Paul Manata’s Objection to Stratton and Moreland: A Rejoinder
- Dr. Tim Stratton
- Dec 5, 2022
- 34 min read
Updated: Nov 13
Paul Manata has raised objections to my arguments against exhaustive divine determinism over the past few months. In fact, Manata seems to have made it his mission to personally lead the charge against An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument which I coauthored with JP Moreland.
Below, Manata’s concerns will be quoted and addressed.<1>>
Paul Manata: “On S&M’s paper on the Freethinking Argument:
Made it to the conclusion. Wrote notes and comments as I read. I’ll post them in the comments below. These are mostly initial impressions. I‘m sure much of this would need to be refined, some points mistaken due to misunderstanding, etc., but I can at least promise you these comments are better than the ones *any* of the reviewers gave. The reviewers’ comments, and author replies, were published online. So see for yourself. Of all the reviewers, R3 seems to be the most competent, and R3 is the only one who recommended rejection, even after reading replies to his/her comments R3 remained steadfast in his commitment to reject the paper. Also, I usually look at footnotes first, so my first few comments are about the footnotes. Without further ado…”
Tim Stratton: Quick note regarding Reviewer 3. We found it interesting that his objections clearly missed the mark and were just plain wrong (it is published online so see for yourself). We pushed back and exposed several serious errors. His steadfastness to continue to reject the paper with zero reasons given was simply unreasonable. That’s probably why the editor chose to publish the paper – since R3 provided no reason to reject it.
PM: “Fn. 4 is a doozy: Naturalism isn't deterministic Naturalism is deterministic! And there is no real quantum indeterminacy!”
TS: Here’s the footnote:
“A naturalist may or may not affirm that all things in the universe are causally determined given the possibility of genuine quantum indeterminacy. However, as we discuss below, if naturalism is true it is reasonable to infer that everything about humanity is either determined by prior causes which have also been causally determined themselves, or causally determined by prior causes that were random or a product of chance. Either way, if naturalism is true, it seems that antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all things about humanity. Moreover, we take quantum indeterminacy to be epistemological, not ontological.”
I fail to see how Paul reached his conclusion. Indeed, what Moreland and I described is perfectly consistent with the Sam Harris quote we offered.
PM: “Their target Calvinist are Hart, and Helm? Those are the only two Calvinists in the biblio…”
TS: Our target is not Calvinism, but the view that humanity is exhaustively determined by something or someone else.
PM: “Fn. 7:
‘However, if indirect doxastic voluntarism is true, a person is truly responsible for (at least some of) his beliefs or propositional attitudes in the sense that he can exercise libertarian freedom at various points in life.’”
So they get to define "indirect doxastic voluntarism" as libertarian? Seriously, who does this in the literature? Clearly, I can choose to expose myself to various kinds of evidence and thus indirectly influence what I believe. But it doesn't follow from that, that the choosing is libertarian.
TS: Paul is incorrect. If EDD is true, then Paul is passive and does not have logical access to the active use of “I can choose . . .” This is why we wrote the following on page 11 of our paper:
“Though unintentional, by utilizing statements in expressing their views, determinists benefit from a rhetorical mirage that keeps hidden what is actually being asserted.”
So, if Paul is not passive, but actually an active chooser not determined by antecedent conditions which necessitate what he is exposed to and what he is not, then, Paul possesses libertarian freedom – and is ironically using it to argue against libertarian freedom.
PM: “Geez, fn. 9 just begs the question:
‘We are concerned about a specific kind of deliberation worth wanting. We will call this: the power to deliberate and infer better or true beliefs over false ones. This power is not compatible with determinism. After all, if an omnipotent deity of deception, for example, causally determines Carl to affirm a false theological belief in a specific circumstance, then it is impossible for Carl to deliberate in order to infer a better or true theological belief in that same circumstance.’
What if this deity ‘causally determines Carl to affirm a false theological belief in a specific circumstance’ *by way of* Carl's deliberations? Then not only could he have used deliberation to get the belief, he can use deliberation later to get a different belief.
Why doesn't this occur to them?! It just follows from causal determinism that no deliberations are used as means by the believing agent? Lol”
TS: According to Paul’s view, if x does not occur to a Christian while deliberating about theological matters, it is ultimately because God deterministically prevented x from occurring to the Christian.
If EDD is true, then “Carl’s deliberations” are not up to Carl. Again, Carl is a passive cog and how he deliberates is up to an omnipotent deity of deception.
PM: “More question-begging in fn. 9:
‘If EDD is true, for example, and God determines a Calvinist to affirm a false theological belief, then there is nothing the Calvinist can do to infer a better or true belief. The Calvinist in this scenario does not have the power to actively rationally deliberate and infer the truth. Rather, the Calvinist is a passive recipient of false beliefs, beliefs which he is deterministically caused to possess by God.’
Obviously there is something the Calvinist can do: actively deliberate and come to a different belief.”
TS: Talk about begging questions (something determinists do frequently, it seems; see this article, for example). Paul does not have access to the language he employs. If a deity of deception determines Paul to reason poorly while deliberating on this topic and to ultimately reach a false conclusion, then it is impossible for Paul (in the same world) to reason correctly and infer the truth while deliberating on this topic. Paul cannot do the impossible.
PM: “Smh more question-begging on p. 3:
‘In a process of deliberation, are we a genuinely responsible active agent who is steering the ship or are we passive patients, spectators, passengers simply along for the ride waiting to see what the antecedent causal chain that begins before the “deliberative” process and runs through our mental states will end up causing?’
So those are the only options: be a non-determined, active deliberator, or be a determined, passive non-deliberator? Basically, determinism means you can't deliberate? Let’s see the arguments…”
TS: The Free-Thinking Argument and the Deity of Deception Argument show that if non-rational things or deceptive beings exhaustively determine how passive Paul deliberates, then Paul is not epistemically responsible for the metaphysical or theological inferences and conclusions he holds.
Yes, determinism means you are not actively steering the ship. You simply experience sensations of deliberation that pass through you – all determined by, necessitated, and up to a deceptive deity or untrustworthy physics and chemistry.
PM: “Fn. 16:
‘One might object that “this is a compulsive view of determinism that most determinists (compatibilists) would reject today. It’s not that something is preventing you, it’s that the determinants and your belief-forming processes align with each other”. We believe this does not get the determinist/compatibilist off of any hooks. If determinism is true, then antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the belief-forming processes, their alignment/non-alignment, along with one’s ensuing beliefs. If antecedent conditions necessitate a belief-forming process to necessitate belief X, then one is deterministically prevented from believing anything other than X.’
Last sentence shows that even if they’re right in their 'prevention' thesis, it would be irrelevant to their case. This because even if determinism 'prevents' me "from believing anything other than X" at t, it doesn't prevent me "from believing anything other than X" *later than* t. The latter could come about through... get ready for it... *deliberation*. Smh…
Are they seriously saying that if I'm determined at t to believe X, then I can't believe anything other than X... ever!?!”
TS: If a deity of deception determines Paul’s mind to change at a later time, then Paul’s mind will change (for the better or worse). However, if an omnipotent fiend determines Paul to affirm false theological belief X for the next ten years, then it does not matter how many good arguments one can offer him in an attempt to get him to hold reasonable theological belief X. There is just as much of a chance to change the mind of a brick wall as there is to change the mind of a brick Paul during those ten years.
Since no Christian philosopher or theologian dies with perfect theological beliefs, it follows that if God determines all things, then God determines mature Christians to die with false theological beliefs. Thus, if a deity of deception is determining Paul Manata to affirm a false theological belief now and to hold it until the day he dies, then it makes just as much sense for one to argue with a brick wall as it does to argue with a brick Paul.
On Paul Manata’s own view, in this sense, he is just as rational and reasonable as a brick wall.
It comes down to the use of the word “can.” Is it passive or active? The libertarian uses “can” in the active sense; the determinist uses “can” in a passive/conditional sense. So, according to EDD, can Paul believe something other than X? Only if a deity of deception determines Paul to believe something other than X. That is not an ability to do, think, or believe otherwise worth wanting.
Paul’s passive “cans” are at the mercy of the whims of a deity of deception’s active “cans.”
PM: “p. 3:
‘In some circumstance, do we possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to reject incoherent thoughts and beliefs in favor of coherent thoughts and beliefs?... If we answer “yes”, then our answer logically implies libertarian freedom as we affirm our opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between a range of alternative judgment options each of which is compatible with our nature and overall mental state at the moment of choice in a specific circumstance.’
None of this is indexed to moments of time, which means the argument is so loose that I can drive a Mack truck through it. Let's say I'm determined at t to believe X. Do I have "the opportunity to exercise an ability to reject incoherent thoughts and beliefs in favor of coherent thoughts and beliefs" at t? I guess not, since I'm determined to believe X at t.
Why would it follow at all that I don't have an "opportunity to exercise an ability to choose" a different belief at a time *later* than t? That's entirely compatible with being determined to believe X at t.
I mean, it could be that I *arrived* at my belief X at t by way of a process of deliberation prior to t. If so, surely I can *change* my belief via a *later* process of deliberation. But I forgot, determinism means I can't deliberate at all, at any moment. Lol”
TS: This is no laughing matter. If EDD is true, Paul cannot actively deliberate. At best, he merely experiences passive sensations of deliberatings which are all determined and necessitated by a deity of deception. For any moment in time, whatever Paul “believes” (or better, “affirms”) at that moment is up to and at the mercy of the whims of a god of mischief. This includes all of Paul’s past, present, and future theological beliefs.
PM: “This problem is pervasive throughout the paper, and S&M’s accepting of this (inane) point seems to block them from considering obvious rebuttals to their position.”
TS: Think about that statement and what it would imply if it were true. First, saying that JP and I “accept” information assumes an active libertarian choice, which would render Paul’s view of EDD false. But, if something or someone else “blocks” us from the truth, then JP and I are not epistemically responsible for not affirming the truth.
PM: “p. 5:
‘Consider the fact that if the forces and events of nature causally determine Harris to affirm a false belief about X (in the actual world), then Harris does not possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to infer a better or true belief about X in that circumstance.’
Complete non sequitur. Notice that they relativize their critique to "that circumstance". What circumstance? Well, the circumstance in which Harris affirms a false belief about X.
TS: No, the circumstance of deliberation (no matter how many moments it takes) leading to one's false belief about X.
PM: Let's say that occurs at time t. Then their argument is that Harris can't, at time t, "infer a better or true belief about X in that circumstance."
Well, duh! Who would hold a false belief at t and infer a better belief at t?! What typically happens is that you hold a belief at t1, and then deliberate, and come to a different belief at t3. What they argue is that you can't squeeze those three steps into t1. Duh. But where's the argument that you can't have those three steps distributed over t1-t3, if determinism is true? No argument is forthcoming so far..
They keep relativizing their argument to a particular moment, and then say trivial things about what 'can' happen at that moment. It's like they don't realize that agents are extended through time, and deliberation happens over time, etc. All that falls out, and we get some triviality about how we can't believe X and infer not-X at the same moment! Like who would disagree?”
