Are Determinists Guilty of Begging Questions?

Objection!

"Over and over and over again, Stratton claims that Paul Manata is question-begging against “epistemic” incompatibilism. <See=">See" this="this" link="link</a>" for="for" details="details">. But, I don’t understand. Who’s argument is being presented? Is it Manta’s ? Is it the compatibilist’s? Who has the burden here to show that epistemic compatibilism is false? It is clearly NOT the compatibilist’s burden; it is the incompatibilist’s burden. How can an interlocuter be accused a question-begging when they haven’t even presented a *positive* argument for their view? That makes no sense.

For this most basic, elementary reason, I fail to see how Manata could be indeed “question-begging” against epistemic incompatibilism. The failure to understand this difference between negative and positive argumentation is truly bewildering. In fact, I would argue (positively) that it is worse that mere bewilderment; Stratton’s accusations charge the compatibilist camp as question-begging (committing a logical fallacy) when they indeed are not. The hundreds of curious thinkers eager to learn about this debate will therefore find an incompatibilist bent when encourtering this article, which is unfortunate because it just isn’t true."

– Colton Carlson

Dr. Tim’s Response

Oh, it’s absolutely true!

Mr. Carlson does not seem to be grasping the bigger picture. Allow me to connect some dots and address his claims. He asks:

“Who’s argument is being presented? Is it Manta’s? Is it the compatibilist’s? Who has the burden here to show that epistemic compatibilism is false?”

In our paper, An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument, JP Moreland and I argued that epistemic responsibility is not compatible with exhaustive divine determinism. Here is a variation of one of our arguments:

1- If God determines all things about humanity, then God determines all Christians to have some false theological intuitions and to hold some false theological beliefs.

2- If God determines all Christians to have some false theological intuitions and to hold some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive, His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted, and Christians cannot have assurance of salvation.

3- God is not deceptive, His Word can be trusted, and Christians can have assurance of salvation.

4- Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to have some false theological intuitions and to hold some false theological beliefs.

5- Therefore, God does not determine all things about humanity.^<1>> 

As previously pointed out in The Generally Reliable Liar and the Transfer of Untrustworthiness Principle, if an advocate of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is committed to rejecting the deductive conclusions, they must defeat one of the three premises. I doubt any Christian will want to reject the third premise and explicitly affirm that God is deceptive and that the Bible cannot be trusted. Indeed, if this premise is explicitly or implicitly rejected, then a Christian ought to run as far from this view as possible.  

Defending the Premises

What about premise (1)?

The first premise is easy to defend. It simply follows if one affirms that God determines all things about humanity and that all humans hold false theological beliefs. As noted elsewhere, if someone tells you that he holds zero false theological beliefs . . . RUN! Since no theologian worth his salt is going to assert that he has no false theological beliefs, it follows that if EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to hold theological beliefs which they believe are justified, but are actually false. 

So, the first premise follows logically from the EDD advocate’s position. This leaves only one premise left to oppose.

What about premise (2)?

If an advocate of EDD objects to the second premise — which raises a defeater against one’s theological intuitions — by stating, “I just don’t share that theological intuition,” then no rational objection has been offered and the premise remains strong along with the rest of the argument. Jim Slagle explains this nicely in his book The Epistemological Skyhook (p. 25):

According to determinism . . . the only methods by which we could examine such processes are products of these processes themselves. To appeal to the reliability of these processes in arguing for their reliability is an invalid procedure . . . to appeal to these processes in order to verify the reliability of these processes is simply, and blatantly, to beg the question.

Any argument (or counter-argument) based upon a logical fallacy or an “invalid procedure” is no argument (or counter-argument) at all. This invalid procedure is what Paul Manata and company are guilty of committing time and time again. For example, although I raised a defeater against what Paul refers to as “his reasoning” and “his evaluating,” he blithely went on and appealed to “his reasoning,” and “his evaluating.”

Consider Manata in his own words:

“I’m reasoning and evaluating Stratton’s claims. Where am I off? The *possibility* that God is causing me to behave irrationally and not appreciate evidence, fail to see what follows from what, etc?”

As I noted in the same article:

The problem for Paul is that a deity of deception might be giving Paul some true theological beliefs, but they would be mixed in a bag of false theological beliefs, and Paul has no way to sort them out and affirm which ones are true and which are false. Why? Because that same sorting out process is ALSO determined and necessitated by the same deity of deception who determined Paul to have bad theology in the first place.

As William Lane Craig said in his article Molinism vs. Calvinism, "A sort of vertigo sets in." Vertigo is a sudden internal sense of spinning. It seems that Craig is referring to an internal realization of reasoning in a circle.

Craig continues in Calvinism and the Unliveability of Determinism:

Thinking that you’re determined to believe that everything you believe is determined produces a kind of vertigo. Nobody can live as though all that he thinks and does is determined by causes outside himself. Even determinists recognize that we have to act “as if” we had free will and so weigh our options and decide on what course of action to take, even though at the end of the day we are determined to take the choices we do. Determinism is thus an unliveable view.

This "unliveable view" is exposed in the manner in which determinists typically speak. To simply respond “but I have weighed the options and sorted it out,” begs the question (a logical fallacy) that a deity of deception is not deceiving you this time, or this response inadvertently assumes the God-given power of libertarian freedom to argue against the God-given power of libertarian freedom.

Paul is using active – first mover – language, but his view of EDD does not logically allow it (which is exactly why I continue to point out the “E” of EDD). Paul’s so-called "reasoning" and "evaluations," according to his view, are determined by a deity of deception which provides the antecedent conditions that are sufficient to necessitate exactly what passes through “Passive” Paul. This includes all of Paul's theological beliefs he passively thinks are justified, but some of which are actually false. 

This is why Moreland and I wrote the following on page 11 of our paper:

“Though unintentional, by utilizing statements in expressing their views, determinists benefit from a rhetorical mirage that keeps hidden what is actually being asserted.”

Since that attack against the second premise fails, perhaps the advocate of EDD will object to the second premise by asserting, “just because God determines all Christians to hold false beliefs about God and ultimate reality, that does not make God a ‘deity of deception!’ He has good reasons to deceive us, so, we can still trust the Bible and our theological inferences from it!” 

This is a common response from those committed to determinism. This response however misses the point entirely. Our argument is not attacking God’s character or his reasons for determining all of his loyal, elect, and spirit-filled followers to read scripture and then infer, affirm, and advance false theology. After all, perhaps God has good and morally sufficient reasons to be a deity of deception. The problem for humanity trying to engage in theological discourse, however, is that God is still a deity of deception and we are all still deceived. 

If this deity of deception inspired scripture, then we have reason to doubt scripture and any other theological view one gleans from the text of scripture. As I rhetorically asked James White in our recent debate:

“If a deity of deception assured you of salvation, do you really have assurance of salvation?”

To reiterate, this is not an attack against God’s character, rather, it simply exposes the epistemic quicksand into which the EDD-theologian is sinking and suffocating.

Defeaters have been raised against the sensations of reasonings passing through Paul Manata. After all, if what Paul experiences as “his reason,” “his evaluation,” and “his deliberation” about theological matters is actually determined by a deity of deception, then there are significant undercutting defeaters (reasons to doubt) raised against Paul Manata’s thoughts and beliefs about theological matters. This includes those discussed here.

Why? Because they are all determined by an untrustworthy supernatural being (even if the deity of deception has morally sufficient reasons to be a deity of deception). Since there is reason to doubt Paul’s experiences of reason (they are suspect and in question), it would be an invalid procedure for Paul to appeal to his experience of reason to justify his experience of reason.

It would be akin to a known liar – who you know has deceived you in the past – promising you that he is not lying to you . . . this time.

If one is going to assert a certain view of the actual world, then the view offered should entail the ability of the proclaimer to make this rational inference in the same world. After all, onecannot rationally conclude a model of reality which destroys the very method he used to reach the conclusion. Alvin Plantinga notes the circularity involved by referencing : Thomas Reed’s perceptive statement:

“If you want to know whether a man tells the truth, the right way to proceed is not to ask him.”

If you have reason to suspect a certain man is a liar, why should you believe this individual when he tells you that he is not a liar? This is why millions of Marvel fans found the following exchange quite humorous:

Loki: "You can trust me."

Mobius: "Loki, I've studied almost every moment of your entire life. You've literally stabbed people in the back like fifty times." 

Loki: "Well, I'll never do it again!" 

Similarly, if we have reason to suspect that the manner in which we experience thought and reason is determined by a deceptive deity, why assume these specific thoughts and reasons (which are already suspected of being unreliable) are reliable when addressing this defeater? 

In response, however, Manata appeals to the same experiences of reason that are suspected to be untrustworthy in an attempt to conclude that they are trustworthy. One does not need a degree in philosophy to see the problem with Manata’s response. Just as anyone knows that a suspected liar is still a suspect even though he tells you he is not lying (it’s an invalid procedure), Paul Manata is begging the question in favor of his so-called “use of reason.”

So, to answer Colton's question: This is exactly HOW an interlocutor can be accused of question-begging. It is when the interlocutor commits an invalid procedure in response to an argument previously raised against his view. 

Ultimately, the second premise of this argument raised against exhaustive divine determinism is extremely strong. In fact, I have jokingly (in hyperbolic tone) referred to this premise as "one of the strongest premises in the history of argumentation!" 

What about Premise (3)?

This leaves only one premise left to reject if EDD has a chance to remain standing. I invite EDD-Calvinists to explicitly state what implicitly follows from their view. I invite them to reject the third premise and affirm that God is deceptive, the Bible cannot be trusted, and that no one can have assurance of salvation.  

Sadly, I have witnessed far too many "former Calvinists" make a similar move, deconstruct, and walk away from Christianity altogether. 

As an alternative, I invite Calvinists to do exactly what I did over a decade ago -- drop the low view of God entailed by exhaustive divine determinism! It is better to give up one's weird and unjustified commitment to determinism than to affirm that the Bible is inspired by a deity of deception who determines all of his devoted followers to hold false metaphysical and theological beliefs.  

 Wrapping Things Up

Since all Christians study the Bible and infer false theological beliefs, it follows that if EDD is true, God determines all Christians to read scripture, reason poorly, and infer false theological beliefs. But if God determines all Christians to read scripture, reason poorly, and infer false theological beliefs, then a Christian has reason to doubt his use of reason and his inferred theological beliefs. With the Christian’s use of reason and inferred theological beliefs in question, one cannot appeal to one’s use of reason and his inferred theological beliefs to justify his use of reason and his inferred theological beliefs. As Slagle noted above, that is an invalid procedure. That is the epitome of question begging.

Moreover, if one’s view entails that a deity of deception determines Christians to study scripture and reach false theological beliefs, why should we trust what the deity of deception inspired in the first place? If it is still not clear, here is another argument:

1- If EDD is true, God exhaustively determines the mental activity of all humans.

2- All humans — including all Christians — reason poorly and infer some false metaphysical and theological beliefs. 

3- Therefore, if EDD is true, God determines all humans — including all Christians — to reason poorly and infer false metaphysical and theological beliefs.

 But wait, there's more! In the following argument, a divine being who determines all humans, including all of the deity’s loyal followers, to infer and affirm false theological beliefs shall be known as a “deity of deception.”  

1- A deity of deception is untrustworthy.

2-  If a deity of deception is untrustworthy, then any of p’s theological beliefs determined by a deity of deception is untrustworthy (even if it happens to be true).

3- Therefore, any of p’s theological beliefs determined by a deity of deception is untrustworthy.

4- If p affirms premises 1 through 3 above, and p believes that all of his theological beliefs are determined by a deity of deception, then p should affirm that all his theological beliefs are untrustworthy.

5- P affirms premises 1 through 3 above, and p believes that all of his theological beliefs are determined by a deity of deception.

6- Therefore, p should affirm that all his theological beliefs are untrustworthy.

With this argument’s conclusion in mind, consider a few theological beliefs often advanced by the divine determinist:

- “My theological beliefs are true.”

- “God is good!”

- "God is trustworthy!"

- “The inspired word of God is inerrant and infallible!”

- “My interpretation of scripture is correct!”

- “Calvinism is true!”

- “I have assurance of salvation!”

- “Tim Stratton’s theological views are false.”

The list of theological beliefs could go on and on. All of them, however, are taken out at the knees by the huge undercutting defeater of EDD which relegates the concept of God as a maximally great being into a lowly deity of deception.  

Accordingly, since a giant defeater has been raised against the conjunction of the reliability of one’s theological thoughts and the affirmation of EDD (the EDD-advocate’s process of reason is suspect), if an EDD advocate appeals to his process of reason to support his process of reason (which is suspect), then he begs the question by assuming his process of reason is reliable in the face of and despite the existence of a defeater. 

Since Paul Manata, Colton Carlson, and many of their colleagues have all made this move in an attempt to object to the arguments advanced by Moreland and me, no counter-argument has been offered at all. Only logically invalid procedures, circular reasoning, and the constant begging of questions.  

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

<1> For those who need more dots connected, consider an expanded Deity of Deception Argument: 

1- If God determines all things about humanity, then God determines all Christians to have some false theological intuitions and to hold some false theological beliefs.

2- If God determines all Christians to have some false theological intuitions and to hold some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive.

3- If God is deceptive, then, there is reason to doubt God’s inspired word and what He has promised.

4- There is never reason to doubt God’s inspired word and what He has promised.

5- Therefore, God is not deceptive.

6- Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to have some false theological intuitions and to hold some false theological beliefs.

7- Therefore, God does not determine all things about humanity.