil is ultimately defeated, all animals flourish eternally, and all humans who are not transworld damned are saved. And if that world exists, then a perfectly good, loving, wise, and powerful God would create that world—even if it involved immense but temporary suffering.

Not because suffering is the goal. Not because pain itself is good. But because evil ultimately loses and eternal flourishing is attained.

This is not merely philosophical speculation. I believe Paul himself hints at this eternal-endgame perspective:

"For our light and momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison..." (2 Corinthians 4:17)

Now, before someone protests, I realize Paul is speaking directly about human suffering. But notice the principle at work: Temporary suffering can be instrumentally connected to immeasurably greater eternal goods. Paul is asking us to compare finite suffering with infinite flourishing.

Paul is not minimizing suffering. Indeed, Paul himself was beaten, imprisoned, shipwrecked, persecuted, and ultimately executed.

Rather, Paul is viewing suffering through the lens of God's eternal endgame.

And if my Molinist proposal is correct—if God created the one feasible freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated and maximal flourishing ultimately triumphs—then perhaps all suffering, including animal suffering, must ultimately be viewed from that same eternal perspective.

Christianity is not the problem of evil.

Christianity is the answer to the problem of evil.

Indeed, I would contend that perfect-being theology is the lens through which we can finally see this clearly.

V. Why Animal Suffering Is Not the End of the Story

This is where I ultimately part ways not only with Alex, but perhaps even with some of Dr. Craig's approach (he's still my hero).

Alex repeatedly framed the issue as though human suffering receives redemption while animal suffering does not. If Christianity is true, something special happens with humans, he argued. Human suffering gets redeemed. Animal suffering does not.

But notice what has quietly been assumed:

Animal suffering → death → oblivion. Therefore: Animal suffering is pointless.

But how do we know that? How do we know animal suffering is not redeemed? How do we know the story ends at death? How do we know the grave gets the final word?

I do not believe we know any of these things. The Bible certainly says nothing like this. In fact, I believe we have good reason to think otherwise.

Last year, after saying goodbye to my beloved dog Rondo, I wrote an article defending what I called the "Reasonable Hope Argument." My argument was not rooted in sentimentality, although I certainly loved my dog. It was rooted in perfect-being theology.

The argument can be summarized this way:

1. If God is perfectly loving, then God desires the flourishing of all creatures He creates.

2. God is perfectly loving. (1 John 4:8)

3. Therefore, God desires the flourishing of all creatures He creates.

4. If a creature is not morally responsible in a desert sense (i.e., deserving of blame or punishment), then there is no justice-based barrier to its flourishing in the afterlife.

5. Animals are not morally responsible in a desert sense. (Unlike humans, they lack rational moral agency and libertarian freedom.)

6. Therefore, there is no justice-based barrier to the continued flourishing of animals in the afterlife.

7. If God desires the flourishing of a creature, and nothing prevents its continued existence, then it is reasonable to hope that creature will exist and flourish eternally.

8. Nothing prevents God from granting continued existence to animals, including pets.

9. Therefore, it is reasonable to hope that beloved animals will be granted continued life and flourishing in the New Creation.

I don't just hope for it, I think it's probably true!

But notice what this means:

Animals do not stand before God guilty of moral rebellion. Animals are not transworld damned. Animals are not morally responsible agents in the same way humans are.

Elsewhere I have argued that human souls are more like active pilots while animal souls are more like passive passengers. Humans are rational agents possessing libertarian freedom and moral responsibility.

Yes, animals are conscious. Animals are sentient. Animals can experience pain. Animals can experience joy. Animals even possess individuality and an immaterial aspect of their existence.

But they are not active pilots in the same sense humans are.

Passengers can suffer. Passengers can flourish. Passengers can be loved.

But passive passengers do not bear the same moral responsibilities as active pilots.

Alex's argument sometimes seems to quietly import human categories into the animal kingdom.

Animals matter immensely. But they do not function identically to human persons.

Scripture itself paints pictures of animals inhabiting the New Heavens and New Earth:

“The wolf shall dwell with the lamb...” (Isaiah 11:6)“The leopard shall lie down with the young goat...” (Isaiah 11:6)“The lion shall eat straw like the ox...” (Isaiah 11:7)

Similar imagery also appears in Isaiah 65:25:

“The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall eat straw like the ox...”

Could these images be symbolic? Certainly. But symbols often point toward realities rather than away from them.

Why would the God who delights in restoring all things suddenly forget the creatures He created? Why assume Rondo—or your dog, horse, cat, or pet parakeet—is simply erased forever?

If perfect-being theology tells us anything, it tells us that God is not stingy. Quite the contrary, He is maximally great!

And maximally great beings do not create creatures merely to discard them.

VI. God Does Not Possess a Guilty Mind

Elsewhere I have argued that if Molinism is true, then the concept of mens rea—a guilty mind—does not apply to God.

God does not intend evil for evil's sake. God does not delight in suffering. God does not maliciously design creatures merely to torment them. God's ultimate intent is ultimate victory over evil and a true love relationship with those created in His image.

That matters.

Because Alex's objection can begin to sound as though God is sadistically constructing animal suffering as an end in itself. But under Molinism (a strong view of God’s omniscience) suffering is never the goal.

Ultimate flourishing is the goal. Ultimate victory is the goal. The complete defeat of evil is the goal.

Temporary suffering is permitted—not desired as an end in itself.

That is a huge difference.

VII. The Naturalistic Problem

Ironically, I think Alex's objection creates at least as much difficulty for naturalism as it does for Christianity. After all, under naturalism:

The zebra beneath the lion's jaws simply dies.

That is it.

No cosmic justice.

No restoration.

No redemption.

No ultimate flourishing.

No final victory.

No New Creation.

No eternal joy.

No "all things made new."

The suffering simply happens.

The animal dies.

The universe continues moving toward heat death.

How depressing!

Under Christianity and perfect being theology, however, animal suffering may be one small chapter in a story culminating in eternal flourishing without end.

So ironically, the worldview Alex appeals to appears to provide less hope for animals than Christianity does.

VIII. Defeating Defeaters

Defeaters matter. If someone raises evidence that undermines your reasons for belief, that matters. Alex attempts to raise a defeater against perfect-being theology:

"A maximally loving God would not permit animal suffering."

But defeaters themselves can be defeated.

If God possesses complete middle knowledge… if God actualized the best feasible freedom-permitting world… if evil is ultimately defeated… if animals ultimately flourish eternally… and if all who are not transworld damned are ultimately saved… then Alex's proposed defeater loses its force.

Alex's objection asks:

"Why would a perfectly loving God allow the zebra beneath the lion's jaws?"

My answer:

Because for all we know, that zebra's story is not over. And neither is ours.

Suppose Alex opens his eyes on the other side of death looking into the eyes of Jesus—and then looking around at this suffering-free state of affairs. He sees the exact same zebra he watched on YouTube suffering in the jaws of the lion here on earth, but now laying down with the same lion! They are flourishing and flourishing together.

Alex understands that the zebra knows that it was all worth it!

Suddenly what once appeared to be a pointless tragedy becomes one relatively small chapter in a much larger—infinite—story.

This is awesome, but an even deeper question emerges: What guarantees that a suffering-free world remains suffering-free? What ensures the “perseverance of the Saints”? After all, Adam and Eve lived in paradise and rebelled. Satan and a third of the angels dwelled in a suffering-free state of affairs and in the very presence of God who was anything but “hidden”—and rebelled anyway.

Apparently even perfect environments alone do not guarantee the eternal preservation of perfect states of affairs.

Perhaps this is exactly why God permits all kinds of suffering in the first place. Perhaps we must freely come to understand, value, and eternally preserve a world free from suffering.

If my Molinist proposal is correct, perhaps God created the one feasible freedom-permitting world in which creatures ultimately and freely choose never again to wreck what God has restored.

I know this much: I, for one, certainly will not take the New Creation for granted. I will do everything in my power to love my neighbors—and all of God's creatures—into the eternal future. And if God has actualized the one feasible freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated and maximal flourishing ultimately triumphs, then one day lions, lambs, zebras, and all of God’s creatures will lie down together and flourish together.

Evil loses.

God wins.

Humans win.

Animals win.

Stay reasonable (James 3:17).

Dr. Tim Stratton