Epistemic Meltdown

Objection

Dear Dr. Stratton,

I saw the video An Epistemological Case Against Calvinism right when it came out. And I was surprised that the whole video you assumed that a determinist has to argue for general reliability. I can simply reject this premise and argue that God is absolutely reliable. Seems to me that you have to argue for a specific sense of deception. But in the coloquial sense, deception often refers to some form of coercive act. And calvinists deny coercion, so if you redefine what decieving is then there's no debate.

Worst thing for your case, is that even if I were to affirm that God is deceptive. That still gets you anywhere, as you'd have to somehow affirm that God is bound by his own commandments *for men* as evil is sin, and sin is transgression of the law. And God's law is for humans, not for himself. And the worst part of this is that even if you were to prove God is bound by his own laws (which is very easily proven false in scripture) you'd shoot yourself in the foot with a intercontinental missile as you'd prove even your own version of the God of Christianity to be false. Since you'd have to say that God is a murderer for killing babies in the flood, egypt's firstborn, and David's baby to name a few. So in the task of disproving calvinism with this argument, you destroy your own view.

We could also get into a tu quoque case on how a God that chooses indeterministically is unreliable as he could always do otherwise like being suddenly choosing to be deceptive. Whereas the calvinist immutable God always chooses to be truthful because it's in his nature to be truthful.

I can even prove to you LFW falls into a true dichotomy between determinism and randomness. So that would leave your worldview as a non starter.

I think the epistemic meltdown will happen in your side dear brother.

- Israel Trujillo

Dr. Tim's Response

Thank you for your friendly pushback, Israel. I'm happy to address your concerns as we sharpen each other like iron. 

First, you stated that you were "surprised that the whole video assumed that a determinist has to argue for general reliability." I did not assume such a thing, Israel. At the beginning of the video I offered the following clarification:

In response to the Deity of Deception argument that JP Moreland and I have advanced in our Journal article entitled An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument, several have attempted to defeat the second premise. In our paper this key premise reads as follows: "If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and his word (the Bible) cannot be trusted." Elsewhere I've worded it in the following manner: "If God determines all Christians to have some false theological intuitions and to hold some false theological beliefs then God is an untrustworthy source of theological beliefs."

Now, a common response is for a committed determinist to propose a counter example. . . What are these counter examples? Thus far, they are typically some kind of deterministic machine or mechanism or system that is generally reliable but occasionally fails.

Read those last two sentences carefully, brother. It is clear that I did not assume that a determinist has to argue for general reliability as I argued against exhaustive divine determinism (EDD). Instead, I simply noted that a common counter to my argument is an appeal to "general reliability." I've seen many horrible attempts to escape the conclusions or the deity of deception argument; not only is the "general reliability response" the most common thus far, in my estimation, it's the best attempt I've encountered. Be that as it may, my video forcefully demonstrates why this best attempt fails miserably. 

You followed that by suggesting that you do not need the "general reliability" defense and that you can "simply reject this premise and argue that God is absolutely reliable."

I'm thrilled that you -- as one whom I describe as an "EDD-Calvinist" -- are willing to grant that the "general reliability response" could fail. The goal of my video was focused upon showing why that specific response does not work. That does not mean there are not other possible defeaters that might be raised. Let's see if your attempts are successful. Does it work to "simply reject the premise"? Well, before making any hasty rejections, let's look at the entire argument. Here it is:

A1- If EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.A2- If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted.A3- God is not deceptive and His Word can be trusted.A4- Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.A5- Therefore, EDD is false.

This argument consists of three premises and two deductive conclusions with the final conclusion offering a logical proof that EDD-Calvinism is false. For the Calvinist who is committed to EDD, he must show that one of the premises is false. Let's examine each premise beginning with the first: "If EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs." Why should we think this premise is true? 

The First Premise

It's supported by the fact that no committed Christ follower who studies scripture has a perfect set of theological beliefs. We all seem to know this intuitively. Indeed, even James White, who is one of the most confident theologians in the world today, admitted to me during our debate in Houston, that he did not have perfect theology. White also affirms the proposition that God determines everything. It follows from these two commitments, that God determines James White to affirm false theological beliefs. Consider a syllogism:

B1- If EDD-Calvinism is true, God determines all things about Christians.

B2- All mature Christians (including James White) affirm false theological beliefs. 

B3- Therefore, if EDD-Calvinism is true, God determines all mature Christians (including James White) to affirm false theological beliefs. 

Now, one can simply reject the conclusion without reason, but that would be unreasonable (by definition). Since we are called to "reason together sayeth the Lord" (Isaiah 1:18), those who claim to be Bible-believing Christ followers need to do better. So, what premise would a good Calvinist reject? The first premise is true (according to the divine determinist) by definition. To reject it would be to say that God does not determine all things. But the view that God does not determine all things is my view, and the one that the committed determinist wants to avoid. So, the first premise must be affirmed by the EDD-Calvinist. 

The second premise seems demonstrably true. All mature Christians seem to get at least one thing -- if not multitudes -- wrong about theology. That's why there are a plethora of "Four-Views Books" published where Christian scholars argue and debate over all the different views under the umbrella of Christendom. All these Christians scholars cannot be right. Moreover, if one were to reject Premise (B2), then the question would be raised: "Who is this person with perfect theology?" He would become more valuable than the Bible itself! He would be treated as some kind of "Super Pope." 

It seems the Calvinist is stuck, since both premises of this sub-argument are extremely strong. Thus, unless the divine determinist rejects logic and the rules of reason, he must affirm the deductive conclusion. It follows that if EDD is true, then God determines all Christ followers to get important things wrong. In this case, all Christians are determined to affirm false theological beliefs.

All of that to say, Premise A1 of the Deity of Deception argument (the primary argument) is defended, supported, and seems true. 

The Second Premise

What about premise (A2)? This is the premise defended against the "generally reliable" objection in the aforementioned video. You seemed to grant that my video could be successful against that response, but then said that you would simply reject the premise so you can continue to rationally hold to EDD. But if you want to rationally hold to EDD, you cannot simply reject the premise. You've got to provide a defeater to show exactly WHY you can rationally reject it. 

Be that as it may, I've provided reasons as to why (A2) is true. Think about it: If a wizard, a demon, or a Jedi using a mind trick used their power to necessitate your false beliefs, then these folks would properly be referred to as deceptive agents. Now, suppose a Jedi intentionally used his power to determine and necessitate all people to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality. It would be fair to describe this fellow as a "Jedi of deception." If a demon used his power to determine and necessitate all humans to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality, it would be fair to say that this being is a "demon of deception." 

What's the difference between a demon of deception and a deity of deception? 

Does a deity who intentionally uses his power to determine and necessitate all humans to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality suddenly become non-deceptive just because this being has more power than demons? Is this deity who determines all humans to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality suddenly become non-deceptive just because he created the universe? If Loki, the "god of mischief," created the universe, is he no longer a "god of mischief"? Of course not. Loki is still untrustworthy, and so is any deity who intentionally uses his power to determine every single human -- including all Christ followers -- to affirm false theological beliefs. 

Now, some have attempted to argue that this premise is false because a deity of deception requires the deity to be morally deficient. After all, they claim, perhaps this deity has good reasons to deceive all Christians. Although I have responded by saying that this seems to be an entirely unlikely, odd, ad hoc, and unbiblical view, I can grant this desperate maneuver for the sake of argument. Sure, God could have "morally sufficient reasons" to be a deity of deception, or if one prefers, an untrustworthy source of theological beliefs, but God would still be a deity of deception or an untrustworthy source of theological beliefs. No epistemic progress has been made. All humans -- including all Christ followers -- are still deceived. 

The Third Premise

The third and final premise seems to be essential Christian doctrine, so I doubt you or any good Calvinist will want to reject that one. If that's the case, then all three premises stand strong and the two conclusions follow deductively. If that's the case, then it follows that EDD-Calvinism is false. 

You said that it seems to you that I "have to argue for a specific sense of deception. But in the coloquial sense, deception often refers to some form of coercive act. And calvinists deny coercion, so if you redefine what decieving is then there's no debate."

Not at all, Israel. Deception is deception if coercion is involved or not. I've said nothing about coercion. I simply noted that if a deity intentionally uses his power to determine and necessitate your false beliefs about ultimate reality, then it is fair to say that at best, this being is an untrustworthy source of important beliefs. At worst, this is a deity of deception. Bottom line: you are still determined to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality. 

So, it seems fair to say that God, on your view, is a deity of deception. As I've noted elsewhere, in this one sense, Mormonism is better than EDD-Calvinism (even though Calvinists get many other things right that the Mormon gets wrong). Mormons, to their credit, are committed to the proposition that God is a trustworthy source of theological beliefs and desires all people to know the truth (1 Timothy 2:4). Be that as it may, you seemed to realize that your view does entail the fact that God determines all people to affirm false theological beliefs as you offered the following:

"Worst thing for your case, is that even if I were to affirm that God is deceptive. That still gets you anywhere, as you'd have to somehow affirm that God is bound by his own commandments *for men* as evil is sin, and sin is transgression of the law. And God's law is for humans, not for himself."

This, along with your above comments about intercontinental missiles, the great flood, and David's baby, all miss the point, Israel. As I noted above, I am not committed to the view that it's impossible for God not to have morally sufficient reasons to deceive all people -- including all Christ followers. My argument rests upon the fact that even if God has morally sufficient reasons to deceive all people about theological issues (including you), then all people (including you) are still deceived about theological issues. Moreover, as soon as one affirms that God deceives all of his own followers, then, if one believes they follow God, then they must affirm that this deity determines him to affirm at least one, if not multitudes, of false theological beliefs. If that's the case, as was clearly expressed in the video shared above, one would be in no epistemic position to know which of his theological views are true, and which are false. Thus, one would have reason to doubt all of his theological beliefs (including the theological belief you are advancing here). 

This is what I have referred to as epistemic meltdown. 

You continued and said, "We could also get into a tu quoque case on how a God that chooses indeterministically is unreliable as he could always do otherwise like being suddenly choosing to be deceptive. Whereas the calvinist immutable God always chooses to be truthful because it's in his nature to be truthful." But, Israel, I've already shown that the EDD-Calvinist's view of God is that he's not truthful, but rather, a deity of deception or an untrustworthy source of theological beliefs. This deity might tell some truths, but he determines all people to affirm false beliefs about important theological matters. Thus, you stand in no position to affirm that "the Calvinist immutable God always chooses to be truthful because it's in his nature to be truthful." Why? Because that was inferred from an interpretation of the text, that according to your view, was inspired by a deity of deception. What justifiable reasons do you have for believing what was inspired by a deity of deception? Why should you believe it? 

Be careful not to beg the question in response. 

It's better to reject EDD and affirm that God is a God of truth who desires all people to come to a knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:4), and thus, He does not determine all people -- including all Christ followers -- to affirm false theological beliefs. Indeed, a view that entails this low view of God is not a view of God at all. It's a false god -- an idol -- that ought to be sacrificed at the feet of the Maximally Great Being. Digging in one's heels at this point is a dangerous place to be. It might expose that one is more committed to their low view of the divine, or more committed to John Calvin, than to God Himself. 

Finally, you asserted that you can prove to me that libertarian freedom "falls into a true dichotomy between determinism and randomness. So that would leave your worldview as a non starter."

This is known as a tu quoque fallacy. That is to say that even if your assertion happened to be true (it isn't), it does not remove the fact that your view of EDD-Calvinism, to put it bluntly, has been destroyed. As I like to say, this is what playing with tu quoque fallacies gets you -- you still get burned and your view still melts away.

But does your "so's your old man" objection pass? Not at all. In fact, this is what JP Moreland and I had in mind when we wrote the following in our peer-reviewed journal article:

Ultimately, a person’s metaphysical and theological beliefs are either: (i) determined by something non-rational (and thus, untrustworthy), (ii) determined by a deity of deception (and thus, untrustworthy), (iii) random (and thus, untrustworthy), or (iv) caused by an intelligently designed free-thinking agent created in the likeness of a maximally great being (God) with cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in an appropriate environment which can be aimed at truth if the agent is careful and handles his or her powers responsibly. The first three options leave us with skepticism and reason to doubt our metaphysical and theological thoughts and beliefs. Option (iv) is the best explanation and our best hope. However, the fourth option entails that one is free in a libertarian sense—not determined by something unreliable or someone who is untrustworthy.

We added the following footnote:

Regarding randomness or luck, we believe that a Christian view of God and man—especially with Molinism in mind—does the best job of diminishing any “luck problems”. If all things about an agent are causally determined by something or someone else (which seems to follow in both naturalism and EDD), then one is “lucky” if the external deterministic force beyond one’s control causally determines one to affirm a true belief. If one’s belief truly is random—and the agent happens to affirm a true belief—he is also lucky. However, if one is a rational agent created in the image/likeness of God, everything changes. If a human possesses the God-given powers of reflective self-control (see Franklin 2018), then—if one is careful to take thoughts captive and does his due diligence (as opposed to being lucky), then he 

can

 rationally infer and rationally affirm better and true beliefs in the actual world. This is perfectly compatible with Molinism. According to EDD, however, God does not choose the elect based upon anything about the individual—“lest any man should boast” (Eph 2:9 RSV). So, those who are “passed by” (the damned) and those who are “elect” seem to be based upon luck or chance. Indeed, the elect seem to have won a cosmic and infinite lottery of sorts. Moreover, those who have been created for the sole purpose of eternal damnation are literally the unluckiest folks in all of creation. Ultimately, it seems we can find luck problems for any view. Some luck problems are worse than others.

Ultimately, Israel, you have offered a false dichotomy. Intelligently designed agents created in the likeness of God with the supernatural power of libertarian free thinking provide the third option which split the horns of this false dilemma.   

Conclusion

You concluded with the following:

"I think the epistemic meltdown will happen in your side dear brother." Given the defeaters I've offered to your counter-argument above, your conclusion does not follow, my friend. Your epistemic foundations have melted. Your only escape is to reject exhaustive divine determinism, as I did years ago. You must reject EDD.  God bless you as you continue your search for truth. And whatever you do . . .

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton