The Ontological Argument, Eternal Souls, and a Surprising Lesson from Mormonism

I have long been a defender of the modal ontological argument.

While many Christians are uncomfortable with it, I have found it to be sound and compelling (see a short video I recorded for Frank Turek on the Ontological Argument here).

The argument goes like this:

If the concept of a maximally great being is logically possible, then a maximally great being exists necessarily. And if a maximally great being exists necessarily, then a maximally great being exists in every possible world—including the actual world.

Therefore, a maximally great being (God) exists.

As I explain in the second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, following Plantinga, a Maximally Great Being is defined as a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect in every possible world in which he exists.

Crucially, this entails not just greatness in some worlds, but necessary existence—i.e., existence in all possible worlds, including the actual one. 

The deductive argument is formulated in the following manner: 

1. It is possible that God—a Maximally Great Being (MGB)—exists. 

2. If it is possible that God exists, then He exists in some possible worlds. 

3. If God exists in some possible worlds, then He exists in all possible worlds. 

4. If God exists in all possible worlds, then He exists in the actual world. 

5. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists. 

6. Therefore, God exists. 

The argument does not work for maximally great pizzas, tropical islands, or other parodies. A pizza is not the sort of thing that possesses maximal greatness. Nor is an island. These objections misunderstand the argument from the outset.

Recently, however, a conversation with Latter-day Saints caused me to revisit a question I had never seriously considered before: What about souls?

The Challenge from Mormonism

During a recent trip to Utah and a subsequent discussion with LDS apologist Hayden Carroll, I was reminded of a distinctive Mormon doctrine: human intelligences (what many Christians would call souls) are eternal and uncreated.

According to this view, God did not create the fundamental essence of human persons. Rather, human intelligences exist eternally without beginning alongside God.

To be clear, I reject Mormonism (but I do love the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints).

I reject its logically impossible infinite regress of gods, its denial of the Trinity, its denial that Jesus is the Second Person of the Trinity, its rejection of creation ex nihilo, its rejection of a necessarily existing maximally great being (God) who "is love" (1 John 4:8) as the ultimate ground of moral reality, and its view of human souls (what they refer to as "intelligences") as eternally existing rather than intentionally created on purpose and for the specific purpose of love (which grounds objective morality along with the Moral Argument for the existence of God).

Moreover, nearly every argument in the cumulative case for theism not only works against atheism—it also works against Mormonism (that's attention-getting)!

Nevertheless, one does not refute a worldview by assuming every proposition within it is false.

Mormons get some things right. I have often argued that their commitment to libertarian freedom is far closer to the biblical picture than the Calvinistic view of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD).

And their doctrine of eternal intelligences raises an interesting modal question.

Could Human Souls Exist Necessarily?

Suppose we imagine a state of affairs logically prior to the first ontological change (what I often refer to as the "Kalam state").

There exists a maximally great being. There also exists a plurality of human souls or intelligences. No finely-tuned universe has yet been created. No physical reality yet exists.

The state of affairs is entirely static—nothing is happening because this is prior to the first ontological change in reality.

At first glance, I do not see an obvious contradiction in such a scenario. Whether that means the proposition is genuinely possible is another question entirely—but the absence of an obvious contradiction should nevertheless give defenders of the ontological argument pause.

And that is precisely what troubled me.

If I affirm the modal ontological argument, why should I affirm the possibility of a necessarily existing maximally great being while denying the possibility of necessarily existing imperfect souls?

Would this not expose me to the same criticism often raised by atheists? Why should anyone accept one possibility premise while rejecting the other?

The concern is not whether Mormonism is true. The concern is whether consistency requires me to affirm necessary souls.

Let's examine what this argument might look like formulated in a manner parallel to the modal ontological argument for a maximally great being:

1. It is possible that human intelligences exist necessarily.

2. If it is possible that human intelligences exist necessarily, then human intelligences exist necessarily in some possible world.

3. If human intelligences exist necessarily in some possible world, then they exist necessarily in every possible world.

4. If human intelligences exist necessarily in every possible world, then they exist in the actual world.

5. Therefore, human intelligences exist necessarily.

Notice that the logic is identical to the modal ontological argument. The entire debate therefore centers upon the first premise:

"It is possible that human intelligences exist necessarily."

If that premise is true, the conclusion follows. If that premise is false, the argument fails.

There is another question that arises as well.

Suppose there exists a maximally great being along with billions of necessarily existing souls. