Can I Know I Exist if Determinism Is True?

Question:

After watching your debate with Alex Malpass on Unbelievable?, I have a question regarding the following argument you offered:

1. If naturalistic determinism is true, then human beings lack libertarian freedom.

2. If human beings lack libertarian freedom, then their rational processes are unreliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

3. Human beings’ rational processes are reliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

4. Therefore, human beings have libertarian freedom.

5. Therefore, naturalistic determinism is false.

What metaphysical matters are we talking about? I would think, regardless of whether or not we have LFW

, settling the question of whether consciousness is an illusion or whether I exist is very easy and it doesn't take any work of the will to affirm in the libertarian sense. Indeed, I would find it puzzling if the belief that I am conscious or that I exist was something I had to consciously affirm, and I couldn't care less if that knowledge was generated by some deterministic process that began before I was even born and I received this knowledge as a "passive cog." But if you are talking about whether presentism is true or if there are bare particulars, or if numbers exist... well, I don't think our rational processes are reliable at all to attain truth about those questions! Indeed, our rational processes seem rather inadequate even if we deliberate about those things in a libertarian sense. We might be able to generate some justification this way and that for answers to those questions, but I doubt very much that anyone KNOWS the true answer to them (except for Jesus). All this is to say, the premise is ambiguous, and the ambiguity in question exposes, I think, the irrelevance of the control condition in the free will debate for warrant about "metaphysical matters." Oh, and I thought this was one of the more pleasant exchanges to listen to about this topic. - Adam

Dr. Tim's Response: 

Thank you for sharing your thoughts with me, Adam. Allow me to address them step by step. You said,

//What metaphysical matters are we talking about? I would think, regardless of whether or not we have LFW

, settling the question of whether consciousness is an illusion or whether I exist is very easy and it doesn't take any work of the will to affirm in the libertarian sense.//

I don't know about "the will," but it seems that reaching this conclusion does require a little bit of active reasoning (which might explain why no one seemed to be expressing such things before René Descartes (1596-1650) issued his famous philosophical statement, “Cogito ergo sum

”).

 After all, I believe my dog Rondo thinks, but I have yet to hear him conclude, "therefore, I am." Moreover, if you claim that it doesn't require "any work" to reach that conclusion, and Alex Rosenberg (for example) offers an argument concluding the contrary in his book

An Atheists Guide to Reality,

now we are off to the races "working" to show why he is wrong. Consider the words of Rosenberg:

“The illusion that there is someone inside that has thoughts about stuff is certainly as old as the illusion that there are thoughts about stuff. . . if the physical facts fix all the facts, there can’t be a me or you inside our bodies with a special point of view.” (p. 214)

A few pages later Rosenberg reiterates:

“Scientism must firmly deny

 existence. The self, as conveyed to us by introspection, is a fiction. It doesn’t exist.” (p. 217)

These quotes are too good to stop:

“Now that we see that the self is an illusion, it should be easier to give up the notion that the self is free.” (p. 238)

In a nutshell, Rosenberg claims “I do not exist” (other naturalists such as Hume, Dennett, Harris, Blackmore, and the Churchlands make similar statements). With this view there are no selves, no persons, and no first-person perspectives. That is to say, the thing you and I call “I” does not exist on this particular naturalistic view. It takes a little bit of work to show why all of these folks are wrong. Moreover, in my debate with Alex Malpass, I offered a "pilot" illustration, showing that mere consciousness is not enough. We need control. Perhaps we have direct awareness of consciousness, but there are philosophers like Rosenberg who argue that intentionality is an illusion. Indeed, as Graham Oppy has noted, there is hardly any metaphysical matter that enjoys a majority vote or unanimous agreement. I am primarily discussing these issues (this would also include all the theological issues focused upon within multitudes of the well-known "Four Views" books). This would also include questions like, "do abstract objects exist," "is time dynamic or static," "does God exist," "do souls exist," "is God a maximally great being," "are miracles possible," and finally, "do humans possess libertarian freedom to think?" If your beliefs on those matters are all determined by mindless antecedent conditions that know nothing about metaphysical matters -- and they do not care if you know anything about these metaphysical matters -- then there is reason to doubt your beliefs about those metaphysical matters. After all, the source of your beliefs on these matters is unreliable. You said,

//Indeed, I would find it puzzling if the belief that I am conscious or that I exist was something I had to consciously affirm, and I couldn't care less if that knowledge was generated by some deterministic process that began before I was even born and I received this knowledge as a "passive cog."//

What do you mean when you say, "I would find it puzzling" and "I couldn't care less"? If you are determined by mindless stuff to "not care" and to "find it puzzling," why should you (or anyone else) trust your lack of care or your puzzlement? It seems to me that you are assuming that you are piloting the ship of reason, when -- if naturalistic determinism is true -- you are a passive passenger and the mindless pilot has no idea where he's going. You said, 

//But if you are talking about whether presentism is true or if there are bare particulars, or if numbers exist... well, I don't think our rational processes are reliable at all to attain truth about those questions!//

What do you mean when you say "I don't think . . ."? Again, you are assuming that YOU have the power to pilot the ship of reason to reach the rational conclusion that "I don't think our rational processes are reliable at all to attain truth about those questions." Did you (the thing you refer to as "I") reach that conclusion . . . or did mindless stuff that doesn't know anything about metaphysics and epistemology determine that thought for you? If it's the latter, then an undercutting defeater is raised against your belief that our rational processes are not at all reliable to attain truth about these metaphysical matters. This removes justification for your beliefs on this matter. Thus, you do not possess knowledge that our rational processes are not at all reliable to attain truth about these metaphysical matters. It becomes self-defeating to make such claims. Now, with much respect, I adamantly disagree with you, Adam. I do believe you and I both have the power to rationally infer truths about ultimate metaphysical reality. If I am wrong, then that means that the same antecedent conditions that determine me to be wrong also determine your thoughts and beliefs. The question is raised: What makes you so special that these untrustworthy antecedent conditions determine you to possess truth on these matters of ultimate reality, and those who disagree with you to hold false ones? And if you affirm that these mindless antecedent conditions are the kinds of things that determine humans to get these matters wrong, how do you know that they aren't doing that to you when you make your above comments? You said, 

//Indeed, our rational processes seem rather inadequate even if we deliberate about those things in a libertarian sense.//

That's because we humans *can* fail to be careful thinkers when we could have

and should have

been more careful. We humans often fail to bracket our biases which is only possible if we have libertarian freedom. We fail to take our thoughts captive although we could have. We fail to be aware of our emotional attachments to our ideas although we do not have to. Our faculties are quite reliable -- IF we handle our powers carefully and responsibly. Indeed, if Christianity is true, the God of truth (John 14:6) who desires all people to attain truth about ultimate reality (1 Tim 2:4), has given us the power to reason together (Isaiah 1:18), and take our thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5), before bad thinking takes us captive (Col 2:8), so that we can be set free by this knowledge of reality (John 8:32). This is a point J.P. Moreland and I make in the footnotes of our paper. Just as my AR-15 is quite adequate to hit a small target a couple hundred yards away, it will only do so if I AM CAREFUL, train with it regularly, and handle it responsibly. The same is true with our God-given powers to hit metaphysical targets of truth at great distances far far away. Just as Remington creates and determines their rifles to be accurate target shooters at great distances — if the user is careful and responsible — God also creates our cognitive faculties to be reliable to attain truth (at great metaphysical distances) if humans are careful and responsible. But this carefulness condition entails libertarian freedom. We can choose to be careful — or not. Don't sell yourself short. You are a divine image-bearer who -- by God's grace -- has the power to do some amazing things if you are careful to handle your God-given powers responsibly. As the Amazing Spider-Man says, "With great power comes great responsibility." You said, 

//We might be able to generate some justification this way and that for answers to those questions, but I doubt very much that anyone KNOWS the true answer to them (except for Jesus).//

If justification is generated for a metaphysical proposition that you affirm, and it's also true, then you have knowledge of said metaphysical matter (See John DePoe discuss this topic here). Indeed, carefully examine what you are doing right now: Did you offer a knowledge claim or merely a baseless subjective opinion? Did the thing you refer to as "I" reach this conclusion? Did the buck stop with you? Were you the pilot of that process of reasoning? Or did mindless antecedent conditions make you believe that no one "KNOWS the true answer to them (except for Jesus)"? If it is mindless stuff piloting your experience of deliberation, then there is reason to doubt the thoughts and beliefs produced within the thing you refer to as "I". If you, on the other hand, are piloting that ship, then welcome to the land of the free (in a libertarian sense). You said,

//All this is to say, the premise is ambiguous, and the ambiguity in question exposes, I think, the irrelevance of the control condition in the free will debate for warrant about "metaphysical matters."//

Again, note your persistent use of the term "I think." C.S. Lewis, in his book Miracles (first published in 1947) wrote the following:

“Reasoning doesn’t ‘happen to’ us: we do it. Every train of thought is accompanied by . . . ‘the I think’.”

So, as Moreland and I made clear, this means that either

YOU

are actively doing the thinking -- as a source -- or the manner in which you experience sensations of reasoning

happens

to you, and is determined by an untrustworthy and unreliable source. If the source is unreliable to determine you to affirm true metaphysical beliefs, then there is reason to doubt your metaphysical beliefs. In conclusion you said, 

//Oh, and I thought this was one of the more pleasant exchanges to listen to about this topic.//

Thank you, Adam! Many Christians can learn how we ought to argue by following the example of Alex Malpass (even though he is an atheist). His attitude helped to keep me calm and relaxed in the heat of debate. The tension was low and I had fun. It just seemed like two guys who are both trying to work at growing closer to truth together. Thank you for exemplifying the same attitude, Adam. I hope to have those kinds of conversations moving forward with atheists and Christians who disagree. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

Alex Rosenberg’s book, An Atheists Guide to Reality, is, in my opinion, the best book about atheism from an atheist’s perspective. I think Rosenberg does far more than his atheistic contemporaries in academia today taking his atheistic/naturalistic beliefs to their logical conclusions. Although I do not think Rosenberg takes them all the way to their logical destinations (which would require him to admit atheistic naturalism is false), he does get closer to the truth than the majority of his peers. A

theist philosopher Paul M. Churchland explains in his book, Matter and Consciousness, “The important point about the standard evolutionary story is that the human species and all of its features are the wholly physical outcome of a purely physical process. If this is the correct account of our origins, then there seems neither need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into our theoretical account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we should learn to live with that fact.”

“There

 are no mental states at all—no one has ever been in a mental state of pain, of having a thought or belief, or sensing something. Richard Rorty and Paul Churchland are two contemporary advocates of eliminative materialism.” Philosophical  Foundations for a Christian Worldview, p. 259

Graham Oppy wrote that “there is next to nothing in metaphysics on which there is even bare majority agreement among metaphysicians.” “Anti-Naturalistic Arguments from Reason.”

Roczniki Filozoficzne

70, no. 1 (2022): 15–35. https://‌doi‌.org‌/10‌.18290‌/rf‌22‌01‍.‍2.  This essay is focused on the justification element required for knowledge (justified true belief). But belief itself is hard to make sense of if determinism is true. Consider the words of Jim Slagle (

Epistemological Skyhook

, 206): "The claim, recall, is that there must be an

explanation

for a belief, it must be a

good

explanation, and it must be

my

explanation. But if the determining factors are extrinsic to the individual (not to the belief), then it is difficult to see how it could

my

explanation as opposed to just

an

explanation. In order for it to be my explanation, I have to accept it. If my acceptance is also determined by extrinsic forces

, then in what sense is it my explanation? In fact, how could the resulting state be called a “belief” at all? Belief seems to involve both reception of information

and some level of assent to or approval of it

. After all, we often receive information that we do not subsequently believe, so clearly mere reception of information is an insufficient definition of belief. And assent or approval in turn seems to intrinsically involve the concept of

self-origination

. I may not have to originate the explanation of the belief, but I do have to make whatever explanation there is my explanation for believing it. This would suggest that determinism is incompatible with belief, and so belief in determinism, including theistic determinism, is self-defeating."