The Deity of Deception Argument: A Response to C. Jay Cox

Recently, my colleague and friend Dr. Tim Stratton issued a challenge on X which led to many responses. Dr. Stratton posited a form of what he calls a “Deity of Deception” (DoD) argument in an attempt to refute Deterministic Calvinism and show that Exhaustive Divine Determinism (or EDD, as he calls it) leads to epistemic meltdown if consistently applied in matters of faith and reason.

This argument isn’t just a clever thought experiment; it goes straight to the heart of whether a deterministic worldview can sustain rational trust. If God determines every thought and belief—including the false ones—then we have to ask: how could anyone, including committed Calvinists, know which of their beliefs are true? That’s why the DoD argument has stirred so much discussion—it raises a serious question about the logical and epistemic consequences of Exhaustive Divine Determinism (EDD).

The argument goes like this:

1. If God determines all things, then He determines every thought, belief, and action.

2. All people—including Christians—hold false theological beliefs.

3. Therefore, God determines all people to affirm false theological beliefs.

4. A being who intentionally determines people to believe falsehoods about ultimate reality is—by definition—functioning as a deceiver (even if it’s said to serve a “greater purpose”).

5. Therefore, if exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is true, God functions as a “deity of deception.”

This is a question about logical entailment: Does consistent Calvinism entail EDD—and if so, how do you avoid this “deity of deception” problem?”

Many people offered a response to the original postand it even led to a video about Grok published recently (view podcast by clicking this footnote). Stratton has offered different versions of the Deity of Deception argument over the past three years and they have been the object of much discussion within the philosophical and theological world recently leading one young and upcoming Calvinist to write a blog on academia in an attempt to refute it. C Jay Cox responded to Dr. Stratton’s challenge on X by inviting him to respond to the article which Dr. Stratton did here (note footnote). This prompted Cox to respond in a long series of X posts speaking to why he saw Stratton’s responses as lacking. It is this post that I will seek to address in this blog and, by extension, Cox's blog on Academia.com. I don't normally wade into these waters very often as I am just starting my PhD journey on such complex and important issues. However, after reading C Jay Cox's response I felt compelled to address it.

From C Jay Cox's “Why this response doesn’t work” thread

(Note: I have edited *some* of the wording for readability and grammar.)

Cox: Calling an argument pedantic is not actually a substantive argument. The fact is, semantics, procedure, structure and the like are incredibly important, really in general, but especially in syllogistic logic. The DoD is a deductive argument, meaning its strength rests in the fact that all premises, if true, render the conclusion certain. If your deductive argument is actually only *likely* true, I.e., inductive, then it fails at a fundamental level. That is not merely pedantic, it is crucial.

Response:

But this doesn’t answer the charge of Stratton. Deductive arguments are free to use generally true statements that are *likely* true. In fact, many arguments are made this way, which is why the best way to defeat a sound deductive argument is to show that one of the premises is likely false or, at least, not *probably* true. As Cox says in his paper:

“A

deductive

argument is one that relies on the

certainty

of its premises in order to guarantee its conclusion” (pg 5).

But does a deductive argument rely on the *certainty* of its premises? Cox seems to assume that

certainty

means that each premise of a deductive argument must also be deductively concluded in separate arguments. This is simply wrong. One can use an inductive premise in a deductive argument. To say otherwise is either disingenuous or ignorant of how that form of argumentation works. For instance, here’s a valid deductive argument which uses an inductive premise:

Premise 1 (Inductively justified):

All metals expand when heated.

Premise 2 (Deductive):

Iron is a metal.

Conclusion (Deductive):

Therefore, iron expands when heated. When Dr. Stratton says Cox is being pedantic, this is what he means. You cannot dismiss an argument simply because one of the premises is inductive. That’s not how it works, you must demonstrate why said inductive premise should not be used in the logical flow of the argument or why that inductive premise is not justified. Here’s another argument with two inductively justified premises:

Premise 1 (Inductively justified): All people who produce or have the capacity to produce male gametes are men. Premise 2 (Inductively justified): All “trans-women” have had or have the capacity to produce male gametes. Conclusion (Deductive): Therefore, All “trans-women” are men.

One can debate premise one, but given the principles of biology and the incoherence of gender ideology, it stands. I don’t think C Jay would disagree with premise 1 at all but a gender ideologue would and this is where the debate would rage. Having two inductive premises does not invalidate the deductive conclusion. The conclusion is deductive because it follows logically from the premises via a valid syllogism. The same could be said for Tim’s inductively justified premise that “

all Christians hold false theological beliefs.

” To deny this premise would be akin to the gender theorist denying premise 1 of the above argument. You can try but it could make you look relativistic and incoherent. Which is why interlocutors like James White and others simply do not do so. A premise that originates from observation or generalization (i.e., inductive) can still become epistemically certain through rational defense, making the overall argument not just formally valid, but also functionally deductive in its epistemic force. If Cox's objection were effective it would also undermine Dr. William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument which begins with an inductive, or at least, an empirical generalization. I would not anticipate Cox thinking that an atheist could refute the Kalam simply by pointing out the fact that the first premise is inductive. As such, Stratton often asks those who push back against this premise if they affirm a perfect set of theological beliefs, in essence he is asking them to refute the inductive premise through rationality if they fail to do so then the premise holds. That is, does the person who disagrees with the premise "

all Christians hold false theological beliefs

" only affirm true theological beliefs -- making them infallible? In this case, if Cox asserted that he does not affirm any false theological beliefs, then he has (in Stratton's words), appointed himself as a "Super Pope". If he says that God determines all things and that he also affirms false theological beliefs, then it follows that the deity he worships determines Cox to affirm false theological beliefs --  as  a result, it becomes impossible for Cox to differentiate between his false theological beliefs and his true ones. After all, as Stratton says:

"the same deity who determined C Jay's false theological beliefs in the first place, is the same deity who determines the manner in which C Jay experiences sensations of evaluatings."

Thus, this experience of "truth finding" Cox has is not trustworthy to lead to theological truth -- since it's also determined by a deity of deception. As Stratton says, there is no escape for the EDD-Calvinist. Once one's view logically leads to the conclusion that God determines him to affirm false theological beliefs, then any other theological statement they make in order to escape the problem only makes the problem worse. Let's continue addressing Mr. Cox's comments on X:

Cox: as stated in the paper, the premise is not observationally certain at all. In fact, again, as stated in the paper, it may even been flatly false, considering the apostles and prophets.

Response:

Again, This is silly. Could there be examples of metals that do not expand when heated? Sure, do we know of any for sure? No, but generally that principle is reliable. Are there examples of men that do not produce male gametes? Sure, does that render P1 false? No, because the underlying principle of the claim is true. Men are designed to produce male gametes. The same could be said of this premise. As I said before, one needs to address the justification of that premise not simply the inductive nature of it. Cox's attempts to do this by saying there *could* be examples of humans holding a perfect set of theological beliefs by pointing to Prophets and the Apostles. The idea that prophets had zero sets of untrue theological beliefs is an interesting one but one that would seem to be at odds with scripture itself as there are examples of prophets (Elijah had false beliefs that God himself rectifies “I have kept for myself 7,000 that have not bent the knee” (1 Kings 19:18), Jonah, etc) that were wrong about certain things, but not about their

specific

prophecy. Also, the same could be said of the apostles. Certainly, one would not argue that Peter was correct in his theology when Paul had to oppose him to his face (Gal. 2:11) or when Jesus scolded him with "Get behind me Satan" (Matt 16:23; Mark 8:33) however, it is in the *inspiration* of scripture that we believe God intervened to ensure that any scripture they

wrote down

would be true about Him. This attempt to escape the Deity of Deception argument provided by C Jay Cox should be rejected by any and all Bible-believing Christians and should be rejected by Calvinists as well.

Cox: But even if it is not false, it is nevertheless unprovable and unfalsifiable, meaning that one cannot substantively demonstrate it to be wrong or right. Again, deduction relies on certainty.

Response:

All that is needed for this premise to hold is for people to agree that it is probably true, or that they can observe it in their own life and in the world as generally true in principle, if it is generally reliable as a principle (as far as we know) then it passes. As noted above, if Mr. Cox affirms that God determines him to affirm false theological beliefs, then this argument applies to Mr. Cox himself. If he believes someone else is a "Super Pope," he would need to demonstrate this clearly without passing references to *some* prophets or apostles. As for whether this premise is unprovable or unfalsifiable that is simply not the case. As far as proof, experience and good theology would be able to easily show that all people, after the fall, possessed at least one false theological belief except for one person, Jesus Christ as Mr. Cox himself admits. If we can know that Jesus held a set of perfect theological beliefs we ought to be able to find another person that does to falsify this premise. If no other person can be found then the premise stands. Mr. Cox confuses the fact that it is likely impossible to falsify this premise given what we know theologically and historically with the idea that it is not falsifiable. The two are not the same. For instance, the law of gravity is impossible to actively falsify but it is not unfalsifiable. So too is the premise that "all men produce male gametes". Just because it is impossible (due to the nature of the thing in question) to falsify does not mean it is unfalsifiable and should be dismissed. Thus, this premise is falsifiable in principle but impossible to falsify due to its intuitive, historical, and biblical strength.

Cox: If the premises are only likely, you are arguing inductively, which is fine, but takes away the strength of certainty which is precisely why Dr. Stratton does not want to go that route.

Response:

Again, it doesn’t. One can use inductive premises in a deductive argument so long as the inductive premise can be justified. Tim is correct, this is pedantic, and a silly hill to die on. One need not even use the words “likely” for an inductive premise to be included in a deductive argument. We can craft an argument where an inductive premise makes a universal claim (i.e. no “almost” or “probably”), and yet the deductive structure remains valid. The inductiveness would come from how that universal premise was originally justified — not from its wording. So, to defeat that premise one would need to defeat the justification (which Stratton has provided). It seems that this premise is on solid footing as every reputable theologian that I know of would admit that it is a justified belief that all Christians hold at least one (if not multiple) incorrect theological belief. Refusal to agree with this premise requires a strong rebuttal considering history, facts of human nature, and the existence of many competing truth claims within Christianity itself. One that is not offered by Cox beyond the idea that Jesus Christ obviously had a perfect set of beliefs (though Jesus is the cause of Christianity and not a “Christian” himself as C Jay Cox rightly points out) and the idea that we cannot know for certain if one person has a perfect set of theological beliefs. That seems to be at odds with scripture but if he wants to make that case to knock down the premise he is free to try.

Cox: That all Christian’s disagree does not mean all Christian’s are wrong. Full stop. Even if they are all wrong about something, this argument doesn’t prove it.

Response:

It’s not simply that “all Christians disagree” it’s that there are numerous contradictory theological positions held by a majority of Christians, maybe all, as far as we know (i.e. determinism and LFW or real presence in eucharist vs symbolic, role of baptism, the list could go on). Because of the law of the excluded middle we can KNOW that a Christian that believes all things are determined is either right or wrong. The same could be said for every Christian belief. It is either correct, or it is incorrect. Also, scripture indicates that all Christians will need sanctification (maturation in Christ), thus, they will not have a perfect set of beliefs and behaviors until the consummation of time (

1 Cor. 13:12

). Generally speaking, this premise should be uncontroversial, as even staunch Calvinists like James White grant it. Cox’s reasoning here nearly collapses into relativism. “Just because all Christians disagree does not mean all Christians are wrong?” What is a disagreement then? Can there be two competing and simultaneous truths? Of course not! Mr. Cox's attempt at escape is absurd.

Cox: there was no redefining of deception in my paper, and Dr. Stratton knows this. What the paper does argue is that Stratton is seemingly implying that this “deity of deception” is malicious; he even compares it to a Cartesian demon, and declares he cannot be trusted. Now, he will certainly then say that this argument doesn’t rely on the deity being malicious. Fine, I don’t mind addressing that, and did do so in the paper (more on that later). But Stratton is trying to have his cake & eat it too, here. Either this deity need not necessarily be evil or sinful for deceiving, in which case, Stratton’s frequently used rhetoric arguing as much is out of line AND I still have full reason to trust Him and His word, knowing He always has my interests at heart and does not lie (more on that later, also) OR this being is necessarily wicked for being deceptive, in which case, the fact that we know indisputably that GOD deceives believers for righteous purposes defeats this argument.

Response:

I may be wrong, but I believe Dr. Stratton says this makes God “like” a Cartesian demon, not that he IS one. In fact, I called Tim to ask him about this: he said that he's often noted that if a demon causally determined humans to affirm false theological beliefs, it would be warranted to refer to this being as a "demon of deception." If a deity determines humans to affirm false theological beliefs, it's just as warranted to refer to the entity as a "deity of deception." Saying that the former is justified but not the latter (just because it's a "deity") is special pleading. With that said, the Cartesian demon’s sole purpose was deception, that is not the argument Tim is making, the argument that Tim is making is that God implants (as it were) false theological beliefs much like the Cartesian Demon who does the same thing *except* with malicious intent. The point is not that the God of determinism’s character is identical to the Cartesian Demon but that his activity is similar even if there are “morally good reasons” for him to do so. Thus, the question then becomes, what can I trust and not trust from this Deity? At least I know the Cartesian Demon has malicious intent to 

always

deceive so I can arrive at the claim “I Think, therefore I am” but the DoD has righteous intent which means I can’t really know when I am being deceived and when I am not for my own good which means I cannot trust even my thoughts on the matter. Again, this is trust as in a matter of arriving at a conclusion not in character assessment. Hence: epistemic meltdown. In no way does this ascribe maliciousness to the DoD and it does not entail in Stratton “having his cake and eating it too.” The Deity need not be wicked to devise deception but if he does devise deception without obvious justification (more on that in a bit) then it stands to reason all of my beliefs are then suspect for I am not in an epistemic position to know which of my beliefs are true and which are false. Which means, I likely shouldn’t even debate at all considering I could, accidentally, become a secondary cause of someone else’s deception.

Cox: the “cox collapse into Creator-creature distinction” comment is, to be frank, shockingly inept. What Stratton is referring to here is the section which demonstrates that the DoD argument fails to properly understand primary and Secondary causation. Put simply, if GOD determines you to be healed by way of a good doctor, does that make GOD the doctor or the even the direct healer?

Response:

This is a good example actually. Have you ever seen the painting of Jesus holding the surgeon’s hands as he operates? While this is not what determinists literally believe it is important to note that it is not far off. Sure the doctor’s work, as determined by God, is a secondary cause to the healing but if that doctor is causally determined to possess his medical knowledge, then whether he is a secondary or primary cause is of no matter, the

ultimate

cause is God himself, of course it does not “make God the doctor” but that’s not the point, just as me hiring a hitman does not make me the “shooter” but it does make me liable for the shot when it was taken, and morally responsible. Likewise, even in secondary causation, God carries with himself the ultimate responsibility, not humanity. At least so it would seem. This is why we call God the good Physician in this instance. This is also why Christians are right to praise God after successful surgeries performed by the surgeon.

Cox: Obviously, not. Likewise, that GOD determines a deception does not mean that He Himself is actually the deceiver. GOD’s agency just *is* different, whether Stratton wants to refer to that as magic or not.

Response:

I think it is funny here that C Jay claims creator-creature distinction is silly, yet he ends here with a statement stating exactly that! Ironically, the creator-creature distinction here is actually very important as God is the only one with the power to determine all things (not that he does). Of course, his agency is “different” but one must demonstrate how that agency being “different” means we can trust our faculties of reason and belief if God uses that agency to determine our holding false theological beliefs. That's the relevant point not to be missed. Even if Cox kicks the can back to a secondary cause it is God’s intent to cause, via those causes (which were also determined via God's decree on Calvinism), people to hold untrue beliefs about himself. Why is that? This must be explained to hold a justified belief. Molinism can explain this through libertarian freedom and middle knowledge (God actualizes a world in which he KNOWS people will be mistaken on their own but he does not use primary or secondary causes to necessitate their arriving at false conclusions), but Calvinism has no such mechanism. Compatibilism doesn’t hold up here either for various reasons, the primary of which is that if compatibilism is true then our reasonings would lead us only to our greatest desires which cannot be trusted to discover truth either because our desires can be at odds with what is really real and really true from time to time (see transgender discussion above). Utilizing Compatibilism to explain why we have false theological beliefs may work but it fails to explain how we differentiate between the false and true ones. Epistemic meltdown holds. A rational person does not choose his beliefs based upon his greatest desires. As Stratton has noted, that's the epitome of irrationality.

Cox: that GOD determines us to have trustworthy faculties is not begging the question; Stratton is seemingly unaware of what begging the question is. The argument that we can trust Certain beliefs because we have functioning mental physical faculties does not beg the question, unless Stratton wants to argue that *any* argument that suggests we can trust our beliefs is in effect begging the question.

Response:

I think the point here is that there are no grounds, on exhaustive determinism, to say one even meaningfully *possesses* faculties of reason. Trustworthy or not, and if they are grounds they should not be, “my faculties of reason seem to work.” How do we analyze whether they work or not? What does it mean for a causally determined individual to possess trustworthy faculties? How does a causally determined individual SHOW that their reasoning is trustworthy if it is not *really* their reasoning but it is a reasoning stemming from a separate primary or secondary cause that antecedent conditions were sufficient to necessitate their faculties in the first place? Where this gets into begging the question is when one says a thing like, “

God determines all of my theological beliefs, and I also have some false theological beliefs, but I can trust my faculties of reason about theology because I can use them to reach reasonable conclusions”

-- but how do you KNOW this? One of the points I would make is in the coopting of LFW language to prove one’s own deterministic position. What does it mean to say you have reasoning faculties? What does it mean to say you can trust them? Explain that on a deterministic worldview without invoking compatibilism and without using language that appeals to choices. I think one would find it difficult.

Cox: It goes like this. Stratton puts forward the DoD argument. Stratton then asks “given this argument, how can you trust your beliefs.” We then refute the argument, and point out that we can trust our beliefs because we have access to evidence, reason, and so forth. Stratton then replies “that begging the question.” How?

Response:

I think Cox answered the question in his response. What does it mean you have access to reason and evidence? How does a deterministic system give one “access”? Access implies some sort of

ability

to utilize. How do you utilize reason, evidence and so forth as a determinist?

As Stratton often notes (referencing C.S. Lewis):

"On determinism (even if one appeals to compatibilism), reasoning

happens

to you, but you don't do it. That is to say, on EDD, a deity determines the manner in which you passively experience sensations of reason, but you are not the agent actively engaging in reason. You are not "piloting the ship of reason," but are merely a passive passenger in the back seat. You are being driven to your conclusions and beliefs by an untrustworthy driver. I and J.P. Moreland have explained (see

An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument

), that if the God of truth (John 14:6) who desires all people to know the truth (1 Tim 2:4) intelligently designs and fine-tunes human faculties with the ability to hit the target of theological truth -- if we are careful -- then we can attain the theological truth God wants us to have." (Stratton via conversation)

Libertarian free-thinking, provided to humans by the God of truth who desires all people to know the truth, provides a mechanism for trusting faculties or, at least, testing them to see if they are trustworthy. Determinism lacks that mechanism; which is exactly why Stratton points out that this is begging the question. Assuming that I can trust my beliefs because of how my beliefs were formed just IS begging the question unless you are able to exemplify the HOW in a way that can be explained apart from your starting point. Consider this: If Cox affirms that God determines all things and that he also affirms some false metaphysical and theological beliefs, then goes on to assert,

"but one thing I know isn't a false belief is that I have trustworthy and properly functioning faculties aimed at metaphysical and theological truth!"

How does he know that? After all, if God determines Cox to affirm false metaphysical and theological beliefs, his belief that his theological reasoning faculties are reliable is under suspicion of being false itself. Thus, it is unjustified and Cox cannot KNOW his faculties are reliable. In fact, ironically, we all have reason to doubt Cox's metaphysical and theological statements. This is why Cox begs the question. He continually assumes the very thing that's under scrutiny. That is to say, one needs to provide an external reason to trust the formation process which is exactly what is under examination here. The question is: is the external reason of a deity that determines everyone to have both false and true beliefs a good justification for one’s beliefs? There are a few responses but saying, “We can trust the deity because of his nature” (which seems to be a classic response) leads to a blind faith sort of response without epistemic backing. If we say we can trust our faculties of reason because God is a good God and has morally sufficient reasons for determining our false beliefs we then punt to mystery and faith but that doesn’t solve the epistemic issue. Why should we trust the belief-forming process (as determined by the deity) if it allows for false beliefs to persist? Without a clear explanation of how we can differentiate between what is false and what is not we’re left with the same problem we started with: epistemic melt-down even if the deity has a moral justification for his deception. So it is imperative to explain how one can differentiate between what is false and what is true and that the manner in which this differentiation occurs can be explained and defended in a deterministic framework having access to reasons and evidence isn’t enough.

Cox: For one, your argument has already been addressed. But that aside, you asked us to give an argument for why we can trust our beliefs. When one is given, you say it is begging the question *because* it allows for us to trust our beliefs. That is textbook begging the question, All the while accusing us of begging the question. Furthermore, there is no contradiction in saying “GOD determines all false theological beliefs” AND “GOD determines our faculties to be generally reliable.” These statements can both be true, there is no a, not a therein.

Response:

First of all, Cox (and many others) confuse merely

addressing

an argument with a refutation of it. Cox can address Stratton's Deity of Deception argument every day, but if each time he addresses the argument, he also begs the question in response, then he has not refuted Stratton's argument. Be that as it may the question remains: Are you in a position to know when your faculties fail or not? Are you in a position to know when this deity determines your faculties to affirm false theological beliefs or not? How does one actively test this “general reliability” if a deity determines the entirety of your mental activity? Indeed, this is a metaphysically impossible task. And recall, the metaphysical impossibility does not equate to unfalsifiability it simply means a different model is needed to explain all the relevant data. Cox simply has to assume that his theological belief-forming faculties are generally reliable as a determinist. But are they? How does he know they are? And if he says, “because I have come to know the truth at a generally reliable rate” the question remains: How do you KNOW that? If the answer is the laws of logic and reason then the question remains: Are you using logic and reason or is it determined for you by antecedent conditions and they are happening to you? You see how this starts to look like begging the question? No, okay, perhaps my next response will help.

Cox: Further still, Stratton says your faculties are 100% reliable to make you believe whatever GOD wants you to believe. But it GOD wants you to believe true things, then it stands to reason that your faculties are at least generally reliable to make you believe true things Even if GOD sometimes causes those faculties to misfire such that you believe wrong things.

Response:

Again, how does one DEMONSTRATE the general reliability here? Therein lies the rub. How do you KNOW they are generally reliable to believe true theological things? And what does it mean to believe something deterministically anyway? After all, you did not actively choose to assent to the proposition; that was determined for you by a deity suspected of deceit. And can GOD accomplish those things by way of human reason? Of course He can, but humans reason poorly all the time. Just because one reasons does not mean they have reasoned correctly. The existence of ends does not eliminate the necessity of means. What is human reason if it is deterministically ordained? If God sometimes “causes those faculties to misfire” how are we in a position to know when he does or does not cause those faculties to misfire? As someone who believes in LFW I can say that it is my fault when those faculties misfire, that I reasoned poorly but where does the fault lie with the determinist? But even in Cox's own wording here he has admitted that it is not ultimately the human being’s fault that he/she reasons poorly but that God “

causes those faculties to misfire such that you believe wrong things

”. How do I know when God has caused my faculties to fire appropriately and how do I know when God has caused my faculties to misfire? And are you saying God causes my faculties to misfire by way of human reason? What exactly does that mean and how would one prove this misfiring? In the end, Occam’s Razor should apply in this situation. The best explanation that accounts for all of the data is likely the simplest. And the simple explanation from my view is that it is my fault when I reason poorly, not God’s, and that I come to poor and false conclusions even though God can help me come to the correct ones if I pursue him and His word and adhere to the laws of logic and sound exegesis.

Cox: Stratton just fundamentally misses the point regarding Abraham. GOD does not causally determine Abraham to believe false things, sure. But He does *deliberately deceive* Abraham, causing him to believe He wants something that He does not actually want. The point of citing Abraham is not to prove that GOD causally determines false beliefs on Scripture. Rather, the point of citing Abraham is to demonstrate that GOD, in the Bible, absolutely and without doubt does deliberately deceive believers from time to time.

Response:

And here Cox undermines his own case. It is only a problem that God deceives believers if he has also causally determined them to believe that deception. It does not follow that it is an issue if God allows human beings to be deceived of their own FREE WILL. Otherwise, God’s statement of, “Now I know” is a duplicitous statement. On Molinism, God knew that this test would be necessary for Abraham’s continued obedience and the divine redemption story. Middle Knowledge makes the best sense of this deception (as an aside, that God knew it would be necessary to provide the ram also speaks to his foreknowledge). Determinism makes the entire story seem contrived and superficial. God determined Abraham to be deceived (if we can call a "test" deception), then applauds Abraham for faith God determined him to have, then God determines a ram so that Abraham can sacrifice the ram God determined he would sacrifice all along. The story really only works if LFW is true. This passage also seems to undermine compatibilism as Abraham’s greatest desire was clearly to have offspring, so much so that Abraham reasoned with himself that God could raise Isaac from the dead if need be. The test was to see if Abraham was willing to lay down his greatest desire for Yahweh. He did and it was counted to him as righteousness.

Cox: If it is problem that GOD deceives Believers, then it is *our* problem, because He unequivocally does in fact do that.

Response:

First, if it were true that we are sharing the same problem, that does not solve the problem for Cox. Second, this is simply not true, determinism is the issue with divine deception not the deception itself. For instance, in 1 Kings 22, God sends a deceiving spirit (notice that He does not do the deceiving Himself) to entice King Ahab into battle. This deception isn’t arbitrary—it is in response to Ahab's own free choice to reject the truth and listen to false prophets. LFW allows for God to use deception in specific instances for justified reasons, but it also holds individuals accountable for their beliefs because they have the freedom to accept or reject them ("They exchanged the truth of God for a lie" Rom. 1:25). In contrast, determinism removes the moral agency required to address the deception, as the individual’s beliefs would be determined by forces outside their control. In this instance how could we possibly blame Ahab for being deceived?

Cox: BOTTOM LINE - Stratton’s counter arguments fail at almost every level. It is becoming clear to many of us that Stratton does not take objections to his DoD argument seriously, and as such, there is almost nothing you can do to dissuade him. This is not to say that he must be Dissuaded; the rest of us could totally be wrong. But when he does things like this, asking us to show how the DoD doesn’t prove epistemic meltdown, then saying we’re begging the question by doing so, it shows that he is unwilling to actually engage the arguments in good faith. I, for one, am perfectly willing to be proven wrong and that front, and would even welcome debate or dialogue on the matter. But I, and many others, are seeing this more and more clearly as time goes on.

Response:

For people who complain about rhetoric the rhetoric given towards Stratton and the dishonest argumentation regarding his rebuttals has a pot meet kettle effect. As far as I can tell Cox's refutation (and others) of Stratton falls flat and the DoD argument stands.

NOTES

https://x.com/TSXpress/status/1949470895585603989https://x.com/TSXpress/status/1949470895585603989https://youtu.be/zBLoa1Q_MYQhttps://x.com/TSXpress/status/1950740972243152929https://www.academia.edu/128549727/On_the_Deity_of_Deception_Argument_Why_Dr_Tim_Strattons_DoD_Argument_Failshttps://x.com/TheCynicogue/status/1950779633471033453https://www.pinterest.com/pin/595390013255515618/