TS: Paul Manata is typically pretty sharp. Thus, it seems to me that he is being intentionally obtuse here. He knows exactly what we mean when we say that Harris cannot infer a better belief in a particular circumstance. A “circumstance” can be any moment of time. A moment could refer to a few seconds, minutes, hours, months, or years. It could be the circumstance in which Paul finds himself attempting to refute our paper over the course of his life.
So, let’s refer to this as “the circumstance in which Paul has thoughts about the paper written by Stratton and Moreland.” In that circumstance (which could last for days, weeks, months, years, or the rest of Paul’s life), a deity of deception deterministically prevents Paul from attaining truth. Thus, it is impossible, in said circumstance, for Paul to infer better or true beliefs about this philosophical and theological issue.
PM: “A1-A5 argument on p. 5, A2 is obviously false:
‘If the forces and events of nature causally determine all humans to infer and affirm some false metaphysical beliefs, then Harris stands in no epistemic position to know which of his inferred metaphysical beliefs are true and which are false.’
Why can't he just reflect on the metaphysical belief, see that it entails a contradiction, and so change the belief? Determinism prevents him from doing this? Why?
I mean, if libertarian reflection is fallible (and it is), then why must deterministic reflection be infallible if it's to give us the needed "epistemic position" to correct our beliefs?”
TS: It’s attention-getting to see this Calvinist defend one of the world’s leading atheists in order to save his favorite theological view.
To answer the former, the laws and events of nature, on Harris’s view, determine if Harris will reflect upon the metaphysical belief. The laws and events of nature (non-rational kinds of things) also determine how Harris reflects, and thus, determine if Harris believes that contradictions entail, and thus, determine if Harris’s mind is changed or not. If determinism is true, and the laws and events of nature determine Harris to always affirm metaphysical belief X, then Harris is deterministically prevented from believing anything other than metaphysical belief X. Just as the forces of nature determine Harris to keep from floating off into outer space, they also determine Harris from affirming anything other than metaphysical belief X.
Moreover, if Harris had the power to reflect – free from non-rational or untrustworthy deterministic forces – then Harris possesses the libertarian freedom to think.
To answer Paul’s last question, see our paper’s conclusion. Moreland and I note that our beliefs are
either (i) determined by something non-rational (and thus, untrustworthy), (ii) determined by a deity of deception (and thus, untrustworthy), (iii) random (and thus, untrustworthy), or (iv) caused by an intelligently designed free-thinking agent created in the likeness of a maximally great being (God) with cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in an appropriate environment which can be aimed at truth if the agent is careful and handles his or her powers responsibly. The first three options leave us with skepticism and reason to doubt our metaphysical and theological thoughts and beliefs. Option (iv) is the best explanation and our best hope. However, the fourth option entails that one is free in a libertarian sense—not determined by something unreliable or someone who is untrustworthy.
PM: “This on p. 6 doesn’t follow:
‘Since it seems that something or someone else (like God) is not determining humanity to always reach true beliefs, then it follows that if one’s noetic structure is functioning properly, then libertarian freedom is (at least in some circumstances) a vital ingredient in the rationality mix.’
If I'm fallible, then proper function requires libertarianism?
Is there going to be an argument for this?”
TS: We explain why this is the case in the conclusion of our paper.
PM: “On p. 6, under ‘4. A Mad Scientist to the Rescue,’ they give an example of massive manipulation in real time by a mad scientist:
‘Suppose a mad scientist has somehow implanted microchips in a person’s brain while she was sleeping and now exhaustively controls and determines all of her thoughts and beliefs all the time. This includes exactly what she thinks of and about and, more importantly, exactly how she thinks of and about it (i.e., all of her evaluations and judgments). All of her thoughts about her beliefs and all of her beliefs about her thoughts are now determined by the mad scientist (she has no opportunity to think or believe otherwise). She has zero “guidance control” over what she thinks of or how she thinks about it (all of her passive thoughts are completely up to and at the mercy of the whims of the mad scientist). She does not have the control condition required for rational responsibility. In other words, she does not meet the “control condition” if something or someone else is in complete control of her condition.’
S&M say that this doesn't meet the "control condition" on rational responsibility. Well, no, not if every thought is being determined moment by moment *independently* of the agent's deliberation and assessment of reasons!”
TS: Paul misses the point. On his view of EDD, “the agent’s deliberations and assessments of reasons” (the how with which Paul deliberates and reasons) is ultimately controlled and determined by a deity of deception. Thus, there is no reason to trust Paul’s reason.
PM: “I keep hoping they will say, ‘But, of course, typical determinists don't think this is the real picture. Typical determinists say that we are responsive to reasons in a way that is precluded by this mad science experiment.’ But they never say this! Apparently, the above is an illustration of what determinists believe!”
TS: Paul misses the mark. We couldn’t care less about what determinists subjectively say, think, or believe. JP and I are concerned about what is logically entailed by what determinists say and believe.
PM: “Seems to me that they were initially convinced with a "determinism rules out deliberation" thesis, because determinism makes us 'passive,' Ha! Ha! Then they just reinterpret everything about determinism according to that thesis. So, since determined agents don't deliberate, and they're not responsive to reasons, then they're just like the mad scientist scenario above.
Do they really think that determinism operates in a way that bypasses our responsiveness to reasons? I mean, is that an assumption of their view? If so, then it's game over. It's all just a straw man…”
TS: We simply appeal to what it means for an event to be determined, and then point out that Paul asserts that this applies exhaustively to every mental event of all Christians (and everyone else). What Paul cannot seem to grasp is that if his so-called “responsiveness to reasons” is bypassed or not, it is first determined by a deity of deception, and if it is bypassed, then it is determined by a mad scientist (a secondary cause) – who was also determined by a deity of deception.
Paul Manata’s view is relegated to absurdity.
It’s hard to make sense of the term “bypassed” if an omnipotent deity of deception is determining the entire show down to the smallest of mental details in the mind of the human (and every other human).
PM: “This is so odd. The quote from Slagle's book on p. 7 seems inapt for raising any epistemological problem for determinists:
‘According to determinism, however, the only methods by which we could examine such processes are products of these processes themselves. To appeal to the reliability of these processes in arguing for their reliability is an invalid procedure. This may be able to show that the processes in question are not reliable (by showing that they lead to an incoherent system, for example), but to appeal to these processes in order to verify the reliability of these processes is simply, and blatantly, to beg the question.’
Wut, so determinists can't prove the reliability of their most fundamental belief processes, because they'd be arguing in a circle? But that applies to the libertarian. He can't prove perception, memory, or rules of inference are reliable, without relying on perception, memory, or rules of inference.
They really saying: "I had time to think about this with my free will! So I know my free will efforts are reliable!"? You can't be serious.”
TS: We offer a conditional analysis (thank you, Tyler McNabb) showing how the libertarian – created by and in the likeness of a maximally great being – has the best grounds for reliable inferences. See the conclusion of our paper.
PM: “These Slagle quotes *have to be* ripped out of context. He says:
‘And assent or approval in turn seems to intrinsically involve the concept of self-origination. I may not have to originate the explanation of the belief, but I do have to make whatever explanation there is my explanation for believing it. This would suggest that determinism is incompatible with belief, and so belief in determinism, including theistic determinism, is self-defeating.’
Really? Is this for real? Determinism means we can't have *beliefs*. Because to have beliefs, you have to assent to a proposition. And doing that requires self-origination.
I guess none of our perceptual beliefs are determined. Because if they were, they wouldn't be beliefs. So... do we just choose them, then?”
TS: As has been explained to Paul on multiple occasions in the past, we are discussing inferred metaphysical and theological beliefs, not mere “perceptions of pain” or anything of the like.
Moreover, these quotes are not “ripped out of context.” In fact, Dr. Jim Slagle personally reviewed our use of his quotes and gave us his endorsement (along with a few other ideas found in the footnotes).
PM: “On p. 8 they argue that they don't even need their "deity of deception" argument. That's just icing on the cake. The real problem is that determined beings can't deliberate or reason in any way:
‘This is why it does not matter if the external controller is a good, trustworthy being (e.g., God). Given determinism, a human is not really a deliberating agent. As a result, that human has no real ability to reason through syllogisms or engage in any intellectually responsible mental act. Thus, with God as the deterministic controller, it may be the case that one’s thoughts, beliefs and so forth are true, but no one would ever be able to know that by reasoning.’
Determined beings "are not really deliberating agents," and they have "no real ability to reason through syllogisms." I mean, why didn't they stop there?
”
TS: Exhaustive determinism, plus the fact that things other than Paul determine and necessitate Paul to reason exactly how Paul reasons, entails that Paul (the thing he refers to as "I") is not actively reasoning through anything. He is merely a passive Paul at the mercy of the whims of external factors. That's a problem.
Moreover, EDD plus the fact that God – on this view – determines Paul to affirm false metaphysical and theological beliefs, means that Paul (or anyone else) cannot trust his own metaphysical and theological beliefs which he incorrectly believes he has actively inferred. Indeed, according to Paul’s beliefs, his beliefs were “inferred” for him via an untrustworthy cause. That's another problem.
PM: “footnote 36 is long; it begins:
‘Appealing to epistemic externalism does not escape the problem of exhaustive determinism. Assuming that our faculties are typically reliable does not escape this problem. According to the externalist, beliefs are innocent until proven guilty. But why should a belief be presupposed as innocent if said belief is causally determined by something non-rational or someone who is untrustworthy?’
I’ve made this point a few times over the past couple of months, I’ll make it again: there goes perception, memory, a priori acceptance of rules of deductive and inductive inference, etc. Why should we presuppose any of these beliefs as innocent if they are causally determined by my environment or nature? I mean, "nature" and "environment" are "something non-rational," right? So perceptual beliefs shouldn't be trusted. Seems to be a commitment of theirs…”
TS: Paul refuses to deal with the vital point we are making. Why should Paul trust his metaphysical and theological inferred beliefs if they were determined and forced upon Paul by something non-rational or someone who is untrustworthy?
Paul has yet to answer that question.
PM: “p. 8:
‘Remember, we are discussing exhaustive determination. Everything that happens during our so-called “reasoning process” happens exactly the way the mad scientist desires and determines—even when “we” reason poorly.’
Oh wow, this clinches it for me. The mad scientist - who directly determines all of our beliefs moment by moment so that we are not responsive to reasons - is being set forth as a model of determinism.
I don't expect children to know Einstein. I expect professional philosophers to know about contemporary compatibilism. Sheesh”
TS: Paul Manata is attacking a straw man. Neither JP Moreland nor I ever said anything about “directly determines all beliefs moment by moment.” This is why we referenced Paul’s theological belief-forming faculties which were also fine-tuned and intelligently designed by an omnipotent deity of deception.
As long as antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all events, then it does not matter if it is directly or indirectly determined by a deity of deception.
PM: “They attempt to get around Pereboom's S and DE. But their replies are a bunch of meandering stuff that not cogent. For example, "real" deliberation has little to do with the epistemic possibility stuff Pereboom talks about in S. No sir, that 'focuses on the wrong issue,' 'changes the subject,' and 'muddies the waters'. What Pereboom *should* have said is:
‘Real deliberation entails that A1 . . . An must actually be ontological possibilities, especially when we note that deliberation is an internal mental process that does not have a bodily “action” among its constituents.’
So, as a prerequisite for 'real' deliberation, forget 'epistemic' conditions, or any of that weak-minded mental stuff. The alternatives must be ontological possibilities.
By definition, then, deliberation requires the falsity of determinism.
That settles that, then. Pereboom's met his match!
I mean, they even say that "deliberation is an internal *mental* process". But the alternatives must be *ontologically* real if there is to be this inward *mental* process. Umm, why?”
TS: Well, JP Moreland is recognized as one of the top 50 influential philosophers in the world today. So, it stands to reason that if Pereboom were to "meet his match," it might just be JP Moreland.
Be that as it may, if “Passive” Paul is attempting (which assumes active power) to judge our argument as good or bad (note the range of alternative judgment options), but a deity of deception deterministically prevents Paul from judging our argument as good, then Paul (whether he realizes it or not) has a defeater against his belief that our argument is bad.
PM: “they continue to 'refute' Pereboom's S, they say on p. 9 that:
‘Frankfurt-style counterexamples are both irrelevant and misleading.’
Well, good thing that Pereboom *never mentions* or even alludes to Frankfurt examples in S!
They're reduced to shadow-boxing now. Haha…”
TS: Others often appeal to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Thus, if Pereboom makes the case or not, we found it relevant.
PM: “p. 9:
‘Relatedly, the person in (S) has a false belief, viz., that A1 . . . An are actually real, genuine possibilities when they are not.’
Smh this just sucks as a critique of Pereboom. All Pereboom's S says is that the options are epistemically possible for the agent. It's a way of guaranteeing that they don't have false beliefs here. Duh!
The whole point is that the options don't have to be ontologically open. But on S&M’s view, Pereboom is attributing false beliefs to the agent, even though he carefully crafted S so that that isn't an implication. Lol
This Pereboom critique is wild. According to S&M, if I deliberate and say to myself, "Well, nothing I know rules out A, and nothing I know rules out B, and I have good reason for A, so let's choose A".... I'm guilty of having a false belief. I am "actually deluded and operating under pretense" (10).
They can't get around to specifying *what* the false belief would be. I bet they can't! Because Pereboom has more than a lick of philosophical sense when he crafts these conditions.”
TS: Moreland and I show four problems with appealing to Pereboom’s model to escape our argument. In a nutshell:
1- (S) fails because it focuses on the wrong issue. (S) erroneously makes the issue about alternative possibilities instead of the control condition required for epistemic responsibility. (S) shifts the focus away from ontology to epistemology.
2- Person (S) has a false belief that alternative possibilities are actually real and genuine (actually accessible) when they are not. The so-called “deliberator” is actually deluded and operating under pretense.
3- The person in (DE) has a false belief about the efficacy of her deliberating based on a false belief about the nature of deliberation itself. It’s a false belief riding on top of another false belief.
4- The terms in question are active (not passive). As we noted in the article:
(P1) Rae deliberated about P.
(P2) A deliberating-about-P was caused to occur in Rae.
P1 employs “deliberated” in the active voice and implies that Rae was exercising her agency and active power in performing a deliberative act. But this is not the case if determinism is true. For the determinist, P2 makes clear what is actually meant by asserting P1.
PM: “According to Pereboom's second condition for deterministic deliberation, DE, the agent must believe in the efficacy of his deliberations. This means that he must believe that if as a result of his deliberating he were to judge that doing A is the best thing to do, then she would do A.
This makes perfect sense to me. But no! This is deeply flawed! S&M say on p. 10:
‘Put simply, the person in (DE) has a false belief about the efficacy of her deliberating based on a false belief about the nature of deliberation itself.’
She may *think* she is deliberating, and that her deliberations have causal efficacy, but she is deluded! According to determinism, there is no such thing as causation, much less causal efficacy!
I actually made up that last sentence. I could trick people. I mean, at this point you'd expect something lame like that. But really, their critique isn't that bad. They don't claim that determinists deny causation, which would be loony. Instead, they say:
‘One is aware of not being a passive patient through which a deterministic chain of efficient causes is running through her, all the while bypassing the superfluous “agent” altogether.’
That is, in deliberation, you're aware that determinism is false. That's it. All the other clauses in the critique of DE make that move. You're aware that you're uncaused by nature or God. Apparently, the latter two villains always show up with a red cape that has 'N' or 'G' on the front, and you'd be aware of their jujitsu moves in causing you do to stuff.”
TS: To be clear, Moreland and I contend that most folks intuit and are introspectively aware that their deliberations are not being determined by an untrustworthy someone or something else.
PM: “The lameness of the reply to Pereboom's DE continues... From p. 10:
‘Now we suggest that we all have a concept of active power, passive liabilities, teleology, being a first-mover who originates action and so forth.’
That's their critique. We have these concepts because we are aware (in deliberation) that we are active powers, first-movers, etc. It's because determinism is false that we have these concepts!
Of course, if they would actually read Pereboom's DE without blinders on, they would see that he is not only carving out a concept of "active power," he is saying that the determined agents have a concept of it. According to Pereboom's DE, the agent must believe in the efficacy of his deliberations. This means that he must believe that if as a result of his deliberating he were to judge that doing A is the best thing to do, then he would do A.”
TS: If one believes that a deity of deception determines his deliberating processes, then he would be a fool to believe (not that he could believe otherwise) in the efficacy of his deliberations.
Consider Paul’s own words slightly edited to make the point:
“According to Pereboom's DE, the agent must believe in the efficacy of . This means that he must believe that if as a result of that doing A is the best thing to do, then he would do A.”
PM: “That is, he believes he is a causally efficacious agent in the world, and that his deliberations and judgments will bring about effects in the world. Sounds good. Why can't he have such a belief?”
TS: Because, according to Paul’s view, his so-called "beliefs" are often false and always determined by a deity of deception.
PM: “But according to S&M, there's a problem here: determined agents can't have the beliefs that Pereboom's DE says they have. It's only if you're undetermined that you would realize you're an active power in the world, have a concept of it, and believe it about yourself.”
TS: See the conditional analysis provided in the conclusion of our paper.
PM: “Apparently, determined agents couldn't have this belief, because they wouldn't have the concept. But wait a minute: I thought the whole problem with determinism was that a "deceptive deity" could give us any belief he wanted.
So it sounds like their critique of DE proves the impossibility of their central thought experiment against a "deceptive deity". The latter can't do the stuff that S&M say he will do, because determined agents are magically prevented from having certain concepts of themselves. Go figure.”
TS: An omnipotent fiend could determine a person to think in a certain matter and necessitate one’s affirmation of any proposition. As Slagle pointed out, it’s hard to call that a “belief.” Indeed, it is not based upon information that Paul (according to his own view) has not actively chosen to accept or reject. These things have been determined by something or someone other than Paul. But, an omnipotent fiend has the power to determine Paul to think and state that omnipotent fiends do not exist. Indeed, an omnipotent fiend has the power to determine Paul to think and state that Paul does not exist.
Of course that’s irrational, but that’s the point.
PM: “Gawsh, question-begging against Pereboom at the end of p. 10:
‘Given our account of the role of direct access to one’s deliberative process in forming an accurate concept of genuine deliberation, upon reflection, other things become evident. Genuine deliberation entails the presence of real ontological alternative possibilities for the conclusion drawn. (S) and (DE) are bereft of these essential features and, accordingly, yield ersatz deliberation and not the genuine article. The ability in genuine efficacy is the exercise of first-moving active power. Thus, if the person in (DE) believes in the efficacy of deliberation, she believes in libertarian freedom. If she does not believe in libertarian freedom, she does not believe in the genuine efficacy of deliberation. Either way, (DE) is in trouble.’
So, according to Pereboom, a determined agent will believe in the efficacy of his deliberations, believing that if as a result of his deliberating he were to judge that doing A is the best thing to do, then he would do A.
But S&M say no, this isn't to "believe in the genuine efficacy of deliberation". It's not enough to believe that your deliberations are causally connected to your judgments and to what you end up doing. Rather, you must "believe in libertarian freedom."
Belief in LFW is the only way you can have a belief that you causally affect the world by way of your deliberations and judgment. If that's not a begging of the question, I don't know what is.”
TS: Paul is the one who is begging questions if he affirms that a deity of deception deterministically prevents him from reaching true theological beliefs, but then affirms that his theological belief under scrutiny must be a true theological belief.
It makes no sense for Paul to assume and presuppose that a deity of deception determines all of his theological beliefs. That’s not begging any questions. It is simply pointing out the absurd.
PM: “Oops, there it is again on p. 11, that same trivial observation:
‘If something non-rational or someone untrustworthy causally determines a person to affirm a false belief in a certain circumstance, then he or she has no ability to infer a better or true belief in that same circumstance.’
If you're determined to believe X at t, then you don't also infer and believe not-X at t!
Amazing! Insightful!
Apparently we're all little point-beings who exist for a single moment of time...”
TS: Why think that time t must be relegated to a microsecond? Time t might refer to a day, a month, or much longer. Indeed, as implied in our paper (see the Pastor Jones thought experiment), Paul’s entire life can be referred to as a circumstance. With that in mind,
“If something non-rational or someone untrustworthy causally determines Paul to affirm a false theological belief about X until the day he dies, then Paul has no ability to infer a better or true theological belief about X until the day he dies.”
PM: “I actually made this objection to Stratton a month ago. I wrote:
//Imagine thinking that on determinism we don’t “carefully examine” evidence, “examine biases,” etc. I can assure Stratton that I have done this - that I have is more obvious to me than any premise of Stratton’s argument. And if determinism were true, I’ve done this in a deterministic world! I’ve done this and formed a new belief, and I’ve done it and have become more convinced of the target belief up for evaluation. Part of the problem is that Stratton places all his weight on synchronic deliberation, not diachronic. There’s things I can do, like read arguments, think, consider, etc., over time, and this causally affects my beliefs. I know I can do this, because I’m doing it right now as I evaluate all these posts Stratton keeps putting out! I’m reasoning and evaluating Stratton’s claims. Where am I off? The *possibility* that God is systematically causing me to behave irrationally and not appreciate the evidence? The possibility that God systemically determines me to fail to see what follows from what, etc? But going in for radical skepticism to defeat the determinist can only ever be called the most Pyrrhic of all Pyrrhic victories.”//
TS: Again, see our reference to “Pastor Jones.” Speaking of which . . .
PM: “In this example, they try to amend their point-being-ism at the bottom of p. 11, by adding the clause in dashes:
‘Suppose, for example, that God determines Pastor Jones to study Scripture for decades and finally conclude that the eschatological position known as the premillennial view is true. Unbeknownst to Pastor Jones, however, in actuality, the post-millennium view is true. If that is the case—and God determines Jones to think the premillennial view is true until the day he dies—then Jones cannot do anything to infer a better or true eschatological belief and he will teach his entire congregation this false theological belief.’
Well, yes, if "God determines Jones to think the premillennial view is true until the day he dies," then I guess that's what is going to happen. But how does one generalize from this, to the following: if God determines Jones to believe premil at t1, therefore "Jones cannot do anything to infer a better or true eschatological belief," at any later time.? Obviously, he can do something: reflect on the belief some more in the light of Scripture. So maybe at t3 he gives up the belief, and does so for reasons.
What in determinism would preclude this?”
TS: If a deity of deception determines Paul to continue affirming a false theological belief about X at t3, then a deity of deception would preclude this.
Also, see Paul’s continual inappropriate use of active language (“he can do something,” instead of “God determines what passes through Jones,” “ reflect on the belief,” instead of “God determines if and how sensations of reflection pass through Jones”). Paul Manata is stealing from the view he rejects while being completely oblivious to this fact.
PM: “If I had to make a guess, it seems that their conclusion is shaping their 'argument' for it. S&M can just 'see' that determined agents can't have any of the following features: beliefs, active powers, deliberation, reasons-responsiveness, etc. Determinism ipso facto just entails the absence of such features. So those features simply aren't available in their portrait of determined agents. Rather, such agents are just zapped moment by moment, irrespective of responsiveness to reasons et al. So it's no wonder that those features aren't available in the above illustration, to rescue poor pastor Jones from the mad scientist manipulation strawman.”
TS: Paul Manata is the one guilty of attacking straw men. JP Moreland and I never argued for moment by moment “zaps.” All we are referring to is the definition of determinism: antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all events – this includes all of the mental events passing through and experienced by Paul and poor Pastor Jones.
All of these determined mental events include, but are not limited to how these passive pawns respond to reasons. So, falling back on “But I’m reasons responsive” is simply irrelevant. If a deity of deception determines how Paul responds to reasons, then, in a denuded sense, Paul has a response to reasons, but there is reason to doubt these responses since his so-called “process of reason” was determined by a deceiver.
PM: “Umm, no. On p. 14 they say that:
‘Premise C2 is tantamount to the following: If all that exists is nature, then everything about humanity—including all of our thoughts and beliefs—are determined by the forces of nature, the initial conditions of the big bang, and perhaps some indeterministic quantum events (all of which are outside of human control).’
And what's C2? Well:
‘If God or things like God do not exist, humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense.’
I'm sorry, but those two claims are not equivalent at all.”
TS: It is virtually the same, and thus, “tantamount.” If all that exists is nature, then all of Paul’s thoughts seem to be determined by the laws and events of nature. Thus, if naturalism is true – and God or things like God do not exist – then humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense.
As we noted in our paper, libertarian freedom fits quite nicely in a worldview which includes God and things like God.
PM: “It’s looking like it all comes down to this, I think. From p. 14, a statement of premise C3:
‘If humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense, then humanity is never epistemically responsible.
Premise C3 is virtually equivalent with the following statement:
If something or someone else determines person P’s thoughts and beliefs, P is not responsible for her thoughts and beliefs.’
So... determinism precludes responsibility. And what's the argument? Well, top of p. 15:
‘It expresses the fact that if all things are causally determined, then that includes all thoughts, intuitions, beliefs, evaluations, and judgments. If all of a person’s thoughts, intuitions, beliefs, evaluations, and judgments are always forced upon her, then she is simply left assuming that her determined thoughts, beliefs, evaluations, and judgments are good and that her beliefs are true.’
Apparently, if determinism is true, then: All my beliefs are forced upon me”
TS: True! By “forced” we mean that antecedent conditions (the members of the Trinity in this instance) were sufficient to necessitate all of Paul’s beliefs – including all of Paul’s false theological beliefs.
PM: “I have to assume that my determined beliefs are true”
TS: If Paul assumes it or not is also not up to him, but determined by a deity of deception. Thus, if Paul does find himself assuming that his theological beliefs determined by a deity of deception are true, then the deity of deception is also a deity of begging questions.
PM: “But what is footnote 62 there? Well:
‘The externalist might counter that this a valid assumption. The problem of self-defeat explained in this paper, however, provides a reason to reject this assumption.’
But this "problem of self-defeat" for externalism is a non-starter.
This seems to be an Achilles' Heel of the paper. See my response to fn. 36 of the paper (where they give the "self-defeat" argument against externalism), their fn. 36 begins
‘Appealing to epistemic externalism does not escape the problem of exhaustive determinism.’
They continue:
‘Assuming that our faculties are typically reliable does not escape this problem. According to the externalist, beliefs are innocent until proven guilty. But why should a belief be presupposed as innocent if said belief is causally determined by something non-rational or someone who is untrustworthy?’
As I pointed out earlier, there goes perception, memory, a priori acceptance of rules of deductive and inductive inference, etc. Why should we presuppose any of these beliefs as (at least initially) innocent if they are causally determined by my environment or nature? I mean, "nature" and "environment" are "something non-rational," correct? So perceptual beliefs shouldn't be trusted.”
TS: Moreland and I are not arguing against perception, memory, epistemic rules, or anything other than metaphysical and theological intuitions, thoughts, and beliefs.
It would be great if Paul could refrain from attacking straw men and instead interact with the specific argument we have offered.
For clarity I have added words in brackets to Paul’s next comments.
PM: “So let's be clear:”
Premise C3 of their argument at the end says that determinism rules out responsibility.
This is because determinism forces necessitates>necessitates> my beliefs on me (a strawman).
This is also because determinism leaves me to assume my beliefs are true.
Fn. 62 acknowledges that externalism is a possible way out of their argument (in particular, the previous claim).
But they have a "self-defeat" argument against externalism in a deterministic context.
We find that "self-defeat" argument in fn. 36.
Fn. 36 says that if a belief "is causally determined by something non-rational or someone who is untrustworthy," then the belief should not be "presupposed as innocent."
But 7 is dumb, dumb, dumb. If 7 is correct, then perception, memory, a priori rational insight, all go out the window. And since God causes the nature that causes everyone's false perceptual beliefs (trillions of false beliefs throughout history!), then that's yet another reason to reject perceptual belief (since it ultimately comes from a "deceptive deity").”
TS: Again, it seems that God has provided humanity with an ability to “double-check” and take care to see if whether our perceptions are, in fact, accurate (humanity is not stuck with false beliefs). If a deity of deception, on the other hand, determines Paul to affirm a false theological belief for the rest of his life, then it is impossible for Paul to infer a better or true theological belief. Paul is stuck with it and is just as capable as a brick wall to affirm a true theological belief.
PM: “So S&M are dimly aware of externalism as a response, but totally mishandle it.
They don't seem aware of basic compatibilist views like reason-responsiveness over time, and that's a shame.”
TS: This response is the epitome of missing the point and begging questions. We know what the compatibilist subjectively believes. As already explained above, we are pointing out that these responses do not work.
PM: “Wow, on p. 16, they just blow away Paul Helm's claim that all atoms, molecules, thoughts, and desires are under the control of God”
TS: Paul failed to provide an important word of Helm’s quote. Here is the quote of Helm’s in which Moreland and I are referring:
“Not only is . . . every THOUGHT and desire, kept in being by God, but every twist and turn of each of these is under the direct control of God. He has not, as far as we know, delegated that control to anyone else” (emphasis mine).
So much for "guidance control." After providing this quote from Helm, we wrote:
“Helm is incorrect. Scripture is clear that we do have some control of our thoughts and ultimately some of our important beliefs. After all, the apostle Paul declares that we are the kind of creature who can take certain thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5) before they take us (Col 2:8). Thus, these thoughts Paul refers to cannot be necessitated by antecedent conditions which are outside of our control.”
PM: “Hmm, it's as if compatibilists and Calvinists haven't articulated anywhere a theory of 'control' that is consistent with determinism. It's too bad none of them publish any thoughts on this topic... It follows that the only viable version of 'control' is the libertarian one!”
TS: Moreland and I are aware of what compatibilists and Calvinists have articulated regarding their attempts at not losing control. We believe that if a compatibilist or a Calvinist affirms EDD, then they have lost all rights to control language.
PM: “The E1-E5 master argument on p. 17 seems to have a flaw:
‘E2 If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted.’
How about:
E2M If God Molinistically decrees and therefore ensures that all Christians affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted.
Powerful!
Molinism sucks! S&M took it down!”<2>>
TS: Well, this paper is not an argument for Molinism, bur rather, against determinism. So, if our torpedo of truth explodes, destroys, and sinks the Calvinist’s EDD battleship, but also irrevocably damages the Molinist’s ship in the process, then so be it. Thus, Paul’s response to our argument commits the tu quoque fallacy. It’s irrelevant and ignores the problem that Paul’s ship is sinking and he is going to drown if he does not abandon ship.
Moreland and I are more committed to truth than we are to Molinism. We just believe that Molinism is true. However, if it turns out to be false, we are more than willing to abandon ship. After all, our Open Theist allies – who also desire to see EDD sink – will gladly throw us a life-preserver, pick us up, and accept us with open arms.
But let us not get ahead of ourselves: E2M is false, and thus, Molinism is not scathed by the blast that destroyed the Calvinist's EDD battleship. If God chooses to create a world where Paul and every other Christian freely chooses (in a libertarian sense) to not think as carefully as they could have and should have while handling God’s word, then it makes no sense to say that God is the one who cannot be trusted. Unlike EDD-Calvinism, God is not the necessary and sufficient conditions of these false theological beliefs if Molinism is true.
That’s like saying that just because Paul knew that if he had a child, that child would lie, this somehow means that Paul is untrustworthy for bringing a liar into the world. That's just as absurd as Paul's claims.
Conclusion
JP Moreland and I have contributed to the literature and An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument has been published in a peer reviewed academic journal. We encourage Christian scholars who disagree with us to engage us on the same level and (i) conduct themselves like Christ followers, (ii) conduct themselves like scholars, and (iii) publish their objections in peer reviewed journals.
If one does those three things, JP and I will consider a future response at the same level.
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
Dr. Tim Stratton
Notes
<1> I have interacted with Manata on several occasions. Click the following links to read more:
<2> I don't k,now why these conversations must be so aggressive, vitriolic, and just plain toxic (if not sinful). Why can't brothers in Christ disagree on non-essential issues and have friendly, gentle, and respectful (Philippians 4:5; Galatians 5:22-23; Matthew 11:29; Colossians 3:12; 1 Peter 3:15; Titus 3:2; 1 Timothy 3:3; Ephesians 4:2; 1 Timothy 6:11; Proverbs 15:1; James 3:17) discussions which are beneficial to the entire body of Christ (not to mention "outsiders" that are watching us (Colossians 4:5)? Regenerate Christ followers ought to bear the fruit described in the above scriptures. I will be the first to admit that I am not perfect at this, but I long to have loving-debates with fellow Christians who seek to reflect Christ in the process. I think Chris Date and I did a pretty good job providing an example of how brothers in Christ can debate while striving to respect and love the other (click here).
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