Reason and the Necessity of Libertarian Freedom: A Response to David Pallmann

Challenge

Here's a challenge for those who think that libertarian free will is necessary for rationality and/or knowledge (I am defining rationality as believing some proposition justifiably and I am defining knowledge as justified true belief). Imagine two worlds: world A and world B. In both worlds, John believes the same proposition on the basis of the same evidence. Moreover, in both worlds, that proposition is true. In world A, John used his libertarian free will to believe the proposition. In world B, John was determined to believe the proposition. I take it that no one disagrees that John knows the proposition in world A. But since John is in exactly the same position in world B (the only difference lying in the explanation for why he got there), I'm wondering upon what basis one could say that John does not know or rationally believe the proposition in world B. It seems like if John's belief, John's evidence, and the truth value of that belief all remain exactly the same then, regardless of why it is that he came to believe the proposition, he should still know it to be true. - David Pallmann

Dr. Stratton's Response

Thank you for offering this public challenge, David. Consider your challenge accepted. A similar question was first posed to me about a decade ago by a bright student at the University of Nebraska at Kearney who went on to set UNK's record for the best score on the MCATs. He was also the president of the Reasonable Faith campus chapter (which is now partnered with Ratio Christi). So, you are in good company, David. My response seemed adequate to alleviate his concerns ten years ago; hopefully you will find them sufficient as well. My primary concern is attaining justified metaphysical and theological beliefs. Can we come to

know

these important matters? J.P. Moreland and I have argued that if either naturalistic or divine determinism is true, then rational inference and justified beliefs on important metaphysical and theological matters are illusory. See our paper, An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument. Before proceeding, it is vital to note that I have not denied the impossibility of holding true metaphysical or theological beliefs in exhaustively determined worlds. After all, a deity of deception might determine a few folks here and there to get some of these metaphysical matters right. My contention is that if this were the case, humanity would never stand in an epistemic position to know which of our beliefs are true and which are false. Thus, we would have reason to doubt our metaphysical and theological beliefs. Thus, our beliefs about ultimate reality would not be justified. This point is made explicitly clear in

An Epistemic Case Against Calvinism

. With that in mind, allow me to respond to your public challenge in a step-by-step manner: You said, 

"In both worlds, John believes the same proposition on the basis of the same evidence."

Not so fast! In the world which John is a libertarian free thinker (world A), John possesses the ability to carefully consider the evidence, weigh the evidence himself, carefully consider opposing options, etc. John is the first-moving

source

of these careful considerations, weighings, and evaluations. His mental activity was not determined by something or someone else as he deliberated. Let's describe this free-thinker as John (A). In the world in which the entirety of John's mental activity is determined by something or someone else (world B), John does not decide the manner in which he thinks or ultimately determine what he believes (directly or indirectly). He is not the source who is actively driving the ship of reason, as it were, but is instead a passive passenger in the back seat. His weighings, judgments, and evaluations are like the color of his eyes -- determined by something or someone else. As C.S. Lewis would say, in world B, John is not reasoning; rather, reasoning is happening to him. Let's refer to this passive cog as John (B). So, in world A, John (A) was able to determine the manner in which he would respond to the evidence. In world B, John (B) is a passive cog and responds to the evidence in the exact manner that something or someone else determines. Thus, it is not true that they are both believing the same proposition on the basis of the same evidence. John (A), was created on purpose and for the purpose of attaining truth. John (A) was intelligently designed and created with the supernatural power to carefully weigh the evidence in order to attain true beliefs about important metaphysical and theological matters. John (B), however, was determined to experience sensations of reasoning which happened to determine him -- in this particular instance -- to affirm a true metaphysical/theological belief by something or someone which is guaranteed to often determine John (B) to affirm false beliefs on related matters. For all John (B) knows, this belief which was imposed upon him, although it happens to be true, could actually be false. He is in no position to know. You continued:

"Moreover, in both worlds, that proposition is true. In world A, John used his libertarian free will to believe the proposition. In world B, John was determined to believe the proposition."

The problem for John (B) arises in the fact that the something or someone else who determines the manner in which John (B) reasons and ultimately what he believes cannot be trusted to always determine him to think, reason, and believe correctly. Indeed, these antecedent conditions are trustworthy -- trustworthy to determine John (B) to get these things wrong, while simultaneously determining him to confidently declare that his false beliefs are true and justified. As Moreland and I discussed in our paper mentioned above:

Suppose, for example, that God determines Pastor Jones to study Scripture for decades and finally conclude that the eschatological position known as the premillennial view is true. Unbeknownst to Pastor Jones, however, in actuality, the post-millennium view is true. If that is the case—and God determines Jones to think the premillennial view is true until the day he dies—then Jones cannot do anything to infer a better or true eschatological belief and he will teach his entire congregation this false theological belief. On this deterministic view, God is untrustworthy

and Jones cannot infer better or true eschatological beliefs (although Jones confidently declares he has rationally reached his conclusion and that he is, in fact, proclaiming the truth regarding the end times).

Replace God with “non-rational forces,” “a mad-scientist,” or any other deterministic option, and we have epistemic problems. If one has no idea which of his or her beliefs are false, then he or she cannot rationally affirm which beliefs are true. This ability to infer better and true beliefs seems to be a power worth wanting, and, more importantly, one with which we have an intimate introspective awareness. The ability to rationally affirm claims of knowledge also seems to be a power worth wanting. In fact, that is a power we have. If one disagrees, one seems to assume that he or she has that power, too.

Ultimately, John (B) might be determined to affirm a true eschatological belief, but he does not KNOW it. Why? Because if a deity of deception who determines Pastor Jones and multitudes of other Christians to get theological matters wrong is also determining John (B), then John (B) cannot know whether this deceptive deity is determining him to affirm a true eschatological belief. For all he knows, this is one of those theological beliefs that the deity of deception determines him to get wrong. All John (B) has left is hopes and assumptions. Hoping and assuming that a deity of deception does not deceive him

this time

. But that's a far cry from justification. You continued: 

"I take it that no one disagrees that John knows the proposition in world A. But since John is in exactly the same position in world B (the only difference lying in the explanation for why he got there), I'm wondering upon what basis one could say that John does not know or rationally believe the proposition in world B."

And the HOW he gets there makes all the difference in the world. In fact, I'll never forget talking to J.P. Moreland about this during my first semester at Biola. He was teaching me about epistemology and noted the difference between seeing evidence, understanding it, and reaching a true conclusion versus seeing the evidence, not understanding it, and yet affirming the true conclusion. Both persons attained truth, but since they both arrived at truth in different manners, the former person possesses knowledge, the latter person does not. Indeed, the HOW is what John Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment is all about. The HOW one reaches true conclusions is what provides justification for one's beliefs. I've explained this at length on multiple occasions. Here's a section from a presentation I gave at an apologetics conference in Texas this past weekend:

" . . . both libertarian freedom fighters and determinists will say things such as the following: “

I have

deliberated about theological belief P and

I have

concluded that P is false.” However, as Moreland and I explained, it is more appropriate for the determinist to say something along these lines: “A deliberating-about-P was caused to occur in me and has determined me to state that P is false.”

This appropriate reducible paraphrase is not available to the libertarian,

but it is available – and appropriate – for the determinist to employ. Thus, the determinist who cares about accuracy and precision

ought

to use it. If they refuse to do so, one ought to be suspicious as it seems like they are trying to hide something. With this clarification in mind, we can understand

agency

—and what it means for an agent to reason—in the following three ways:

• 1) An agent is an active driver behind the steering wheel and driving the pickup truck of reason.

This means that the manner in which an agent reasons is determined

by the agent

, and not something or someone else. The agent is genuinely in control of the steering wheel, the accelerator, and the brakes of deliberation. While thinking things through,

the agent has the active power

to decide if he will swerve to the left, turn to the right, keep going straight, step on the gas, tap on the brakes, or hit the emergency brake and do a 180-degree turn and then . . . hit the brights to see if they had previously missed something along the way. The

manner in which

the agent reasons is determined BY the agent because he is behind the controls of reason—and he is not being controlled, determined or driven by something or someone else. This agent possesses the libertarian freedom to think, reason, and deliberate. If one is going to reject the libertarian freedom to steer the ship of reason (or to drive the pickup truck of reason), then one is left with the following options:

• 2) An agent is a passive passenger tied-up, gagged, and sitting in the back of the truck, merely along for the ride (passively aware but with no active power to steer the truck of reason).

If all things are determined by something or someone else, then the agent is not driving the ship of reason (or the truck of reason). No, reasoning is

happening

to

him (as C.S. Lewis described). Sure, the agent who is tied up in the back of the truck is aware of the turns the driver is making, but none of these turns are

up to

or determined by the passive passenger. Mere awareness is not sufficient to be in control of the ship of reason (or the truck of reason). The passive passenger might be directly aware of all the turns the driver made. The passive passenger might even be able to recount

how

they arrived at their destination. Be that as it may, they were not in any control of

how

they arrived at their destination, and the passive passenger has no idea if they arrived at the correct destination. Now, there’s one more option to consider. The final option describes those who affirm that all mental actions are determined by something or someone else, but, somehow, they still possess a kind of control of their thoughts:

• 3) An agent is a deluded passive passenger (tied up, gagged, and sitting in the back of the truck) who is also tripping on acid and subjectively and incorrectly believes they are driving the truck.

This describes the determinist who affirms that something or someone else necessitates all things – including the entirety of his mental actions – but who still claims to have “guidance control.” Indeed, this so-called “agent” is experiencing subjective direct awareness that he is behind the steering wheel, but this does not actually correspond to objective reality. It’s absurd! The first option entails the libertarian freedom to think, reason, and deliberate. Options (2) and (3) are entailed by determinism. With that in mind, choose wisely (if you have the freedom to do so)!"

Let's get back to John (A) and John (B). John (A) "got there" because he was driving the ship of reason. Not only that, but God created, fine-tuned, and intelligently designed John (A) with the power to drive the ship of reason with precision -- if he's careful -- in order to attain truth regarding metaphysics and theology. John (B), on the other hand, was not driving to the destination (his beliefs); rather, he was tied up, gagged, and sitting in the back seat while a driver -- who is known to take him to incorrect destinations (beliefs) -- was driving the ship. Thus, when John (B) arrives at his beliefs, he has no idea if the manner in which he experienced sensations of reasoning led him to the destination of truth or not. He can only hope and assume. Moreover, when John (B) tries to re-evaluate the evidence to see if he is thinking and believing correctly, he once again finds himself tied up, gagged, and sitting in the back seat. Moreover, if he thinks he's got any control of his experience of "re-evaluation," then he is once again trippin' on acid and deluded. John (B) is not actively re-evaluating anything. No, once again, John (B) is being driven by the same deceiver who sometimes determines him to think and believe correctly, but often determines him (and everyone else) to affirm false beliefs about ultimate reality. You said,

"It seems like if John's belief, John's evidence, and the truth value of that belief all remain exactly the same then, regardless of why it is that he came to believe the proposition, he should still know it to be true."

Not at all, David. John (B) stands in no epistemic position to know if his metaphysical and theological beliefs are true if they are determined by mindless laws and events of nature or determined by a deity of deception who determines all of his followers to affirm false theological and metaphysical beliefs. All John (B) is left with -- and this is likewise determined by something or someone else -- is assumptions and hopes that untrustworthy antecedent conditions have determined him to arrive at truth. But assumptions and hopes are a far cry from justification, and thus, assumptions and hopes do not count as knowledge. Moreover, consider the fact that if something or someone else determines you (David Pallmann) to affirm a false theological belief, then it is impossible for you to infer a better or true belief on this matter. Say goodbye to the power of inferring the best explanation of all the data and available evidence (that's not up to you if determinism is true). Moreover, if one rejects the power of rational libertarian free thinking, then one must point to what exactly is determining how (the manner in which) he thinks and ultimately what he believes. If there is reason to doubt these antecedent conditions determine true metaphysical and theological beliefs, or reason to see them as untrustworthy, then one's beliefs on these matters are not justified. Thus, if determinism is true, one could never know it. That is to say, if world B is exhaustively determined, John (B) could never know it.

Bottom line:

Victor Reppert once noted that no belief is rationally inferred or justified if it's fully explained by untrustworthy antecedent conditions. J.P. Moreland and I have shown that if either exhaustive naturalistic determinism (END) or exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is true, then all metaphysical and theological beliefs are fully explained via untrustworthy antecedent conditions. Therefore, John (A)'s belief is a justified true belief and he knows what he's talking about. John (B)'s belief, although it happens to be true, is not justified. The beliefs of John (A) and John (B) are not merely based upon the same evidence. The beliefs of John (A) are based upon the fact that he has been intelligently designed, fine-tuned with properly functioning cognitive faculties, and empowered by God to infer and attain metaphysical truth iff he's careful to evaluate the evidence/arguments and handles his God-given powers responsibly. John B, on the other hand, has no power to be more careful. His metaphysical beliefs are fully explained, determined, and based upon the whims of either mindless stuff or a deity of deception who determines all of his followers -- including John (B) -- to experience sensations of evaluating evidence in such a way that ultimately determines him to often get important things wrong about metaphysics and theology. Thus, John (A) and John (B) do not stand on the same epistemological foundation. John A's belief is justified if he carefully does his due diligence. John B's belief -- even if it happens to be true -- is not justified because the manner in which he experienced evaluations of premises was determined by mindless or deceptive antecedent conditions. Unlike John B . . . Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

 A divine determinist might counter that perhaps God has good or morally sufficient reasons to determine Pastor Jones to believe the falsehood. This is ultimately irrelevant as God is still untrustworthy in the sense that he causally determines his own followers to affirm falsehoods about God and reality (even if it is for morally sufficient reasons).  Perhaps it would be helpful to distinguish between

 and 

 justification as regards knowledge? So, for example:

1. If we're talking about person P's knowledge being  justified, we're talking about justification from a perspective that is outside of, or goes beyond, P's perspective.

2. But if we're talking about P's knowledge being  justified, we're talking about justification exclusively given P's set of beliefs.

So, to use Pallmann's example, suppose that in both world A and world B, John believes both that he is a libertarian free-thinker and that he has freely exercised his reason to arrive at conclusion

. In this case, John's belief in 

 is 

 justified in both A and B (because of his set of beliefs), but it is only 

 justified in A, not in B (because he was determined in B). Conversely, suppose that in both A and B, John believes that he lacks the libertarian freedom to think and that he was determined to arrive at

by something or someone else. In this case, John's belief in

is subjectively justified in neither A nor B (because his belief in determinism undercuts, or provides a defeater for, his trust in the reliability of his reasoning processes), but it is objectively justified only in A.