Molinism on Trial: My Defense Against Warren McGrew and Open Theism

Warren McGrew (aka, "Idol Killer") is a friend. I deeply respect his passion, his boldness, his humor, and his tireless efforts to challenge theological systems he believes are flawed. He has been a consistent voice pushing back against Calvinism and determinist frameworks, and I’ve stood shoulder to shoulder with him in many of those battles. On that front, we are not only friends—we are allies.

That’s part of what makes this conversation so difficult—and so important.

Warren has invested his life and ministry into advancing what he calls “Dynamic Omniscience,” a form of Open Theism. I, on the other hand, have built my work around defending Molinism. These aren’t just intellectual curiosities for either of us—they’re core to how we understand God, truth, love, justice, salvation and all reality. So when we critique each other’s views, it’s not a game. We’re engaging the deepest convictions that shape our theology, our ministries, and our lives.

We both want the truth. We both believe that God desires all people to know the truth. And we both believe that love sometimes means correcting, sharpening, and challenging those we care about most.

So while this exchange might get intense at times, it comes from a place of conviction, not contempt. I’m not attacking Warren’s character—I’m addressing his claims. And I’m confident he would say the same about me. I, for one, am not interested in scoring debate points, but I know that Warren and I are simply striving to glorify God by loving Him with all our minds.

My aim in the responses that follow is not to "win an argument," but to defend what I believe is a more accurate and biblically faithful picture of God's omniscience, providence, and character. I believe Molinism offers a powerful and coherent framework for understanding these doctrines. And I believe Warren’s objections, while earnest and sharp, ultimately miss the mark.

That said, I remain grateful for Warren’s voice, even when we strongly disagree. I know we’ll keep gladly linking arms against theological determinism—and I hope we can keep sharpening each other in the process.

Warren’s Charges Against Molinism

Now, let’s turn to Warren’s claims. I will quote from his recent YouTube video and provide responses.

Warren McGrew (WM): //In this video, I’ve done my best to consolidate Tim’s main arguments across those 18 articles and two videos, and I’m going to try to respond here using Scripture, logic, and careful analysis.

I want to be clear: Tim is a friend—and I respect his passion. I understand he has an entire ministry built on affirming and defending Molinism. It’s a topic he knows very well. He’s done a lot of work defending that view. And then here I come basically trying to kick down a sandcastle.

So I can appreciate the position he's in. And while I hope we can come to an agreement, it's entirely possible that never happens. Tim can go along affirming Molinism and I'll go along affirming dynamic omniscience. But I'm confident that regardless, we'll still remain friends and still team up to go and kick over those Calvinist sandcastles together when the opportunity presents itself.//

TIM: Warren is in the exact same position. His entire ministry is based on Open Theism—or what he calls “Dynamic Omniscience.” I’ve tried to knock down my friend’s sandcastle by showing that his view doesn’t adequately explain the biblical data, suffers from philosophical challenges, and falters on several fronts—especially when it comes to the Problem of Evil. To be clear: we can’t both be right. At least one of us is affirming false theological beliefs. The good news is that we both reject the idea that God is determining one of us to hold false theological beliefs! That means one of us hasn’t been as careful as he could—or should—have been. That’s why one of us is wrong. But thankfully, whichever one of us is mistaken, neither ministry stands or falls with this debate. We both continue to offer strong critiques of Calvinism, atheism, and other false “-isms.” So while we may be taking turns trying to kick over each other’s sandcastles, it’s all done in love. We both genuinely believe our views are true, and we both sincerely want to see the other benefit from embracing the better view.

WM: //Now, I want to be clear—I appreciate the intentions behind Molinism. I believe that many Molinists are genuinely trying to make sense of difficult theological concepts and uphold the integrity of God’s character. I appreciate their desire to affirm human responsibility and divine providence. But good intentions don’t make for good metaphysics.//

TIM: Warren is exactly right to affirm that good intentions don’t guarantee good metaphysics. But for a layman like Warren to confidently claim that Molinism falls short of good metaphysics is a bold move—especially when many of the world’s leading PhD metaphysicians affirm it. Scholars such as William Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland, Thomas Flint, Kirk MacGregor, Alfred Freddoso, John D. Laing, and Alvin Plantinga (among others) have offered rigorous philosophical defenses of Molinism. Now, I fully agree that an appeal to authority doesn’t prove Molinism is true. But when some of the sharpest minds in metaphysics and analytic philosophy have carefully examined Molinism and embraced the view, anyone claiming it’s “bad metaphysics” bears a significant burden of proof. That person had better have his metaphysical ducks in a row—and be ready to present compelling arguments. To his credit, Warren has certainly

tried

to do that. But as I’ll show in what follows, his ducks are not in a row, and his attempts to refute Molinism ultimately fail.

Analytic Theology & the Importance of Defining Terms 

WM: //One of my primary critiques of Molinism is that it does not actually preserve libertarian freedom. When you examine the mechanics of how God chooses to actualize a world, you find that every free decision is already settled in God’s mind before creation.//

TIM: Let’s pause for a moment. The most important word that must be defined in this conversation is the word "determine."

An event is determined if antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate said event.

Determinism is often referred to as the view that antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all events. To avoid confusion, when discussing the thesis advanced by many (if not most) academic Calvinists, I use the term "exhaustive divine determinism" (EDD). This simply refers to the thesis that God provides the antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate all events. Warren and I stand together as libertarian freedom fighters as we seek to refute the evil of EDD. With that said, however, one recurring issue I’ve raised with Warren’s presentations is his use of ambiguous terms—like “settled” or “fixed”—without clear definitions. He’s been made aware of this before, yet the pattern continues here.

If by “settled” he simply means “known,” then there’s no problem at all.

Molinism holds that God possesses middle knowledge of all counterfactuals of creaturely freedom before creation. That’s not determinism—it’s omniscience. 

But if “settled” means “determined” in a causal sense, then that’s no longer Molinism—it’s Calvinism or exhaustive divine determinism (EDD).

Molinism expressly denies that God causally determines all human choices. And if “settled” means something else entirely, then it’s not clear what relevance it has to this discussion at all. This kind of slippery terminology creates confusion and undermines productive dialogue. It’s one reason why theological discussions on YouTube can sometimes generate more heat than light—especially when terms are left undefined. Precise language matters, especially in philosophical theology.

WM: //God picks a world in which he knows you will freely choose X—and once he actualizes that world, you cannot choose otherwise. Your choice is fixed. There is no real alternative possibility. And if you cannot do otherwise, then you’re not free in the libertarian sense. You’re free in name only.//

TIM: Here we go again: Warren uses the word

fixed

without defining it—something I’ve repeatedly asked him to clarify. More importantly, his entire objection seems to turn on a confusion about the nature of divine knowledge and libertarian freedom. Let’s grant Warren’s own wording:

“God picks a world in which he knows you will freely choose X.”

If that's true—if you truly

freely

choose X—then that’s the end of the discussion. Libertarian freedom is preserved. That’s what Molinism asserts: God chooses to actualize a world in which agents make

libertarianly free

choices. His knowledge of those choices doesn’t remove their freedom; it presupposes it. As I explain in my book

Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism

, the word

freely

doesn’t magically vanish just because God knows how you would (and will) choose in a given set of non-deterministic circumstances. To assume otherwise is to commit a modal fallacy—conflating epistemic certainty with causal necessity. Just because a choice is known in advance does not mean it is determined, necessitated, or unfree. Molinism holds that God creates a world in which nothing causally determines a libertarian agent’s choice. The agent truly could do otherwise—there’s real alternative possibility. God simply knows, from His middle knowledge, what the agent would do in those circumstances. His knowledge is not causally efficacious—it doesn’t make the choice happen. Rather, it reflects what the free agent would do. So, even though God knows you won’t do otherwise, you still

can

do otherwise (absolutely nothing that actually exists is stopping you). That’s the essence of libertarian freedom, and it’s fully preserved in Molinism. Warren makes two major errors here: first, he assumes that God’s knowledge causes choices, which it does not; and second, he attacks a distorted version of Molinism that no Molinist actually affirms. In short, this is both a modal confusion and a straw man fallacy.

WM: //Libertarian freedom requires the ability to choose between alternatives. But under Molinism, all of your choices are known by God in advance and are embedded in the very fabric of the world he actualizes. You could not have chosen differently, and yet you're held morally responsible. That’s a problem.

TIM: What does

"embedded in the very fabric"

mean? If it just means "determined" then he should use that word since we all know what it means. If it doesn't mean determined, then there is no problem. Be that as it may, this is yet another common misunderstanding. As J.P. Moreland and I argue in our peer-reviewed journal article, libertarian freedom does not

require

the actual exercise of alternative possibilities in every case. Rather, what it fundamentally requires is

sourcehood

—that the agent is the ultimate originator of at least some of their mental actions (such as judgments, evaluations, and decisions). This is consistent with the broader family of libertarian views, including source incompatibilism. That said, it seems to follow that if I am the source of my own mental actions, and if nothing causally determines or prevents me from choosing otherwise, then I do in fact

have

the ability to do otherwise—even if God knows that I

will not

do otherwise. God’s foreknowledge does not magically override my agency or reduce me to a puppet. Warren claims, “You could not have chosen differently.” But that’s simply false on Molinism. God’s knowledge of how I

would

freely choose does not entail that I

could not

have chosen differently. That’s another modal fallacy—conflating “would not” with “could not.” Knowing a choice in advance doesn’t eliminate the categorical ability to do otherwise; it simply reflects what I

will

do freely. So the so-called “problem” Warren raises isn’t a problem for Molinists. It’s based on confusion about the nature of libertarian freedom, middle knowledge, and the distinction between epistemic certainty and metaphysical necessity.

Addressing the Grounding Objection Head-On

WM: //Moreover, Molinism introduces all sorts of metaphysical baggage. It requires the existence of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—these are the would-counterfactuals God allegedly knows prior to creation. But these counterfactuals are problematic. What makes them true? Where do they reside? If they exist independently of God, then we run into issues with divine aseity and sovereignty. If God makes them true, then we’re back to determinism. Either way, the grounding objection remains unanswered.

TIM: Let’s address this common objection head-on.

One of the most common challenges to Molinism is the so-called Grounding Objection. It claims that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) cannot be true unless something “makes” them true—unless there is a truthmaker in reality prior to God’s creative decree. Since, on Molinism, the creature in question does not yet exist, critics conclude that such truths would have no ground, and therefore Molinism collapses.

This objection, contrary to Warren’s claims, rests on a controversial philosophical thesis: Truthmaker Maximalism—the claim that every truth must have a corresponding truthmaker. Many leading metaphysicians reject this thesis, and there is no obligation for anyone to hold it. In fact, it seems rational thinkers ought to reject it. For example, negative truths such as “There are no unicorns” are true without any “non-unicorn” entity existing to make them true. Similarly, modal truths like “If Socrates had been a general, he would have been as shrewd as a snake but as innocent as a dove” (Matthew 10:16) can be true without the existence of some concrete object that serves as their truthmaker. In such cases, truth supervenes on reality without requiring a special ontological entity to “make” it so.

Just as these examples show truths without corresponding truthmakers, so too with counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) belong to this same category of truths. Their truth conditions are satisfied if—and only if—the same agent, possessing the same essence, in the same fully specified circumstances, would freely perform the described action. They are identical to propositions eternally and necessarily known by God as part of His omniscience, in virtue of His perfect understanding of all possible essences and circumstances. This necessity is logical and conditional, not causal or metaphysical; the agent retains libertarian freedom and could have done otherwise, in which case a different counterfactual would have been true. No external Platonic realm is required, and no part of creation exists prior to ground them.

Moreover, and more importantly, CCFs are causally effete—they describe what would freely happen; they do not determine what happens. Their truth has no efficient causal power over the agent’s choice, and thus they do not constrain God’s power or human freedom.

In modal terms, if a given CCF is true, it is necessarily true in the sense that it holds in every possible world where the antecedent conditions are fully specified and met. However, this is a conditional necessity, not an absolute or causal necessity—it follows from the truth of the conditional, not from any deterministic mechanism. The action remains libertarianly free because, had the agent freely chosen otherwise in those same conditions, a different counterfactual would have been true instead. Its truth is therefore contingent when viewed across the entire set of possible worlds God could have actualized.

In summary:

1. Truthmaker Maximalism is not a necessary truth, and rejecting it removes the Grounding Objection’s main premise.

2. Even if Truthmaker Maximalism were accepted, CCFs are grounded in the omniscient mind of God (ultimate reality)—His perfect comprehension of every possible essence in every possible set of circumstances—not in anything external to Him.

3. CCFs are necessary conditionals that are causally inert—they reflect but do not cause or determine the actions of free creatures.

The Grounding Objection therefore fails. It either assumes an overly restrictive—and unnecessary—truthmaker principle or misunderstands the metaphysical status of CCFs within God’s omniscience.

With that said, let's discuss God's inspired Word. Scripture itself affirms that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) have truth-values and that God knows them. While there are more, the two that I have offered for consideration as examples are the following:

• In 1 Samuel 23:11–13, David is told that if he stays in Keilah, Saul will come and the people will hand him over. David flees—and the counterfactual never happens. Yet God knew it.

• In Matthew 11:21–23, Jesus declares that if Tyre, Sidon, or Sodom had experienced the miracles performed in Bethsaida or Capernaum, they would have repented—more counterfactual knowledge.

So, we have strong biblical grounds for affirming that God knows the truth-values of CCFs—statements about what free creatures

would

do in hypothetical circumstances—even if those events never happen. Now to Warren’s metaphysical concerns. He asks:

What makes these counterfactuals true? Where do they reside?

These are good philosophical questions, but they don’t serve as defeaters. Philosophers have shown that

Truthmaker Maximalism

—the view that every truth must have a distinct truthmaker—is false. Not all truths require truthmakers, especially

modal

or

counterfactual

truths. Some truths are simply

brute facts

about reality (but brute facts don’t stand in causal relation – they are causally effete). CCFs and future-tensed propositions about libertarian choices fall into this category. God’s omniscience entails that He knows all truths—including counterfactuals—even if we cannot explain

how

He knows them. After all, we also can’t explain how God created the universe

ex nihilo

, yet we believe it on biblical and philosophical grounds. The inability to explain the

mechanism

doesn’t undermine the reality. As for Warren’s concern about aseity: CCFs do not exist independently of God. They exist in God’s mind as part of His perfect omniscience. As thinkers like

Leibniz

and

Anselm

have argued, all possible worlds are grounded in God’s nature and power. They are contingent upon His existence. If God did not exist, there would be no possible worlds, no CCFs, and no truth-values to be known. Just nothingness. Finally, recall: an

omnipotent

God must have

options

. Otherwise, He is merely “unipotent.” If God is both omniscient and omnipotent, then He knows all feasible non-deterministic worlds within His power to actualize, and He sovereignly chooses one in which His purposes and perfect "endgame" are achieved through the free choices of creatures. That’s precisely what Molinism affirms. So, contra Warren, the grounding objection has been answered many times over. If God is a maximally great being, then middle knowledge isn’t “metaphysical baggage”—it’s part of the package.

WM: //But the Molinist proposes a third kind of knowledge which it claims is somewhere between God's natural and free knowledge. So they call this middle knowledge. Middle knowledge is God's supposed pre-volitional knowledge of what any free creature would do in any hypothetical circumstance, even if that creature never actually exists.

This assumes that there is a single determinate truth about how each creature would freely choose even—and this is the controversial part—even in indeterministic situations. But the reason this is so highly questionable is because, since by definition, indeterministic scenarios allow for more than one possible outcome, if multiple outcomes are truly possible, then there shouldn't be one fixed fact about what would happen.//

TIM: There Warren goes again with the word

“fixed”

—a term he never clearly defines. If by “fixed” he simply means

“known”

, then there’s no problem for Molinism. God can know what would happen without causing it. If he means

“determined”

, then he’s misrepresenting Molinism entirely, since the whole point is that these choices are

not

determined. As I’ve already emphasized (and will continue to emphasize):

knowledge does not stand in causal relation

. That’s not just a theological point—it’s a logical one. If God knows that a libertarian agent would choose X in situation S, it doesn’t follow that the agent

must

choose X or is

determined

to choose X. It only follows that God knows the truth about what the agent

would freely do

—a truth grounded in the agent's nature and freedom, not divine causation. So yes, in an indeterministic situation, multiple outcomes are

possible

. But what God knows is

which outcome the agent would freely actualize

, not which one is determined. That’s precisely what makes it middle knowledge: it’s pre-volitional, non-causal knowledge of libertarian outcomes. This might be conceptually difficult for some, but it’s logically consistent and well-defended in the philosophical literature (see Thomas Flint and William Lane Craig, among others). Again, Warren's objection only appears to work by either equivocating on terms like “fixed” or by assuming a deterministic framework—which Molinism explicitly rejects.

WM: //So there's some problems here—some tension within the Molinist worldview. What tension? There’s tension.//

TIM:

Warren seems to be confusing mystery with tension.

There’s no

actual

tension

here—at least, not in the sense of a contradiction. What we’re dealing with is mystery, not incoherence. Yes, it’s mysterious

how

an omniscient God knows counterfactuals of libertarian freedom prior to His creative decree. But that’s not a logical problem—it’s simply a matter of epistemic humility. The same kind of mystery applies to divine omnipotence. We don’t know

how

God created everything from nothing, but that doesn’t mean it’s contradictory to say He did. Likewise, we don’t need to know

how

God knows these truths in order for Him to know them. So if Warren’s “tension” boils down to “I don’t understand how this works,” then that’s not an argument. It’s just a statement of personal incredulity.

WM: //At any rate, the Molinist claims that before God creates, He knows every possible scenario involving creaturely free choices. And by accessing this middle knowledge, God can choose to actualize the world where His purposes are accomplished through the freely made decisions of His creatures.

According to Molinists, God doesn't cause people's choices, but He does select the world in which they freely do what He wants overall. And this supposedly preserves libertarian free will while still affirming God’s meticulous providence.

When critics attack Open Theism, they often frame it as an assault on God's greatness, His power, or His knowledge. But this is a profound misdirection. Open Theists can readily confess that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and maximally great. Open Theism isn't really concerned about God's capabilities, but about the kind of world God freely chose to create.

TIM: Let’s be clear: when I critique the god of Open Theism, it’s precisely because such a being fails to qualify as maximally great—especially in light of the various “problems of evil.” These are problems the omniscient God of middle knowledge doesn’t face (and I’ve explained why elsewhere). If Open Theism were true, not only would God fail to be maximally great—He wouldn’t even be good. And if that’s the case, then why should we worship such a being? Would we worship Loki—the "god of mischief"—if he happened to be the one who created the universe? Of course not. Loki isn’t worthy of worship, and everyone knows it. Likewise, the god of Open Theism is vulnerable to every variant of the problem of evil: moral evil, natural evil, gratuitous evil, and divine hiddenness.

These challenges are devastating if God lacks foreknowledge of libertarian choices.

But the Molinist model avoids these problems by grounding God’s providence in perfect knowledge of what free creatures would do in any possible circumstance. I’ve also argued that the god of Open Theism cannot make full sense of the biblical witness.

Scripture repeatedly affirms divine foreknowledge and fulfilled prophecy based on God's knowledge of what free libertarian agents will do in the distant future.

Finally, a maximally great (or greatest conceivable) being would have maximal knowledge. That includes knowledge of the future free actions of creatures and the truth-values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs). After all, is it greater to possess

all

knowledge or only

some

?

Why Open Theism Risks Collapsing into Functional Atheism

WM: //Perhaps the most egregious thing Tim has said came from a Facebook post dated July 8th where he wrote, quote, “If open theism is true, so is atheism." It's not an argument. It's an accusation and it's not biblical.//

TIM: That’s simply false. I did offer an argument—both in the very same Facebook thread Warren references and in multiple published articles, including several from the 18-part series he claims to have read. To be clear, I offered

arguments

(not mere "accusations" that show the view Open Theists have of God is not biblical. The argument is straightforward: Open Theism is vulnerable to multiple forms of the Problem of Evil (PoE)—including moral, natural, gratuitous, and divine hiddenness. These problems are not mere abstractions; they are the very arguments atheists use to justify disbelief in a good, loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful God. Importantly, these atheistic arguments don’t always deny that

some

supernatural being might exist. Rather, they argue that such a being would not be worthy of worship.

That’s the crux of the matter.

You could have a being powerful enough to create a universe, but if he’s not good, wise, or trustworthy, then he’s not

God

—at least not the kind of God worthy of worship. This is what I meant when I said, “If Open Theism is true, so is atheism.”

It’s not an insult. It’s a logical consequence.

A god who is not maximally great—who lacks foreknowledge, wisdom, or moral perfection—is not the God of classical theism or Scripture. And if

that’s

the best theism can offer, then atheism wins by default. Not because there’s no supernatural being, but because there’s no being worthy of the title

God

. This distinction—between a mere supernatural creator and a maximally great being—is critical. Laypeople often blur the line, but philosophers and theologians must be precise. And once we are, the argument becomes clear: Open Theism collapses into functional atheism, even if it retains some minimal theistic vocabulary.

WM: //It’s a reckless theological smear equating a robust affirmation of God's self-revelation with a denial of God altogether.//

TIM: Fact check: FALSE! Warren’s claim is simply inaccurate. I am not engaging in a “theological smear”—reckless or otherwise. I am taking seriously the philosophical arguments presented by leading atheists, particularly those who leverage the Problem of Evil to challenge the existence of a being worthy of worship. Moreover, I am not denying God’s self-revelation—I’m affirming it. In fact, I argue that a proper understanding of God’s self-revelation includes His middle knowledge, His awareness of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs), and His knowledge of future-tensed truths regarding libertarian free actions. These are not speculative additions; they’re necessary features of a maximally great being who reveals Himself as omniscient, sovereign, and relational. So if anyone is mischaracterizing the nature of God’s revelation or reducing His greatness, it isn’t me.

WM: //To be clear, open theists affirm that God exists and is omnisient, omnipotent, holy, and good, loving, and personal.//

TIM:

This reflects the same mistake Calvinists often make: namely, confusing what someone subjectively

says

with what logically follows from their view.

Yes, Open Theists

say

God is omniscient, omnipotent, good, and loving—but the issue isn’t what they personally affirm; it’s whether their theology can logically

sustain

those affirmations. My critique targets what logically follows if God lacks knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) and future-tensed propositions regarding libertarian agents. If God cannot know such truths, then—regardless of what Open Theists affirm—this being is not the God revealed in Scripture and certainly not a being worthy of worship. The multiple forms of the Problem of Evil (moral, natural, gratuitous, and hiddenness) become devastating precisely because this version of God lacks maximal knowledge and providential control. Warren agrees that my Deity of Deception argument defeats Calvinism by logically demonstrating that this view of our creator entails a deceptive deity, even though no Calvinist personally

affirms

that God is deceptive. Likewise, Open Theists may

affirm

divine goodness and omniscience, but that doesn’t shield them from the logical implications of denying God's knowledge of what free creatures would do.

Does Molinism “Constrain” God? Clearing Up a Common Misunderstanding

WM: //We simply believe that God did not create a reality wherein the future is exhaustively settled or that God is constrained by facts that are eternally existing apart from himself. Instead, we believe that God's knowledge reflects reality as it truly is. Some things are settled and some things are open.//

TIM: There he goes again! What exactly does he mean by “settled” or "constrained by facts"? If by “settled” and "constrained by facts" he simply means “known,” then Molinists wholeheartedly agree—and there’s no problem. If instead he means “causally determined” when he uses these terms, then he’s aiming his critique at Calvinism, not Molinism. Likewise, what does “open” mean? If it means “not causally determined” or “could actually be otherwise,” then Molinism affirms that as well. But if “open” means that God lacks knowledge of the truth-values of future-tensed propositions about libertarian free choices, then we have a serious problem: that claim contradicts Scripture and undermines divine omniscience.

WM: //The future is not an existing reality you can hop in a Delorean or a Tardis or a hot tub and travel to.//

TIM: While some Molinists might lean toward a view of the future as ontologically “real,” that is by no means essential to Molinism. In fact, I do not hold that view myself. So this comment attacks a straw man. Molinism is about God's knowledge of future contingents—not the metaphysical structure of time itself.

WM: //Calling that atheism is not only false, it presents fatalism as the only viable Christian view. It vilifies sincere Christians and dismisses a long tradition of biblical theology stretching from the Hebrew prophets and apostles of Christ.

Tim justifies this claim by way of an appeal to the philosophical concept known as the greatest conceivable being . . . 

This claim of Tim’s is another example of one of his arguments undercutting his own stated beliefs. Doesn't Tim believe prior to creation God was free to create or not? Doesn't Tim affirm divine freedom? You see, literally every Christian tradition begins by affirming an open premise. That being the contingent nature of creation and divine freedom.//

TIM: First: What does Warren mean by "fatalism"? What does it even mean to be "fated"? If it merely means "known by God," then great--Molinists happily affirm that and we don't need to use that scary word. If Warren means "causally determined," then he is not arguing against Molinism. Either way, Warren needs to define his terms or use terms that I've already defined. Either way, Molinism is left unscathed. Second: Warren is conflating chronological order with logical order (a distinction I explain in my book). Yes, I affirm that God was free to create or not to create. But this does

not

mean there was ever a state in which God lacked knowledge of all He

could

create—or what would happen in every possible scenario, including the outcomes of creating differently. But once again, what does Warren mean by “open premise”? If he means that God did not possess knowledge of what would happen if He created—or created things differently—then no, I do not affirm that kind of “openness.” But if by “open” he simply means that God had the freedom to choose among a wide array of possible worlds consistent with His omnipotent nature, then of course I affirm that. The deeper problem is that Warren consistently fails to define key terms like “settled,” “open,” or “fixed.” This creates metaphysical confusion. Meanwhile, I have been crystal clear—across 18 articles, multiple YouTube videos, and published academic work—about what I mean by “determinism,” “libertarian freedom,” and “exhaustive divine determinism” (EDD). Unless Warren can show, through a valid deductive argument, that divine knowledge is causally operative and somehow functions as a sufficient antecedent condition to necessitate every human thought and action, then he is attacking a view I do not hold.

His critique, at best, amounts to a category mistake.

WM: //To throw open theism under the bus, Tim is forced into a true dilemma. He either has to consider himself an atheist now or deny divine freedom and argue for a singular settled and necessary world God had to create. It's a really bad argument.//

TIM: This is utterly false. I'll explain why.

WM: //As Tim Stratton explains in one of his 18 articles, he says, quote, "God knows what free creatures would do if created, and he places them in circumstances where they freely do exactly that." This isn't coercion, it's coordination.”

Similarly, William Lane Craig teaches “in virtue of God's knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and his freedom to decree that certain circumstances exist and certain free creatures be placed in those circumstances. God is able to bring about indirectly that events occur which he knew would happen as a direct result of the particular decisions which those free creatures would freely make in those circumstances.”

This model claims to preserve libertarian freedom while still affirming meticulous providence, not by forcing choices, but by arranging circumstances in which people make the exact free choice that God wants. But here's the problem. If God chooses the one world in which you will freely choose X, then you will never choose anything but X.The moment God actualizes this world, your freedom to choose otherwise disappears.//

TIM: Let’s evaluate those final two sentences from Warren:

“If God chooses the one world in which you will freely choose X, then you will never choose anything but X. The moment God actualizes this world, your freedom to choose otherwise disappears.”

The first sentence is true. The second is false. Yes, in the actualized world, you

will not

choose anything but X. But that doesn't mean you

could not

have chosen otherwise. The possibility to do otherwise remained. Indeed,

nothing that actually exists

deterministically prevents you from choosing otherwise in the actual world. Thus, if absolutely nothing that actually exists deterministically prevents you from choosing otherwise in the actual world, then you can choose otherwise in the actual world. God just knows. Big deal. Mere Molinism affirms both:

• You are the ultimate source of your choice,

• and you could have chosen otherwise.

Nothing causally necessitates your decision. It is

your

decision. You are the source. The buck stops with you! God's actualization of the world in which you freely choose X does not eliminate the power to freely choose otherwise. That power doesn’t magically vanish simply because God is omniscient and knows what you would and will freely do. So no—just because God actualized a world in which He knew you would freely choose X does

not

mean you lacked the categorical ability to choose otherwise. Knowledge does not entail causation. This is a category mistake that many Open Theists—and some Calvinists—routinely commit.

SIDE NOTE:

Warren repeatedly plays a clip from my debate with James White in this video (over and over again for effect), but he removes my quote from context. He never attempts to steel-man my view or accurately explain what I meant. Here’s the fuller quote from that exchange:

“Predestination—the divine foreordaining of all that will happen. To clarify, both Calvinists and Molinists affirm predestination via God’s decree prior to actual creation. The disagreement between Calvinists like James and Molinists like me is not over

whether

God predestines all created reality, but rather

how

God predestines all created reality.”

Exactly. I affirm that God predestines all things—including libertarian human actions—via His

middle knowledge

. Dr. White affirms that God predestines all things via a determinative, necessitating decree—which logically cancels libertarian freedom. So let’s be clear: quoting me without context might persuade an uninformed lay audience watching YouTube videos, but it is not a serious or adequate response to someone who contributes to the peer-reviewed academic literature on this subject.

Predestination Without Determinism

WM: //Notice how Tim concedes the Calvinist claim that God decreed whatsoever comes to pass by way of an appeal to predestination. But where do we find such meticulous predestination anywhere in Scripture?//

TIM: If Warren had played more of the debate from which he cherry-picks, he would’ve found that we spent a significant amount of time discussing

Ephesians 1:1–11

:

3 Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us in Christ with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places, 4 even as

he chose us in him before the foundation of the world

, that we should be holy and blameless before him. 5 In love

he predestined us for adoption

to himself as sons through Jesus Christ, according to the

purpose of his will

, 6 to the praise of his glorious grace… 11 In him we have obtained an inheritance,

having been predestined according to the purpose

of him

who works all things

according to the counsel of his will.

T.K. Abbott, in his classic

International Critical Commentary

on Ephesians, emphasizes that Paul’s wording—

“predestined,” “purpose,” “counsel of his will”

—clearly points toward:

“. . . the words ‘all things’ seem to imply an

exhaustive view of predestination

.”

So, Bible-believing Christians are entirely warranted, based on this passage (and others I've discussed), in affirming that God

does

predestine all things. The real question is not whether God predestines all things—but

how

He does so.

• Is it via His power of necessitation, such that God determines everything unilaterally and irresistibly?

• Or is it via His perfect intelligence and middle knowledge—His ability to actualize the best feasible, freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated and all who are not transworld damned freely come to salvation?

James White and other Calvinists affirm the former and reject the latter. Mere Molinists affirm the latter and reject the former. This is the vital context Warren omits when he repeatedly plays that clip from my debate. If he wants to engage academic arguments fairly, even on a lay platform like YouTube, he needs to do a better job of representing views in context.

WM: //Rather, in passages like Ezekiel 18 and Jeremiah 18 and elsewhere, we find God has predestined the end results of our obedience or rebellion. And He tells us how He will respond.//

TIM: And that’s perfectly compatible with my view of Mere Molinism. On this model, God sovereignly chooses to create the one feasible, freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated and all who are not

transworld damned

are saved. This includes God genuinely interacting with us in time—responding, warning, blessing, judging, and guiding. Think of

Doctor Strange

in

Avengers: Infinity War

and

Endgame

. Strange chose to bring about the one possible future in which evil would ultimately be defeated (hence the name “Endgame”). But within that actualized world, he still interacted with and responded to the free actions of others—he wasn't passive. Just because he

knew

how Tony Stark would freely act doesn’t mean Strange didn’t engage with him personally and meaningfully. The same follows for God under Molinism. His perfect knowledge of all possible outcomes—including how free creatures would act in any given situation—does not nullify His relational interaction. It

grounds

it. God isn’t a micromanager pulling strings; He simply created a feasible freedom-permitting world with the best endgame—just as a perfectly good, loving, and intelligent being with the power to do so would do.

WM: //But nowhere do we read that God predestined our obedience or predestined our rebellion before creation—let alone having done so based off of eternally settled truth-values.//

TIM: Once again, I’ve never argued for anything like “eternally settled truth-values.” I don’t even know what Warren means by that. If he means that truths about future free choices are known by God

prior to creation

, then yes—I affirm that God knows such truths via His middle knowledge. But if he’s implying that I affirm divine determinism or some fatalistic necessity, then he’s attacking a straw man that is not entailed by Mere Molinism. I’ve been crystal clear in my writing and debates: I reject

exhaustive divine determinism

and affirm

libertarian freedom

. These are fundamentally different concepts—concepts that Warren continues to confuse and conflate. Furthermore, as noted earlier, we have strong biblical grounds—especially in Ephesians 1:1–11—to affirm that God predestines all things. But, as I've explained ad nauseum, predestination does not entail causal determination (I've deductively concluded this much in my published work). These are distinct notions. God can predestine an outcome without

determining

it, by choosing to actualize a world in which free creatures will (libertarianly) bring that outcome about. This distinction between

predestination

and

determinism

is not minor—it’s the heart of the disagreement. And until Warren stops confusing, conflating, and collapsing them into one, his critique won’t touch Mere Molinism.

Strange Bedfellows: When Open Theists, Calvinists, and Unitarians Unite

WM: //And this isn’t just a disagreement between Molinists and Open Theists. Dr. James Anderson of Reformed Theological Seminary wrote an article entitled Molinism and Other Determinisms. There, he explains how Molinism is no less deterministic than Calvinism.

In that article, Anderson argues that Molinists are incompatibilists regarding divine causal determinism—they reject God directly causing free choices—but they are compatibilists when it comes to non-causal determinism, that is, Molinism’s middle knowledge structure of conditional outcomes.

And he concludes Molinists are broad-scope compatibilists under definitions like those of Robert Kane. Anderson notes that even under classical foreknowledge, if God infallibly knows an event will occur, that makes the event necessary under logical conditions. This qualifies as a form of determinism.//

TIM: Yes, Dr. Anderson has made these claims. But has he been refuted? Absolutely. In fact, I’ve directly engaged Anderson on this very issue—both in published form and in a public debate on X (formerly Twitter). For a detailed response, I encourage readers to see my published rejoinder:

Dr. James Anderson’s Tu Quoque—and Why It Falls Flat

.

Now, here’s the puzzling part: Warren appears to follow my work closely. He’s clearly familiar with my writings and online interactions. So why cite Anderson’s critique without so much as a mention of my direct and detailed rebuttals? That’s not how fair argumentation works—especially when engaging a scholarly debate. If Warren wants to invoke Anderson’s claims, he should also address the responses that have been offered. Otherwise, it risks looking less like careful scholarship and more like selective proof-texting.

WM: //And the Molinist’s affirmation of divine decree plus middle knowledge means God foreordains all free acts. He also points out that because God knew and decreed every free act—even ones that we perform libertarianly—the freedom preserved in Molinism is only freedom in name. Functionally, every choice occurs in the world God designed, eliminating true alternative possibility.//

TIM: There he goes again—using the word “foreordains” without clarifying what he means. If Warren means that God created a non-deterministic world in which He knows how libertarian agents

would

freely choose in any circumstance—and

will

choose in the actual world—then congratulations, he’s just described Molinism. On this view, humans are libertarian agents who make real, undetermined choices within a divinely chosen world. So far, no objection to Molinism. But if Warren is using “foreordains” to mean that God

causally determines

every choice, then he’s not critiquing Molinism at all—he’s critiquing Calvinism. So which is it? Either way, his argument misses the mark. Molinism remains intact.

WM: //Anderson notes that Molinism treats agents’ decisions as responses God foreknew and organized into a world. Free will becomes a function, not an origination. He concludes by saying, “The only way to avoid determinism completely is to embrace some version of the open future view,” according to which, for at least some future events, there are no determinant truths now about whether those events will occur.

For theists, this will require taking what Dale Tuggy has called “the wide road to open theism,” the view that God doesn’t know the future free choices of his creatures because there are presently no truths to be known about those future free choices.//

TIM: If Warren is trying to appeal to Bible-believing Christians, citing Dale Tuggy—who publicly denies the Trinity—is a strange move. Tuggy is a nice guy (I've moderated a debate between him and William Lane Craig), but he's dead wrong on both the nature of God and the nature of time. Scripture clearly affirms that there are future-tensed truths about the free actions of human agents and that God knows them (cf. Isaiah 46:10; John 13:19; 1 Samuel 23:11–13). And Scripture also clearly teaches that God is a triune being. Tuggy’s open futurism is a mere assertion, not a demonstrated philosophical conclusion. It contradicts both divine omniscience and biblical revelation. Warren should choose his authorities more carefully.

Why God’s Knowledge of False Beliefs Doesn’t Undermine Rationality

WM: // Imagine a God who ensures that billions of people believe false things about him, even faithful Christians. But not by directly causing those beliefs, but by carefully choosing to create a world where they were always going to believe them.//

TIM: Once again, Warren constructs a caricature of Molinism rather than engaging with the real view.

He speaks of God “ensuring” false beliefs—yet never clarifies what he means by “ensure.”

If he means that God created a non-deterministic world in which He knew that libertarian agents would freely (and negligently) form false beliefs—despite having the ability and opportunity to reach true ones—then yes, that’s exactly what Mere Molinism affirms. And that’s a feature, not a bug. It preserves human responsibility for error. But if Warren means that God “ensures” false beliefs by providing antecedent conditions sufficient to causally necessitate those beliefs—then he’s describing exhaustive divine determinism (EDD), not Molinism. So which is it? Either way, Warren’s objection fails. He’s either objecting to a position he misrepresents—or inadvertently refuting his own. Molinism remains untouched. Warren’s confusion continues . . .

Why the ‘Deity of Deception’ Problem Doesn’t Apply to Molinism

WM: //This isn't just a problem for Calvinism. Tim Stratton argues that if God determines all beliefs, as in exhaustive divine determinism, then we can't trust our own thinking. We'd be believing what God made us believe, including lies, and that would make God deceptive. Tim calls this the deity of deception, and he uses this as, I think, a very valid criticism of Calvinism. But Tim's Molinism doesn't escape this.

To clarify, both Calvinists and Molinists affirm predestination via God's decree prior to actual creation.

*Warren plays my out of context quote once again: “Do you affirm double predestination? Oh, yeah. End of time. 'Cause I do. I do. I affirm predestination of all things.”

On Molinism, God surveys all possible worlds and chooses to actualize one where every thought, every belief, including false ones, and including false ones held by faithful Christians unfolds exactly as he knew they would. You are always going to believe what you believe now. You are never going to believe otherwise. This is just functional determinism and a denial of genuine freedom. And it leads to the same problem. If God knew that in world W you would freely believe a lie and he picked that world, how is he not still ensuring it?//

TIM: What does "functional determinism" mean? Determinism has been carefully defined.

Thus, if Mere Molinism does not have God providing antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate all things, then adding then adding the word "functional" to determinism still does not describe my view.

Warren's unclear rhetoric is tiresome, but it is only smoke and mirrors. Warren fails to engage my actual position with care or accuracy. His critique here is philosophically confused and rhetorically sloppy—designed more for provoking YouTube commenters than for advancing serious theological discourse. A peer reviewer would send this back for major revision before being published in an academic journal. Let’s set the record straight. Yes, I argue that exhaustive divine determinism (EDD)—such as in Calvinism—leads to epistemic defeat: if God determines all our beliefs, including false ones, then even the Calvinist cannot rationally affirm his theology without begging the question. That’s the “deity of deception” problem. But Mere Molinism doesn’t entail that God causally determines beliefs. Rather, it affirms that God knows what any libertarian agent would freely do in any circumstance and sovereignly creates a world in which their libertarian choices play out. Thus, on Molinism, God creates a world where you

freely

formed mistaken theological beliefs—not one where He causally necessitated them (you could have been more careful, thought harder, and reached true conclusions). To say, “You were always going to believe that,” and then conclude, “So you were never free not to,” is to confuse

would

with

must

.

That’s modal error—confusing certainty with necessity.

You

could have

chosen otherwise. Nothing prevented you—not God, not nature, not any deterministic cause. You simply didn’t. That’s on you. In short, Molinism preserves human responsibility precisely because it affirms genuine alternative possibilities. You were free. You failed. Own it.

WM: //If God holds you accountable for believing a lie that you are metaphysically fated to believe in the world he's selected, then the charge of divine deception still stands. So Tim's argument doesn't just undermine Calvinism, it completely hits his own ship. It destroys Molinism just as hard.//

TIM: Not so fast! Once again, Warren’s argument depends on equivocation.

What does he mean by “metaphysically fated”?

If all he means is that God created a non-deterministic world in which He

knew

what libertarian agents would freely do, then that’s simply Molinism. That’s not a problem—it’s the point. But if by “metaphysically fated” Warren means that our beliefs are

causally determined

by antecedent conditions, then he’s not critiquing Molinism—he’s critiquing Calvinism. In that case, his objection completely misses its intended target. Either way, Molinism remains untouched.

Dr. Tim Stratton VS. Dr. James White

Now, about that debate clip with James White… Warren plays a moment from my exchange with Dr. White:

Stratton:

“Number one, do you agree that God was sovereign over the first sin?”

White:

“Yes.”

Stratton:

“Good. I agree.”

White:

“I’m sorry. What do you mean by sovereign?”

Stratton:

“We can talk about that later” (I was on short time). “Two, do you agree that God decreed and predestined the first sin?”

White:

“Yes.”

Stratton:

“Amen to that. Me too.”

But if Warren had any interest in

steel-manning

my position, he would have explained what I meant: namely, that

sovereignty

and

predestination

are not synonymous with

causal determinism

. That’s the central confusion Calvinists like White—and critics like Warren—keep making. To predestine something via middle knowledge is not to

cause

it in a deterministic sense. That’s the whole point of Molinism: sovereignty without coercion. Knowledge without necessitation. Predestination without puppetry. It’s a shame Warren keeps ignoring that.

Perfect Being Theology and Middle Knowledge

WM: //One of Tim's most repeated claims is that to deny Molinism is to deny a maximally great being—what he calls the GCB God or the greatest conceivable being.

*Warren quotes me:

“Man, we've got to think the best of God. He is a maximally great being. If you don't start with the idea that God is a maximally great being, then you don't have reason to trust God's word. If God is not a perfect being, why spend so much time interpreting a word from an imperfect being? I have a high view of the word of God. I have a high view of scripture. It is the word of God, but I have an even higher view of God. I think if you just read scripture, I think perfect being theology is implied heavily from scripture. I mean, in the same way that the Trinity is not specifically mentioned in scripture, it's implied.”

Warren adds: //Well, I think God is a maximally great being, if you will, it is also implied throughout the whole of scripture. I agree that God is the greatest. And so, I believe Tim's intuition here is correct. But we shouldn't use a metaphysical presupposition to then supplant the self-revelation of that perfect being, which I believe Calvinists and Molinists frequently do.//

TIM: Hold on a second. If Warren had taken the time to actually read my work carefully, he would know that the claim that God is a “maximally great being” is

not

a mere metaphysical presupposition. On the contrary, this conclusion is supported by both

biblical revelation

and

logical demonstration

. Let’s start with logic: the Ontological Argument, famously developed by Anselm and refined by philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, offers a

deductive

case that a maximally great being (MGB) exists. This argument doesn’t appeal to Scripture at all—it flows from conceptual analysis alone. If Warren rejects the Ontological Argument, that’s fine—but his rejection is not an exposure of unwarranted metaphysical assumptions on my part. It’s simply a philosophical disagreement, one he hasn’t adequately engaged. But there’s more: even if someone is unconvinced by the deductive force of the Ontological Argument, a

cumulative case

from other theistic arguments (e.g., moral, cosmological, teleological) can be marshaled to

inductively

support the conclusion that God is the greatest conceivable being. And then there’s Scripture itself. Warren says we shouldn’t use metaphysical conclusions to “supplant the self-revelation of that perfect being.” I agree. But he seems to ignore the fact that Scripture consistently describes God as all-powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good, and perfectly loving—indeed,

as the greatest being imaginable

. That’s not a metaphysical presupposition being imported onto the text. It’s a conclusion drawn

from

the text. So, far from “supplanting” the self-revelation of God, Molinists are simply connecting the dots between what Scripture teaches and what reason affirms: that

God is maximally great

, and as such,

He must possess middle knowledge

—because a being who lacks such knowledge would be

less

than maximally great. Warren and I may agree that God is maximally great. But once that’s granted, Molinism follows.

WM: //And here I don't mean to suggest that this is intentional, but I believe it's an unintended byproduct of their metaphysical presuppositions. He writes,

“To affirm open theism is to deny the existence of a maximally great God.”

But what Tim has done here is to elevate his particular view of God as being synonymous with God's essential properties themselves.//

TIM: Once more, Warren is lifting a quote out of context—without acknowledging the broader argument in which it appears. When I say that “to affirm Open Theism is to deny the existence of a maximally great God,” I’m not smuggling in personal preferences or arbitrary metaphysical assumptions. I’m making a deductive claim about the nature of greatness itself. This statement arises in the context of

the Problem of Evil

—one of the most significant challenges in philosophy of religion. My point is simple: if a being is truly maximally great, then that being would not be defeated by the problem of evil. If a greater being could exist—one who

could

defeat the problem of evil—then the one you’re calling “God” is not the

greatest

conceivable being. So the question becomes: which theological model of God is best equipped to handle the problem of evil? I argue that

Molinism

does exactly that

. It preserves God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence

while also accounting for the existence of evil in a logically coherent way

. This is not “elevating my particular view of God” to the status of essential attributes. It’s showing that

certain attributes are essential

if God is to be maximally great at all. And if Open Theism entails the denial of those attributes—such as complete foreknowledge or sovereign wisdom—then it necessarily entails a less-than-maximally-great God. That’s simple philosophical precision.

WM: In both Molinism and open theism, God knows everything that can be known. The difference is that under open theism, God didn't determine all future events.//

TIM:

That’s also true of Molinism.

God does not determine all future events because He created a non-deterministic world filled with libertarian agents. He simply knew how these libertarian agents would freely choose in this non-deterministic world. But, to beat that dead horse, knowledge does not magically stand in causal relation. Knowing how a person will freely choose does not mean they don’t freely choose (by definition).

WM: //He isn't constrained by eternal truth values he didn't determine, nor did he create a world where a singular future is necessary.//

TIM: God is no more “constrained” by eternal truths than He is “constrained” by logic. We don’t say God is limited because He can’t create a married bachelor or draw a four-cornered triangle. That’s not constraint—it’s coherence. Likewise, if God is omnipotent, then He has the power to create or not create. If He creates, He can choose to determine all things, or to create a non-deterministic world instead. And if He creates a non-deterministic world, then—as an omniscient being—He knows how free creatures

would

and

will

freely choose in it. That’s

predestination without causal determination

. And contrary to Warren’s assertion, Molinism does not entail that the future is necessary in any metaphysical sense. Quite the opposite: on Molinism, the future is contingent on free choices. A “singular future” is only necessary in the

epistemic

sense—

known

, not

caused

. So once again, Warren isn’t describing Molinism. He’s attacking something else entirely.

WM: //The argument just comes across as though if Tim's view of reality and the nature of the future is wrong, well then why believe in a God at all? Why be a Christian at all? I'll just take my ball and go home. Now, I suspect this was just Tim employing rhetoric to advance his position and that he really didn't mean that if middle knowledge is metaphysically incoherent and false, then God just doesn't exist.//

TIM: Warren completely misses the point of my article—despite the fact that I explicitly clarified what I meant. My claim was not simply about “the nature of the future,” as if this were a mere academic squabble over time theory. My argument focused on what logically follows

if

God does

not

possess middle knowledge

—specifically, if He lacks knowledge of how genuinely free creatures would and

will

choose in non-deterministic circumstances. That limitation would mean God cannot providentially secure good outcomes through libertarian agents without resorting to deterministic control or blind chance. This undermines any robust answer to the problems of evil. The result is not the God revealed in Jesus Christ, but rather a lesser being—possibly powerful, possibly mostly nice, but not

maximally great

, not

trustworthy

, and ultimately not

worthy of worship

. This was

not

mere rhetoric—it was

a logical consequence

of denying middle knowledge in the face of evil and suffering. And if the being you’re left with fails to be a maximally great and morally perfect Creator, then yes—

that’s not the God of Christianity

.

Why Open Theism Would Be My Distant Second Choice

WM: //In fact, Tim has told me and others publicly that if Molinism goes, his fallback position is that of open theism—likely dynamic omniscience, the view that I hold.//

TIM: To clarify: I have indeed said that Open Theism is preferable to EDD-Calvinism. I could never affirm a view that entails epistemic collapse—making theological knowledge impossible—a view that depicts God as a

deity of deception

, or a view that undercuts the rational basis for trusting the Bible. I firmly reject any system that results in a “different gospel.” Now, to be fair, I don’t think Open Theism—particularly the dynamic omniscience version—suffers from the same

epistemic self-defeat

that afflicts exhaustive divine determinism (EDD). Nor does it distort the gospel in the same way. That’s why, purely for the sake of argument,

IF

Molinism were somehow proven logically incoherent (which I strongly deny), then I would reluctantly affirm a nuanced form of Open Theism as a fallback. But make no mistake: that would be a

distant second

—not a desirable alternative. I believe Open Theism carries severe theological consequences, painting a picture of God that makes Him appear less than maximally wise, less than morally perfect, and ultimately

unworthy of worship

. It tragically plays into the atheist’s suspicion that even if a divine creator exists, He may not be good, trustworthy, or holy.

WM: //Now, Tim is a friend and I'm putting this video out critiquing the claims of a friend. And that's a delicate situation to find oneself in.//

TIM: Amen to that! I completely agree with my friend—“delicate situation” is an understatement.

I genuinely hate being in this position.

It’s difficult to publicly respond to a brother in Christ, especially when that brother isn’t offering the strongest or most charitable version of my views. Warren is my friend. But in this critique, he has unfortunately misrepresented key aspects of my position, conflated crucial terms, and made several modal and logical missteps along the way. That’s not steel-manning—it’s setting up straw men. And it doesn’t help the conversation. Still, I love Warren—and I want to be absolutely clear about that. I’ve encouraged people to subscribe to his YouTube channel, even though he uses it to make bad arguments against Molinism! He also uses it to make excellent arguments against Calvinism, and for that I’m truly grateful. In fact, I believe in Warren and his ministry so much that I’ve encouraged others to support him financially—even though I raise my own support as well. That’s not something I do lightly. But that’s how much I care about my friend. I hope this response communicates both truth and love, even in disagreement.

WM: // I want to make sure that I'm offering honest feedback and criticism, challenging those areas that I think are in error or not clear, but at the same time, I don't want to blow up our friendship over a disagreement on the way that God knows reality. I think that's silly. This is more of a situation of iron sharpening iron.//

TIM: On this, we both agree.

When “Steelman” Attempts Only Hit Straw

WM: //So, what I'd like to do now is attempt a steelman of the argument that Tim made. So, it would go like this: If middle knowledge is true and one knowingly rejects it, then they are knowingly rejecting the greatest conceivable being, which could lead to a denial of God's existence altogether.

Steelman over.//

TIM: No, Warren—that’s not a steelman at all. That was only a straw man dressed up in cardboard armor. Let me be clear: I’m not arguing that “if one knowingly rejects middle knowledge, then they’re rejecting the greatest conceivable being, and that could lead to a denial of God’s existence.”

That is not the argument I've been advancing.

Here’s what I’ve actually said—repeatedly—in writing and on YouTube:

If

God does

not

know the truth-values of future-tensed propositions regarding libertarian agents, then several versions of the Problem of Evil succeed in undermining the worship-worthiness of our Creator. This isn’t rhetorical posturing. It’s a logical entailment. If God lacks such knowledge, then He cannot be maximally great, and worse—He is powerless to bring good from evil in any meaningful sense. That’s a major problem.

So no, this isn’t about rejecting Molinism per se—it’s about what logically follows

if

middle knowledge is false.

I’m not saying someone denies God’s existence

because

they reject Molinism. I’m saying that

if

God lacks middle knowledge, the implications cascade toward a picture of God that is not worthy of worship—indeed, not worthy of belief. So if you’re going to actually “steelman” my view, please don’t paraphrase. Just quote me—accurately and in context. That would be the truly charitable thing to do.

WM: //This assumes middle knowledge is real and it entails a slippery slope fallacy. But it also smuggles in a smear of open theists via a guilt by association fallacy. Overall, the argument just falls flat.//

TIM: Warren misfires again. First, this argument does

not

assume that middle knowledge is real. Rather, it explores the logical consequences

if it is not.

I’m not presupposing middle knowledge—I’m showing what follows

in its absence.

That’s a critical distinction. If God lacks knowledge of future-tensed truths regarding libertarian agents, then multiple formulations of the Problem of Evil—especially the evidential and soteriological versions—are back on the table with devastating force.

That’s not a slippery slope.

That’s direct logical entailment.

Second, there is no “guilt by association” fallacy at play. I’m not smearing Open Theists. I’ve repeatedly affirmed that Open Theism is more epistemically stable than EDD-Calvinism. But if Open Theism entails that God doesn’t know what free creatures will do—only what they might do—then we’re left with a deity who cannot ensure that good ultimately triumphs over evil, especially gratuitous suffering. That’s a substantive theological critique, not a smear.

So no, the argument doesn’t “fall flat” at all. In fact, it stands extremely tall—logically, theologically, and philosophically. What Warren dismisses as fallacious is, in fact, carefully reasoned and academically published argumentation.

WM: //But here's the irony. If we take this line of reasoning seriously—that the greatest possible being must possess every perfection—well, Molinism collapses under its own weight.

Why? Well, because it's pretty much unanimously agreed upon that the greatest possible being must also be metaphysically free, self-determining, and not bound by external or abstract conditions. But under Molinism, God's creative options are limited by eternal counterfactuals he did not determine and cannot change. These truths constrain which worlds he can create. That's not greatness—that's dependence.//

TIM: This objection confuses logical consistency with metaphysical dependence. It’s like saying God is “dependent” on the law of non-contradiction or “bound” by the impossibility of creating square circles. That’s not “dependence”—that’s logical coherence.

As many philosophers have noted, omnipotence means God can do all things that are logically possible. But if God chooses to create libertarianly free agents—creatures who are not causally determined—then He cannot force their free choices without contradiction. That’s not a limit on God’s power; it’s a recognition of the nature of libertarian freedom combined with the laws of logic.

So yes, there are some logically possible worlds that God cannot actualize—not because He lacks power, but because they are not feasible given the free choices creatures would make. That’s not a flaw in Molinism. It’s the very heart of why Molinism preserves both divine sovereignty and genuine freedom.

Rather than collapsing, Molinism elegantly reconciles the greatness of God with the reality of free creatures.

WM: //In my last video on Molinism, I utilized an example that was given to me by Dr. Alan Rhoda where it regards these counterfactuals of creaturely freedoms like fortune cookie slips. And in this example, God happens across a big tub of these fortune cookie slips. And for whatever reason, everything that's on these is a truth value that God can't change.//

TIM: I’ve already addressed Dr. Rhoda’s flawed “fortune cookie” analogy elsewhere (here and here), but let’s briefly clarify the issue. If a human would freely choose X in a non-deterministic environment Y, then by definition of libertarian freedom, even God cannot make that person choose otherwise—at least not without violating their freedom. That’s not a limitation on God’s power; it’s simply what it means to be a libertarian agent in a freedom-permitting context.

So yes, God cannot change how a free creature would freely choose if placed in particular circumstances. That’s not a bug in Molinism. That’s the core insight of what middle knowledge is.

If Rhoda or McGrew want us to affirm logically incoherent claims like “God causally determines a libertarian free choice to be otherwise,” I’m afraid I’ll have to pass. Coherence matters.

The Myth of Cobbling Worlds with Eternally Settled Truths

WM: //And so what he does is he tries to cobble together a world utilizing these pre-existing truth values. And it really shows just how constrained this view of Molinism is on divine freedom.//

TIM: This is yet another misrepresentation of Mere Molinism. I’ve been crystal clear—in published academic work, on my website, in debates, and across YouTube—that on Mere Molinism, God sovereignly creates a world based on the best

feasible

freedom-permitting endgame. There’s no “cobbling together” of pre-existing truth-values as if God is scrambling to make something work.

It’s like accusing Doctor Strange of “cobbling together” reality because he gave Thanos the time stone. That’s not cobbling; that’s sovereign strategy.

Warren knows this is my view. So why mischaracterize it? At best, this is careless. At worst, it’s disingenuous. Either way, it attacks a straw man, not my actual position.

WM: //Tim's GCB argument assumes middle knowledge is possible, but it never proves it. And you can't just assert that God has middle knowledge if its content is metaphysically incoherent.//

TIM:

FALSE.

I have provided

deductively valid

arguments concluding that God possesses middle knowledge in both peer-reviewed literature and public debate (the same debate Warren pulls quotes from).

But more to the point: this particular argument isn’t even assuming Molinism is true. It’s showing that if Molinism is not true—if God lacks middle knowledge—then Open Theism collapses under the weight of multiple versions of the Problem of Evil. That’s a conditional argument, not an assumption. So Warren’s objection misses the mark entirely.

WM: //At first glance, what Tim said sounds reasonable, but this is a category error, and it's one that's extremely significant to the debate between Molinism and dynamic omniscience. The question isn’t whether God is all-knowing—we all affirm that He is. The real issue is: are future-tensed propositions—especially about free creatures—something that can be known as eternally settled truths? And if so, what grounds them?//

TIM: There he goes again: what is an “eternally settled truth”? Warren again appeals to the phrase

“eternally settled truths”

—but without clearly defining what he means.

If by that term he refers to the Molinist claim that God has always known (logically prior to His creative decree) how libertarian agents would freely choose in any given non-deterministic circumstance, then yes—this is exactly what Molinism affirms.

But if he means that such truths are “settled” because God deterministically decreed them to be so, then he’s no longer talking about Molinism at all—that’s Calvinism.

Either way, his critique completely misses its mark. It might score points against a straw man, but it does not touch Mere Molinism.

Now, some Open Theists boldly presuppose (without proof) that future-tensed propositions about libertarian agents lack truth values altogether. That a sweeping metaphysical assertion—one that can’t be demonstrated and certainly shouldn’t be dogmatically assumed.

Even worse, this claim directly contradicts Scripture. The Bible presents numerous examples of God knowing distant anddetailed, future-tensed truths about the free decisions of human beings—sometimes before they are even born. If someone insists that such truths cannot, even in principle, be known, then they must reject clear biblical teaching to maintain consistency.

What's even worse, Open Theism also falls prey to multiple formulations of the Problem of Evil, since the view strips God of the very knowledge that would allow Him to sovereignly permit suffering only when it would ultimately lead to a greater good in the future.

Here’s the bottom line: If Christianity is true, then it must be both (1) consistent with the full counsel of Scripture, and (2) immune to the various Problems of Evil.

Open Theism fails on both fronts. Mere Molinism stands strong.

Facts, Truths, Propositions, and Causal Relation

WM: //This is where the entire debate hinges. Critics of open theism and dynamic omniscience often conflate the present reality with future potentialities. They say things like, “Well, it’s a fact Tim is wearing a black t-shirt, so it must have always been a fact.” But this misses the entire distinction between what is grounded in present actuality and what has not yet happened and may or may not unfold through genuine freedom.//

TIM: Warren continues to conflate

modal categories

of freedom.

He’s right that there’s a difference between what is actual and what is merely potential—but he misses the crucial distinction between God’s knowledge of what could happen and what would happen under specific libertarianly-free conditions.

Let’s take his example. If I’m wearing a black shirt right now, then the present-tensed proposition “Tim is wearing a black shirt” is true. And if that’s true now, then the past-tensed proposition “Tim will wear a black shirt tomorrow” was true yesterday. That’s just how propositions and truth values work across time.

But does that mean I wasn’t free? Not at all.

The truth of that future-tensed proposition did not cause me to wear a black shirt. Why? Because facts—if they exist at all—are abstract objects, and abstracta, by definition, do not stand in causal relations. They don’t do anything.

So even if it was true yesterday that “Tim will freely wear a black shirt tomorrow,” that doesn’t imply I was causally determined to do so. I could have worn a blue one instead (as absolutely nothing that actually exists deterministically prevented me from doing otherwise)—but God, with His perfect foreknowledge, simply knew that I wouldn’t.

Conclusion: Facts about what I will freely choose do absolutely nothing to prevent me from choosing otherwise. That’s what makes God’s foreknowledge compatible with libertarian freedom—and what makes Molinism work.

WM: //Tim speaks of this as a fact. But as Merriam-Webster defines it, a fact is something that has actual existence—an actual occurrence. “Tim is wearing a black t-shirt” is a fact now because it’s happening now. It’s grounded in reality.

TIM: Warren wants to restrict the term “fact” to present occurrences, citing Merriam-Webster. But I’m not appealing to popular-level definitions—I’m talking about

truth values

in a

philosophical

and

metaphysical

sense. I stand in a long tradition of philosophers who recognize truths not only about what

is

actual, but also about what

could have been

and

would have been

in other circumstances. These aren’t fictional—they are

modal truths

, and they’re just as real in God’s knowledge as present-tense truths.

Yes, facts include what actually exists, but God—who is ultimate reality—knows more than what currently exists. He knows:

• what is the case,

• what was the case,

• what will be the case,

• what couldhave been the case,

• and what would have been the case under different conditions.

That’s why the Fine-Tuning Argument works: it relies on God’s knowledge of non-actualized possibilities.

In short: a proposition is true if it corresponds to reality. But reality isn’t limited to what’s currently happening—it includes the mind of Ultimate Reality--God--who exists from eternity without beginning and encompasses all truth. Future-tensed and counterfactual propositions are true because they correspond to God’s perfect knowledge, even if they haven’t (yet) occurred.

And crucially: just because God knows how libertarian agents would freely choose doesn’t mean He causes those choices. Molinism affirms both God’s sovereignty and libertarian freedom without collapsing into determinism.

WM: //But under Molinism, it was eternally true that Tim would wear that shirt, and all other choices were never truly possible in this world.//

TIM: //False! This is a fundamental misunderstanding of Molinism.

Yes, under Molinism, God knew from eternity past that I would freely choose to wear a black shirt today. But that doesn’t mean I could not have chosen otherwise.

Molinism affirms that libertarian freedom is real: that I was free to choose any number of shirt colors, and nothing—external or internal—causally determined my decision. I simply chose black, and God eternally knew I would. That’s not determinism (by definition)—it’s foreknowledge.

Here’s the key point:

If nothing deterministically prevented me from choosing otherwise, then I could have done otherwise—even if God knew that I wouldn’t.

So yes, it was “eternally true” that I would wear a black shirt. But it was also eternallygenuinely possible that I could have worn something else.

Molinism preserves both divine omniscience and human libertarian freedom without contradiction.

WM: //This is the world God actualized, and He predestined for Tim to choose that shirt. But that’s not a fact; it’s a philosophical commitment to a settled future. It’s at the heart of the very debate.//

TIM:  There he goes again—using slippery language without clear definitions. What exactly does Warren mean by “predestined” and “settled future”?

If he means what I mean by predestination—that God freely chose to create a world in which He knew how free creatures would choose, and sovereignly allowed those libertarian choices to unfold all the way to the best feasible freedom-permitting endgame—then great! That’s precisely what Mere Molinism affirms. God actualized a world with a settled endgame, but one that is settled because of free choices, not instead of them. That’s a feature, not a flaw.

But if by “predestined” Warren means that God causally determined every detail of the future such that no creature could ever do otherwise—then he’s describing Calvinism, not Molinism.

So which is it? If Warren wants to critique Mere Molinism, he should start by accurately representing what it teaches. Otherwise, he’s just attacking a straw man. Again.

The Book of Ephesians VS. The Book of Assumptions

WM: //Critics often assume the future is settled because God is sovereign. And they define sovereign not as “King of kings” and “Lord of lords”—not in biblical terms—but in terms of philosophical meticulous predestination of all things.//

TIM: This isn’t merely about assumptions—it’s about what God has revealed in Scripture.

Ephesians 1

makes it clear that God predestined certain things “before the foundation of the world” (v. 4), including our adoption as His children (v. 5), “according to the purpose of His will.” Then, in verse 11, Paul explicitly states that God “works all things according to the counsel of His will.” In context, this suggests that the “all things” God now sovereignly works out in dynamic time are consistent with what He eternally purposed before creation. This isn’t a philosophical assumption of determinism—it’s a biblical affirmation of divine omniscience and providential governance. Open Theists must reject this straight forward interpretation and start doing hermeneutical gymnastics similar to what Calvinists do with 1 Corinthians 10:13 in an attempt to reject libertarian freedom. Mere Molinism, on the other hand, makes sense of all the biblical data.

Moreover, Scripture is replete with examples of God knowing truth-values of future-tensed propositions regarding libertarian agents and their actions—sometimes even before they are born, and often in significant detail. These conclusions have nothing to do with critics supposedly defining “sovereign” as “King of kings” and “Lord of lords.” That’s a red herring.

Neither I, nor any Molinist I know, makes their case based on that line of reasoning. The biblical witness itself drives our conclusion: God eternally knows what free creatures would do in any possible circumstance and sovereignly actualizes a world in which His purposes are accomplished through their undetermined but foreknown decisions. That’s not exhaustive divine determinism (EDD)—it’s Mere Molinism. *Warren plays the soundbite from my debate with James White again:

“Do you affirm double predestination? Oh yeah. 'Cause I do. I affirm predestination of all things.”

WM adds: And again, the Bible just doesn’t describe God this way. Instead, it shows Him as a potter at His wheel, shaping, responding, and even refashioning His creation in real time based on how it responds to His hand. In fact, this is how God instructed the prophet Jeremiah to consider Him. He laments, He warns, He adapts, and redeems.

The world is dynamic—and so is God’s interaction with it. This is what dynamic omniscience affirms.//

TIM: I’ve never denied that the world is dynamic. I believe it is. But God’s knowledge of how free creatures will choose doesn’t somehow negate His genuine interaction with them. Consider this: did Doctor Strange

fail

to interact with Tony Stark just because he knew what Tony would freely choose? Of course not. Knowledge of a free decision doesn’t nullify real-time engagement. The same is true of God—only on a divine, infinite scale.

Warren keeps assuming a metaphysical framework but never argues for it. He throws around loaded phrases like “refashioning” and “responding in real time,” but never explains how divine interaction requires ignorance of future free choices. That’s not an argument—it’s an assertion dressed up in rhetoric (and to Warren’s credit, he is a fantastic rhetorician)!

At the end of the day, it’s smoke and mirrors. Warren never clearly distinguishes his view from determinism, nor does he explain why God’s omniscience must be limited in order for the world to be dynamic. Molinism allows for both divine foreknowledge and genuine creaturely freedom. Warren’s position seems to offer neither clarity nor coherence.

WM: //God is perfectly aware of all that can be known—both actual and possible. He’s never caught off guard. He does not believe falsehoods like “Tim will wear a white shirt” when no fact grounds that outcome. He knows all paths, all conditions, all hearts, and He responds in perfect wisdom. He’s free to either coerce or persuade.

God doesn’t lose power or greatness when creatures are free. He designed them for this. He magnifies His greatness by working within a world where love, rebellion, redemption…//

TIM: I’m genuinely confused—wasn’t Warren trying to critique Molinism? Because what he just described sounds exactly like Molinism. Molinists affirm that God knows all truths—both actual and possible—including what every creature would freely do in any set of circumstances. He’s never caught off guard. He knows all hearts, all paths, and all conditions. And He sovereignly responds in perfect wisdom.

Where Molinism differs from Warren’s Open Theism is that we affirm God had this exhaustive knowledge prior to His creative decree. That means He created a world in which He knew how libertarian agents would freely act—without needing to determine or override their freedom. God doesn't lose power or greatness because creatures are free; He displays His power and greatness by working through their freedom to bring about love, rebellion, and redemption—precisely as Warren described.

So unless Warren is now agreeing with Molinism, his objection seems to evaporate. He hasn’t shown that Molinism opposes anything he just affirmed. If anything, it seems he’s critiquing a caricature of Molinism rather than the real thing.

Logical Moments of Divine Knowledge

WM: //Molinists want to protect libertarian freedom, the ability to choose between multiple options, and they assert that creatures possess this kind of freedom. They also claim that God is free and that he had many possible worlds or feasible worlds to choose from. But let's apply their own framework back onto God.

If God in pre-creation circumstance C would choose to actualize world A, and this is an eternally true counterfactual, well then He cannot choose to actualize any other world without falsifying His own middle knowledge. Suddenly God’s range of options across these possible or feasible worlds vanishes. He’s no longer free in any meaningful sense. He’s locked into actualizing the one world He would actualize. So those possible worlds—they're not truly possible.

Just like our ability to choose between different options in this world—it’s not really truly possible. We just have the illusion of it. This is just metaphysical scenery, philosophical sleight of hand, never actionable, as God Himself would be fated by these would-be counterfactuals.//

TIM: Warren asserts that if God knows from eternity which world He would actualize, then He isn’t truly free to do otherwise. But this objection misfires. Molinist do not deny that eternal truths exist, nor do we claim that God is

temporally

undecided prior to creation. Rather, Molinists distinguish between

logical moments

within God's

timeless

existence sans creation.

Here’s the basic structure of God’s omniscient knowledge in His timeless (sans creation) state:

1. Natural knowledge: What God knows He could do (i.e., all possibilities, grounded in His omnipotence).

2. Middle knowledge: What any creature would freely do in any possible circumstance, if created.

*God’s choice to create a feasible freedom-permitting world with the best eternal endgame.

1. Free knowledge: What God knows will happen, given His sovereign choice to actualize a particular world.

Warren’s objection hinges on a category mistake: he treats counterfactuals of divine freedom (what God would freely do) as if they are part of God’s middle knowledge, just like counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. But this is precisely what Molinists reject.

God does not possess middle knowledge of His own free actions—because He is a necessary being, and His actions (like creating world A rather than B) are not “truths” until after His volitional choice (the divine decree). That’s why Molinists locate such truths in His free knowledge, not His middle knowledge. This has been made explicit by leading Molinists like William Lane Craig and Kirk MacGregor. There’s no inconsistency here—just a misunderstanding of how God’s knowledge is taxonomized.

The upshot is this:

• Creatures are contingent beings. What they would freely do, if created, can be known prior to God’s creative decree.

• God, however, is a necessary being. What He would freely do is not known until logically after His choice is made—thus not middle knowledge, but free knowledge (by definition).

This preserves both God’s freedom and omniscience. He is not “locked in” by anything external. On the contrary, God freely chooses which world to create—or even whether to create at all. Absolutely nothing prevents Him from refraining. He is the source of His own actions and He could have done otherwise. That’s why Molinists affirm that God could have created a different world, or none at all.

To argue that God is “fated” (whatever that means) by His own eternal knowledge is to confuse the order of knowing with the order of being. The truth of what God will do follows from His decree, not the other way around.

WM: //Now, Tim often appeals to God’s freedom by saying God could have created a different world. But if counterfactuals of divine freedom are eternally fixed, then God’s creative act is bound by something external to Himself. And if God didn’t determine the truth of those counterfactuals, then what did?

Molinism renders God a metaphysical vending machine: input circumstance C, and output world A every time. And this is a massive problem. It means God could not have created otherwise. God is subject to truths He did not author. Creation is not a free act but a constrained necessity. And Molinism tries to preserve God’s sovereignty, but in reality it destroys God’s freedom.//

TIM: How exactly does it follow that God is a “metaphysical vending machine”? Warren hasn’t demonstrated that God is determined by facts, truths, or anything else. On the contrary, Molinists affirm that God is the source of His own actions. Nothing external to Him stands in a causal relation to His decision to create. In fact, nothing else exists unless and until God chooses to create.

Moreover, although Warren throws around the phrase “eternally fixed,” he never clarifies what he means. If he means “true in all times,” then sure—eternal truths exist. But the Molinist doesn’t claim that counterfactuals of divine freedom (i.e., what God would do in certain circumstances) are known prior to God’s decree. That’s a misrepresentation. Molinists have been clear: God’s free decisions are known logically after His sovereign decree, and thus fall under free knowledge, not middle knowledge.

So another objection from Warren fails. God’s creative act is not “bound” by abstract truths external to Himself. To say “God could not have created otherwise” is to confuse truths about what God has freely chosen with constraints on what God could have done. But God could have refrained from creation entirely. There was nothing deterministically preventing Him from remaining in his timeless state. That’s precisely what Molinists mean when we affirm that God had the power to do otherwise.

And even if there are truths about what God would do, those truths do not stand over God like metaphysical chains. They’re simply true because of what a supremely rational, omnibenevolent, omniscient being would freely choose. The truths are posterior in explanation to the kind of being God is—not anterior in authority.

Also worth noting: truths, if they exist at all, are abstract objects. And abstracta—by definition—are causally effete. They don’t do anything. They don’t cause anything. They don’t constrain anything. So Warren’s entire argument crumbles under careful metaphysical analysis.

Molinism does not destroy divine freedom. It grounds it—while also preserving God’s sovereignty, omniscience, and the reality of creaturely freedom.

WM: //So Molinism is not only an assault on human freedom but divine freedom as well.//

TIM: This simply does not follow. Molinism affirms and makes possible the libertarian freedom of humanity and the Maximally Great Being.

WM: //But let’s consider some possible responses from our Molinist friends.

TIM: The Possible responses Warren should have considered are the actual responses I’ve given in the past.

WM: //One response is to say, “Well, God is still free because He chooses from among feasible worlds.”

If what God would do in any given circumstance is eternally true, then God can never have had a range of actual possibilities.//

TIM: Warren claims that if what God would do in any circumstance is “eternally true,” then God never really had a range of possibilities. But that objection is muddled. It confuses the

truth

of a proposition with

causal determination

—an elementary mistake.

Here’s the key point: just because something is true, it doesn’t follow that it is causally necessitated. Consider Doctor Strange in Infinity War. He knows that if Tony Stark freely asks, “Is this the one way we win?” he will freely answer, “If I tell you, it won’t happen.” And so, he freely declines to answer Stark. Did this knowledge causally determine his choice? Of course not. He simply knew that answering Stark’s question would wreck everything—since Strange is not stupid, but wise—he freely chooses to decline to answer Stark (which is why a good God often does not answer our good prayers).

Likewise, God can know what He would freely choose to do in a given circumstance without being causally determined by anything outside Himself. The truth of such counterfactuals doesn’t force God’s hand. Rather, they reflect the kind of free, rational being God is. His choices are still free, even if they are foreknown.

And here’s the metaphysical issue Warren never addresses: abstract truths are causally effete. They don’t make anything happen. They don’t determine or necessitate actions. If counterfactuals of divine freedom are true, they are true because they accurately reflect what God—freely and sovereignly—would do. Truth doesn’t constrain God; God’s perfect nature and wisdom explain the truth. Warren’s got it metaphysically backwards.

So Warren’s worry—however rhetorically bold—is metaphysically hollow. Molinism preserves both God’s freedom and omniscience. Until Warren can show how an abstract proposition can cause or determine a divine act, his objection carries no philosophical weight.

WM: //What could do collapses into what He would do.//

TIM: No, what God could do is part of His natural knowledge. What would happen if He chooses to create one way instead of another is part of His middle knowledge. God’s choice to create is free. That is, nothing apart from God determines God’s choice. He is the source of his free choice and could have refrained from creation or created otherwise. This is, by definition, divine libertarian freedom. Nothing is “collapsing” as Warren exclaims.

WM: //Meaning there was only one true feasible world all along. Others were hypothetically conceivable but never genuinely actionable.//

TIM: While I have advanced the possibility that there might be only one feasible freedom-permitting world where evil is ultimately defeated and all who are not Transworld damned are saved (making this world the one best feasible creatable world), I’ve also argued that this would not be a net benefit or negation upon ultimate reality -- and a perfectly omniscient God knows this. Thus, even if there are not “tied for the best” feasible created worlds (as MacGregor, Laing, and Craig believe), there are still multiple options for God -- to create the one best feasible world . . . or to remain in his timeless triune state. God has alternative options. Thus, on the Mere Molinism view, God possesses libertarian freedom – and so do humans.

Sourcehood and Alternative Possibilities

WM: //Now, another response would be to say, “Well, freedom doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise.” And this version of libertarian free will shifts from affirming the Principle of Alternative Possibilities to sourcehood libertarianism, which is another debate in and of itself. But it still doesn’t solve the core dilemma. If God’s choice is eternally true prior to creation, then God did not determine that truth. He simply conforms to it. That’s not sourcehood. It’s submission to a preexisting metaphysical fact that God did not determine. If God is not the source of that truth, His freedom is still compromised. But this is probably the most common response—and that is to say that counterfactuals of divine freedom are not a thing. They’re not part of middle knowledge.//

TIM: Let’s not be misled by rhetorical sleight-of-hand. Warren claims that if the truth about what God would freely choose is “eternally prior” to creation, then God is somehow

submitting

to a pre-existing metaphysical fact—one He did not determine. But this misconstrues the nature of abstracta and the logical structure of freedom.

First, facts—if we grant them ontological status—are abstract objects. And abstracta, by definition, are causally inert. They don’t do anything. They don’t cause anything. So it is metaphysically confused to say that God “submits” to these truths in any coercive or necessitating sense. That would be like saying God “submits” to the laws of logic. He doesn’t submit—He is necessarily and perfectly rational. The impossibility of God creating a square circle or a married bachelor doesn’t impugn His freedom or sovereignty.

Moreover, counterfactuals of divine freedom are not part of middle knowledge—not because they’re false or incoherent, but because middle knowledge, by definition, is about creaturely freedom in logically prior scenarios God could create. Divine decisions fall under free knowledge, not middle knowledge, and are known by God only after, His creative decree.

Warren's argument rests on a category error and the mistaken assumption that “truths” constrain omnipotent agency. But they don’t—especially not when those truths are simply reflections of what a free and sovereign God would do, were He to do it.

Warren continues:

WM: //Facts. Hard facts. And this creates a theological double standard. If you reject applying counterfactuals to God because it undermines His freedom, why apply it then to creatures? Either these truths pre-exist freedom and bind it or they don’t. If you allow God’s will to be undetermined and self-originated, then why not allow the same for creatures—or just abandon libertarianism altogether?//

TIM: Hard abstracta is still abstracta. Calling them “hard facts” doesn’t change their ontological status—they remain

causally effete

. The truth of a counterfactual doesn’t

cause

anything; it merely

reflects

what would happen if a free agent were in a certain situation.

Moreover, Warren’s accusation of a “double standard” misses the mark. The Molinist doesn’t deny that counterfactuals apply to both God and creatures—we simply distinguish between them. Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) are known logically prior to God’s creative decree as part of His middle knowledge. By contrast, counterfactuals of divine freedom are true in virtue of God’s decree itself and thus belong to His free knowledge, which is logically posterior to the decree.

In short, Molinists affirm that both God and humans can be the ultimate source of their actions. Libertarian freedom applies on both levels. The key difference is that God is the ground of His choices, whereas we are grounds of ours in the sense that we are the originators of our free acts. Nothing about the existence of truth—hard or soft—alters that.

This isn’t a double standard. It’s careful metaphysics.

WM: //Now, one response would be to say, “Well, you’re confusing logical order with causal necessity.” But if the counterfactual is eternally true and cannot be otherwise, then regardless of causal language, the effect is the same.//

TIM: Once again, Warren uses the phrase “eternally true” without explaining what it actually means—let alone how such truths stand in any

causal

relation that deterministically prevents God or creatures from doing otherwise. Until he provides a coherent account of how a truth-value (an abstract object) causally constrains God’s freedom, he’s simply asserting metaphysical nonsense.

Moreover, even if God knows logically prior to creation how Warren would freely act in world W, it does not follow that Warren’s actions are not free in W. God's foreknowledge of free choices is just that—knowledge, not causation. The word “freely” doesn’t magically vanish just because God sovereignly creates a world in which certain free choices are foreknown. That’s the whole point of Molinism: God’s perfect knowledge and human libertarian freedom are not at odds.

WM: //God’s options are metaphysically restricted, and logical priority doesn’t rescue divine freedom if the would is fixed and God has no say in making it true or false.//

TIM: Again, “fixed” does not mean determined. If one’s action is not determined by something or someone else, then one is free to choose to act or to act otherwise. God’s options are logically restricted, sure . . . but again, He is also logically restricted from creating married bachelors. Big deal.

Appealing to Mystery or Affirming Contradiction?

WM: Now, one response would be to appeal to mystery and say, “Well, we have to just say it’s a mystery in order to preserve maximal greatness.” It’s all quite a mystery. And mystery is acceptable where Scripture reveals a sort of paradox where we’re not given an answer—but they’re not necessarily contradictory.//

TIM: The only genuine “mysteries” I’ve appealed to are (1)

how

an omnipotent God creates a physical universe out of nothing physical, and (2)

how

an omniscient God knows the truth values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and future-tensed libertarian propositions.

But I have never affirmed contradictory claims and then hand-waved it away as “paradox.” If Warren thinks I have, he’s welcome to point out where. I’ve offered models that are coherent—even if some aspects remain mysterious due to our finite cognitive limitations.

That’s a far cry from asserting metaphysical contradictions and calling it “orthodoxy.”

WM: //But here, the paradox arises not from revelation but from contradictions arising out of philosophical speculation—specifically the metaphysical commitment to eternally true counterfactuals. So, the burden of coherence is on Molinism. Invoking mystery doesn’t rescue a position from an internal contradiction.//

TIM: What internal contradiction? I’m not the one claiming that abstracta stands in causal relation with the physical world? I have not made contradictory claims. Maybe Warren has someone else in mind, but this video is supposed to be critiquing the work of Dr. Tim Stratton.

WM: //Now, regardless of how the Molinist responds to this problem, the argument forces them into a corner. Either they accept that God is bound by eternally true counterfactuals and thus not truly free, or they have to admit that those truths are contingent on God’s will, undermining middle knowledge’s independence.//

TIM: No, I can affirm that God is “bound” by logic and that all that actually exists is contingent upon God’s decree. Where is the contradiction?

WM: //If they try to exempt God from this framework, they commit a category error or special pleading—where they’re treating God and His creatures by different standards while simultaneously arguing for a uniform model of libertarian freedom.//

TIM: Warren’s conclusion does not follow (see my responses above).

WM: //Let's flip this lens back onto creatures. Molinism says that in any circumstance C, person would freely choose to act A, and God knowing this, creates the world where the person faces circumstance C and thus chooses A. But what does that actually mean?

Well, it means that the person cannot choose otherwise. That choice was known eternally—logically prior to creation—built into the very blueprint of the world God chose.

If the person had chosen B instead of A, then God's middle knowledge would have been falsified. But God can't be wrong. So the person could not have chosen otherwise.//

TIM: Wrong again. As I’ve clarified repeatedly, nothing causally or deterministically prevents the agent from choosing otherwise. The truth of a counterfactual does not cause or necessitate the action—it merely reflects what the agent would freely do in those circumstances. As William Lane Craig has explained, if the agent had freely chosen B instead of A, then God would have known that instead. God’s knowledge is perfectly accurate, but it is not causally constraining. Knowledge, even divine knowledge, is not a metaphysical force. To claim otherwise is to conflate epistemic certainty with causal necessity—an

elementary

category error.

So yes, the person really could have chosen otherwise. That’s the essence of libertarian freedom, and Molinism preserves it without compromising divine omniscience.

Attacking More Straw Men

WM: //So Molinism says you're free, but you can't act differently than what God already knew you would do.//

TIM:

STRAW MAN ALERT!

Molinism neither affirms nor entails that you “can’t act differently than what God already knew you would do.” Rather, Molinism says:

You are libertarianly free—meaning you are the ultimate source of your choice, and nothing that actually exists causally determines your decision or deterministically prevents you from doing otherwise. So, you could choose otherwise. God simply knows what you would freely do in any given circumstance, without causally determining that outcome.

God’s knowledge doesn’t magically constrain your freedom; it reflects it. His foreknowledge is logically prior, not causally prior. So where’s the contradiction? There isn’t one.

If Warren thinks there is, then he must show how knowledge entails causal necessity—because without that link, the objection collapses.

Good luck with that.

WM: //You never had the ability to falsify that knowledge, and you had no say in how that truth came to be. That truth pre-existed you. This is fatalism with softer language.//

TIM: Once again, this is a misfire. Libertarian freedom has never been defined as “the ability to falsify God’s knowledge.” That’s not only a straw man—it’s a category mistake.

As I explain in my book (and as any academic discussion of free will affirms), libertarian freedom is not about outwitting omniscience or “tricking God.” It’s about metaphysical sourcehood and/or alternative possibilities. Here’s a more precise formulation:

Libertarian freedom is the ability to choose, think, or act such that antecedent conditions are insufficient to necessitate the agent’s choice, thought, or action. Or as others summarize: “An agent is free in the libertarian sense only if he or she is the ultimate source or originator of his or her actions” (See Timpe).

This is perfectly compatible with divine omniscience—so long as God’s knowledge is logically prior to the decree and causally inert (which Molinism affirms). God knows what you would freely do, not what you must do.

SIDE NOTE: Warren repeatedly plays the same clip of me over and over throughout his video for rhetorical effect, but there’s no metaphysical substance there.

Merely replaying a sound bite from my James White debate—where I stated that the difference between Calvinism and Molinism lies in

how

God predestines—is not an argument. It’s a sound bite without substance unless you also engage with my actual explanation that follows.

Warren continues . . .

WM: //It replaces determinism by decree with determinism by selection.//

TIM: That’s simply false—and it reveals a basic misunderstanding of both determinism and Molinism.

By definition, an event is determined when antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate that event. So if God determines everything by decree (as in exhaustive divine determinism), then all events unfold necessarily due to God’s antecedent causal act—His decree. That’s classical determinism.

But on Molinism, there is no antecedent causal condition sufficient to necessitate a person’s free choice. That’s the whole point. The counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) that God knows are not determinative—they are explanatorily prior, not causally prior. They are not agents. They don’t do anything. They are abstract truths that reflect what would happen freely—not what must happen deterministically. Thus, God’s selection of a world in which certain CCFs are true is not the same thing as determining those outcomes by decree.

If that still sounds confusing, here’s the bottom line: on Molinism, there’s nothing actual—nothing with causal power—that forces or necessitates the agent's choice. That means the agent really is the source of their own actions. The metaphysical structure is non-deterministic, which is precisely why it allows for libertarian freedom.

So no, Molinism doesn’t “replace” one kind of determinism with another. It replaces determinism altogether with a model in which God sovereignly chooses a world in which agents freely make the very choices He middle-knows they would make. That’s not determinism—it’s sovereignty plus genuine freedom.

Warren plays another out of context sound bite from my debate with James White:

“Do you affirm double predestination? Oh yeah, because I do. I affirm predestination of all things.”

WM: // But the effect is the same. You do what you do because that's the world God decided on. Molinism promises freedom, but it delivers a locked-in script.”

Tim: There he goes again.

What exactly does Warren mean by “locked-in script”?

He repeatedly uses vague and undefined metaphors rather than engaging the actual claims of Molinism as articulated in the academic literature. Warren is focused on rhetorically scary terms and I am focused upon metaphysical precision.

If by “locked-in script” Warren simply means that God knows with certainty how libertarian agents would freely act in particular circumstances—and actualizes a world in which they do just that—then yes, that’s precisely what Molinists affirm. But this is not determinism; this is sovereign selection of genuinely free actions. That’s a feature of the view, not a bug. It’s what allows Molinism to maintain both divine predestination and libertarian freedom without contradiction.

If instead Warren means by “locked-in script” that antecedent conditions are sufficient to causally necessitate all events, then he’s critiquing exhaustive divine determinism (EDD)—not Molinism. Molinism explicitly rejects that antecedent conditions necessitate all outcomes.

So whichever way Warren means it, the “locked-in script” language does nothing to challenge Mere Molinism. It either restates a core Molinist affirmation (that God sovereignly chooses a world in which free agents act freely), or it critiques a view we reject.

Bottom line: Molinism promises libertarian freedom—and it delivers exactly what it promises.

Truth-Maker Maximalism and the Grounding Objection

WM: //Now, one of the most difficult problems for Molinism is the grounding objection, which we've touched on here and elsewhere. Molinism depends on the idea that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—statements like: if placed in situation C, person would freely choose A. But here's the key question: What makes these counterfactuals true? What grounds them? What is the basis by which, prior to creation, God knows the single outcome of indeterministic scenarios when there are multiple possible outcomes?

Tim responds to this objection in his article "Grounds to Object to the Grounding Objection." And there he dismisses the grounding objection…

…by attacking the idea known as truthmaker maximalism. He argues that those opposing Molinism must embrace metaphysical extremes to make our case.//

TIM: The grounding objection assumes that all truths must be grounded in concrete entities—what’s called

truthmaker maximalism

. But that principle is highly contested. If one rejects it, then it is no problem to say that some truths—such as counterfactuals of freedom—are simply brute truths (that don’t cause anything), known by God. If one affirms it, then a Molinist can still argue that such truths are grounded in the libertarian essence or disposition of the creature, which God knows. Either way, God’s omniscient grasp of modal and counterfactual truths is sufficient to confer determinate truth value without causally determining them. Thus, the grounding objection either relies on a controversial metaphysical assumption that we are not obligated to accept—or it misrepresents what’s actually required for a truth to be grounded within a theistic framework.

WM: Now, first it needs to be noted that this is a redirection, not a resolution to the problem. The grounding objection isn't about truthmaker maximalism. It's about how any non-actual truth can be true at all. If counterfactuals of creaturely freedom aren't grounded in reality or divine decree, then they're either unjustified brute facts or natural knowledge in disguise.//

TIM: But Warren’s complaint is misplaced. The whole point of the grounding objection is to ask what makes a non-actual truth true—i.e., whether truths must be grounded in something ontologically real. That’s precisely what truthmaker maximalism asserts. So, to say that the issue isn’t about truthmaker maximalism is simply incorrect.

That aside, consider this: If God has the power to create libertarian agents (even if He never does), then those agents would—by definition—act freely. Suppose God knows that if Agent P were placed in circumstance C, he would freely choose X. If that is indeed how P would freely act, then it is true that “P would freely choose X in C.” And if it is true, then an omniscient God necessarily knows it.

That’s middle knowledge.

Molinism affirms that God knows all true propositions, including conditionals like this, even before the actual world is created. Nothing in this requires deterministic grounding—just the metaphysical possibility of libertarian agents and God’s perfect knowledge of what they would freely do in various circumstances.

So the real issue is this: Do future-tensed propositions and CCFs have truth values? If the answer is yes, then there is something for God to know. If the answer is no—if such propositions are neither true nor false—then one must deny the traditional understanding of omniscience held throughout the history of the Church, or redefine it to exclude entire classes of propositions. That may be a move Open Theists are willing to make, but Bible-believing Christians should think twice before affirming that God simply doesn’t know what free creatures would do—especially given the whole of Biblical data suggesting otherwise.

WM: //Tim shifted the target from Molinism-specific counterfactuals to a broader rejection of truthmaker maximalism. He implies that if truthmaker maximalism is false, well then the grounding objection collapses. But this is evasive because the grounding objection does not require maximalism. I repeat, the grounding objection does not require truthmaker maximalism—only a minimal form of metaphysical grounding for non-actual truths.//

TIM: But what exactly is this “minimal form of grounding” that Warren insists is required? He never tells us. If it doesn’t involve truthmaker maximalism—or at least some substantive account of what grounds non-actual truths—then what

does

it involve?

Molinists, by contrast, offer a coherent and theologically sound account: God, as ultimate reality, simply knows all true propositions—including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—because His omniscient mind encompasses all modal truths. That includes what free creatures would do in any non-deterministic possible scenario.

How does God know these truths? I don’t pretend to know how omniscience works any more than I know how God created the universe ex nihilo. But ignorance of the mechanism does not entail denial of the fact. To demand an explanatory mechanism behind God’s knowledge of true CCFs is to set an epistemic standard that undermines much of classical theism—including divine omnipotence and creation itself.

Bottom line: Just because we don’t know how God knows, doesn’t mean He doesn’t know. Molinism doesn’t collapse under the grounding objection—it exposes the objection’s assumptions as either unjustified or question-begging.

WM: //So the question remains: what makes these CCFs true—these counterfactuals of creaturely freedom?

Well, Tim's dismissal replaces an objection with a new question, but it avoids answering how counterfactuals concerning non-existent agents are truthbound. Without explaining that, the grounding objection still demands a coherent account.//

TIM: But again, the demand for a “coherent account” of how God knows CCFs presupposes that if we can’t explain the

mechanism

of divine omniscience, then the truths in question must be suspect. That’s an epistemically overreaching standard—and one that would undermine vast swaths of classical theism.

I don’t claim to know how God knows all counterfactuals of freedom. But I do affirm—along with many philosophers—that middle knowledge is not only the best explanation of the Biblical data, but it also provides the best model for how a maximally great, omniscient God can sovereignly govern a world of libertarian agents without causally determining them. That’s not evasion. It is simply explanatory power.

Scripture itself presupposes the truth of CCFs (e.g., 1 Samuel 23:6–14; Matthew 11:21–23), and if they are true, then a necessarily omniscient God knows them. Whether or not we can explain how God knows them is irrelevant to whether He does.

Bottom line: Not knowing how God knows something doesn’t entail that He doesn’t know it. The grounding objection doesn’t disprove Molinism—it just demands a kind of metaphysical transparency that no theistic model can fully provide without gutting divine omniscience.

But not a deal breaker!

WM: //By rejecting truthmaker maximalism, Tim doesn't clarify what notion of grounding he affirms instead. And this leaves Molinist claims either incoherent or question-begging. CCFs are truths, yet there is no account of their ontological basis.//

TIM: I reject

truthmaker maximalism

, but that doesn’t mean I reject

all

metaphysical grounding. I affirm that CCFs are simply known in the perfect, omniscient mind of God—ultimate reality itself. God knows all necessary, actual, and counterfactual truths precisely because His knowledge is not derived from the world; the world is derived from His knowledge. So yes, there is an ontological basis: God’s aseity and necessary omniscience. These truths correspond to the divine intellect, which is the source of all modal reality—not a created or contingent thing. To ask “what grounds God’s knowledge of CCFs?” is like asking “what grounds the grounding?” at the level of ultimate explanation.

Thus, Molinism avoids both incoherence and question-begging: it roots CCFs in God’s nature as a necessarily omniscient being whose knowledge reflects all that would be true in any possible world—including the free decisions of libertarian agents.

WM: //In my last video, I noted how some Molinists will try to ground these in the supposed essences of non-existent agents. And I pointed out how essences don't make free choices—persons do.//

TIM: If God knows the complete essence of Warren, then God knows how Warren—the actual person—would freely choose in any given set of circumstances.

Warren might object and say that God cannot know our essences before we exist or before our character is freely formed. But Scripture contradicts that assumption. Psalm 139 affirms that God knows our “unformed substance” (perhaps our essence) and that all the days ordained for us were written in His book before one of them came to be (Psalm 139:16). That necessarily includes the effects of libertarian free choices—our own and those of others.

Moreover, Isaiah 44–45 reveals that God knew Cyrus and what he would freely choose to do—actions influenced by countless other free decisions—over 150 years before Cyrus was even born. That’s God's knowledge about how a libertarian agent would freely choose before he even exists. That's knowledge of truth values of future-tensed propositions regarding libertarian agents and their free actions.

Now, Warren may not know how God knows such things. But not knowing how God knows something doesn’t entail that God doesn’t know it. By that logic, atheists could reject creation ex nihilo merely because they don’t know how it’s possible. But ignorance of mechanism is not a defeater of metaphysical truth.

So, if Warren denies that God possesses this kind of propositional foreknowledge, he’s not just rejecting Molinism—he’s rejecting the clear teaching of Scripture.

WM: //Dr. Alan Rhoda's critique remains on target here: CCFs either become ungrounded, meaning brute facts, or they collapse into determinism and natural knowledge.//

TIM: As demonstrated above, this critique misses the target altogether.

WM: Rejecting truthmaker maximalism doesn't answer the question—it only raises a new one. What makes CCFs true?//

TIM: Not so fast. If one rejects truthmaker maximalism—as one should—then it follows that

some propositions are true without requiring truthmakers

. Molinists simply point out that

counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs)

fall into that category.

So Warren’s question amounts to something like this:

“Assuming not all true propositions require truthmakers, what makes CCFs true?”

To which I reply:

“They’re precisely the kind of true propositions that don’t need truthmakers.”

At this point, if Warren repeats, “But what makes them true?”—he’s begging the question. He’s smuggling truthmaker maximalism back in the side door after we’ve already shown it’s unnecessary.

That’s simply a violation of the rules of reason. CCFs are often conditionally negative: they tell you what would not happen in alternative scenarios. If negative existentials don’t require concrete truth-makers, neither do conditionals that merely describe unrealized possibilities.

Bottom line: truth-maker maximalism is not a compulsory principle. As I explained in my book, many truths — such as negative existentials and modal truths — are uncontroversially accepted without truth-makers. Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom belong to this same category, since they are modal conditionals about what would happen under hypothetical circumstances. God’s perfect knowledge of possibilities, creaturely essences, and brute facts makes them knowable without actualization. Therefore, the Grounding Objection simply loses its force. It's more appropriate to refer to this as "the grounding question," because at the end of the day, although it's an interesting question . . . it does not succeed as an objection that defeats Molinism.

WM: If these truths about what you would do aren't grounded in God's will, and they aren't grounded in you—because you don't exist yet—well then where are they grounded? On what grounds? On solid grounds? On holy grounds?

TIM: If they require a ground, then they’re grounded in the perfect mind of God—

ultimate reality

itself. God’s omniscient knowledge doesn’t depend on our existence. He knows all true propositions, including what free creatures

would

do in any set of circumstances, by virtue of His nature as a maximally great being. These truths are not grounded “in” us, but

about

us, and they eternally reside in God’s mind—even if we never come to exist.

WM: Until Molinists spell that out coherently, the grounding objection stands, and no amount of dismissal will change that.

TIM: As I noted above, the so-called “grounding objection” certainly raises an interesting metaphysical question.

But it does not “stand” as a logical defeater of Molinism

—unless one assumes the highly controversial thesis of

truthmaker maximalism

: the idea that every truth must be grounded in some concrete entity or state of affairs. But why accept that assumption?

As I’ve explained, if truthmaker maximalism is false—as many philosophers rightly believe—then there’s no problem affirming that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) are simply true in the mind of God, even if they lack traditional “truthmakers.” God is ultimate reality, and His omniscient knowledge of all would-counterfactuals is perfectly sufficient to confer truth value—without causally determining those outcomes.

Moreover, this grounding issue is not unique to Molinism. As Jennifer L. Jensen has persuasively argued, Open Theism faces a parallel grounding problem. If Open Theists claim that God knows what libertarian agents would probably do in non-actual circumstances, what grounds those probabilities? If the person doesn’t yet exist—and hasn’t freely formed a character—then what ontological basis justifies saying they would likely do X instead of Y?

Unless Open Theists smuggle in something like a pre-existent essence, dispositional tendency, or divine causal input, their view becomes just as metaphysically opaque as the one they’re attempting to critique. So, if Warren thinks grounding issues refute Molinism, he’s unwittingly leveled the same challenge at Open Theism. That’s the textbook definition of a tu quoque.

Fortunately, as I’ve noted, there’s no need to embrace the extreme metaphysical thesis of truthmaker maximalism.

Bottom line (again): the grounding objection may be a worthwhile puzzle for metaphysicians, but it’s not a defeater of Molinism—and it certainly doesn’t give Open Theism a free pass.

Back to The Bible

WM: // But now let's turn to Scripture, because one of the boldest claims that Tim makes is that Open Theism is incompatible with biblical prophecy.

Then God couldn't make specific predictions and he appeals to examples like 1st Samuel 23 where God tells David what would happen if he stayed in Keilah and Matthew 11 where Jesus says if the miracles done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented. And Tim treats these as examples of middle knowledge—God revealing counterfactual truths about what free agents would do.//

TIM: False. I treat these as counterfactual knowledge. From there, I argue that if these propositions really are true, then God knows these truths from eternity past – “prior to the foundations of the world” – and thus, this would be middle knowledge. I reason toward middle knowledge, but I don’t assume, presuppose, or treat these passages as if they prove middle knowledge.

WM: //But there's a serious problem with this reading.

First, David is asking God whether Saul will come and whether the men of Keilah will hand him over. God says he will come and they will hand you over. But then David leaves, and none of this happens. Was David a false prophet? Did God lie? Was God wrong? No—none of this. And this makes sense under a dynamic omniscience view. God was warning David about what WOULD occur IF he stayed.

TIM:

EXACTLY!

Warren just made my point for me.

God didn’t say, “They will probably hand you over to Saul.” No—God revealed what would in fact happen if David remained in Keilah. That’s a textbook example of a counterfactual: If David stays, then Saul will come and the people will hand him over.

But David didn’t stay—he left. And because God had perfect knowledge of what free creatures would do in that alternate scenario, David’s life was spared. This wasn’t a guess. It wasn’t probabilistic. It was a true counterfactual grounded in God’s middle knowledge.

Ironically, Warren just illustrated why dynamic omniscience lacks explanatory power here. Open Theism can't account for the fact that God revealed what would happen—not just what might happen or what was likely. But on Molinism, it all makes perfect sense: God sovereignly governs and protects using His knowledge of what free agents would do in non-actual situations.

God saved David’s life by means of His counterfactual knowledge regarding libertarian agents.

WM: //The statement was conditional—a classic example of an open theistic view of the future, not Molinism.//

TIM: But that’s exactly what Molinism affirms!

Molinists don’t deny that God makes conditional statements—we just affirm that He knows the truth of those conditionals with perfect precision. In this case: If David stays, then the people of Keilah would hand him over to Saul. But David didn’t stay—so the conditional never obtains.

Open Theists might treat this as a lucky guess or a divine prediction based on current trajectories. But on Molinism, God isn’t guessing—He knows what free agents would do in any possible set of circumstances, including this one. That’s not “dynamic omniscience”—it’s counterfactual knowledge.

So Warren’s appeal to conditionality only confirms the Molinist model. The whole exchange with David fits Molinism like a glove.

WM: //God is speaking in terms of sowing and reaping, of a contingent future—not a settled one, and not eternally settled truth values.//

TIM: Not to beat a dead horse, but what exactly does Warren mean by “settled” here?

If by “settled” he simply means known by God but “not causally determined,” then the Molinist agrees—because Molinism affirms libertarian freedom. But if he means “not true” or “not knowable” prior to the creature’s choice, then he’s simply presupposing Open Theism without argument. That’s question-begging.

WM: //There is no world in which Saul comes down, overtakes the city of Keilah, and kills David. There's just this world.//

TIM: Let’s pause here. Warren just asserted that there is "

no possible world

" in which Saul kills David—that is, that means that it was metaphysically impossible. But if that’s true, why would God warn David about a scenario that

could not

possibly occur? Was God bluffing? Playing a mind game with David?

This is a problem for Open Theism, not Molinism.

Under Molinism, the meaning of God's warning is straightforward: “If you stay, they will hand you over.” That’s a counterfactual of creaturely freedom—true, contingent, and known to God. David exercises his libertarian freedom and flees. The antecedent condition fails, and the predicted consequence never occurs.

So ironically, Warren’s explanation undermines his own position. To make sense of the warning, you need true counterfactuals of what free creatures would do in hypothetical circumstances—just like Molinism affirms. God’s guidance in 1 Samuel 23 makes rational and theological sense on a Molinist model.

WM: //In fact, if the future were exhaustively settled, God would have to have said, "Don't worry, you're going to leave, and they won't hand you over." Or in another world, they would have handed you over—but not this one. But God didn’t, because the future was open at that moment. And God, like the potter at his wheel, was busy working with his clay.//

TIM:

This response hinges on an ambiguous use of the phrase

“exhaustively settled.”

If Warren means “causally determined,” then he’s critiquing Calvinism—not Molinism. But if he means “known in God’s mind,” then he’s simply assuming Open Theism and ruling out middle knowledge without argument.

Molinists affirm that the future is contingent and not causally determined. And yet, God can still know true conditionals about what would happen if someone were to act in a particular way. In this case, God wasn’t giving a prophecy about what will happen, but a conditional warning: “If David stays, they will hand him over.” That’s a counterfactual of creaturely freedom—fully compatible with libertarianism and middle knowledge.

So ironically, far from disproving Molinism, this passage exemplifies it.

God isn’t “working with clay” in the sense of improvising with an unknown future. He’s sovereignly guiding events based on perfect knowledge of what free agents would freely do in any circumstance. That’s how He saved David’s life.

WM: //Now, consider the example of Matthew 11. Jesus says, "If the miracles done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented." And Tim reads this as counterfactual freedom known by God before the foundation of the world.//

TIM: Not quite, Warren.

What I observe is that Jesus uttered a counterfactual proposition—

“they would have repented”

—that is either true or its negation is true.

Unless Warren wants to say that Jesus was wrong or merely speculating, it follows that Jesus had knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs), which Open Theists deny is even possible.

Now, while I don’t necessarily “read” this passage as a formal statement of God’s middle knowledge, if God possesses true CCFs logically prior to the divine creative decree, then God has middle knowledge. That’s just what middle knowledge is. And either way, the Open Theist view is in conflict with the fact that Jesus affirms such counterfactuals as true.

Of course, some Molinists avoid reading Matthew 11 literally to sidestep theological concerns it might raise. After all, if Jesus is speaking literally and if repentance entails salvation, then it appears that God knowingly created a world in which the people of Tyre and Sidon were denied saving revelation—even though He knew they would have repented if given the chance.

However, I contend that repentance, while necessary, is not sufficient for salvation. Saving faith requires a persevering, freely chosen love relationship with God—a love that “never fails” (1 Cor. 13:8). On my view, God created the one feasible, freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated and all who are not transworld damned are eventually saved.

Thus, if Tyre and Sidon would have repented, yet are not saved in the actual world, we can reasonably infer that their repentance would not have endured. This repentance (a necessary condition for salvation) would have been superficial and short-lived—much like the seed that springs up quickly but withers because it lacks root (Matt. 13:20–21).

This allows us to take Jesus’s statement at face value while preserving God’s justice and His genuinely salvific love for all.

WM: // Where is this in the text? That's not what’s going on here. Jesus is using prophetic hyperbole—a rhetorical rebuke to show how hard-hearted his current audience is. He's not offering a metaphysical commentary on alternate timelines or something like the multiverse. We don’t build doctrine off of rhetorical flourishes or sci-fi tropes. We try to be good Bereans and understand what the author was intending to convey when they said and wrote what they said and wrote.//

TIM: I doubt good Bereans attack straw men rather than addressing the actual views of their interlocutors. While I love a good and imperfect analogy, no serious Molinist appeals to actual “alternate timelines” or a literal “multiverse.” To suggest otherwise is to either profoundly misunderstand the view or to misrepresent it for rhetorical effect.

Let’s be clear: two things can be true at once:

1. Yes, Jesus was rebuking the hardness of heart of his current audience.

2. But in doing so, He also affirmed a true counterfactual: “If the miracles done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented.”

This isn’t science fiction; it’s a theological assertion with real metaphysical implications. If that conditional statement is true—and there’s no reason in the text to think it’s not—then Jesus had knowledge of what free agents would have done in different circumstances. That’s precisely the kind of knowledge Molinists claim God has via middle knowledge.

So unless we want to say Jesus was speaking falsely, then we’re left with a powerful instance of counterfactual knowledge, right there in the text. No caricatures required.

WM: //This could easily be understood as Jesus revealing his knowledge of previously existing agents based in an intimate knowledge of their character. It’s like saying a loved one who passed away would have really enjoyed a particular event or experience. It’s a statement based on the intimate knowledge the speaker has of previously existing agents. If you said Grandma would have really enjoyed this last Christmas with all the family as all of the grandkids were together, no one would assume you were affirming an eternally settled truth value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.//

TIM: That analogy simply doesn’t work. Jesus isn’t commenting on what Tyre and Sidon

would have enjoyed

—He’s declaring what they

would have freely chosen to do

in morally significant circumstances. That’s an entirely different category. Saying “Grandma would have really enjoyed Christmas” is a non-moral, aesthetic prediction grounded in personal familiarity and shared memories.

But saying “They would have repented” is a counterfactual claim about a libertarian free choice with moral (and potentially salvific) consequences.

It’s not based on sentimental speculation—it’s either true or it’s false.

And if it’s true (as Jesus implies), then we have a textbook example of a true counterfactual of creaturely freedom—precisely the kind that Open Theism denies and Molinism affirms. So unless Warren wants to say Jesus was wrong or merely guessing, this passage undermines his case and supports mine.

WM: Everyone would just know what you were talking about. And yet when Jesus is speaking, the Molinists invest his words with extra metaphysical freight.//

TIM: If that’s the case, then Jesus was wrong and delivering a false message. I typically go after Calvinists for their “deity of deception” problem, but now Warren is flirting with the same idea.

WM: //Next, just consider that even Jesus uses the word “chance” in passages like Luke 10:31 where he says, “By chance a certain priest came down the road.” The Greek word here is sunkuria. It literally means “coincidence.” This is Jesus affirming contingency—genuine contingency is built into creation. It’s not a blueprint. It’s not deterministic. Not everything has been predestined, as Tim has asserted. It’s certainly not exhaustive, settled foreknowledge of all things.//

TIM: Hold on a minute!

This is actually a great example of how Molinism accounts for both providence and contingency.

Contrary to Warren’s caricature, Molinists affirm real contingency in creation. The Greek word

sunkuria

(

συγκυρία

) can indeed refer to “coincidence” or “chance”—but in ordinary, phenomenological language. Even today, we often say something happened “by chance” while still affirming God’s sovereignty behind the scenes.

Suppose, for example, I throw up a blind, full-court shot at the buzzer—and it goes in off the glass to win the state basketball championship. We’d rightly call that a “lucky shot.” But that doesn’t mean it was causally determined, nor does it mean it wasn’t foreknown or even predestined in a Molinist sense.

Molinism affirms that God chose to create this specific world out of all feasible worlds—one in which He knew, via middle knowledge the best feasible freedom-permitting eternal endgame. This world happened to include me making that severely improbable shot under those precise conditions. God didn’t causally determine it, but He did sovereignly allow and actualize it by choosing to create this world in which He knew this lucky shot would occur.

So yes, it was “lucky.” Yes, it was contingent. And yes, it was predestined—without being determined. That’s the power of middle knowledge: it allows us to preserve both divine sovereignty and genuine freedom (and even luck!) without collapsing into fatalism or randomness.

Two things can be true at once:

The game-winning basket was both predestined and lucky.

WM: //All of this points to a God who is responsive, relational, and active in time—not locked into an eternally settled script.//

TIM: I agree that God is responsive, relational, and active in time. But nothing in Molinism denies that! In fact, Molinism affirms God’s dynamic engagement with creation—including real interaction with human agents who possess libertarian freedom.

But the phrase “locked into an eternally settled script” is misleading and ill-defined. Molinists don’t think God is “locked” into anything. Rather, He sovereignly chooses which possible world to actualize based on His perfect knowledge—including His middle knowledge of what any free creature would do in any circumstance. That’s not a static script—it’s the most loving, wise, and strategically chosen plan among countless options.

God didn’t write a robotic screenplay. He created a world where real persons make real choices, and where His providence incorporates those choices without determining them. So if Warren wants to affirm a responsive, relational God—Molinism is not his enemy. It’s his best option.

WM: //If we examine the examples of biblical prophecy Tim provided in his article, we see number one, right at the top, a typological fulfillment between David’s betrayal in Psalm 41 and Jesus’s betrayal in John 13. Tim presents this as an example of fulfilled prophecy. But this is not a forward-looking prophecy—it’s retrospective typology.

Typology occurs when New Testament authors look backward and they identify Old Testament events that seem to parallel recent events. These are not predictive prophecies, but instead reflect theological parallels.

Now, I don’t want anyone to get the wrong idea here. Typology is an important biblical concept and one that certainly relates to the incarnation and work of Christ. But the manner in which Tim is treating typology is leading him to some erroneous conclusions. So it’s important that we address that here.//

TIM: Did God intend for these typologies to occur? I agree that typology is a crucial biblical category, and I never claimed that Psalm 41 is predictive prophecy in the strictest sense. But the deeper question remains:

Did God sovereignly

intend

for the typological connection between David’s betrayal and Jesus’s betrayal to exist?

If the answer is yes, then this typology reflects divine intentionality. And intentionality implies either that God determined the events (which I reject), or that He sovereignly chose to actualize a world in which these typological patterns freely emerged—precisely what Molinism affirms via middle knowledge.

If the answer is no, and God merely observed the typological parallel after the fact, then typology collapses into theological coincidence. But that strips typology of its doctrinal force. It reduces it to retroactive pattern recognition—a kind of spiritual Rorschach test. That’s hardly compelling.

Now, I’ve elsewhere affirmed that luck is compatible with Molinism in limited contexts (e.g., my buzzer-beater shot analogy). But even I wouldn’t say that Christological typology is just a streak of divine luck. At that point, it’s more akin to astrology than to Christian theology.

So invoking the category of “typology” doesn’t defuse my argument—it demands it. Typology only has theological weight if God intended it. And Molinism uniquely allows for divine intentionality without collapsing into determinism. That’s the key insight here.

WM: //Often Scripture will speak of these as being fulfilled or magnified to a greater extent as the pattern repeats itself.//

TIM: If these scriptural patterns are “magnified” as they repeat, the key theological question is:

why

and

how

do they repeat? Are they merely coincidences arising in a non-deterministic world? If so, then what exactly is being magnified—chance? Or do these repetitions reflect divine providence? If so, then either:

• God determines these events (in which case human freedom is illusory), or

• God predestines them through His middle knowledge—so that free choices and sovereign design harmonize without determinism.

Only the latter preserves both divine sovereignty and human libertarian freedom. In that light, Molinism offers the most coherent and theologically satisfying account of why such patterns matter: they aren’t arbitrary, nor are they the result of exhaustive determinism—they are the result of wise, intentional, sovereign orchestration of genuinely free agents.

WM: //David B. Capes notes that typology is a strategy for discerning the correspondence, pattern, shape, or structural affinity between two God-acts where Old Testament events serve as models for later corresponding acts.//

TIM: Exactly—thank you! Capes is pointing to

two distinct acts of God

that correspond typologically. The crucial question then becomes: Did God merely

observe

these events and notice a pattern? Or did He

intend

the pattern? If God

determined

both events to secure the typological correspondence, then we’re staring straight at Calvinism—which Warren explicitly rejects.

But if God sovereignly orchestrated both events in a way that preserved human freedom—choosing to create a world in which they would freely occur with the intended theological resonance—then we’ve arrived at Molinism.

This is the whole point: Molinism allows us to say that typological fulfillments are part of God’s providential design without collapsing into determinism. It preserves both divine intentionality and human libertarian freedom.

WM: //Now, Trevor Lawrence, in an article on Logos.com, stated:

“Typology refers to the divinely intended historical relationship of correspondence and intensification between earlier and later events, persons, or institutions. A type is the earlier entity which establishes or contributes to a pattern that prefigures, foreshadows, or anticipates a subsequent antitype.”//

TIM: Notice Lawrence’s definition: typology involves a

divinely intended historical relationship

where earlier events

foreshadow

later ones. But here’s the question: If God intends for one event to foreshadow another, how can He ensure the future event actually occurs—without determining it?

If these “antitypes” happen by mere accident, then God’s intent is left to chance. But if God determines them, then we’ve surrendered human freedom. That’s the dilemma.

Molinism offers the only viable solution: God, through His middle knowledge, sovereignly chooses a world in which these typological patterns freely unfold just as He intends—guaranteeing fulfillment without sacrificing libertarian freedom.

Middle knowledge is the only way.

WM: //From within Tim's own stated reformed tradition. Now, it can be said that typology in a general sense involves a prophetic element because types are God-led anticipations of future antitypes. But this differs from predictive prophecy which involves explicit verbal declarations, as typology functions more indirectly by establishing patterned expectations that are fulfilled and exceeded in a subsequent antitype.//

TIM: As an aside: I'm glad that Warren recognizes that I do practice Reformed Theology, but reject Calvinism. There's nothing incoherent with that position. Here's what matters: whether typology is more “indirect” than verbal prophecy is beside the point. The issue is divine intentionality.

Typologies, by definition, are patterns that God

intends

to foreshadow future events for theological purposes.

But how can God

intend

a past event to prefigure a free future choice unless He knows how libertarian agents will act?

Without middle knowledge, you’re left with guesswork or luck. And without exhaustive determinism (which Warren rejects), you can’t guarantee the fulfillment. That puts the Open Theist in a prophetic bind—one that gets even tighter with typology.

In short, without middle knowledge, typology becomes theological roulette. So now we’ve got a trifecta of trouble for Open Theism: predictions, prophecies, and typologies—all of which cry out for God’s sovereign foreknowledge grounded in future-tensed truths.

WM: //These typological foreshadowings are theological interpretations after the fact, not forward-pointing prophecies.//

TIM: Wait a second: while that’s true about humans, there is no theological significance to be gained if these are all random and lucky similarities. No, the author is clear that this is supposed to be attention-getting – highlighting the fact that Jesus is the messiah . . . not that he is lucky.

WM:  There's nothing in the type declaring the specifics regarding the coming antitype. So for example, Judas's betrayal of Christ certainly parallels the betrayal of David by his close friend. And we view this as a messianic typology. But note there is nothing in the original account identifying this as prophetic. Nothing naming Judas or saying the Messiah must be betrayed in the exact same fashion.

Typology is by its very nature interpretive, not revelatory. It’s not God declaring something. It’s us going, "Oh, look, there seems to have been a pattern here. Oh, look, this thing that occurred previously has now been done to a greater extent." It’s something that’s identified after the fact. It doesn’t function as prophecy about Judas. It illustrates a theological pattern. So citing Psalm 41 as a fulfilled prophecy doesn’t support Tim’s claim that open theism undermines predictive prophecy, as Psalm 41 is not predictive prophecy.

Now I could just note that Tim’s very first example of prophecy here—he claims undoes open theism—significantly failed, and we could move on from there. But I want us to look at another example that Tim provides, because prophecy is a very difficult thing to understand, and a lot of people think that God is somehow reporting back on a settled future event that He sees or something that He’s eternally decreed and wasn’t free to do otherwise.

Now what Tim does is he points to Isaiah 53, noting that it occurs roughly 700 years before the crucifixion, which itself involved free human action. From this, Tim assumes that God could not prophesy of this unless all future truth values are eternally settled.//

TIM: False! That’s a swing and a miss. I never said anything about “eternally settled truths”—that’s not my language, nor is it necessary for my argument. I don’t even know what Warren means by that phrase, and I suspect he doesn't either.

What I did argue—and quite clearly—is that God cannot predict the free actions of creatures centuries in advance unless He knows the truth-values of future-tense propositions about those free actions. If Judas’s betrayal was genuinely free, yet still known and foreshadowed hundreds of years earlier (as Isaiah 53 and Psalm 41 both suggest), then God must possess knowledge of what free agents would do under specific circumstances.

So Warren has a choice:

1. Deny that God has such knowledge and collapse typology and prophecy into lucky guesses (which guts divine providence and Scripture’s authority), or

2. Deny that Judas acted freely and embrace divine determination (which makes God the author of evil).

Molinism avoids both extremes by affirming that God sovereignly chose a world in which human agents would freely fulfill His redemptive purposes—including betrayals, crucifixions, and resurrections—without causing or coercing any of it.

WM: //And remember, they must be eternally settled or Tim falls on the same criticism he levied. And he also arrives at atheism. “You’re sounding like an atheist.”//

TIM:

False!

That’s a category mistake, Warren.

He keeps repeating the phrase “eternally settled,” but unless he defines it to mean “causally determined,” then it simply doesn’t carry the force he thinks it does. And if he does mean “causally determined,” then welcome to Calvinism—something I know he rejects (and rightly so) and so do I.

The Molinist position avoids this dilemma. We affirm that truth-values of future-tense propositions can be known by God without being determined by God. In other words, propositions like “Judas will betray Jesus” can be true long before Judas is born, and God can know this via His middle knowledge—without removing Judas’s libertarian freedom. These truths are not “eternally settled” in a deterministic sense, but they are eternally known because God knows what any creature would freely do in any given circumstance.

That’s the whole point of Molinism: divine omniscience + libertarian freedom = sovereignty without determinism.

So no, I’m not “sounding like an atheist.” I’m sounding like someone who believes God knows what He’s doing without reducing humans to puppets.

WM: //But the open theist merely notes Tim’s point of reference is off—not by several hundred years, but by thousands. The first messianic prophecy is found in Genesis 3:15 and it is God’s response to man’s sin and rebellion. There God reveals the overall plan. The serpent brought death, and those agents in allegiance with the adversary are said to bruise the Messiah, but He will crush his head. God knew the nature of the enemy was to strike, and He to redeem mankind from death and suffer.//

TIM: Amen to all of that! What in the world is the Molinist supposed to disagree with here? Warren continues:

WM: //There is never any mention of Pontius Pilate or Judas, no specificity pointing to an eternally settled future event, but rather God laying out the plan and then setting to work bringing it to pass by way of his power and his wisdom, not because he was helpless to do otherwise and dependent on eternally settled future truth values.//

TIM: Once again, nothing here is problematic for the Molinist. In fact, it fits beautifully with the Molinist model. Molinism teaches that God lays out a plan and sovereignly brings it about through His wisdom and power—not because He’s “helpless” or constrained, but because He

freely chooses

to actualize a world in which the choices of libertarian human agents will align with His future endgame.

And let’s clarify: the idea that something is “eternally settled” does not entail that it’s causally determined. That’s a false equivalence. On Molinism, God knows the truth-values of future-tensed propositions, but they are true in virtue of what free creatures would do—not because God causally determines them.

Thus, God's knowledge is maximal, but it doesn't collapse into determinism.

WM: //But here an objection may be raised: “Warren, what about Acts 4?” It says there, “For truly in this city there were gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, along with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, to do whatever your hand and purpose predestined to occur.”

Doesn’t this prove that the crucifixion was an eternally fated event? 

No.//

TIM: I actually agree with Warren here—Acts 4 does

not

prove that the crucifixion was “eternally fated” (whatever that means) in the sense of being

causally determined

from eternity past. But it clearly affirms that God

predestined

the crucifixion. And the question then becomes:

How

did God predestine it?

This is where Molinism provides a theologically rich and philosophically coherent answer. God didn’t predestine the crucifixion by determining the sinful actions of Herod, Pilate, or the mob. Rather, through His middle knowledge, He knew exactly what these agents would freely do in specific circumstances—and sovereignly chose to actualize a world in which their freely chosen rebellion would be used to bring about redemption (Acts 2:23).

So yes, the crucifixion was predestined. But it wasn’t “fated” in a deterministic sense. It was the result of divine wisdom operating through foreknown free decisions. This preserves both God's sovereignty and human responsibility—unlike exhaustive divine determinism (EDD), which turns all sin into divine causation, and unlike Open Theism, which renders divine predestination impossible.

WM: //Again, this is referring back to God’s stated plan given in response to man’s sin. This is a reference back to Genesis 3:15—that being to subject himself to suffer at the hands of the enemy for his image bearers. It’s not arguing in favor of meticulous determinism or eternally settled and necessary future truth values, but rather it’s noting that God was good and faithful to his promise. The serpent struck, and our redeemer crushed his head.//

TIM: And yet again—we’re back at Molinism.

God predestined all of it without determining all of it. That’s the beauty of divine middle knowledge: God can sovereignly orchestrate the fulfillment of His promises—including Genesis 3:15—through the genuinely free choices of human agents. No coercion, no causal determination, and yet no guesswork or risk of failure.

But if Open Theism were true, how exactly could God predestine anything—let alone a specific time and place for the serpent to strike and the Redeemer to crush his head—without either determining it (which they deny) or gambling on uncertain outcomes (which undermines divine providence)? If they want to say God determines the timing and outcome of these events, then they’re just Calvinists with a different label. And if they reject determinism, they lose predestination altogether.

Either way, Molinism alone preserves all the biblical data: God's promises, human freedom, and meticulous providence—without turning God into the author of evil or reducing Him to a cosmic gambler.

WM: //We don’t trust God because he is fixed, settled, and eternally fated to accomplish some task. We trust God because of his consistent, holy character. And this is the very appeal that Jesus made in John 10. He didn’t appeal to some unchangeable counterfactual, some eternal decree, or even an exhaustively predetermined world. He said, “Believe the works so that you may know and understand that the Father is in me and I in the Father.” We trust God because he is good.

TIM:

First:

 I still have no idea what Warren means by terms like “fixed,” “settled,” and “eternally fated.” These phrases are never defined, and they seem to shift meaning depending on the point he's trying to make.

If by these terms Warren simply means that God knew what libertarian agents would freely choose in certain circumstances—such as the crucifixion—and chose to create a world in which those choices would actualize, then he’s not critiquing Molinism at all. He’s just describing it.

That’s the whole point of middle knowledge. God doesn’t determine their choices, but He knows them infallibly.

But if Warren means that God determines or necessitates all things by providing antecedent conditions sufficient to cause every event (including sin), then he’s accidentally critiquing Calvinism, not Molinism.

So which is it?

Either way, his objection misses the mark. Molinism alone preserves God’s goodness, human freedom, and divine sovereignty—without collapsing into Open Theism or Calvinism.

Second: God's "holy character" is exactly what's called into question via the multiple problems of evil. Since Open Theism cannot defend itself from these charges (unlike Molinism), the problems of evil provide an undercutting defeater to think that the creator has a holy character.

This is why the problems of evil must be taken seriously. I will discuss this in detail below.

WM: //What adherents of exhaustive divine predestination and exhaustive divine determinism fail to understand is that there is no indication in the Old Testament that Judas personally would betray Jesus. No indication that Pontius Pilate specifically would be involved. Only that Jesus would be betrayed, suffer, and die. The specifics were not clear until near the event itself.//

TIM: Warren’s objection seems to confuse what

we

can see clearly in hindsight with what

God

knew in eternity past. Yes, it’s true that the Old Testament doesn’t name Judas or Pontius Pilate explicitly—but that’s irrelevant to the philosophical issue at hand. The point is this: if these prophecies were truly

about

future free actions, then they still require knowledge of the truth-values of future-tensed propositions about libertarian agents. God either determined these individuals to act as they did (which undermines their moral responsibility), or He sovereignly orchestrated these events by knowing what they

would

freely do in any circumstance and choosing to create a world in which those actions would be actualized. That’s precisely what Molinism affirms.

If Warren wants to say these were just lucky typologies that foreshadow without foreknowledge, then what’s the reason for awe, wonder, and worship? But if they were divinely orchestrated, then the Open Theist is stuck. God either determines them (à la Calvinism), or knows them via middle knowledge (Molinism). There is no third option that preserves freedom, prophecy, and providence.

WM: //God, in his goodness and mercy, did not need Judas to betray him. Nor was God eternally bound by the truth value that Judas would betray him.//

TIM: No Molinists claims otherwise.

WM: //Neither the Molinist nor the Calvinist can escape the charge of fatalism when events like this are considered, as they believe Judas was damned prior to Judas’s existing, prior to God creating the world, as there was a CCF (counterfactual of creaturely freedom) constraining God’s creation of this world.//

TIM: I don’t know about “fatalism” (since Warren has never explained or defined the term). What I do know, is that the Calvinist cannot escape determinism, but the Molinist sure can.

WM: //It’s also important to note that an example of God determining something doesn’t prove God determined everything.//

TIM: Who says otherwise? Indeed, I’ve been clear in my work that God determines some things, but does not determine all things.

But if Warren is going to say that God determines some sins and some evil, then he is going to face huge problems and might as well just be a Calvinist.

WM: //Leo of Rome, an early Church Father, wrote:

“That which was foreknown in respect of the Jews’ malice is far different, indeed quite contrary to what was ordained in respect of Christ’s passion. Their desire to slay him did not proceed from the same source as his to die. Nor were their atrocious crime and the Redeemer's endurance the offspring of one's spirit. The Lord did not incite but permit those mad men's naughty hands. Nor in his foreknowledge of what must be accomplished did he compel its accomplishment, even though it was in order to its accomplishment that he had taken flesh."

And pay attention to what Leo wrote when he said that the Lord did not incite.

You see, under Molinism, God did incite them by intentionally placing them in the specific circumstances whereby he knew exactly how they would act, how they would respond.//

TIM: First, let’s clarify the source:

Leo of Rome is an important historical figure, but he’s not inspired Scripture.

Church Fathers sometimes offer valuable theological insights, but they’re not infallible—and they certainly don’t settle philosophical debates about providence, foreknowledge, and freedom.

Second, Leo rightly says that God “did not incite” those who crucified Jesus—and the Molinist wholeheartedly agrees! On Molinism, God doesn’t incite evil desires; He simply knows what free creatures would do in specific circumstances and sovereignly chooses to create a world in which His redemptive purposes are accomplished through their free choices.

Now, if Warren wants to redefine “incite” as merely “knowing how someone would freely act in a given situation and choosing to actualize that world,” then he’s stretching the term far beyond its typical usage. By that strange standard, even Doctor Strange “incited” Gamora to land two vicious knee strikes below the belt on Peter Quill in Avengers: Infinity War and Endgame. But that’s obviously not what we mean by “incite.”

Here's the point: knowing how someone would freely act is not the same as causally inciting or compelling their behavior. That’s precisely the distinction Molinism preserves and that both Calvinism and Open Theism struggle to account for.

The Problem of Evil vs. Open Theism

WM: //Tim argues that Molinism solves the problem of evil while open theism fails. But does this claim really hold up under scrutiny? I'll let you in on a secret. No. No, it doesn't.

Tim suggests that by having middle knowledge, God can ensure the greatest possible balance of good over evil. He argues that God actualizes a world in which free creatures do what they would freely do. And this world contains the sort of optimal ratio of moral goods versus moral evils.

But here's the problem. If God knew all of the evil that would happen in exhaustive detail and he chose to actualize it anyway, then God becomes morally culpable. He's responsible for every atrocity that follows.//

TIM: The charge that Molinism makes God morally culpable for evil misunderstands both the structure of Molinist providence and the nature of culpability itself.

Let’s start with the concept of mens rea—a “guilty mind.” This legal category does not apply to a perfectly omnibenevolent being who, with exhaustive foreknowledge of what creatures would freely do in any given circumstance, sovereignly chooses to actualize the one feasible, freedom-permitting world in which (1) evil is ultimately defeated, and (2) all who are not transworld damned are saved.

Warren’s use of the word “responsible” does a lot of philosophical heavy lifting without doing the necessary clarifying work. Is God “responsible” in the sense that He created the actual world? Of course. That’s not unique to Molinism. All classical theists—including Open Theists—must affirm that God created a world in which evil is possible (and actual). I have explained why God did this in my book: because the same power that allows humans to love and infer theological knowledge (libertarian freedom) is the same power that -- when used backward -- allows humans to do evil.

What differentiates Molinism is that it preserves libertarian freedom, which allows for moral and rational responsibility without divine determinism.

So let’s ask the real question: Is God morally culpable for the evil actions of libertarian agents who could have done otherwise? No. Moral responsibility attaches to the one who is the source of the action and who had the power to refrain. That’s not God—that’s the agent.

To put this in perspective: under Molinism, God actualizes a world in which He knows how free creatures would choose—not a world in which He causally determines their choices. This is not the same as divine determinism, where God ordains every action by necessity. The difference is crucial. In Molinism, evil is permitted through creaturely freedom for the sake of a greater, morally sufficient end—namely, the ultimate triumph of good and the salvation of the greatest number of people.

To borrow from pop culture once again: Doctor Strange knew of millions of possible outcomes and chose the one where evil was defeated and the heroes who were killed off in Infinity War ultimately rose again in Endgame. He knowingly allowed evil to occur for a finite time because he knew the future outcome was worth it. And no one accused Doctor Strange of having a “guilty mind.” Likewise, if Doctor Strange was a hero for actualizing the endgame, how much more so is a perfectly good and omniscient God who does the same—but on a cosmic and eternal scale?

Warren’s objection, then, fails on both philosophical and theological grounds. The Molinist God is not morally culpable for evil; rather, He is the architect of the ultimate good, who permits evil only as a temporary means to a supremely good and eternal end. The concept of mens rea does not apply.

WM: //To be clear, no view makes evil just go away. But for Molinism, Calvinism, and even simple foreknowledge, those views make God complicit in actualizing every instance of evil.

TIM: False.

Molinism does not have this problem of evil

(see my published academic work), but Calvinism and Open Theism have huge problems of evil. I’ll explain below.

WM: While open theism holds that God did not decree evil, let alone actualize all evil with specificity, it does hold that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. And this is often difficult for people to understand, both Christians and non-Christians alike. But it is the view that emerges doing the least amount of harm to God’s self-revelation in Scripture and in the person and work of Christ.

TIM:

The Problem of evil for Open Theists is devastating.

As I have explained in a recent article and on YouTube: Many are drawn to Open Theism because they believe it helps solve the problem of evil. The reasoning goes like this: if God doesn’t foreknow the future choices of free creatures, then He can’t be blamed for the evils they commit. The Holocaust, school shootings, child abuse, war crimes, and atrocities—all of these horrors caught God off guard. But He’s doing His best. At least, they say, He didn’t plan them. At first glance, this seems like a morally appealing solution. It paints God as a loving but limited Father who suffers with us and wishes He could have stopped the crash. He didn’t cause the pain; He simply couldn’t foresee it. That picture definitely tugs at the heartstrings—but I believe that it collapses under scrutiny. I understand the emotional pull. The idea of a God who suffers with us, who responds in real time, who is never the author of evil—that’s deeply comforting. But comfort isn’t the same as truth and “facts don’t care about our feelings.” When we trade truth for sentiment, we lose both. The more you probe the implications, the more disturbing the picture becomes. This isn’t the maximally great God revealed in Scripture. It isn’t even theism in any traditional sense. The god of Open Theism might be well-intentioned, but this view also implies that he’s shockingly inept, tragically naive, and utterly unworthy of worship. Ironically, the Open Theist’s attempt to save Christian theism from moral collapse ends up affirming the core claim of atheism: that a maximally great being does not exist. Let’s take a closer look.

The God Who Didn’t See Auschwitz Coming

According to Open Theism, God did not know Adolf Hitler would freely choose to enact “the Final Solution.” Thus, he also didn’t know that six million Jews would be slaughtered as a result of Hitler’s free and evil choices in concentration camps. This deity simply could not foresee the gas chambers, the crematoriums, or the death marches. Sure, He knew it was a possibility (however unlikely), or perhaps He even suspected that it might happen. Surely He hoped for the best. But ultimately, He was surprised. Now imagine this deity witnessing the first million people brutally murdered. Then another million. And then another. If He doesn’t intervene, either He couldn’t or He wouldn’t. And neither option is compatible with the traditional understanding of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. If He knew and allowed it, He is morally monstrous (unless, that is, He knew that specific future goods would certainly follow from these free and evil actions—but Open Theism denies Him this kind of justified true belief about the future). If He didn’t know the horrendous evils taking place over relatively long periods of time, He is incompetent. Either way, He is not worthy of worship.

A Deadly Double Standard for Prophecy

Deuteronomy 18:20–22 lays out God’s standard which I referred to above: if a prophet speaks a word in God’s name that does not come true, that prophet must die. The test of true prophecy is 100% accuracy. But if Open Theism is true, then God Himself can get predictions wrong. And a prophet could be executed for trusting a God who doesn’t even know these future events with certainty. That’s not just absurd, it’s unbiblical and morally abhorrent. It’s a hypocritical god (note the “little g”) holding humans to a standard that he can’t keep. This is not the maximally great being revealed in Scripture.

The Bigger Problem of Evil

Let’s return to the core motivation. Why are Open Theists so passionate? For many, it seems to be because they believe their view solves the problem of evil. They think it exonerates God by limiting His knowledge. But in reality, it makes the problem so much worse. If God doesn’t know specific future evil is coming, then he allows suffering with no redeeming and guaranteed plan. He permits horrors with no providential purpose. Evil becomes gratuitous, not instrumental—and something that He could prevent but chooses not to. By contrast, Molinism holds that a maximally great being (God) permits evil only if He knows that it will ultimately contribute to the greatest feasible freedom-permitting eternal future. Evil is still evil. But it isn’t pointless (Genesis 50:20; 1 Corinthians 4:17).

The Problem of Natural Evil

Open Theism also stumbles badly on the problem of natural evil—events like earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, and, most recently, the horrific flash flood in Texas this summer that killed so many young girls at camp. As a Molinist, I can be sickened, horrified, and heartbroken when I see such tragedies unfold, yet also comforted knowing that the God of middle knowledge sovereignly created the best feasible freedom-permitting world—one where evil is ultimately defeated, and every soul not transworld-damned is saved. God knew that allowing this tragedy was necessary for greater future and eternal goods that justify it, even though those future goods might be presently hidden from us (2 Corinthians 4:17).

But what about the god of Open Theism?

The Open Theist asserts that God cannot know the future free choices of libertarian agents—but they also affirm that He does know the deterministic events of the natural world. Surely this god knew, well in advance, that a deadly flood was going to strike Texas on July 4, 2025. He also knew that these parents were planning days in advance to send their daughters to that camp on that exact night. Yet, this god—who supposedly values human flourishing—did nothing to stop their plans from moving forward. This deity could have warned the parents through a weatherman, prompted sickness to keep the girls home, or otherwise intervened in multitudes of ways to protect them. Since Open Theism denies that God has access to future eternal goods resulting from the tragedy, the only benevolent course of action would have been to prevent the girls from getting to the camp. And yet this god failed to do so. This is not the God of Scripture. It is not a being worthy of worship. The maximally great God of Molinism, however, remains trustworthy—even in the face of unimaginable pain—because He alone knows how all things work together for the future good of free agents who love Him (Romans 8:28).

The Problem of Divine Hiddenness

Open Theism also fares poorly when it comes to the problem of divine hiddenness. John Schellenberg and others have argued that the existence of non-resistant non-believers is strong evidence against theism. But here Molinism shines! In Chapter 16 of my book Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism (and in my co-authored academic article with Jacobus Erasmus), I explained why God, knowing the future eternal goods that are guaranteed to result from allowing a person to remain in non-resistant non-belief for a time, is justified in delaying His self-revelation. But the god of Open Theism doesn’t have that kind of knowledge. If God doesn’t know how the story of libertarian agents ends, He can’t weigh future goods against their present disbelief. Therefore, if He truly is loving and good, He would immediately reveal Himself to every sincere seeker the moment they become open to Him. We know from experience, and even Schellenberg’s own arguments, that non-resistant non-believers exist. I’m confident that I know some of these folks personally. But on Open Theism, their existence is inexplicable. So we can formulate the problem like this:

1. If Open Theism is true, there would never be non-resistant non-believers.

2. Non-resistant non-believers exist.

3. Therefore, Open Theism is false.

Once again, Molinism explains what Open Theism cannot: why God justifiably remains hidden—for now—because He knows the future good of each soul who would freely love Him into the eternal future.

Enter Molinism: A Better Way

Molinism affirms that God possesses middle knowledge: He knows what any free creature would do in any possible set of circumstances possible for Him to create. This allows God to sovereignly order history without micromanaging or causally determining human choices.<6>

God isn’t surprised. He doesn’t guess. He doesn’t override freedom. He simply knows. This means:

• God is omniscient (He knows all truths, including CCFs).

• Humans are libertarianly free and responsible agents.

• Evil is permitted only if it contributes to future and eternal goods.

• Prophecy of the future is trustworthy and precise.

• God is maximally great and morally perfect.

Conclusion: When Open Theism Collapses into Atheism

I don’t doubt that many Open Theists are sincere Christians who love Jesus and affirm the gospel. Let me be clear: Open Theists are my brothers and sisters in Christ and they are saved! But the God they describe, although they don’t seem to realize it, is so diminished in power, knowledge, and goodness that he no longer qualifies as God in any meaningful or biblical sense

. Open Theism, to its credit, attempts to protect God’s goodness by limiting His greatness and rejecting his maximal greatness. But the result is a god who is surprised by evil, powerless to stop it (or chooses not to), just watches horrendous evils occur, and unable to guarantee redemption through it. That’s not just bad theology. At its logical end, Open Theism collapses into functional atheism. If such a limited deity exists, he may be supernatural—but he is not God in any meaningful or biblical sense. He is far from perfect. He is not worthy of worship. To affirm Open Theism is to deny the existence of a maximally great God. And once you’ve done that, atheism—the affirmation that a maximally great being does not exist—is the only logical conclusion. Let that sink in: if Open Theism is true, then so is atheism. What’s the advantage of becoming an Open Theist? I don’t see it. Molinism, by contrast, preserves God’s sovereignty, omniscience, omnipotence, omni-benevolence, and moral perfection while affirming the genuine and libertarian freedom of  humanity. It offers the best answer for Christian theists when faced with the problem of evil posed by atheists. Because the God of middle knowledge did know that evil was coming. And He knew exactly how to redeem it. If you’ve embraced Open Theism out of a desire to honor God’s goodness, I get it—I really do. But I invite you to take a closer look. The God of Molinism doesn’t just permit evil; He redeems it. Like a jiujitsu master, God uses the momentum of evil against itself through His perfect knowledge.

In Summary: Why Open Theism Fails

In the end, Open Theism collapses under scrutiny because it portrays a god who is anything but maximally great and worthy of worship. Specifically, Open Theism makes God: 

a moral monster

, standing by while ongoing atrocities like the Holocaust and sexual abuse of children unfold—even long after it’s obvious what’s happening—with no guarantee that such horrors will contribute to any future greater goods; 

culpable for evil

, since He must either causally determine sinful acts to fulfill prophecy (or else gamble on absurdly lucky guesses to get them right); 

hypocritical

, holding human prophets to a standard of perfect predictive accuracy—even executing them for mistakes—while He Himself can be mistaken about the future; 

tragically reckless

, allowing people to walk into predictable, deterministic disasters (like floods and hurricanes) without so much as a warning, despite knowing full well they’re coming; 

inconsistent and short-sighted

, withholding His self-revelation from non-resistant seekers at crucial moments, even though He lacks knowledge of how their future choices will ultimately unfold; and

ultimately, impotent to redeem

, permitting evils that risk being entirely gratuitous—suffering with no ultimate purpose or guarantee of redemption. By contrast, Molinism vindicates God’s sovereignty, omniscience, moral perfection, and redemptive power—while preserving genuine human freedom. The God of Molinism not only permits evil, He masterfully redeems it, ensuring that all things work together for the good of those who love Him. Indeed, the God of Molinism is Holy, perfect, and worthy of worship!

WM: //For Molinism, there wasn't a world where evil didn't exist.//

TIM: False again.

God could have refrained from creation – thus, the possible world where God never creates never produces evil.

Moreover, a possible world exists where God determines all things (call this Calvinist world), but in this world, because God determines all things, humans do not experience true love, nor are they morally responsible, nor are they rational agents able to infer truth about metaphysical and theological reality (see my work on the Deity of Deception). Moreover, a possible world exists in where God creates the universe of stars and planets but no life. Thus, no evil.

WM: //And instead of choosing not to create, God instead orchestrated specific evils to ensure a maximally good outcome.

TIM: No more than Doctor Strange did in

Avengers: Infinity War

and

Endgame

.

Strange was not micromanaging or “orchestrating” all specific evils.

Based upon his knowledge of the endgame, all Doctor Strange did was hand Thanos the timestone. Based upon God’s knowledge of the endgame, all He did was said, “Let there be . . .” No orchestrating multitudes of specific events. No micromanaging involved.

WM: //But he is still complicit in selecting each instance of evil by placing creatures in the exact circumstances whereby they would commit the evil he knew they would commit. And again, for open theists, God knew rebellion was possible, but it wasn't fated or necessary. And his desire to create true image bearers capable of freedom and love and genuine relationship was worth the risk. Then once they rebelled, God went to work redeeming his creation.//

TIM: Do some Molinists hold this view? Yep. Do I? Nope. Since Warren’s video was supposed to be a critique of Tim Stratton’s material, it would be nice if he would critique my work on the topic. Anyone who follows my work knows my view: God does not “place creatures in exact circumstances so that evil will occur.” No, God simply selects this world based upon His knowledge of the future endgame (which Open Theists do not have access to). All the evils that happen to occur in this world come along for the ride because all the ripple effects they cause ultimately lead to the best endgame – a world in which God knows that evil will ultimately be defeated and everyone who is not transworld damned is saved. Doctor Strange basically did the same thing, and everyone rightly sees him as a hero worthy of praise.

But when God does the same thing, according to Open Theists, he’s now guilty of evil.

Absurd.

WM: //But yes, evil presents a problem for every view—for everyone—even actual atheists who explicitly deny the existence of God. It's a problem everyone has to face.//

TIM: True—evil is a problem for all worldviews. But it’s

not

an unsolvable problem for the Molinist.

In fact, as I’ve argued extensively in both academic and popular works, Molinism offers the most robust explanation for why a good God would allow evil: because God knows, via His middle knowledge, how every free creature would act in any circumstance, and He actualizes the one feasible world where libertarian freedom is preserved, evil is ultimately defeated, and the greatest feasible eternal good is achieved—including the salvation of all who are not transworld damned.

By contrast, Open Theism suffers profoundly here. It lacks the explanatory resources of middle knowledge, and therefore lacks any rational basis for trusting that God knew this world would ultimately yield the best eternal outcome. That’s a theological and philosophical liability.

So yes, evil presents an unsolvable problem for atheism, Calvinism, and Open Theism. But not for the Molinist who understands the full picture—from God’s eternal vantage point.

WM: //So who really has the better theodicy here? Molinism, where God actualized a world, predestining every rape, genocide, and suffering because it was the best feasible world? Or open theism, where God created a world of real freedom and continually works to confront and overcome evil—not ordain and predestine every evil event?//

TIM:

Molinism—without question.

Why? Because Molinism affirms that God, via His middle knowledge, chose to actualize the one feasible world in which He knew that evil would ultimately be extinguished into the eternal future, where every atrocity would be redeemed, and where all who are not transworld damned would ultimately be saved. In short, God knows that this world, filled with finite evils, ends in the greatest eternal good.

On this view, even horrific acts—freely committed by libertarian agents—are not meaningless. God knew how ultimately every ripple of evil would eventually bring about eternal triumph. As Genesis 50:20 reminds us, “You meant it for evil, but God meant it for good.”

But what does Open Theism offer?

A God who didn’t see evil coming.

A God who watches rape and genocide slowly unfold and—once it becomes tragically clear what’s happening—does nothing to stop it.

And worse still: a God who stands and watches “with folded arms” (to quote Christopher Hitchens) as he permits these horrors with no knowledge that any long-term future good is guaranteed to result from them. That’s not sovereignty. That’s divine helplessness. Or worse, indifference. Either way, it’s not a God worthy of worship.

Summary and Collegial Appeal

In sum, Warren McGrew's case against Mere Molinism misfires on several fronts. Among them are the following:

• Misrepresentation of the position — conflating Mere Molinism with exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) and overlooking its explicit affirmation and logical entailment of human libertarian freedom.

• Grounding Objection Misfire — Focus on the two-pronged Molinist reply: (1) CCFs may not require grounding at all (analogous to negative and modal truths), and (2) if grounding is required, they can be grounded in ultimate reality—God’s eternal, necessary, and omniscient mind—without invoking a Platonic realm or preexistent creation.

• Truthmaker Maximalism Overreach — Focus on the meta-level problem: TM is a controversial thesis many philosophers reject; Warren treats it as if it’s an uncontested axiom; and even if TM were true, it wouldn’t necessarily apply to CCFs because they function more like modal truths than empirical truths.

• Neglected key distinctions — such as the difference between explanation and causation, and between fixing an outcome in advance and determining it. Moreover, Warren repeatedly uses a plethora of terms like “fixed” and “settled” without definition. These can sound ominous, but until they are clearly defined, they function more as rhetorical fog than philosophical force.

• Open Theism’s Incomplete Biblical Alignment — Like Calvinism, Open Theism can account for some strands of biblical data, and in that limited sense one could call it “biblical.” But neither view can do justice to all of the relevant biblical teaching. That makes them both, in the fuller sense, unbiblical. Mere Molinism, by contrast, offers a framework that can integrate all of Scripture’s testimony—God’s exhaustive foreknowledge (including knowledge of the truth values of future-tensed propositions regarding libertarian agents found in God's Word), providence, and sovereignty—while preserving genuine human freedom.

• Open Theism’s theodicy problem — While Open Theism seeks to solve the problem of evil by limiting divine foreknowledge, it creates its own set of devastating challenges, including weakening confidence in God’s providential governance, undercutting His ability to guarantee ultimate victory over evil, failing to account for certain prophetic and biblical claims about God’s exhaustive knowledge of the future, and failing to avoid the deductive conclusions of the Hiddenness Argument.

Bottom line: Only one of these views truly secures God’s maximal greatness, preserves genuine human responsibility, and offers a theodicy worth believing. That’s why I’m a Mere Molinist.

Warren and I remain committed to our friendship, united in our rejection of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) and our shared conviction that Scripture teaches a robust, biblical view of human freedom. That common ground matters far more than our intramural disagreement here. My aim is not to “win” at Warren’s expense, but to sharpen the case for libertarian freedom and God’s maximal greatness—whatever model turns out to be true in the end.

In that spirit, I’ve been clear: if Molinism were somehow shown false, my fallback would be a nuanced form of Open Theism, which—though I believe it has significant problems—is still preferable to Calvinism’s theological determinism. I’d encourage Warren to take the same posture in reverse: in light of the philosophical and theological challenges I’ve raised here, even if Dynamic Omniscience / Open Theism remains his preferred view, he could hold Mere Molinism as a reasonable fallback should he finally become convinced that Open Theism proves untenable.

Our friendship and shared mission against EDD are not at stake here. Iron sharpens iron, and I count it a privilege to sharpen—and be sharpened by—my friend Warren, even in spirited disagreement. I’m sure I speak for Warren when I say that we both hope all of you are sharpened by our conversation.

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton