Has Paul Manata Defeated My Argument?

Paul Manata is known to be an aggressive but intellectual defender of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) on social media. He is also more than willing to attack a fellow Christian's character in the process. He has recently taken issue with my arguments against EDD and my arguments for libertarian freedom. He took to social media in an attempt to debunk my arguments while also throwing a few personal insults. While Manata’s behavior is not becoming of one who considers himself to be an academic or a Christian, I do try to sift through the insults to find his arguments.

Dan Chapa and I responded to his “Public Challenge to Tim Stratton” on the FreeThinking Ministries YouTube channel (before proceeding, you should watch this video response to Manata). The next day Manata offered a rebuttal to our video on Facebook. Since Mr. Manata is a scholar who has a significant following and influence, it is important to correspond with his comments. The remainder of this article addresses Manata’s rejoinder.

Manata wrote:

“They said a lot of true things, these all occurred at the beginning when they were complimenting me.”

Yes, I try to make it a habit to always compliment those I am about to debate. With that in mind, Paul Manata is a brother in Christ (albeit a belligerent one) who is extremely well read. If he disagrees, you ought to take his comments seriously. Unlike many online detractors, Paul cannot be safely ignored (he possesses a MA in philosophy, has published articles in academic journals, and has earned the right to be heard).

This is exactly why I have made videos on YouTube and written articles on my website addressing his concerns.

Manata continued and attempted to ignore my primary argument:

“Adam Omelianchuk already pointed out an error in what Stratton said I was committed to when Stratton talked about “the negation of (2).” So that argument flopped.”

This is a poor attempt at dismissing an argument for an irrelevant reason. My minor error does nothing to impact the case. This has already been pointed out in the vid’s description and in the comments (it’s pinned at the top). Here’s what I shared shortly after the video was released:

“I am indebted to Adam Omelianchuk for pointing out a mistake I made in the video. The negation of: "If all Demons are untrustworthy, then any of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon is untrustworthy." Is not: "If all demons are untrustworthy, then any of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon ought to be trusted." Rather it is: "All demons are untrustworthy and some of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon are trustworthy." The negation of a conditional is equivalent to an "and" statement which affirms the antecedent and negates the consequent. The negation of the universal quantifier ("for any x, x is P") turns into an existential quantifier ("for some x, it is not P").“I am indebted to Adam Omelianchuk for pointing out a mistake I made in the video. The negation of: "If all Demons are untrustworthy, then any of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon is untrustworthy." Is not: "If all demons are untrustworthy, then any of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon ought to be trusted." Rather it is: "All demons are untrustworthy and some of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon are trustworthy." The negation of a conditional is equivalent to an "and" statement which affirms the antecedent and negates the consequent. The negation of the universal quantifier ("for any x, x is P") turns into an existential quantifier ("for some x, it is not P").

With that said, I don't think my minor mistake has much of an impact on the overall point. If Manata is merely affirming that "All demons are untrustworthy and some of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon are trustworthy," the question is raised: "Which of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon is trustworthy?" If p responds (for example), "My belief in Calvinism should be trusted," The next question is raised: "But isn't that theological belief determined by a demon?" P would have to respond in the affirmative based upon his previous claims. Thus, the final question is raised: "Why should p trust his theological belief that Calvinism is true if this belief was determined by a demon? The transfer of untrustworthiness is going to be applied to the theological belief the demon determines p to think is true.”With that said, I don't think my minor mistake has much of an impact on the overall point. If Manata is merely affirming that "All demons are untrustworthy and some of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon are trustworthy," the question is raised: "Which of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon is trustworthy?" If p responds (for example), "My belief in Calvinism should be trusted," The next question is raised: "But isn't that theological belief determined by a demon?" P would have to respond in the affirmative based upon his previous claims. Thus, the final question is raised: "Why should p trust his theological belief that Calvinism is true if this belief was determined by a demon? The transfer of untrustworthiness is going to be applied to the theological belief the demon determines p to think is true.”

With that said, here’s the argument that supposedly “flopped”:

1- All demons are untrustworthy.

2-  If all demons are untrustworthy, then any of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon is untrustworthy (even if it happens to be true).

3- Therefore, any of p's theological beliefs determined by a demon is untrustworthy.

4- If p affirms premises 1 through 3 above, and p believes that all of his theological beliefs are determined by a demon, then p should affirm that all his theological beliefs are untrustworthy.

5- P affirms premises 1 through 3 above, and p believes that all of his theological beliefs are determined by a demon.

6- Therefore, p should affirm that all his theological beliefs are untrustworthy.

Manata says that he rejects the second premise. That either means that he affirms the negation, and thus he believes that some of the theological beliefs determined by a demon can be trusted, or it means that he believes that one can trust every theological belief determined by a demon. I contend that although some theological beliefs determined by a demon might be true, there is always reason to doubt any theological belief determined by a demon.

I would love to hear why Paul Manata thinks we can trust demons (at least occasionally) when it comes to theology and essential doctrine. At this point, I am unaware of any case he has made for the trustworthiness of demons.

Manata continued:

“Stratton denied that he affirmed ’U’, but implicitly affirmed it in the video when Dan commented on ‘U*’ and made it out that determinism simpliciter is the problem. Stratton smiled and nodded. Also in the YouTube comments on the video, Stratton said a commenter had a “good point” when he said if determinism were true, I don’t even ”think.” Stratton followed up by saying that thoughts just plop into my head, and I have no control over them, and I’m just a passive cog. That all follows from determinism simpliciter. So it seems that despite his violent head shaking and accusations of straw manning, Stratton thinks mere determinism, all by itself, causes epistemic chaos. Gives me no reason to trust my beliefs, etc., since I don’t actually *do* anything thinking, trusting, etc. I’m just a ‘passive cog’ if determinism were true.

It is better to engage one’s actual argument than to put too much weight on “smiles and nods.” Moreover, I never said that Paul’s thoughts just “plop” in his head. I have been clear that Paul does have thoughts, but none of them are up to him if EDD is true. This is exactly the point of the Free-Thinking Argument. Are all of one’s thoughts determined by something or someone else, or are some of them free in the libertarian sense and ultimately up to the thinker?

In the end, the point that seems to be ignored is that a deity of deception determines Paul’s theological beliefs. Paul has no control over how he thinks according to determinism simpliciter (indeed, that is a problem all by itself), however, my primary argument is that determinism plus the fact that a deity of deception determines all of Paul’s theological beliefs is the much bigger problem.

This is the important difference between the two statements:

U: If God determines that you will believe that p, then p is Untrustworthy for you.

U*: If a deity of deception determines person p to affirm theological belief x, then an undercutting defeater is raised against (there is reason to doubt) p’s affirmation of theological belief x.

The former alone might not do the trick, but the latter explains that it is determinism plus the fact that the one determining Paul’s theological beliefs is deceptive. If that is a person’s view of God, then the whole theological system is going to disintegrate (see, The Generally Reliable Liar and the Transfer of Untrustworthiness Principle).

Manata wrote:

‘ complained about my ‘headache argument’ since Stratton, after seeing my argument from perceptual beliefs, developed a new argument focusing on theological beliefs, and that wanted me to reply to that one. The reason for the ‘headache argument’ is because, up until my refutation, Stratton’s argument was always about all beliefs whatever and how determinism defeats rationally believing them. So I’m glad it’s acknowledged I refuted in seconds the first ten years of Stratton’s thinking on this subject.’

This is laughable and also sad. In Mere Molinism published two years ago, I noted that if EDD is true, then our beliefs are not “aimed at truth,” but rather, aimed at God’s will (which is often for Christians to hold false theological beliefs). As previously written in 2020:

"Ultimately, if naturalistic determinism is true, the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not intentionally “aimed” at anything since physics and chemistry are running the show. Hence, since the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not aimed at truth, our thoughts and beliefs are not reliable. Alternatively, if God is exhaustively running the show via causal determinism, then the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not necessarily aimed at truth either. Rather, the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are always perfectly aimed at the will of God—and God causally determines humanity to possess and affirm false theological beliefs. Hence, if EDD is true, then human theological beliefs are not reliable (including those discussed here).""Ultimately, if naturalistic determinism is true, the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not intentionally “aimed” at anything since physics and chemistry are running the show. Hence, since the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not aimed at truth, our thoughts and beliefs are not reliable. Alternatively, if God is exhaustively running the show via causal determinism, then the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not necessarily aimed at truth either. Rather, the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are always perfectly aimed at the will of God—and God causally determines humanity to possess and affirm false theological beliefs. Hence, if EDD is true, then human theological beliefs are not reliable (including those discussed here)."

Additionally, articles and videos discussing the problem with nefarious neurosurgeons, deities of deception, transcendent demons, and gods of mischief determining our beliefs are littered across the internet (start here on this website). I have been clear that the primary problem with determinism is when it is combined with untrustworthy causes. I then provide arguments to show why the laws and events of nature AND the creator of the universe are not reliable or trustworthy if determinism is true.

Paul Manata has missed the mark and his so-called “refutation” had absolutely nothing to do with my argument.

He tries again:

“On his ‘theological belief argument’, Stratton and Dan complained that my ‘headache argument’ didn’t respond to the ‘theological belief argument’. That’s explained above. However, in a Facebook post on 9/6/22, I did respond to the theological belief argument. So the video just didn’t advance the ball.”

That’s interesting because the argument based upon theological beliefs was not shared until I published the video on 10/5/22. Here it is:

1. If EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.

2. If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive, His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted, and Christians cannot have assurance of salvation.

3. God is not deceptive, His Word can be trusted, and Christians can have assurance of salvation.

4. Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.

5. Therefore, EDD is false.

Now, I did offer him the “Demon Argument” (see above) in a conversation on Eli Ayala’s thread. Paul retreated from that conversation and posted a response (and failed to tag me) on his FB page. Here it is:

“Tim Stratton gave me his most recent ‘free thinking argument’ against theological determinism. It now heavily turns on using sophistic rhetoric to call a God who determines all things a ‘Cartesian Demon’. This is because,

//The EDD-Calvinist’s view of the creator of the universe and the inspirer of scripture is that he is a supernatural agent who intentionally uses his power (one way or another) to necessitate false beliefs in the minds of all humanity.//

Check out the parenthetical. “One way or another” this could happen, obviously, is Molinism. On Molinism, God intentionally uses his power to ensure that billions of human beings (i) exist, and (ii) exist with false beliefs. God's decree, combined with the CFs, ensures this, down to the last microsecond, particle, and belief state of human history. So this is no special problem for theological determinists. As usual, *open theism* turns out to be the robust alternative to Calvinism, not Molinism.”

I explained the “one way or another” comment in the video responding to Paul. I noted that I was referring to God creating antecedent conditions (or simply via decree) which were sufficient to necessitate Paul’s false theological beliefs either via primary means, secondary means, efficient means, or deficient means). “One way or another” refers to any deterministic mechanism which necessitates Paul’s false theological beliefs which are still determined by a deity of deception.  

On Molinism, God does not decree or create antecedent conditions which are always sufficient to necessitate false theological beliefs. God simply creates a world in which He knows that Paul would/will not be careful when thinking through these topics, and thus, Paul would/will freely reach false theological beliefs – but he did not have to.

Again, Paul is offering a rehashed version of Greg Welty’s Bullet Bill thought experiment. Actually, in this instance, he is offering a Bullet Bill fallacy. This is the case because I am not currently arguing for Molinism, but rather, I am arguing against exhaustive divine determinism. If I launch a torpedo of truth at the EDD-Calvinist's battleship -- destroying it and sinking it -- and the explosion happens to sink my ship in the process (because I was too close to the blast), so be it (I know my Open Theist friends will happily throw me a life preserver). I am more concerned with truth than I am to Molinism. Be that as it may, Bullet Bill is unsuccessful at taking Molinism down along with the sinking ship of Calvinism. 

My favorite counterexamples to the Bullet Bill thought experiment are two of the most successful movies in the history of the world – Avengers: Infinity War and Avengers: Endgame!

Manata’s friend and colleague, Guillaume Bignon, in his recent debate with Kirk MacGregor (see Braxton Hunter and I review it here and here), says that people have this intuition that the person who “fired the gun” – who knew the evil that would freely occur – is still morally responsible. But this assertion of intuition is demonstrably false. Case in point: the millions upon millions of folks who intuit that Bucky was not morally responsible (in a desert sense) for being deterministically mind-controlled by Hydra to commit evil and the millions upon millions of folks who see that it is intuitively obvious that Doctor Strange should be praised for actualizing a possible/feasible future where horrible evil occurs, but is ultimately defeated.

Virtually everyone intuits that Doctor Strange ought not be blamed for the evil he knew Thanos would commit if Strange gave Thanos the time stone. All the movie-goers intuit that Strange is a hero who saved the Marvel Comics Universe and ought to be praised.

Doctor Strange knew all the evil that would freely occur if he actualized a specific feasible freedom-permitting future into existence. Strange did not deterministically mind-control Thanos, but he did “fire the gun” (as it were) and created a world – by doing the unthinkable (from our limited perspective) and giving Thanos the time stone. By doing this, Doctor Strange created a world in which he knew how Thanos would freely choose (along with everyone else), which ultimately led to the best feasible “endgame!”

Everyone knows that Strange should not be held responsible (in a desert sense) for the evil that Thanos freely chose to do (that’s on Thanos and Thanos alone). We all realize, however, that Strange should be praised for creating the one feasible freedom-permitting world where the evil of Thanos is ultimately defeated and all the saints are raised. Does that sound familiar?

So, those who offer the Bullet Bill story like to assert that we have these intuitions that the one who “fired the gun” should be held blameworthy, but this assertion is baseless. It's a claim made mainly by those who already presuppose EDD for theological reasons. The Avengers and Doctor Strange have shattered the Bullet Bill myth since 2019.

Here’s the deal: On EDD-Calvinism, God is the necessary and sufficient condition for all the evil in the world. On Molinism, God is only the necessary condition for all the evil in the world.

That’s a vital and relevant difference.

Manata continues:

“Of course, it’s not a “problem” at all, on any view, since “untrustworthiness” in the Author of my being isn't a defeater for my beliefs (at least on the externalist account I would defend), unless I have reason to think that my circumstances of belief-formation don’t satisfy the conditions for warrant.”

Paul does not grasp the point that undermines his position. There are reasons to doubt Paul’s *theological* beliefs if the Author of Paul’s faculties and ultimately all of his theological beliefs is a deity of deception. That is to say, undercutting defeaters are raised against Paul’s theological beliefs if the Author of Paul’s beliefs is a deity of deception who created and fine-tuned Paul’s theological belief-forming cognitive faculties.

Manata continues:

“But why think this? “One way or another” God gets me perceptual faculties that are reliably aimed at truth in a congenial epistemic environment.”

Two problems:

1- Question begging (Paul is assuming he can trust a deity of deception to get him “perceptual faculties that are reliably aimed at truth”).

2- We are discussing inferred theological beliefs – not mere perceptions of one’s physical environment (this common mistake is one reason why I continually add the word "exhaustive" to divine determinism). 

Paul continues:

“Those faculties are the immediate cause of my beliefs, but sometimes they cause false beliefs. So... we shouldn’t trust them? Sure...”

If EDD is true, then any time Paul’s faculties fail to cause true theological beliefs, they are functioning exactly the way that an omnipotent deity of deception determined them to function. Thus, every one of Paul’s false theological beliefs is perfectly determined by God (no matter what mechanism God used to necessitate them). Determinism, by definition, is determinism. 

Manata writes:

“One might as well say that because God ‘directly’ intervenes in nature and produces miracles, then because ‘sometimes’ nature proceeds regularly and ‘other times’ nature doesn't proceed regularly, that therefore there are no laws of nature, we can’t do science, etc. God causes all natural regularities and irregularities, so there’s no laws we can trust. But that's a dumb argument. Right?”

That's not relevantly analogous to my argument. What premise of the Deity of Deception argument does Paul reject?

Manata continued:

“Stratton tried a ‘Pascal Wager’ argument against Calvinism in the video reply to me. However I already addressed this in a post on my page that I wrote on 9/26/22. So the video he probably spent 15 hours preparing for, editing, etc., simply doesn’t move the ball forward.”

I did see his post about the Pascal Wager for freedom – it’s the epitome of question begging. Consider Manata in his own words (while quoting some of mine) :

“This from Stratton is so goofy:

//On a side note: consider a “Pascal’s Wager for Freedom” (I believe my colleague Leighton Flowers first offered something like this): If I’m wrong about this topic (and determinists are right), it is because God causally determined the determinists to be correct and God causally determined me to affirm a false belief. If this is the case, I have no opportunity to choose, think, judge, or believe otherwise. I do not determine what I think if God causally determines how I think. It is fair to say, it seems to me, that I am not responsible (I do not deserve blame) for being causally determined by God to think incorrectly. Be that as it may, if the determinist is wrong, it is the determinist’s fault and he deserves blame! He should have been more careful, examined his biases more closely (like his greatest subjective desires), and chosen—even if EDD is his greatest desire—to reject incoherent thoughts and beliefs in favor of truth. Instead, Bignon freely chooses to stand as an obstacle in the way of an argument that actually leads people to Christ and/or strengthens the faith of believers.24 That is to say, if I am wrong, I am not blameworthy. If the determinist is wrong, he is to blame." (Stratton, "Rejoinder," 12)//

I’ll highlight but not comment further on this bizarre idea that you get morally blamed for all your false beliefs - doesn’t matter if that’s what all your evidence, on balance, supported. I mean, not even Clifford went this far! I mean, many people think “Clifford’s maxim” that, “it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence,” is extreme. But “Stratton’s maxim” is Clifford’s on steroids! Imagine believing that “it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything… that’s false.”

First, I am not necessarily talking about “moral blame,” but rather, “epistemic blame” (to miss this vital point will lead to the attack of straw men) where one fails to think carefully, but they could have done so in the exact same circumstance in which one failed.

Moreover, I do not think anyone should get blamed for a false belief if God deterministically prevented him or her from thinking correctly. Only if we have cognitive faculties and the libertarian freedom to infer truth, but we fail to do so, should we be blamed. Indeed, as I made clear in my debate with James White:

"No possible world exists in which God causally determines me to do X, yet I "No possible world exists in which God causally determines me to do X, yet I should have done otherwise (that doesn’t even make any sense)." have done otherwise (that doesn’t even make any sense)."

Here’s a basic necessary condition of moral responsibility: One cannot be deterministically prevented from thinking or doing otherwise – especially by the one judging (and blaming) the person for not thinking or doing otherwise!

That’s the point that ought not be dismissed.

Paul continues:

2.. Next, note the amazingly lucky way things turn out for Stratton. If “the determinists are right” it’s *just* about the ‘determinism’ bit, you see, not the compatibilism bit. If they’re right about the compatibilism bit, then it turns out that Stratton *can* be “blamed” for “believing something false” (but see (1) above). Is this lucky or is the argument self-servingly crafted to avoid this problem? I mean, if the compatibilism bit is true, then it turns out I *can* be blameworthy for doing stuff God determines, and it turns out that I *can* play a role in determining what I believe (at an indirect, reflective, and diachronic level - most of what I directly or immediately believe I have no voluntary control over anyway, I just find myself believing them). How does Stratton justify just passing by this glaring problem? Just dogmatically assume incompatibilism… no matter what? Anyway, this shouldn’t move the compatibilist. If I’m right, Stratton can be blamed for the (tons) of false things he believes (but again, see (1)).

This is another question-begging response. It is like saying “If the indeterminists are right about the libertarianism bit, then it turns out that Manata *can* be “blamed” for not doing otherwise." Moreover, I have argued at length as to why the theological determinists are wrong about the “compatibilism bit. I have argued (along with JP Moreland) that epistemic responsibility is not compatible with determinism. So, this response is severely lacking.

Any so-called “role” Manata believes he actively plays is an illusion if EDD is true. Paul merely passively experiences sensations of role playings, but EDD (emphasis on the word “exhaustive”) means that God is actively playing ALL the roles (or the only role) and none of it is up to "Passive" Paul. 

Let’s unpack this “Pascal’s Wager for Freedom." If Paul is determined by God to espouse falsehoods, then Paul has a great excuse for this supposedly inappropriate activity – Paul is a victim! God should be blamed (or praised) for necessitating Paul’s false theological beliefs. However, if Paul is using his libertarian freedom to reject libertarian freedom, then Paul has no excuse – and he is guilty of advancing bad theology. Paul deserves blame.

On the other side of the coin, if EDD is true, then a deity of deception determined me (back in my pastoral days) to affirm true beliefs about EDD, but then, decided to deceive His loyal follower and devoted pastor by determining me to affirm false theological beliefs about libertarian freedom. This deity of deception might blame me for forcing these false beliefs upon me, but that seems to be something compatible with a deity of deception’s nature. Be that as it may, the vast majority of folks intuit and realize that a necessary condition of moral responsibility is that one cannot be deterministically prevented from doing otherwise – especially by the one judging the person for not doing otherwise.

But perhaps that’s just because a deity of deception is determining all these folks to have false intuitions. Indeed, if EDD is true, a deity of deception determines all Christians to possess false intuitions regarding theological matters.

Manata’s view of EDD is simply absurd and ultimately self-refuting.

Bottom line: if I am wrong, I have a great excuse for being wrong because an enormously powerful deity of deception determined me to hold false beliefs. If Paul is wrong, he ought to be blamed for using his God-given gift of libertarian freedom to reject his God-given gift of libertarian freedom. He has chosen poorly.

So, it does seem to be more reasonable to choose to join libertarians and reject EDD. If you are wrong, you have the best excuse. If you are right, you have chosen wisely. If the EDD guy is right, he has gained nothing. If he is wrong, he is blameworthy.

Manata continues:

“3. Imagine thinking that on determinism we don’t “carefully examine” evidence, “examine biases,” etc. I can assure Stratton that I have done this - that I have is more obvious to me than any premise of Stratton’s argument. And if determinism were true, I’ve done this in a deterministic world! I’ve done this and formed a new belief, and I’ve done it and have become more convinced of the target belief up for evaluation.”

Paul Manata continues to beg the question. I made the case that if EDD is true, then Paul is merely a passive passenger at the mercy of the whims of a deity of deception. Paul does not actively “do” anything, but rather, sensations of examinings -- necessitated by antecedent conditions -- pass through Paul as a passive cog.

However, people reason poorly, judge inaccurately, and ultimately believe incorrectly all the time. Indeed, this is what Paul thinks I am guilty of being causally determined to do by God. But according to his own view, Paul has no reason to think that this is not exactly what a deity of deception is doing to him. Paul can only beg the question and assume that he is not the one being deceived by a deity of deception. Yes, I have experienced what it is like to judge, evaluate, and deliberate. The question raised is this: Am I actively steering that ship of reason, or am I just a passive passenger merely tied up in the backseat and along for the ride?

Paul does not actively steer the ship of reason or do his due diligence if EDD is true. No, Paul simply thinks, deliberates, and believes in the exact manner in which a deity of deception determines and necessitates him to think, deliberate, and believe. This is problematic, but it’s down-right damning when one considers the fact that this includes all of Paul’s theological beliefs (which is what we are currently discussing).  

Moreover, Paul says that “he does these things” and this is more obvious to him than any premise in my arguments. Really? What about the fact that this so-called “obviousness” that Paul is passively experiencing is also determined by a deity of deception who determines all Calvinists to hold false theological and metaphysical beliefs?

It would be great to hear a response from Paul Manata that refrains from begging questions.

In the meantime, let’s continue addressing Paul’s next comment:

“Part of the problem is that Stratton places all his weight on synchronic believing, not diachronic. There’s things I can do, like read arguments, think, consider, etc., over time, and this causally affects my beliefs. I know I can do this, because I’m doing it right now!”

So much for hoping to avoid begging the question. What Paul seems determined to miss is that the way or manner in which he supposedly “considers” (including his evaluations, judgments, deliberations, and so forth) are not up to him, but are determined and necessitated by a deity of deception. Thus, Paul has reason to doubt “his” considerations, judgements, evaluations, and deliberations (which were not up to him but determined by a deceiver) of the arguments he has read.

He continues:

“I’m reasoning and evaluating Stratton’s claims. Where am I off? The *possibility* that God is causing me to behave irrationally and not appreciate evidence, fail to see what follows from what, etc?”

I think most folks are beginning to see where Manata "is off." Namely, it’s not a “possibility” if EDD is true. This is because on Paul’s view, unless he is going to claim to be theologically infallible, then if God determines all things, and Paul has false theological beliefs, then God has determined and necessitated Paul Manata’s false theology. The problem for Paul is that a deity of deception might be giving Paul some true theological beliefs, but they would be mixed in a bag of false theological beliefs, and Paul has no way to sort them out and affirm which ones are true and which are false. Why? Because that same sorting out process is ALSO determined and necessitated by the same deity of deception who determined Paul to have bad theology in the first place.

Ultimately, Paul is trying to steal from libertarian freedom to argue against libertarian freedom. Paul is using active – first mover – language, but his view of EDD does not allow for it (which is exactly why I continue to point out the "E" of EDD). Paul’s so-called reasoning and evaluations are determined by a deity of deception which provides the antecedent conditions that are sufficient to necessitate exactly what passes through "Passive" Paul.

He continues:

“Lol at the hubris of thinking “this (pet) topic” of Stratton’s is “leading people to Christ” and “strengthening the faith of believers.” I mean, maybe. God can strike a straight blow with a crooked stick, after all.”

This is certainly an important topic to me, one that I think has a tremendous impact on one's web of theological beliefs. I'm gratified to know that my work has helped some. Consider one testimony here: Evidence In The Flesh for Apologetics).

At the end of the day, Paul Manata has put up a fight (while also hurling a few personal insults), but his view of EDD is ultimately un-biblical and self-refuting. The family of Free-Thinking Arguments I've offered have yet to be refuted and they seem to be growing stronger after each failed attack. 

Manata Continues to Respond

I was about ready to hit the publish button when I was informed that Manata offered another lengthy post attempting to escape the problems Dan Chapa and I burdened upon him. He wrote:

Initially, Stratton overplayed his hand, arguing that if theological determinism were true, we couldn’t rationally believe *any* proposition, since God causes some people to believe some falsehoods. I offered two replies, the first from perceptual beliefs, where we’re caused to believe falsehoods due to misperception (like a stick in water appearing bent), yet nevertheless we’re warranted in believing the deliverances of our perceptual faculties; the second used non-inferentially justified beliefs - such as ‘I am in pain’ - to show that we can know such even if our beliefs are brought about by a deceptive demon.

Paul attacks a straw man. My argument is not that God causes some people to believe some falsehoods. Nor do I argue that one cannot be wrong about experiencing pain. As seen above, the first premise of my argument clearly points out the fact that if EDD is true, God determines ALL Christians to affirm false theological beliefs. 

My argument has never been about perceptions in the physical universe. However, while on this irrelevant topic, Manata fails to interact with the "carefulness condition" I have offered (stolen from epistemologist Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton). Sure, one's cognitive faculties might initially provide false information to his mind, but -- if he chooses to be careful -- he can do his due diligence and infer that the stick is not actually bent and there is no water at the end of the road on a hot summer's day.  

Be that as it may, if God determines Paul to affirm a false theological belief until the day he dies, and God also determines Paul to reason poorly while interacting with defeaters raised against his view until the day he dies, then it is impossible for Paul to be more careful and infer a better or true theological belief in this circumstance of his life (feel free to replace the entirety of Paul's life with any smaller length of time). Paul is simply stuck with bad theology. Indeed, it is just as impossible to reason with a brick wall as it is to reason with a "brick Paul." 

Manata writes:

Recently, Stratton took the smart path and granted, ad arguendo, that such could be rationally believed even given determinism (if he doesn’t want to grant these things, arguendo, let’s go there). But, he was quick to excitedly add that he wanted to focus on *inferential* beliefs. These, he stated, were what really posed the problem.

Recently? I submitted my doctoral dissertation in 2019 (much of which is found in my book published in 2020). In MereMolinism, I make sure to focus on inferred beliefs -- based upon a short conversation I had with renowned epistemologist Tim McGrew (I believe this was in 2016 at the EPS conference in San Antonio). 

But here he’s just as jejune as when it comes to non-inferentially justified beliefs. The same argument holds. Stratton’s shifting to “inferential beliefs” does nothing to change the basic issue, since these are involuntary as well. When I reflect on the Socrates syllogism (“All men are mortal, Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal”), I *find myself* assenting to the inference.

There is so much more to rationality than merely to find oneself assenting to an inference. The more crucial matter involves an evaluation and judgment of each of the premises involved leading up to the inferred or deductive conclusion. Be that as it may, on Paul's view of EDD-Calvinism, Paul does not have access to the active language, "when I reflect." No, it is more accurate for Paul to say, "when I experience sensations of reflectings passing through me." Paul is unintentionally assuming that he possesses libertarian freedom while arguing against libertarian freedom.

This is why Moreland and I wrote the following in An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument:

"Though unintentional, by utilizing statements "Though unintentional, by utilizing statements , determinists benefit from a rhetorical mirage that keeps hidden what is actually being asserted, determinists benefit from a rhetorical mirage that keeps hidden what is actually being asserted."."

I'm glad Paul corrected himself by saying "I *find myself* assenting to inference." Does Paul also find himself accepting or rejecting all the points of information leading up to the inference? What Paul fails to find himself grasping is that any point of information along the way (leading to his conclusion) is also determined by a deity of deception on his view. This is why I continue to highlight what is entailed by divine determinism with the addition of the word "exhaustive." 

Paul's admission that he passively "finds himself" assenting makes my point. This is especially evident when two epistemic peers disagree. When peer 1 finds himself assenting that a theological proposition is true, and peer 2 finds himself assenting that the same theological proposition is false, then -- according to EDD -- the reason why one peer is wrong is because God determined one theologian to assent incorrectly. An additional problem is raised in that neither can rationally affirm who the deity of deception has determined to affirm truth and who he has determined to infer and affirm a false belief. Indeed, that next deliberative step is also determined by the same deity of deception. 

Paul continued: 

Second, the quasi-formal arguments he overlayed on his video reply to me do nothing to change the problem, since they just reproduce the fallacious reasoning about perceptual beliefs:

1. If experience counts for anything, then nature determines all people to affirm some false perceptual beliefs. 2. If nature determines all people to affirm some false perceptual beliefs, then nature is deceptive.

Perhaps nature is "deceptive." Fortunately, as some versions of the Free-Thinking Argument demonstrate, there is a supernatural aspect of humanity which grants humans the libertarian freedom and power to reason, be careful, and reach true beliefs in spite of nature's attempts at deception. 

Paul continues: 

Obviously, there must be a way of interpreting ‘deceptive’ here that is innocuous, or we’re all in big trouble. Likewise, there is a way of interpreting ‘deceptive’ in ‘God is deceptive’ that is innocuous. I mean, there must be, because in 1 Kings 22:20-23 it is God (and no one else!) who “puts a lying spirit in the mouths of the prophets” who are proclaiming victory to Ahab. God’s purpose is to “entice Ahab”!

I mean, if God wants to do this, what’s to stop him? Is Stratton now going to throw his Bible away because it comes from this ‘untrustworthy’ source?

Let's examine the text:

20 and the Lord said, ‘Who will entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead?’ And one said one thing, and another said another. 21 Then a spirit came forward and stood before the Lord, saying, ‘I will entice him.’ 22 And the Lord said to him, ‘By what means?’ And he said, ‘I will go out, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ And he said, ‘You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so.’ 23 Now therefore behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these your prophets; the Lord has declared disaster for you.”20 and the Lord said, ‘Who will entice Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead?’ And one said one thing, and another said another. 21 Then a spirit came forward and stood before the Lord, saying, ‘I will entice him.’ 22 And the Lord said to him, ‘By what means?’ And he said, ‘I will go out, and will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.’ And he said, ‘You are to entice him, and you shall succeed; go out and do so.’ 23 Now therefore behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these your prophets; the Lord has declared disaster for you.”

As Dan Chapa and I noted in the video Manata is interacting with, the only time God allows (as opposed to necessitates) a person to be deceived in Scripture is when they have already chosen to reject Him. It is only in an act of judgment enacted upon those who are responsible (in a desert sense) for rejecting Truth. My specific argument is not focused upon those who have rejected God's revelation, but rather, it is focused on a deity of deception determining all of his loyal, elect, and spirit-filled followers to affirm false theological beliefs. 

To attack anything else is to attack a straw man. 

Moreover, Manata's quip of "it was God and no one else" is a bit too hasty. Consider the following commentary from Got Questions:

"God had . . ."God had . . . given opportunity to repent of his wickedness. With this final rejection of God’s counsel, God determined to carry out the death sentence. Since Ahab continued to prefer the lies of his false prophets over the truth given by God’s prophets, God chose to use the false prophets to carry out His plan. When God asked for volunteers to “entice Ahab into attacking Ramoth Gilead and going to his death there” ( given opportunity to repent of his wickedness. With this final rejection of God’s counsel, God determined to carry out the death sentence. Since Ahab continued to prefer the lies of his false prophets over the truth given by God’s prophets, God chose to use the false prophets to carry out His plan. When God asked for volunteers to “entice Ahab into attacking Ramoth Gilead and going to his death there” (1 Kings 22:20), a spirit (fallen angel/demon) said he would be a lying spirit in the mouth of the prophets. God gave the spirit permission to proceed, and Ahab received the message he desired . . . . ), a spirit (fallen angel/demon) said he would be a lying spirit in the mouth of the prophets. God gave the spirit permission to proceed, and Ahab received the message he desired . . . . In the case of Ahab, God chose to a lying spirit to accomplish His perfect and righteous plan (In the case of Ahab, God chose to a lying spirit to accomplish His perfect and righteous plan (Psalm 18:30).")."

It makes much more sense to say that Ahab freely -- in a libertarian sense -- chose to continually reject God's love, grace, revelation, and truth. Thus, since Ahab was not determined by God to reject God, Ahab deserved blame and punishment. God allowed a demon to bring about this punishment. It is virtually as if God said, "Okay, Ahab, if you are committed to rejecting truth and believing lies . . . have it your way and enjoy this demon of deception." 

Manata continues to miss the point:

If you had a friend who is a CIA spy in a foreign land, he probably lies all the time. But you still trust him when you meet for coffee.

As noted in the same video Manata is grappling with, I am clear that on rare occasions, deception is actually good. The CIA spy in a foreign land has morally sufficient reasons to be deceptive, just as you would if you were hiding Jews in your basement and the Nazis were on your doorstep. 

Indeed, the spy who "lies all the time" to evil enemies of the state (who deserve to be deceived) has not offered reason for you to doubt him when discussing theology over hot drinks at the coffee shop.

Side note: For what it's worth, I have a good friend (who shall remain nameless because of the nature of this comment) who is an epistemologist and also a former CIA agent. In fact, his job at the CIA was referred to as "applied epistemology." Much of my views I am currently espousing have been sharpened by this former "spy."

Now, Paul is right that just because a CIA spy lies to multiple communists, Paul does not have reason to doubt his claims about theology over coffee . . . unless you knew that this same "friend" also intentionally seeks to deceive all of his friends on occasion. According to Paul Manata's view, God determines all of His loyal followers to infer and affirm false beliefs about God. Moreover, according to Paul's view of EDD, God determines all mature Christians -- including all theologians -- to die with false beliefs about God and ultimate reality. He does not merely allow an evil person in a foreign land to believe falsehoods. No, this deity of deception deceives all of his loyal "friends" and followers.

Paul writes: 

Clearly, whether or not unreliability in the source of our beliefs means we shouldn’t trust the source all comes down to how the beliefs are formed. And that means we must reflect on the conditions of warrant, and whether those are satisfied in a deterministic universe. Stratton doesn’t seem interested in that. He wants to do brain surgery by exploding bombs. It’s all so much wasted breath. Is this because he has no training in epistemology?

Although this is not rocket science or brain surgery, Paul is correct in that I am dropping atomic bombs on EDD. I am not dropping bombs on Paul as a person (unless he finds his identity in EDD instead of Christ). I am saddened by this constant attack on my character or so-called "lack of training" (much of which has occurred across social media). Whatever happened to responding with gentleness and respect (1 Peter 3:16)? Moreover, let's suppose that I have horrible character and that I am the worst scholar in the history of mankind, why can't Paul (and some of his colleagues) simply interact with arguments and treat each other as brothers in Christ? 

With that said, again, when Paul says "we must reflect," he is again stealing from the libertarian view and using active language. If one reflects and (more importantly) how one reflects -- after all one can reflect and reason poorly -- is not up to Paul but determined by a deity of deception if EDD is true.  

According to Paul's view, the "how his beliefs are formed," is also determined by a deity of deception. There is no escape! If Paul's interpretation of scripture (which was also determined by a deity of deception according to Paul) leads Paul to "find himself assenting" to the proposition that God determines all Christians to affirm false theological beliefs, then there is reason to doubt his theological beliefs and how Paul passively found himself assenting. 

I will leave you with this argument from James 1:13-15 (NLV) . . .

God Does Not Tempt Us 13 When you are tempted to do wrong, do not say, “God is tempting me.” God cannot be tempted. He will never tempt anyone. 14 A man is tempted to do wrong when he lets himself be led by what his bad thoughts tell him to do. 15 When he does what his bad thoughts tell him to do, he sins. When sin completes its work, it brings death.God Does Not Tempt Us 13 When you are tempted to do wrong, do not say, “God is tempting me.” God cannot be tempted. He will never tempt anyone. 14 A man is tempted to do wrong when he lets himself be led by what his bad thoughts tell him to do. 15 When he does what his bad thoughts tell him to do, he sins. When sin completes its work, it brings death.

1- If EDD is true, God determines all things. 

2- If God determines all things, then God determines the temptations of humanity.

3- God does not determine the temptations of humanity.

4- Therefore, God does not determine all things. 

5- Therefore, EDD is false. 

It is utterly absurd to say that God does not tempt anyone -- but He does (wink, wink) determine and necessitate our temptations and responses to them. It is much better to take the Molinist view -- that God created a feasible freedom-permitting world (with the endgame in mind) in which He knew how people would freely choose to think and act in order to ultimately arrive at the glorious, perfect, and eternal endgame. 

The former is an absurd and low view of the divine. The latter is a maximally great being -- God -- who ought to be praised. 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

I've been informed that Manata has written objections against the paper I coauthored with JP Moreland entitled An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument. Manata continues to make many of the mistakes I've addressed above and many more. We have already started crafting a response that will be released in due time. Stay tuned.