Hoist by its Own Petard – A Grounding Objection to Molinism

By Andrew Harland-Smith

1. Preliminary Remarks

This exchange between John and myself concerns a

narrowly framed

articulation of the grounding objection. Mine is not an argument founded on any

universal

theory of truth; not truthmaker maximalism, not atomic truthmaker, not even truth-supervenes on being. Rather, mine is a much

narrower

claim. It is only that a small but significant

subset

of truths, the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom (‘

CCFs

’), require truthmakers. This essay contains two key parts. In the first, I outline and briefly defend what I call the “Dependence Thesis” (‘

DT

’). Roughly, this states that:

(DT). For any person S and CCF C, if C is true, S has made it true that C

My defence of (‘

DT

’) is two-fold. On the one hand, it is ingredient in the claim that we are morally accountable for our actions. More significantly however, it is inherent in the reason Molinism treat the (‘

CCFs

’) as an object of God’s middle knowledge. If this is correct; if Molinism is

committed

to (‘

DT

’), it turns out to be committed to a thesis that spells its own demise. Molinism is, as it were, hoist by its own petard. In the second part, I outline the

apparent

ramifications of (‘

DT

’) for Molinism. Briefly, it

seems

to result in something

like

backward causation. I acknowledge that there

are

moves that the Molinist may make to resists the inference to backwards causation. One may, for instance, punt to Haecceitism. But, the constraints of space are such that I cannot entertain and refute

all

such moves

here

. I will instead leave it to my opponent to raise them as he sees fit.

2. The Dependence Thesis (‘DT’)

As I have indicated, the bulwark of my argument

against

Molinism is (‘

DT

’). Before we proceed any further therefore, I had better stop to ensure that it is solid ground.

2.1 (‘DT’) as Ingredient in Moral Accountability

That ones’ actions are ‘voluntary’ is, without question, a necessary condition of moral accountability. If a person acts

involuntarily

, they are not accountable for any less than desirable outcomes realised as a result. In fact, it must be noted, that though they disagree upon what ‘voluntariness’ requires, this is a point on which compatibilists and libertarians will

agree

. One particularly

clear

way to illustrate this, is simply to consider a (somewhat modified) Frankfurt type counter-example. It is November 8 2016, the day of the US Presidential elections. And William wakes up minded to vote for Clinton. However, Hilary, Williams’ wife, is somewhat concerned that he may change his mind and vote for Trump. With a view to mitigating this risk, Hilary surreptitiously installs a chip in Williams’ brain. This chip is such that if William attempts to vote for Trump, the chip will force his limbs into such motions as will mean a vote is cast for Clinton. The moment arrives for William to cast his vote, and he undergoes a sudden change in spirit. Now he wants to vote for

Trump

. Sensing William’s change of heart, the chip activates, overriding his limbs, and forcing him to vote instead for Clinton. William is not, we think, culpable for this disastrous state of affairs. Simply stated, his actions were insufficiently

voluntary

for him to be held accountable for his actions. In this situation, something like the following proposition is true:

(P) On November 8 2016, William’s limbs moved such that a vote was cast for Clinton.

However, most importantly for present purposes, notice what it

would

have taken to render William accountable. Consider that is, what would have been the case had the chip proved needless. Granted that the chip is still present in his brain, it follows that William lacked the capacity to realise the alternate possibility. So, what, we may ask, grounds his accountability in voting for the wrong candidate? The answer, presumably, is that notwithstanding his inability to realise the alternate possibility,

he

is still

source

of his actions. Simply put,

he

, and the powers and dispositions within him, are the

first cause

of the salient outcome. (P), notice, is

again

true. And again, it is perfectly obvious that it does not wont for a truthmaker. Significantly however, the source of its truth is quite different. Where (P) previously depended on the

chip

implanted in William’s brain, the same cannot be said here.

Here

, the truth of (P) depends only upon William himself. And it is

for this reason

that he (William) is accountable for his voting for the wrong candidate. Thus, (‘

DT

’).

2.2 (‘DT’) as Inherent

in Molinism

The claim here, is not simply that there is good independent reason to affirm (‘

DT

’). The claim is rather stronger than that. It is that Molinism is itself

committed

to (‘

DT

’). At the outset, John, myself, and a number of the leadership at Free Thinking Ministries, agreed to a joint understanding of Molinism. That joint statement contained a section 2.1.3 briefly outlining, in syllogistic form, the Molinist argument for locating God’s knowledge of the (‘

CCFs

’) in His

Middle

knowledge. For those who have read this joint statement, it will be recalled that, between those who affirm the libertarian character of free will,

and

the possession by God of exhaustive foreknowledge, the contentious premise is (4). That is, the claim that the (‘

CCFs

’) are

not

an object of God’s Free Knowledge. What, we may ask, was the

argument

to this effect? The joint statement explains:

“…if the CCFs are a feature of God’s free knowledge, they are no longer truths about what libertarian free agents would do. To the extent that the ultimate source of their truth lies in God’s creative decree, their truth has been fixed independently the relevant agent’s causal powers”.

Notice, the conditional in the first sentence is the

conclusion

of the argument, not a premise therein. That is, it is the point to which the Molinist hopes to drive us. Nonetheless, its antecedent proves instructive. What, specifically, are the ramifications alleged

if

the (‘

CCFs

’)

were

(perhaps counterfactually) located in God’s free knowledge? Again, the joint statement, section 2.1.1, proves instructive. Free Knowledge, we are told, is logically posterior to God’s creative decree. Thus, it reads:

“…God knows what is actual (as opposed to what is merely possible) precisely because He has elected to make it so”.

Put another way, the propositions populating God’s free knowledge are those whose truth

God

has determined. Hence, if the (‘

CCFs

’)

are

an object of God’s free knowledge, their truth was set

prior to

, and hence

independently of

, the relevant agents’ causal powers. Put the other way around, if the (‘

CCFs

’)

are

an object of God’s free knowledge, God,

not the relevant agent

, has made the salient (‘

CCF

’) true. Of interest here, is not so much the

validity

of the argument (though that may be challenged). Rather, the interest here, is with the

essence

of the complaint. It

would

, we are supposed to agree, be a

problem

if the truth of the (‘

CCFs

’) had been set

prior to

, and hence

independently of

, the relevant agents’ causal powers. Specifically, we are told, it would undermine our status

as free agents.

But what, we may ask, is the

general

principle here? Well, to some extent, that question has already been answered. Ostensibly, it would be a

problem

if the truth of the (‘

CCFs

’) had been fixed independently of the relevant agents’ causal powers. The obverse of this, is, necessarily, that the truth of the (‘

CCFs

’) are

dependent

on the causal powers of the relevant agent. Thus, (‘

DT

’).

3. Against Molinism from (‘DT’)

Granted then, that (‘

DT

’) is true, it follows that (‘

CCFs

’) do not wont for truthmakers. Specifically, it follows that their truth is grounded

in the powers

of the

relevant agent

. For the purposes of illustration, consider the following (‘

CCF

’):

(C) Had Andrew not come to reject Molinism, he would not have engaged John in a written exchange on the Grounding Objection

Granted that (‘

DT

’) is true, (C) has a truthmaker. Namely, in the nearest possible world (let’s call it ‘w2’) where I

do not

reject Molinism,

I

never exercise the relevant powers to

engage

John in a debate. Presumably, still being a Molinist in w2, I lack the motivation to do so. The significant point here, is that provided (‘

DT

’) is true, truths about how we act have their source

in us

qua individual agents. Or, to come at it another way,

we

are explanatorily prior to the truth of propositions regarding how we act. But, to what extent can Molinism

agree

that the (‘

CCFs

’) have their genesis

in us

. Prima facie, at least, it is not altogether

obvious

that it

can

. As the joint statement, section 2.1.2 explains, the (‘

CCFs

’) are (at least ostensibly) an object of God’s

Middle

knowledge. Further, as section 2.1.1 explains, Middle Knowledge logically precedes the Divine Creative Decree. As John has usefully put it elsewhere, the propositions populating God’s Middle Knowledge are “pre-volitional”. That is, they are true

prior to

, and hence

independent of

, any act of volition on God’s part. Indeed, it is

precisely because

they are pre-volitional in this sense, that they are capable of guiding God in His setting up the world toward

His

end. But here there arises an issue of

timing

. Simply, truths ((the (‘

CCFs

’)) about how we

would

act

were true

long before we made them so. To make this somewhat more concrete, consider a situation where God elects to create, not

this

world, but w2. That is, the world in which I never reject Molinism, and hence never engage in this exchange. In that case, the following proposition is true:

(C') Andrew never engages John in a written exchange.

As from the very first moment of creation (call it

t

), God

knew

(C’). And yet, as from

t

, there was still some 13.8 billion years to traverse before I would

make it true

that (C’). To the extent then, that (‘

DT

’) is true, it follows that my actions

caused

God to be in the state of knowing that (C’)

before

I performed them. Hence, backwards causation. Suffice to say, backwards causation is

not

an intuitive pill to swallow. Formally speaking, it amounts to saying that an

effect

may temporally precede its

cause

. To saying, moreover, that possibly, the universe brought

itself

into being. Certainly, it deserves recalling that Daniel Dennett earned himself great scorn when he once said, in debate with William Lane Craig, that the universe

in fact

brought itself into being. Such an odd claim, though not strictly impossible, was risible nonetheless. Granted that such appeals to intuition do not amount to a

knock down

argument against backwards causation. Such arguments are, in any event, peculiarly rare. Nonetheless, such intuitions give us cause to demand that

independent

reason be adduced before we accept so difficult a notion. And, absent such reasons, we should (at least provisionally) regard it as false. Furthermore, it should also be born in mind, that if (as I’m sure many of my readers

do

) you find yourself wedded to an A-theory of time, your prospects of plausibly biting the bullet on backwards causation are nil. As any good A-theorist will tell you, the future does not exist. To say then, that a future cause may bring about some current effect, is to say that what does

not

exist, may nonetheless cause some present effect. Assuming, plausibly enough, that only extant things have causal powers, it is to say that the cause both exists and doesn’t.

4. Summing Up

In summing up, there are three things that we may say:

1. (‘DT’) is, at least prima facie, ingredient in what it is to say that agents are morally accountable for their actions; and,

2. Further, (‘DT’) seems to be inherent in the reason for the Molinist claim that the (‘CCFs’) are an object of God’s Middle Knowledge.

3. Finally, the conjunction Molinism and (‘DT’) seems to drive in the unpalatable direction of backwards causation.

To re-iterate, I acknowledge that there are moves the Molinist may make to resist the third claim. There is not the space here however, to entertain and refute each such possibility. I leave it to my opponent to raise them as he sees adequate.