Molinism and the Failure of Simple Foreknowledge: A Response to David Pallmann
- Dr. Tim Stratton
- 23 hours ago
- 33 min read
Recently, David Pallmann shared an Arminian critique of Molinism and argued that Simple Foreknowledge is the superior view. While his post is confident in its conclusions, it relies on several philosophical assumptions and category mistakes that require careful examination.
I believe David’s critique rests on a number of misunderstandings—both philosophical and theological. In what follows, I will quote Pallman in segments and respond directly to each major claim (the entirety of his post is found in the notes below). My aim is not to score rhetorical points, but to clarify where Molinism is being misunderstood and why, in my view, it remains the strongest model of divine omniscience, providence, and human freedom.
Before engaging his critique, however, some context is worth noting.
Several years ago, after reading my book Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism (a significantly expanded second edition is forthcoming in 2026), David Pallmann offered the following public assessment:
“First, I found Stratton’s writing style to be remarkably clear and accessible. This is always something I appreciate about a book and especially so in theological and philosophical works… Second, the sheer amount of territory that is covered throughout the book is impressive… Stratton fearlessly rises to the challenge demonstrating a strong understanding of the numerous topics he addresses. Third, and perhaps on a more personal note, I appreciated Stratton’s unflinching commitment to the authority and inerrancy of scripture… Very rarely do I find Molinists who are willing to give robust exegetical arguments for their views. Stratton’s book is a happy exception to that trend. This book is thoughtful, interesting, and will doubtless stimulate much discussion. For those who are seeking a full-scale defense of Molinism as well as an exposition of its versatility, I heartily recommend Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism.”
Although David and I have had substantial disagreements since then (regarding the Moral Argument and the Free-Thinking Argument), his earlier remarks are relevant here for two reasons. First, they show that his present critique is not the result of unfamiliarity with Molinism or my arguments. Second, they underscore that what follows is not a response to a caricature of Molinism, but to a serious proposal that David once regarded as clear, exegetically engaged, and philosophically substantial.
It's precisely because these disagreements are substantive that they deserve careful, engagement—which is what I will now provide in fifteen relatively short sections.
What Molinism Is—and Is Not
David Pallmann:
“What is Molinism? Well, Molinism can be distilled down to two basic doctrines. These are the following: (1) God has middle knowledge … (2) Human beings possess libertarian freedom …”
This definition accurately captures what is often called "mere Molinism"—the minimal commitments required for the view. It is also consistent with how Molinism has been defined and defended in my book that David endorsed above.
However, this is only the starting point.
Is Molinism Non-Soteriological?
David Pallmann:
“So right off the bat, Molinism has a pretty limited set of issues that it’s concerned with, and they are not soteriological.”
This is true of mere Molinism—but it is incomplete.
There is also soteriological Molinism. Ken Keathley’s R.O.S.E.S. model is one example. I have defended a related model using the acronym T.R.U.M.P. This is not a gesture to a political movement; rather, I’m simply encouraging people to play the TRUMP card when discussing soteriological matters.
What follows is one coherent example of how Molinism can be applied soteriologically without abandoning classical Arminian commitments.
T.R.U.M.P.
Total Depravity: There is not one aspect of human existence which is not infected by sin. However, the image of God in which humanity is created has not been erased, but rather, effaced.
Erasure of God's image would imply the loss of rational agency and moral responsibility altogether. Effacement, by contrast, means that every aspect of human nature is corrupted and misdirected by sin, while the image itself remains real and operative, though damaged.
Think of a little drop of black ink being dropped into a tall glass of pure water. Every single particle of the water is now “infected” by the droplet of ink, however, it is still a glass of water. In fact, it is still potable (although your teeth will turn black). Just as the water needs to be cleansed and purified, every aspect of the human existence needs to be cleansed and purified as well.
Resistible Prevenient Grace: On this view, contra TULIP, God’s grace is not “irresistible,” however, it is Amazing Grace! Humans possess the genuine freedom to reject God’s amazing grace (and love) or not. Every single human gets to make a free and informed decision to respond to God’s amazing grace.
Since the question of the unevangelized often comes up at this point, consider an article I wrote about this topic here.
Unlimited Atonement: God (a maximally great being) “is love” (1 John 4:8) and perfectly loves all people, desires the best for all people, and his perfect love and amazing grace are genuinely available to all people (John 3:16; 1 Tim 2:4; 4:10; 2 Pet 3:9).
Jesus tells the parable of the prodigal son to describe God’s perfect love for humanity. Accordingly, the father’s love was always available to his son, and it never decreased or disappeared even when his son rejected his father. The son separated himself from his father’s perfect love and the father did not force his son to remain in his presence. It was not until his son freely chose to repent and return to his father’s love, that their relationship was restored. It is vital to see that if the son would have never made the choice to stop resisting his father’s love—and return to his father—then their relationship would have never been restored. This is representative of God’s love for all people. God loves first and loves all people unconditionally—just as the father in the parable—and God’s love is always available. Indeed, God is omni-benevolent.
Middle Knowledge of the Elect: God created a world in which he knew all people could freely choose to accept his invitation (it is actually available to all people); however, he also knew that not all people would freely accept his marriage proposal. God actualized and elected a world in which he knew the atonement was logically sufficient for all mankind (1 Tim 4:10); he also specifically knew which individual humans would freely choose to reject it (although they did not have to). It follows that God created a world in which he knew with perfect certainty that the atonement was logically sufficient for all but would only be freely experienced by a limited number of humanity.
Perseverance of Free Saints: God created a world in which he knew which persons would freely choose to love him for eternity. This is easy if God is truly omniscient and omnipotent. God actualized a world in which he knows which persons will freely choose to love God and persevere into the infinite future. True love never fails (1 Cor 13:4–8).
With the T.R.U.M.P. card in mind, one can label himself as a Five-Point Molinist.
Now, while it’s true that one is not logically forced to apply Molinism to salvation, refusing to do so quickly becomes ad hoc, given Scripture’s pervasive emphasis on election, predestination, and divine intentionality.
Moreover, as I have pointed out in my published work, a historical case can be made that Jacobus Arminius himself was a Molinist (see the forthcoming second edition of Mere Molinism). Indeed, Arminius owned a copy of Molina's Concordia and quoted it twice in his own writings (without specifically citing Molina).
So, before an Arminian distances himself from Molina, it’s vital to realize that Molinism is not a foreign imposition on Arminian theology. Indeed, Molinism plausibly belongs to its roots.
Molinism Is About More Than Foreknowledge
David Pallmann:
“Molinism is not a soteriological theory. It is a theory about foreknowledge and freedom.”
While it's technically true that Molinism is not a soteriological theory (but can be applied to soteriology), Pallmann's comment also understates the view.
Molinism is fundamentally a theory of divine omniscience, not merely foreknowledge. An omniscient being knows the truth-value of all propositions—past, present, future, modal, and counterfactual.
If propositions about what free creatures would do under certain conditions have truth-values (and given the logical law of excluded middle, they do), then an omniscient God knows them. Middle knowledge is not a speculative add-on; it simply follows naturally from maximal omniscience.
4. Is Molinism a “Genuine Third Alternative”?
David Pallmann:
“So it’s not a genuine third alternative to Calvinism or Arminianism.”
This is true and false.
It is true that mere Molinism is not a third soteriology alongside Calvinism and Arminianism. But it is a genuine alternative to:
• Exhaustive Divine Determinism (EDD)
• Simple Foreknowledge
• Open Theism.
Each of these other views faces serious philosophical problems. Exhaustive Divine Determinism (EDD) is advanced by the vast majority of academic Calvinists, while Simple Foreknowledge is held by some Arminians (including David). Open Theism, by contrast, maintains either that God does not know the truth-values of future-tensed propositions (or counterfactuals of creaturely freedom), or that such propositions lack truth-values altogether. Both strategies are ad hoc, lack independent justification, require rejecting the Law of Excluded Middle, and—so I contend—stand in tension with clear biblical affirmations of divine foreknowledge and counterfactual knowledge.
Molinism, however, avoids the problems that these other views have while preserving libertarian freedom, divine sovereignty, providence, and predestination.
On that axis, Molinism is very much an alternative view.
5. Why Anyone Cares About Molinism
David Pallmann:
“So what’s the big selling point with Molinism anyway?”
Several reasons:
It avoids the fatal problems of EDD-Calvinism, Simple Foreknowledge, and Open Theism.
It makes sense of all of the entirety of Scripture—including strong divine predestination language.
It preserves the libertarian freedom of humanity.
It preserves a robust divine sovereignty and providence.
It is supported by arguments in the cumulative case for theism (e.g., the fine-tuning, ontological, and free-thinking arguments).
It neutralizes the argument from Divine Hiddenness as well as the logical and evidential problems of evil.
The list could go on, but here's the point not to miss: this is not “having one’s cake and eating it too.” It is explanatory adequacy—an essential criterion of abductive inference.
6. Exegesis, Predestination, and Scripture
David Pallmann:
“The Molinist ‘solution’ … is actually just an excuse for not doing exegesis.”
This is a category mistake.
Molinism is not an exegetical shortcut; it's a metaphysical framework. Scripture is filled with predestination language, but not exhaustive divine determination language. Any Christian model must explain how God meaningfully predestines without causally determining free choices.
Simple Foreknowledge does not do this.
To illustrate: if I traveled ten years into the future, learned who wins the World Series in 2036, and returned to 2026, I would have simple foreknowledge of who wins—but zero control over who wins. I would not have predestined anything. I simply have simple foreknowledge. Big deal!
A Bible-based Christian view must explain how God is sovereign over the future—not merely aware of it.
Pallmann’s suggestion that Molinism functions as an excuse to avoid serious exegesis is especially puzzling in light of both his endorsement of my book where he notes that it offers serious exegesis to support Molinism along with the fact that Molinism can be derived from Scripture via straightforward exegetical and logical steps. In fact, this is precisely the structure of the case I presented in my formal debate entitled, "Is Molinism Biblical?" with James White (which White never refuted)—a case grounded not in metaphysical speculation, but in biblical data combined with modest logical guardrails.
Deductive Argument: Scripture Implies Molinism
P1. Scripture affirms that at least some human actions are libertarianly free.
P2. Scripture affirms that God predestines at least some human actions and outcomes that involve libertarianly free human choices.
P3. If an action is libertarianly free, then (by definition) it is not causally determined by God.
P4. Therefore, God’s predestination of these actions is not exhaustive divine determination.(From P1–P3)
P5. Simple foreknowledge alone cannot explain how God predestines which future becomes actual without causally determining human actions (negating libertarian freedom).
P6. If God predestines libertarianly free actions without causally determining them, then God must possess pre-volitional knowledge of what free creatures would do under various possible circumstances.
P7. Pre-volitional knowledge of what libertarianly free creatures would do under various possible circumstances just is middle knowledge (by definition).
C. Therefore, God possesses middle knowledge.
Scripture affirms both libertarian human freedom and genuine divine predestination. Libertarian freedom rules out causal determination, and simple foreknowledge cannot explain providential control. The only remaining option is that God predestines free actions by knowing—prior to creation—what free creatures would do under various circumstances.
That is precisely the doctrine of middle knowledge. Molinism is therefore not an escape from exegesis; it is the logical consequence of taking the biblical data seriously.
The claim that Molinism exists to avoid exegesis is backwards. Molinism arises because the biblical affirmations of freedom and predestination are taken seriously and jointly—rather than explained away by determinism, denied by Open Theism, or rendered providentially inert by Simple Foreknowledge.
7. On the Use of Arm-Chair Psychology
David suggests that Molinism’s appeal lies not in its explanatory power, but in a desire to avoid difficult biblical exegesis. If this is the case, then according to David Pallmann, Molinists are motivated less by fidelity to Scripture and more by a wish to harmonize texts without doing the hard interpretive work.
This assertion is not an argument. It is nothing but arm-chair psychology.
Appeals to motivation do not establish truth or falsity, and in philosophical and theological discourse they are especially suspect when offered without evidence. More importantly, the charge is demonstrably false when measured against the actual Molinist literature.
To name just a few Molinists (off the top of my head) who would surely take issue with the suggestion that Molinism exists to avoid exegesis:
• William Lane Craig
• Thomas Flint
• Alvin Plantinga
• Kirk MacGregor
• John D. Laing
• Kenneth Keathley
• Tom McCall
• J. P. Moreland
• Mike Licona
• Braxton Hunter
• Johnathan Pritchett
• Clay Jones
• Andrew Loke
• Randy Everist
• Joshua Ryan Farris
• Ryan Mullins
• Tim McGrew
• Jacobus Erasmus
• Leighton Flowers
• Paul Copan
• Adam Lloyd Johnson
• Peter Rasor
• Bobby Conway
• Phil Kallberg
• Tyson James
• Eli Haitov
• Eric Hernandez
• Scott Olson
• Jacob Waller
• Will Hess
• Dan Chapa
• Evan Minton
• Aaron Fitzwater
• Andrew Drinkard
• Chris Stockman
• Richard Eng
• Phil Bair
• Timothy Fox
• Thomas Moller
• Josh Klein
• Me (Tim Stratton)
These are not philosophers or theologians known for dismissing Scripture or being too lazy to do thorough exegesis. Many of them have written extensively on biblical interpretation, historical theology, and doctrinal formulation. Most of them are active members of the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) and the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS), organizations whose very existence presupposes the importance of the rigorous exegesis of God’s inspired Word.
At best, Pallmann’s motivation charge is speculative. At worst, it substitutes psychological conjecture for substantive engagement. Either way, this is an immature charge that does absolutely nothing to advance the discussion.
What matters—and what I have focused on throughout my academic studies—are the arguments themselves.
8. The Grounding Objection
David Pallmann:
“The most serious of these is … the grounding problem.”
If this is the "most serious" problem for Molinism, then there isn't much for Molinists to worry about.
This objection only works if one assumes the odd and controversial view of truthmaker maximalism—the view that every truth is grounded in some truthmaker in the world.
That assumption is neither obvious nor widely accepted.
Philosopher Dr. Randy Everist, responding to Pallmann's post in a Facebook thread, puts the issue well:
“[Pallmann is] mixing up reasons and ontological grounding. He does not acknowledge the issue is truthmaker maximalism, which outside of theological debates is very much rejected by philosophers overall, regardless of where they stand on Molinism, if anywhere . . . and lest I am accused of ad populum or appeal to authority: I'm not saying a majority of philosophers don't accept it, therefore it's false. I'm saying it's simply not an obviously true thing that we all accept. Basically, if a philosopher doesn't already independently accept truthmaker maximalism, he doesn't have to accept it here, either.”
Exactly. As I've said elsewhere, without the presupposition of truthmaker maximalism, the grounding objection never gets off the ground.
(For more information on this topic, see Trenton Merricks's book entitled "Truth and Ontology.")
9. Are Counterfactuals “Empirical” Propositions?
In a subsequent comment responding to a questioner, Pallmann further claims that…
David Pallmann:
“Empirical propositions need truthmakers… knowledge about what I would do in a counterfactual scenario is empirical knowledge.”
This is the key mistake.
Empirical propositions are about the way things are in the actual world. These are, at least in principle, discoverable by observation, experiment, or historical investigation. Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, by contrast, are modal, subjunctive, and non-actual. They concern what would happen if certain conditions were to obtain—even when those conditions never obtain.
No empirical investigation could ever establish propositions of this kind.
Scripture itself makes this explicit.
In 1 Samuel 23:10–13, David asks the Lord whether the men of Keilah would hand him over to Saul if he remained in the city. God answers affirmatively—yet David leaves, and the event never occurs. The proposition concerning what the men of Keilah would have done is true despite never being actualized.
Similarly, in Matthew 11:21–23, Jesus declares that if the miracles performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, those cities would have repented. These are historical counterfactuals about non-actual worlds—truths about what would have happened under conditions that could have but never obtained.
These propositions are neither empirical nor grounded in actual events, yet Scripture treats them as true.
To classify such counterfactuals as empirical propositions is therefore a category error—one that Scripture itself decisively refutes.
10. Divine Knowledge Is Not Human Knowledge
David Pallmann:
“Knowledge may be defined as justified true belief.”
That definition is not itself the problem. In fact, I agree that, at minimum, to possess knowledge one must possess all three of those essential ingredients. God’s knowledge does qualify as justified true belief. The error lies in assuming that the kind of justification required for finite, fallible human knowers must also apply to a maximally great, necessarily omniscient being.
For human beings, justification typically involves inferential processes: gathering evidence, weighing probabilities, reasoning to the best explanation, and eliminating defeaters over time. This is necessary because we are not omniscient and can be mistaken. Our epistemic limitations require us to reason our way to justified beliefs.
God, however, does not operate under such limitations. God does not reason to abductive conclusions over time, infer beliefs, or acquire justification through epistemic processes. As a necessarily omniscient and maximally perfect being, it’s impossible for God to be mistaken. The justification of God’s beliefs is therefore non-inferential and necessary, grounded in God’s very nature rather than in evidential or procedural support.
In other words, while both divine and human knowledge may be described as justified true belief, the mode of justification differs categorically. Human justification is contingent, inferential, and defeasible; divine justification is necessary, non-inferential, and indefeasible. To insist that God’s knowledge must satisfy the same justificatory conditions required of finite knowers is to anthropomorphize divine epistemology from the outset.
Once this distinction is made clear, appeals to Gettier-style concerns or to epistemic dependence lose their force in the divine case. Such problems arise precisely because human justification is fallible and inferential—conditions that do not apply to God. God’s knowledge does not stand in need of epistemic support external to Himself, because the impossibility of error is secured by His perfection.
This point is crucial for the grounding objection. The objection gains traction only if God’s knowledge is treated as epistemically dependent in a human-like way. But if divine justification is grounded in God’s necessary omniscience rather than in inferential processes, then the demand for truthmakers motivated by epistemic dependence is misplaced from the start.
11. The Ad Hoc Nature of Simple Foreknowledge
David Pallmann:
“God’s creative decree is what provides the grounding for God’s counterfactual knowledge.”
This claim initially appears to offer Simple Foreknowledge a way to avoid middle knowledge. On closer inspection, however, it seems to be desperately ad hoc—and ultimately self-defeating.
The first problem is conceptual. The divine decree is not identical to the act of creation itself. God’s decision to actualize a particular world is logically distinct from the execution of that decision. Thus, on Pallmann's view, God can choose to create a world without yet creating it, and—being omnipotent—God also retains the power to delay or refrain from creating a world He has decreed.
If this consequence strikes you as problematic, that reaction is well-founded—not because God would be irrational or indecisive, but because, on Pallmann’s view, there are no truth-values for future contingents or counterfactuals of creaturely freedom prior to the decree. As a result, God cannot possess full knowledge of what He is choosing prior to choosing it. On Pallman's view, God is blind logically prior to the decree and the decree itself becomes the epistemic mechanism by which those truth-values are grounded and thus known.
In other words, any appearance that God “acquires” new information is not a psychological defect in God, but a structural feature of the model itself: if the decree is what grounds the relevant truths, then knowledge of those truths is logically posterior to the decree.
Once this distinction is recognized, the Simple Foreknowledge strategy collapses.
Suppose God decrees to create a particular world W, and in virtue of that decree, as Pallmann asserts, gains knowledge of all future-tensed propositions concerning free creatures in W. Now suppose God freely chooses not to actually create W. In that case, God still knows what would have happened in W—including how libertarianly free creatures would have chosen—even though W never exists.
But knowledge of what free creatures would have done in a non-actual world is, by definition, middle knowledge (at least if it's logically prior to the creative decree and execution of the decree). Thus, in an attempt to avoid middle knowledge, Simple Foreknowledge ends up reintroducing it through the back door.
The Simple Foreknowledge move is ad hoc because the appeal to the decree is introduced solely to block Molinism, not because it follows naturally from a coherent account of divine omniscience. Once the decree is doing the epistemic work, there is no principled reason why God could not possess such knowledge prior to the execution of the act of creation—especially if God is necessarily omniscient.
If God inevitably ends up knowing what free creatures would have done in worlds that are never actualized, then the denial of pre-volitional middle knowledge becomes arbitrary. At that point, the only difference between Simple Foreknowledge and Molinism is timing, not content. And since God’s omniscience is necessary rather than contingent, that timing distinction does no real explanatory work.
In short, Simple Foreknowledge faces a dilemma:
• Either God is capable of knowing what libertarianly free creatures would do under conditions that never actually occur—even in worlds God never creates—in which case middle knowledge is unavoidable; or . . .
• God is incapable of knowing such truths, which means there are many true propositions about possible creaturely actions that God does not know—an outcome incompatible with traditional claims about divine omniscience.
Molinism avoids both horns of the dilemma by affirming what divine omniscience already requires: that God knows the truth-value of all propositions—including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—logically prior to His decision to create.
The Decree and the Price of Truth-Grounding
Pallmann insists that God’s creative decree “grounds” the truth of future-tensed and counterfactual propositions. Calvinists and Simple Foreknowledge Arminians, he claims, agree on this point, while Molinists do not.
But this claim trades on a crucial ambiguity—one that must be resolved before it can do any philosophical work.
The key question is this: what does the decree do?
If the decree necessitates that a creature performs some action X, then libertarian freedom is lost. The creature could not have done otherwise, and the decree functions as a determining cause. This collapses the view into Exhaustive Divine Determination (EDD)—precisely the position Pallmann wishes to avoid.
If, on the other hand, the decree does not necessitate X, then it is far from clear how the decree magically “makes it true” that X non-deterministically occurs. In that case, the decree presupposes rather than produces the truth of propositions about free creaturely action.
Molinism occupies precisely this second option. Molinists affirm the divine decree, but we deny that it causally determines libertarian free choices. On the Molinist account, the decree does not make creatures act; rather, given the decree, propositions of the form “S would freely do X under circumstances C” are transformed into propositions of the form “S will freely do X under circumstances C.” The decree simply determines which world is actualized, not how free agents choose within it.
Pallmann’s appeal to the decree therefore faces a dilemma:
• If the decree grounds truths by necessitating them, libertarian freedom is lost.
• If the decree grounds truths without necessitating them, then there is a truth-value to those propositions independently of the decree.
In either case, the Molinist position is not undermined. What is undermined is the claim that Simple Foreknowledge possesses an “easy” solution to the grounding problem. The appeal to the decree either collapses into determinism or tacitly presupposes the very counterfactual truths Molinism explicitly affirms.
The Decree-Grounded Knowledge Dilemma: Why Simple Foreknowledge Collapses into Trial-and-Error Providentialism
Pallmann’s proposed escape hatch from middle knowledge is to claim that God’s creative decree “grounds” the truth-value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and future-tensed propositions about libertarian free agents. The idea is that God does not possess such knowledge pre-volitionally, but only logically posterior to the decree. On this model, the decree does not merely select a world that God already comprehends; rather, it is what makes certain propositions true, and thus what provides the basis for God’s knowledge of them.
Even if we bracket other objections, this move generates a problem that is both underappreciated and devastating: it makes God’s knowledge of the relevant truths dependent on an act that an omnipotent God is free not to complete. Once that is made explicit, Simple Foreknowledge faces a dilemma that it cannot escape without surrendering something essential—either divine omniscience, divine perfection, or libertarian freedom itself.
To see the problem, we need to distinguish two things that are often run together:
(i) God’s decree to actualize a world
and
(ii) the execution of that decree (actual creation).
These are not identical. A decree is an intention, choice, or decision regarding what will be actualized; execution, on the other hand, is the bringing-about of what is decided. One can coherently distinguish a plan from the carrying-out of a plan. This distinction is not only logically coherent but dialectically fair.
Now notice what follows.
1. If the decree is what grounds these truths, then God “learns” what He decrees
If counterfactuals and future-tensed truths about libertarian free agents are not grounded until the decree, then God does not know their truth-values until logically after the decree. That means God’s epistemic position changes across actual states of affairs: prior to God's choice (the decree), God lacks the relevant truth-values; posterior to His choice (the decree), God has them.
This implies a logically prior epistemic condition (an actual state of affairs) in which God lacks knowledge of future contingents and counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Only once God issues the decree do the relevant propositions become grounded—and thus knowable. On this view, God’s knowledge of what libertarian free creatures will do is logically posterior to an act of will.
But this is deeply problematic. It means that God does not create with full knowledge of what He is doing. Rather, God must first decree in order to discover the truth-values of the very propositions that bear on the wisdom, goodness, and outcome of that decree.
This reminds me of when Nancy Pelosi said that "we have to pass the bill so that we can find out what's in it." But God is not like Nancy Pelosi; God is a maximally great being.
But Pallmann's view entails that God's knowledge is logically dependent—and that dependence is incompatible with the idea of a maximally great being who acts with perfect rational knowledge and foresight.
In short, God’s knowledge depends on the decree in precisely the way Pallmann intends: knowledge of what creatures will freely do becomes available only once God “sets” the relevant world-order by decree. But that makes the decree function as an epistemic probe rather than a rational selection among fully known possibilities.
But this immediately raises a question that Simple Foreknowledge rarely addresses:
Why would a maximally great, perfectly wise, and perfectly good God ever issue a decree that functions as an epistemic probe? Why would a maximally great being blindly create without knowing what He was getting Himself into?
I don't think a perfect being would do such a thing. After all, God in a perfect state of triune perichoresis—who lacks nothing, needs nothing, and is under no compulsion to create—would not rationally embark on creation blind, only to discover what He has gotten Himself into after the decisive act that (on Pallmann’s model) generates the relevant truths.
2. The “trial-and-error” consequence: God can decree, learn, and then refrain from creating
Here the modal point becomes unavoidable.
If (a) God gains the relevant knowledge logically posterior to the decree, and (b) God is omnipotent and free not to create, then it follows that God could:
Decree world W1
Thereby “ground” and know what would/will happen in W1
Decide not to execute the actualization of W1
Decree W2 instead
Ground and know what would/will happen in W2
Refrain again
Repeat (again, and again, and again . . .)
This is not rhetorical mockery. It's merely the absurd modal upshot of the view. If the decree is what provides the epistemic access, then the decree becomes the mechanism by which a perfectly good and loving God “samples” candidate world-histories prior to actualizing any of them.
On this view, God is no longer selecting among fully known possibilities. He is issuing decrees in order to discover what the decrees entail.
Moreover, if God can decree-and-check once, why not twice? If twice, why not a trillion times? Nothing in the decree-grounding proposal supplies a principled stopping condition. One can always ask: why this decree rather than another? If the answer is “because God learned this one yields the best outcome,” then the learning is doing the explanatory work—yet the learning occurs only after an act that itself presupposes rational selection.
In short: decree-grounding makes God’s world-selection procedure look like an ad hoc search algorithm. That is not the providence of classical theism.
3. The last-ditch move also fails: grounding by the act of creation implies “create, learn, erase, repeat . . . .”
At this point, a Simple Foreknowledge defender might push the grounding further forward:
“Fine. It’s not the decree that grounds these truths; it’s the act of creation itself.”
But this revision does not solve the underlying problem; it simply relocates it. If creation is what grounds future-tensed truths and CCFs, then God can only know what will happen after creation occurs. That yields an even more troubling picture: God creates without knowing the libertarian future, then “discovers” it once the world exists.
Yet even here omnipotence restores the trial-and-error loop. God can create a world, “see” and learn how it unfolds (or at least what would unfold), and then annihilate it—erase it—replace it with another. If the defender replies, “God would never do that,” the question remains: WHY—what principled feature of the model rules it out? If the answer is “divine perfection” or "a good God wouldn't do such things," then the critic is entitled to insist that divine perfection is precisely why the model is implausible in the first place: a perfect being would not create blindly, only to learn what He has done afterward.
So, the view either makes God blind and ignorant in His timeless sans creation state (an Open Theist-style cost), or it makes God’s creative action function like epistemic experimentation (a providentially incoherent cost).
4. The decisive dilemma
Simple Foreknowledge, combined with decree-grounding, forces us into a dilemma:
Either God can know what libertarian free creatures would do under non-actual conditions (including decrees or worlds that are not executed or do not exist), in which case middle knowledge is unavoidable—because that is precisely knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to actualization;
Or God cannot know such truths, in which case God’s omniscience is restricted in a way incompatible with classical claims about divine knowledge (and, practically, collapses into a version of Open Theism where God must “wait” on the world to know the relevant truths).
There is no stable middle position where the decree both (i) grounds the truth-values of libertarian future-tensed propositions and counterfactuals, and (ii) avoids pre-volitional counterfactual knowledge, and (iii) preserves libertarian freedom, and (iv) preserves a robust, non-experimental doctrine of providence.
5. Why Molinism avoids the collapse
Molinism avoids these costs precisely because it does not treat God’s decree as an epistemic crutch. On Molinism, the decree does not “manufacture” truths about creaturely freedom; the divine decree is merely the selection of a world in which God already knows what free creatures would do under specified conditions. Given the decree, “would freely” truths are transformed into “will freely” truths—not because the decree causes the choice, but because the decree ensures (without causally determining) which set of already-true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom becomes actual.
That is exactly what one should expect if God is maximally great: God creates with full knowledge of what He is doing, not by issuing decrees in order to discover what He has done.
13. Fine-Tuning and Pre-Volitional Knowledge
As I explain in Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, the Fine-Tuning Argument already commits us to a very strong claim about divine knowledge—one that Simple Foreknowledge cannot plausibly accommodate.
According to the Fine-Tuning Argument, the life-permitting structure of our universe depends on extraordinarily precise values of the fundamental constants and initial conditions of the early universe. Had these values been even slightly different, a life-permitting universe would not have existed.
For God to intentionally create a life-permitting universe (and not merely get lucky), God must therefore know how different possible universes would be given different initial conditions. This is not hypothetical or approximate knowledge. It is precise, counterfactual knowledge about what would result if the universe were configured in one way rather than another.
Crucially, this knowledge is not grounded in any actual universe. Prior to creation, none of these possible universes existed. Nor can this knowledge be grounded in God’s decree to create this universe, since the decree itself presupposes that God already knows which configurations would succeed and which would fail. Fine-tuning thus requires pre-volitional knowledge of non-actual possibilities.
To deny this, one would have to adopt an implausible picture of divine decision-making—namely, that God repeatedly decreed different universes, observed that they failed, revoked those decrees, and continued this process until eventually arriving at a life-permitting world. Aside from being theologically problematic, this ad hoc and absurd picture presupposes temporal trial-and-error in a omniscient being. It also fails to avoid the very counterfactual knowledge it was meant to escape.
Once the fine-tuning data are taken seriously, pre-volitional counterfactual knowledge becomes unavoidable.
The case grows even stronger if quantum indeterminacy plays a role in the emergence of life—as many physicists believe it does. If indeterministic quantum processes are among the conditions required for a life-permitting universe, then God’s knowledge must extend not merely to deterministic outcomes, but to what would occur under indeterministic conditions.
In other words, God must know how indeterministic processes would unfold under various initial configurations—and, by extension, how free agents would act in those worlds.
This is robust middle knowledge.
It is knowledge of what would happen under conditions that never actually obtain, involving outcomes not determined by prior states of the universe and not grounded in any divine decree to create those worlds. Such knowledge is precisely what Molinism affirms and what Simple Foreknowledge struggles to explain.
Once fine-tuning and quantum indeterminacy are taken together, middle knowledge is no longer a speculative addition to divine omniscience. It is a natural implication of it.
14. Truth, Correspondence, and Counterfactuals
David Pallmann:
"What makes God's counterfactual knowledge true given Molinism?" [What makes these propositions true?]
This question assumes that truth requires a concrete, actualized state of affairs to serve as its ontological ground. But that assumption is precisely what is at issue—and it’s far from obvious.
On the standard correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. Importantly, as I explain in Mere Molinism, “reality” need not be restricted to what is actually the case. A proposition may correspond to:
• the way things are (or are not) (present-tensed truths, including negative existentials),
• the way things were (past-tensed truths),
• the way things will be (future-tensed truths), or
• the way things would have been if conditions were different (counterfactual truths).
Pallmann’s appeal to the evidence of the resurrection of Jesus as an illustration of truthmaking relies on a subtle but important confusion—namely, a failure to distinguish ontological truthmakers from epistemic evidence.
Empirical evidence does not make propositions true; it merely allows finite knowers like us to discover truths that are already the case. Evidence is epistemic, not ontological. What makes a historical proposition true is the event itself—not whether any physical traces, eyewitness testimony, or documentary records remain available to us.
This distinction is uncontroversial. There are countless true historical events for which no empirical evidence survives: private conversations, forgotten actions, destroyed artifacts, and undocumented occurrences. The absence of empirical evidence does not entail the absence of a truthmaker, nor does it entail that the event did not occur.
Once this distinction is kept clear, Pallmann’s resurrection analogy loses its force. Molinism does not claim that propositions such as “Jesus rose from the dead” are true even if the resurrection never happened. Rather, Molinism claims that counterfactual propositions—claims about what would have happened under different conditions—have truth-values even when the antecedent conditions never obtain.
Treating such counterfactual truths as if they were disguised empirical or past-tensed propositions is therefore a category error. Counterfactuals are modal truths, not historical reports. Their truth does not depend on empirical instantiation or historical occurrence, but on how reality would have been structured had the relevant conditions obtained.
Properly understood, counterfactual propositions fall squarely into this modal category. They are true not because the relevant events actually occurred, but because they accurately describe how reality would have unfolded under the specified conditions—even when those conditions never become actual.
This is neither mysterious nor controversial. We routinely affirm the truth of counterfactuals in everyday reasoning, history, science, and Scripture. For example, claims such as “If Mike Tyson was in his prime, he would have knocked out Jake Paul in the first round,” or “If Tom Osbourne’s 1995 Nebraska Cornhuskers would have played against Nick Saban’s Alabama football teams, the Huskers would have won,” or “If the general had delayed the attack, the battle would have been lost,” or “If the Volkswagen Bus would not have broken down, my family and I would have died in the Big Thompson River Flood of 1976” (true story), are intelligible and often true—even when the antecedent never obtains.
Crucially, affirming the truth of counterfactual propositions does not commit one to the absurd claim that past-tensed propositions are true even if they never occurred. That would indeed be incoherent—but it’s also a strawman. Molinism does not claim that propositions like “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” are true if Caesar never crossed the Rubicon. Rather, it claims that propositions of the form “If Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon, then X would have followed” have truth-values even if the antecedent is false.
The confusion arises when counterfactual truths are treated as if they were disguised past-tensed or empirical propositions. They are neither. Counterfactuals are modal truths, and their truth-value depends on how reality would have been structured under different conditions—not on whether those conditions were ever actualized.
Once this distinction is kept clear, the demand that counterfactuals require actual, concrete truthmakers loses its force. Counterfactual propositions are true in virtue of corresponding to modal facts about how things would have been under specified conditions—facts concerning possibilities rather than actualities. An omniscient God, therefore, knows such truths simply by knowing the truth-values of all propositions, including propositions about what would occur if circumstances were different.
Thus, the appeal to the correspondence theory of truth supports, rather than undermines, the Molinist account of divine knowledge.
15. Prophecy, Future Contingents, and the Explanatory Failure of Decree-Grounding
A final and decisive difficulty for Pallmann’s view concerns biblical prophecy—especially prophecies involving libertarianly free agents who do not yet exist.
Pallmann is committed to the claim that God cannot know future-tensed propositions regarding libertarian free agents—or counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—logically prior to the divine decree or the act of creation. On this model, God’s knowledge of such truths is grounded by the decree or by creation itself.
But this raises an unavoidable and pressing question:
How does a decree—or even the act of creation—generate truth-values about distant future contingents involving libertarian free agents?
This question becomes especially acute when we consider biblical prophecy. For example, scripture records that God foretold, by name, that King Cyrus would free the Israelites—approximately 150 years before Cyrus was born and nearly 200 years before the event occurred (Isa. 44:28; 45:1). At the time of the prophecy:
Cyrus did not exist.
His parents did not exist.
The relevant political, cultural, and psychological conditions did not exist.
No physical state of the universe—whether at the Big Bang or at any later stage—encoded Cyrus’s future libertarian choices, nor the free actions of the multitudes of other agents involved in the prophesied scenario, including the indeterministic human decisions made over the nearly two centuries leading up to its fulfillment.
If God’s knowledge of such future contingents is not available prior to the decree or creation, then it is deeply unclear how either the decree or the initial act of creation could ground the truth of such propositions.
A decree is a volitional act—it selects what will be actualized. It does not, by itself, explain how truths about future free decisions come to be true. Likewise, appealing to creation or the Big Bang fares no better. A physical event, no matter how grand, does not obviously entail truths about how indeterministic agents will freely choose billions of years, centuries, or decades later.
The problem, then, is not merely theological but metaphysical. On Pallmann’s view, we are asked to believe that a decree or a physical act somehow magically manufactures truth-values about future libertarian actions—truths that Scripture treats as known long before those agents exist.
This is far more mysterious than the Molinist claim that an omniscient God simply knows the truth-value of all propositions.
Indeed, once prophecy is taken seriously, the decree-grounding model appears explanatorily impoverished. It replaces a straightforward appeal to divine omniscience with a metaphysical mechanism that obscures rather than illuminates the grounding of truth—leaving unexplained how God could know specific future contingents and counterfactuals of creaturely freedom long prior to their realization.
By contrast, Molinism offers a simple and coherent account: a necessarily omniscient God knows the truth-value to all propositions (period). Thus, God knows pre-volitionally what any free creature would do under any set of circumstances. This knowledge allows God to issue detailed prophecies, sovereignly guide history, and bring about His purposes without causally determining libertarian free actions.
In short, biblical prophecy—especially long-range prophecy involving libertarian agents—fits naturally within Molinism, but it strains credulity on decree-grounded versions of Simple Foreknowledge like the one Pallmann advances.
Conclusion
I want to be clear about something. Although I have offered sustained and pointed criticism of David Pallmann’s position on Molinism and Simple Foreknowledge—and although we disagree on several other important philosophical and theological issues—this article is not intended as a personal attack or a “rip” on David. Disagreement, even sharp disagreement, is part of serious intellectual engagement.
Moreover, David does some important work that I genuinely respect. In particular, his social media work addressing the Crusades—challenging popular myths and offering historically grounded arguments for why they were morally justified in their proper context—is excellent. On that topic, I highly recommend his work, and I believe it serves the broader goal we both share: defending Christian history against shallow caricature and ideological revisionism.
That said, none of this mitigates the philosophical problems facing Simple Foreknowledge as a model of divine omniscience and providence. Respect for a thinker’s contributions in one area does not require agreement in another, and intellectual charity does not require suspending critical analysis.
Simple Foreknowledge succeeds in preserving libertarian freedom (unless the proponent of SF thinks that the decree necessitates our choices), but only by weakening divine sovereignty, providence, and predestination. On that view, God foresees the future but does not meaningfully govern which future actually comes to pass. Knowledge alone does not amount to control, and foreknowledge by itself does not explain biblical predestination.
Molinism avoids this problem. By affirming God’s pre-volitional knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, Molinism explains how God can sovereignly actualize a world in which His purposes are fulfilled through genuinely free human choices—without causally determining those choices. In doing so, Molinism preserves both libertarian freedom and robust divine sovereignty.
As this response has shown, the major objections raised against Molinism rely on controversial philosophical assumptions that no one is required to accept. The grounding objection presupposes truthmaker maximalism. Appeals to justified true belief conflate finite and divine modes of justification. Attempts to ground counterfactual knowledge in the divine decree prove ad hoc and ultimately collapse into middle knowledge anyway.
Finally, considerations from fine-tuning and quantum indeterminacy reinforce the point. If God intentionally created a life-permitting universe, then God must possess precise, pre-volitional knowledge of how different possible worlds would unfold—including worlds involving indeterministic processes and free agents. Once this is acknowledged, middle knowledge is no longer optional.
For these reasons, contrary to David Pallmann's bold assertions, Molinism remains not merely coherent, but explanatorily superior to Simple Foreknowledge—and better equipped to account for omniscience, freedom, providence, and Scripture together.
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
Dr. Tim Stratton
Notes
Here's David Pallmann's post in full:
"I thought that I would share an Arminian perspective on Molinism and why I'm not a Molinist. So let's begin by getting some basic definitions on the table. What is Molinism? Well, Molinism can be distilled down to two basic doctrines. These are the following: 1) God has middle knowledge (that is, God has pre-volitional knowledge of all subjective conditionals regarding what libertarianly free beings would do in any given situation). 2) Human beings possess libertarian freedom (that is, freedom that is incompatible with determinism).
So right off the bat, Molinism has a pretty limited set of issues that it's concerned with, and they are not soteriological. To be sure, one's position on the issue of divine foreknowledge and human freedom will have ramifications for their soteriology. But Molinism is not a soteriological theory. It is a theory about foreknowledge and freedom. And it is a pretty broad theory at that. So broad, in fact, that one can consistently be a Molinist while also being a Calvinist (because Calvinists don't actually have to be determinists) or while also being an Arminian.
So it's not a genuine third alternative to Calvinism or Arminianism. So what's the big selling point with Molinism anyway? Why would anyone care about Molinism in the first place? Well allegedly it's supposed to let you have your cake and eat it too. Basically newcomers to Molinism are typically bewildered by the fact that there seem to be strong texts on both the Calvinist and the Arminian side of the predestination issue. And they are enamoured with Molinism because it suggests that it allows one to accept both sets of texts.
But from the perspective of most Arminians who base their beliefs on an exegetical analysis of Scripture, it's unnecessary to find a way to have both sets of texts. The Calvinists, in our view, are simply wrong in how they are interpreting passages like Romans 8, Romans 9, Ephesians 1, Acts 13:48, etc. And we are able to demonstrate this from the context of those passages. We don't think that we are simply giving more weight to one set of texts over the other. So from our perspective, the Molinist "solution" to the supposed quandary that is claimed to be posed by two seemingly incompatible sets of biblical texts is actually just an excuse for not doing exegesis, or, even worse it is an excuse for accepting incorrect interpretations of the Calvinist proof texts.
Furthermore, the advantage that Molinism is supposed to have in explaining the full range of biblical texts about election and predestination is simply overwhelmed by the philosophical problems which it incurs. The most serious of these is, of course, the so-called grounding problem. I actually think that this refers to a whole set of problems - not just one - regarding the ontological status of the truth makers of God's middle knowledge. That's a mouthful, so let's break it down.
Knowledge may be defined as justified true belief. This analysis is controversial due to the Gettier problem, but that controversy regards the justification condition and not the truth or belief conditions. And since the version of the grounding problem that I will be detailing only applies to the truth condition, we need not worry about the Gettier problem for present purposes.
So to say that God has middle knowledge is to say that God has pre-volitional justified true beliefs about what indeterministically free creatures would do in any set of circumstances - even in circumstances in which they never exist. It's really important to grasp that Molinism entails that God possesses this knowledge pre-volitionally, meaning logically prior to his decree to create.
Many newcomers to Molinism fail to understand this point. They think that middle knowledge is just knowledge of subjective conditionals. It is not. Simple Foreknowledge Arminians like myself believe that God has knowledge of subjunctive conditionals. We just believe that God has this knowledge logically posterior to his creative decree. This is important because God's creative decree is what provides the basis - the grounding - for God's counterfactual knowledge. (This is also why adducing examples of God having counterfactual knowledge in Scripture doesn't prove that God has middle knowledge).
However, in Molinism, God has to have the knowledge logically prior to the creative decree. And remembering that knowledge has to be true, we can then ask what makes God's counterfactual knowledge true given Molinism? Calvinists and Simple Foreknowledge Arminians have an easy answer to this question: God's creative decree. But Molinists seem to have no answer.
It is telling that Molinists typically will just deny that God's knowledge needs truth makers (as William Lane Craig does). But this entails its own set of problems. If I ask why it is true that, say, Jesus rose from the dead, presumably the answer is that the proposition is true because it corresponds to this fact in history. It seems absurd to suggest that empirical propositions of this sort could just be true for no reason whatsoever. What sense would it make to say that the proposition that Jesus rose from the dead is true even though this never happened? Yet, Molinism (at least of this variety) implies that this is how a whole host of empirical propositions are true. God knows that I would do some action in some possible world, even though that world doesn't exist, and never will exist.
To sum this all up, Molinism isn't a third alternative to Calvinism and Arminianism. The big selling point, from my perspective, is just an excuse to not do exegesis. And whatever advantage it is supposed to have in harmonizing two supposedly immiscible sets of biblical texts is lost by the problematic philosophical implications of middle knowledge. All in all, as a Simple Foreknowledge Arminian, I just don't see any compelling reason to prefer Molinism. I'm quite happy where I'm at."