More Questions About Divine Hiddenness

Question

Tim, thank you for the clarification

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. I want to register a worry I have about the first example given in your paper. Admittedly, you note that the second example is more persuasive than the first but maintain that both are sufficient to show that Schellenberg's argument cannot survive molinism. I want to specifically challenge that second claim. Consider the following two CCFs which I understand to be essential components of your first example: (A) "If S comes to believe in God, S will rebel against God" and (B) "If S comes to rebel against God, this will damage the faith of others" If we imagine a situation in which S has come to believe in God (from the first moment at which they are capable of relating personally to God) and as a result comes to rebel against God, we can disambiguate between at least two different versions of what it is for S to rebel against God. It could be that for S to rebel against God is for S to resistantly self-deceive themselves about God's existence thereby becoming a resistant nonbeliever in the Schellenbergian sense. But a weaker claim is also available. It could be that for S to rebel against God is for S to grow angry with God while still believing that God exists. I think there is a potential problem with the first version of what it means for S to rebel against God. If God exists and has provided causally sufficient reasons for each of his nonresistant loved ones to believe - as the hiddenness argument claims - then no person's theistic belief could be undone by anything other than their own resistance. Not even the most public rebellion of S could change that. So long as they remain nonresistant, God will not allow them to fall into nonbelief as that would entail God's being closed off from relationship with his loved ones which is inconsistent with love. Rather, God would lovingly adjust either their public or private evidence in order that they maintain belief. To claim that it is possible that S's rebellion could have such a result would be to already assume the hiddenness argument is unsound. The problem I'm highlighting is that, even if we grant for the sake of argument that (A) above is true, (B) could not be. But then their conjunction must also be false. Am I right then to assume that you and your coauthor intend the second version of what it means for S to rebel against God? If that's the case, I'd want to register a different worry - namely that Schellenberg's accommodationist strategy has not been sufficiently considered. - Justin

Dr. Jacobus Erasmus's Response

Although your question was addressed to my coauthor, please allow me to respond. First let me address this phrase: "The problem I'm highlighting is that, even if we grant for the sake of argument that (A) above is true, (B) could not be. But then their conjunction must also be false." It's unclear what is meant by "their conjunction must also be false". You seems to be saying this: ◇(A ∧ ¬B) ⊨ ¬(A ∧ B) But, logically, this is false. For any two wffs p and q, ⌜◇(p ∧ ¬q)⌝ does not logically entail ⌜¬(p ∧ q)⌝. In other words, it is possible that both A and B are true, and that is the scenario of our focus. You then say, "If we imagine a situation in which S has come to believe in God (from the first moment at which they are capable of relating personally to God) and as a result comes to rebel against God ..." This mischaracterizes our scenario. We don't claim that S comes to rebel against God as a result of S's coming to believe in God (as if belief in God causes the rebellion); there could be various reasons why S rebels against God after having come to believe in God, such as finding new "evidence" against God, or having a heart change because God doesn't solve all of S's life issues.

Side note from Stratton:

You continued, "... we can disambiguate between at least two different versions of what it is for S to rebel against God. It could be that for S to rebel against God is for S to resistantly self-deceive themselves about God's existence thereby becoming a resistant nonbeliever in the Schellenbergian sense. But a weaker claim is also available. It could be that for S to rebel against God is for S to grow angry with God while still believing that God exists." In all of these scenarios, person S can damage (as we have previously described) the faith of other believers. Perhaps it's better to distinguish between

 and 

: 1. A believer p intellectually rebels against God = p stops believing in God after further intellectual considerations (such as coming across a new argument for atheism that is convincing for p). 2. A believer p emotionally rebels against God = p stops believing in God after undergoing certain emotional experiences (such as feeling that God doesn't care about him because God hasn't healed him from some ailment). So, let's define the following: Ix: person x intellectually rebels against God. Ex: person x emotionally rebels against God. Rx: person x is a resistant non-believer. Now, it is clear that intellectual rebellion does not entail non-resistance, but emotional rebellion does: ¬(Ix → Rx) ∧ (Ex → Rx) Thus, the conjunction of intellectual and emotional rebellion also implies resistance: (Ix ∧ Ex) → Rx Here, then, we have three senses of rebellion: 1. A person intellectually rebels against God and becomes a non-resistant non-believer. 2. A person emotionally rebels against God and becomes a resistant non-believer. 3. A person both intellectually and emotionally rebels against God and becomes a resistant non-believer.

Stratton:

The scenario we offer in our paper is just one of various possible scenarios, and it focuses on sense 2 and/or 3 above. Nevertheless, even for sense 1 above, there are surely possible scenarios where S's intellectually abandoning the faith can damage the faith of other believers, and so it would be better if S would become a believer at a later time than he did. You continued: "I think there is a potential problem with the first version of what it means for S to rebel against God. If God exists and has provided causally sufficient reasons for each of his nonresistant loved ones to believe - as the hiddenness argument claims - then no person's theistic belief could be undone by anything other than their own resistance. ... To claim that it is possible that S's rebellion could have such a result would be to already assume the hiddenness argument is unsound." It seems you are simply rehashing, in loose terms, a premise of the hiddenness argument as well as the former's supporting premise: Q': If God exists, there will never be any nonresistant non-believers. Q'': If for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a personal relationship with S at t, then for any capable finite person S and time t, it is not the case that S is at t nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. Schellenberg treats Q' and Q'' as if there is a strong bi-conditional relation between them: Q' ↔ Q'' Hence, if Q'' is false, then Q' is false. Moreover, given God's necessary nature (and the way Schellenberg discusses God and the hidenness argument and the impossibility of non-resistant non-believers) it is clear that Q'' stands in a bi-conditional relation to the following: Q''': Necessarily, if God exists, then, for some time t and some finite person S who is a non-resistant seeker at t, God will ensure that (or provide sufficient evidence for belief in God such that) at t, S believes God exists. Thus: Q'' ↔ Q''' Accordingly, if Q''' is false, then Q' is false and the hiddenness argument is unsound; so our focus is on Q'''/Q''. Now, Justin, it seems you are saying that our objection to Q''' (or Q'') is unsound because Q''' (or Q'') is true. Ironically, then, it is you who are assuming the core premise of the hiddenness argument. In logic, there is a strategy to test the truth-value of a wff, p, that involves the necessity modal operator: test whether ¬p is possible. And this is the strategy we adopt in the paper. Hence, your following remark is confused and false: "To claim that it is possible that S's rebellion could have such a result would be to already assume the hiddenness argument is unsound." Logically, we are not assuming ¬Q' but, rather, we are arguing against Q''' and Q'' by evaluating possible situations that falsify the former. So, based upon your remarks, I see no worry or difficulty or problems with our argument. - Dr. Jacobus Erasmus