Justified Metaphysical Beliefs

Question

Dear Dr. Stratton,

I was watching a debate review where Taylor Cyr was talking about a revised Epicurean argument against determinism (pretty close to some of your Free-Thinking Arguments). While I don't think he raised any good objections (he didn't spend much time on it), his mention of it made me think of a possible objection to the support you use in your argument. I'm eager to get feedback on this, it probably comes down to a misunderstanding on my behalf.

You seem to support the rough inference of "if rationality then libertarian freedom" by pointing out that determinism in conjunction with theism or naturalism is untrustworthy/unreliable because it determines that there are some false beliefs and because of this, determinists have no basis to trust their own beliefs. I know I'm dumbing down some things, but this makes me wonder: why can't a similar objection be raised to the indeterminist? If someone admits they are fallible, how can they be a trustworthy source for determining their own beliefs?

I'm no philosopher or academic, but it seems to me that if this "symmetry objection" is just as valid, then the support for the inference can only come from grounding trustworthiness in teleological stuff.

- Daniel

Dr. Tim's Response

This is a great question, Daniel! I'm glad you asked it.

You noted that your summary of my view was a "rough inference." Yes, while it is indeed a rough inference, it would have been an accurate summary several years ago. While I am still open to others advancing this idea I do not argue for quite so much these days. The focus of the Free-Thinking Arguments I've been advancing over the past few years is not as aggressive. As demonstrated in my recent debate with Alex Malpass, the primary aim of these arguments today is much more humble and simply focused upon the following: "if ability to rationally infer metaphysical/theological knowledge, then libertarian freedom."

You asked, ". . . why can't a similar objection be raised to the indeterminist? If someone admits they are fallible, how can they be a trustworthy source for determining their own beliefs? . . . t seems to me that if this 'symmetry objection' is just as valid, then the support for the inference can only come from grounding trustworthiness in teleological stuff."

This is the question JP Moreland and I sought to answer in the conclusion of our essay, "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument." Here's a quote:

"This . . . argument says nothing about humanity possessing alternative possibilities. It merely shows that EDD is false and that humans must be the proper source of at least some of our thoughts and beliefs. If one assumes that something or someone else determines all of his thoughts and beliefs, then one cannot rationally affirm important thoughts and beliefs. But of course, at least on occasion, we can rationally affirm these thoughts and beliefs (to argue otherwise presupposes it). Therefore, something or someone else does not determine all of our thoughts and beliefs. Therefore, we are libertarian free thinkers.

Ultimately, a person’s metaphysical and theological beliefs are either: (i) determined by something non-rational (and thus, untrustworthy), (ii) determined by a deity of deception (and thus, untrustworthy), (iii) random (and thus, untrustworthy), or (iv) caused by an intelligently designed free-thinking agent created in the likeness of a maximally great being (God) with cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in an appropriate environment which can be aimed at truth if the agent is careful and handles his or her powers responsibly. The first three options leave us with skepticism and reason to doubt our metaphysical and theological thoughts and beliefs. Option (iv) is the best explanation and our best hope. However, the fourth option entails that one is free in a libertarian sense—not determined by something unreliable or someone who is untrustworthy.

If one believes that he or she is a rational free-thinker who is not ultimately mind-controlled by something (or someone) else, then one should reject the determinism that seems to follow from both naturalism and . Instead, one ought to affirm that a supernatural God exists. Moreover, one ought to realize that he or she is a supernatural and immaterial active and rational free-thinking thing—a soul—created in God’s image and likeness . . .

Here's the deal: if determinism is true, then defeaters are raised because all of the antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate human metaphysical and theological beliefs are untrustworthy to deliver truth about metaphysics and theology. This means if one affirms determinism (naturalistic or divine), then their metaphysical and theological beliefs are unjustified (even if they happen to be true). With that said, however, on the condition that Christian theism is true, then -- if YOU (the thing created in the likeness of God which you describe as "I") have done your due diligence and carefully weighed the evidence, arguments, and the relevant available data, and your view faces no defeaters -- your metaphysical and theological beliefs are justified (even if they are not true). 

This is pretty cool, because the very fact that we engage in metaphysical debate is evidence pointing to the God described in the Bible. 

Bottom line: if Christianity is true -- and humans possess the God-given gift of libertarian free-thinking -- then we can be trustworthy sources of our metaphysical and theological beliefs. Why is this the case? Because the God of truth (John 14:6) who wants all people to know the truth (1 Timothy 2:4) has given us the power to take bad thinking captive (2 Corinthians 10:5), before bad thinking takes us captive (Colossians 2:8), and the ability to carefully reason together (Isaiah 1:18) so that we can attain knowledge of ultimate reality. So, if we choose to handle these powers responsibly, we can trust that we know the truth (John 8:32).

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton