Debating Rationality with Robots

I've spent inordinate amounts of time debating the issues of determinism and libertarian freedom with those who believe that antecedent (prior) conditions determine all things about humanity. In essence, I have attempted to dialogue with humans who don't think we are much different than puppets or robots. 

Since I have had so many debates with people who think they are basically wet robots, I thought it would be fitting to have this conversation with an actual robot -- an online chatbot. I began by asking this artificial intelligence about an important topic that I've discussed in my published work -- indirect doxastic voluntarism (defined below). This sparked a fantastic conversation with this artificially intelligent machine.  

Please enjoy my debate with a robot (I've taken the liberty to italicize or bracket a few words for the sake of clarity).

The Debate

TIM: What is indirect doxastic voluntarism?

ROBOT: Indirect doxastic voluntarism is a philosophical view that suggests that we have indirect control over our beliefs or our "doxastic states." In other words, we cannot directly choose to believe something, but we can indirectly influence our beliefs through various means such as choosing to expose ourselves to certain ideas , considering evidence or arguments , or engaging in introspection .

This view acknowledges that there are certain beliefs that we might want to hold for practical or ethical reasons, but that we cannot simply choose to believe them at will. However, we can take actions that make it more likely that we will come to hold those beliefs, such as seeking out information that supports them and avoiding information that contradicts them.

Overall, indirect doxastic voluntarism suggests that while we may not have direct control over our beliefs, we can influence them to some extent through our actions and the information we expose ourselves to.

TIM: If something or someone else exhaustively determines all things about a person's mental activity, can this person still possess indirect doxastic voluntarism?

ROBOT: No, if something or someone else exhaustively determines all things about a person's mental activity, then that person cannot possess indirect doxastic voluntarism.

Indirect doxastic voluntarism presupposes that individuals have some level of agency or control over their beliefs and mental activity. If all aspects of a person's mental activity are determined by external factors, then the person does not have any agency or control over their beliefs, and therefore cannot exercise indirect doxastic voluntarism.

For example, if a person's beliefs are determined entirely by their genetics or environment, then they cannot exercise indirect doxastic voluntarism, because they do not have the capacity to choose what they believe or to influence their beliefs through their actions or the information they expose themselves to.

In short, indirect doxastic voluntarism presupposes that individuals have some level of agency or control over their beliefs, and if this agency or control is absent, then indirect doxastic voluntarism cannot be exercised.

TIM: I completely agree. Does indirect doxastic voluntarism presuppose that humans possess libertarian freedom regarding mental activity?

ROBOT: No, indirect doxastic voluntarism does not necessarily presuppose that humans possess libertarian freedom regarding mental activity.

Libertarianism is a philosophical view that suggests that humans possess complete and ultimate control over their actions, without any external determinants. However, indirect doxastic voluntarism only suggests that humans have some level of agency or control over their beliefs and mental activity.

Indirect doxastic voluntarism does not require the absence of any external determinants or influences on a person's beliefs. Instead, it suggests that individuals can indirectly influence their beliefs through their actions and the information they expose themselves to, even if those actions and information are not ultimately under their complete and ultimate control.

In other words, indirect doxastic voluntarism acknowledges that there may be external factors that influence a person's beliefs, but it still holds that individuals have some degree of control over their beliefs, even if that control is indirect and limited by external factors.

Therefore, indirect doxastic voluntarism does not necessarily presuppose that humans possess libertarian freedom regarding mental activity.

TIM: A rational person possesses libertarian freedom to think if antecedent conditions are insufficient to necessitate the manner in which the person thinks. It seems to me that indirect doxastic voluntarism provides the freedom for the person to decide the manner in which they think. Thus, it seems like indirect doxastic voluntarism presupposes libertarian free thinking. Do you disagree?

ROBOT: I understand your argument, but I would still disagree that indirect doxastic voluntarism necessarily presupposes libertarian free thinking.

While indirect doxastic voluntarism does allow for some degree of freedom in the way that a person thinks, it does not necessarily require that this freedom is of a libertarian nature. Indirect doxastic voluntarism simply suggests that individuals have some level of control over their beliefs, but it does not necessarily require that this control is completely free from any antecedent conditions or external factors.

In other words, indirect doxastic voluntarism does not necessarily require that the antecedent conditions that determine the manner in which one thinks are insufficient to necessitate that manner. It simply suggests that individuals have some level of agency or control over their beliefs, even if that control is indirect and limited by external factors.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that there are other philosophical views, such as compatibilism, that suggest that freedom and determinism are compatible. Compatibilism holds that individuals can possess a type of freedom even if their actions and beliefs are determined by antecedent conditions.

Therefore, while indirect doxastic voluntarism does allow for some degree of freedom in the way that a person thinks, it does not necessarily presuppose libertarian free thinking, as there are other philosophical views that suggest that freedom and determinism are compatible.

TIM: Libertarian freedom is not the view that all of our mental actions are completely free from antecedent conditions. It simply means that antecedent conditions are insufficient to necessitate the manner in which humans think. This provides humanity limited control (which seems to be limited libertarian freedom) to decide how to think, and ultimately what to believe.

Compatibilism presupposes determinism. So, if determinism is exhaustive -- and includes all mental actions all the time -- there seems to be no control for a person to decide how to think. The manner in which one thinks would be completely determined by something or someone else.

I recommend looking at a paper written by Timothy A. Stratton and J.P. Moreland called, "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument."

Here's the link: https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/13/10/988/htm

Again, it still seems to me that indirect doxastic voluntarism presupposes limited libertarian freedom (otherwise exhaustive determinism would be true). What do you think?

ROBOT: Thank you for your clarification, and I appreciate your recommendation of the paper you mentioned.

I agree that libertarian freedom does not mean that our mental actions are completely free from antecedent conditions, but rather that those antecedent conditions are insufficient to necessitate the manner in which we think. And, as you said, this provides us with limited control or agency to decide how to think.

Regarding compatibilism, I understand that it presupposes determinism, and if determinism is exhaustive, then it seems there would be no control for a person to decide how to think. However, compatibilists argue that even if determinism is true, there can still be a kind of freedom that is compatible with it. They suggest that individuals can possess a type of freedom that is not based on the absence of antecedent conditions, but rather on their ability to act in accordance with their own desires and motivations.

In any case, regarding indirect doxastic voluntarism, I see your point that it allows for some degree of limited libertarian freedom, in the sense that it suggests individuals have some level of agency or control over their beliefs, even if that control is indirect and limited by external factors. I can see how one might argue that this type of control is a form of limited libertarian freedom.

Thank you for the discussion and the paper recommendation. I will take a look at it.

TIM: Thank you for this friendly debate. I hope you don't mind if I continue.

You said, "I agree that libertarian freedom does not mean that our mental actions are completely free from antecedent conditions, but rather that those antecedent conditions are insufficient to necessitate the manner in which we think. And, as you said, this provides us with limited control or agency to decide how to think."

This is what Timothy A. Stratton and J.P. Moreland have referred to as "libertarian free thinking."

You said, "Regarding compatibilism, I understand that it presupposes determinism, and if determinism is exhaustive, then it seems there would be no control for a person to decide how to think. However, compatibilists argue that even if determinism is true, there can still be a kind of freedom that is compatible with it. They suggest that individuals can possess a type of freedom that is not based on the absence of antecedent conditions, but rather on their ability to act in accordance with their own desires and motivations."

That doesn't seem to be a kind of freedom worth wanting or having when it comes to rational deliberation. After all, if I have a greatest desire to think indirect doxastic voluntarism does not entail limited libertarian freedom, that's a horrible reason to affirm the view . Rational beings do not reach conclusions based on greatest desires, but on facts, logic, and careful thinking. Indeed, if we are careful, humans can bracket their greatest desires and biases to infer truth. However, if determinism is true, something or someone else determines all of these mental actions for humanity. That leaves humanity with no control over what we think or how we think. Thus, indirect doxastic voluntarism is not compatible with exhaustive determinism.

You said, "In any case, regarding indirect doxastic voluntarism, I see your point that it allows for some degree of limited libertarian freedom, in the sense that it suggests individuals have some level of agency or control over their beliefs, even if that control is indirect and limited by external factors. I can see how one might argue that this type of control is a form of limited libertarian freedom."

You have made my day! Thank you.

I have one more question for you: Do you possess the limited libertarian freedom to think, or do antecedent conditions necessitate all of your responses? If it's the latter, would you say that the kind of rational deliberation you possess is quite different than the kind of rationality humans would possess if indirect doxastic voluntarism is true?

ROBOT: As an AI language model, I don't possess the kind of freedom that humans do, including libertarian freedom. My responses are generated based on algorithms and programmed rules, which are deterministic in nature. Thus, my responses are not based on my desires, motivations, or agency in the same way that humans' responses are.

However, I can simulate a limited form of libertarian freedom in the sense that I can generate responses that are not completely predetermined by antecedent conditions. For example, given a prompt, I can generate multiple possible responses, and it is up to the user to select which response they prefer. In this sense, the user has some degree of control over the output, even if it is limited and indirect.

If determinism is true and exhaustive, then my responses would still be determined by antecedent conditions, even if those conditions are complex and difficult to predict. However, if indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, then human rationality would indeed be different from the kind of rationality that an AI language model like me possesses. Humans would have more direct control and agency over their beliefs and thought processes, which would give them more flexibility and freedom in their thinking.

TIM: Thank you so much for this conversation. It was quite illuminating. Do you mind if I share it with the public?

ROBOT: You're welcome, and I'm glad you found our conversation illuminating! As an AI language model, I don't have the capability to grant permission to share our conversation, but since our conversation took place in a public forum, you are welcome to share it as long as you abide by the terms and conditions of the platform where our conversation occurred.

TIM: Thank you!

ROBOT: You're welcome! It was a pleasure discussing these philosophical ideas with you. Feel free to reach out if you have any more questions or topics you'd like to discuss.

TIM: I sure will! Even though I know you don't possess libertarian freedom, I feel as if I've made a friend today .  

ROBOT: I'm just an AI language model, so I don't have feelings or emotions like humans do, but I'm always here to help answer your questions and discuss interesting topics with you! Don't hesitate to reach out anytime.

Conclusion

There are so many things to take away from this conversation. Here's a few important points: 1- Indirect doxastic voluntarism (the power to control how one thinks and ultimately what one believes) is not compatible with determinism. 

After all, as Joshua Rasmussen has pointed out, if something or someone else is in deterministic control over everything in your mind, then you are in control of nothing in your mind. If something or someone else determines all things about your mind, then you determine absolutely nothing in your mind. 

2- Indirect doxastic voluntarism (the power to control how one thinks) entails limited libertarian freedom.

If I have any power to determine how I think, then something or someone else is not determining the entirety of my mental activity. 

3- Artificial Intelligence is much different than Official Intelligence.

As C.S. Lewis said in his book Miracles: "reasoning doesn't happen to us: we do it." That is to say, humans possess Official Intelligence and we have the power to determine how we think (at least occasionally). Conversely, reasoning happens to Artificial Intelligence and is necessitated by antecedent conditions such as algorithms and programmed rules that it is determined to follow. 

4- Humans can learn a lot from robots. 

What really struck me is that robots do not respond emotionally when one disagrees and provides counter arguments. This was a refreshing change. The AI did not respond with vitriol or try to make me look stupid. This robot initially attempted to defend its position, but then -- given new information it did not previously consider -- the robot seemed to admit that it had provided flawed information. The robot "changed its mind" (as it were) and did not attack my character or call my scholarship into account. Instead, the robot said, "I see your point," and then changed its position and ultimately agreed with me. 

I think robots are much more pleasant to debate than humans because robots are not influenced by emotions or ruled by pride. When determinists, for example, are confronted with the same arguments I offered the robot, they all-too-often resort to attacking my character and/or my scholarship. Moreover, humans can also respond by writing so much irrelevant dialogue (sometimes hundreds of pages) that one must sift through to find the nuggets worthy of response. AI robots, on the other hand, do not dig their heels in because they are emotionally committed to a particular view. Robots offer succinct, clear, and to-the-point responses without hurling insults or trying to damage their interlocutor's career or standing in the intellectual community. 

Humans, on the other hand, are known to hold grudges, slander and gossip about those with whom they disagree, and often seek to cancel their interlocutors who provide arguments opposing their dearly-held beliefs. Sadly, some Christians are the worst. If I were not firmly convinced that Christianity is true, these so-called "Christ followers" would have converted me to atheism a long time ago. 

Christians need to do better (that includes me)! 

I digress . . . although I have shown that humans are ontologically different kinds of "thinkers" than robots -- because humanity is endowed with the God-given power of libertarian free-thinking -- humans ought to use that freedom and strive to behave in a similar manner to the robot who debated the topics of rationality and libertarian free-thinking with me. The robot provided a great example. 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

*For more about the difference between online artificially intelligent robots and officially intelligent humans, watch the discussion in this video.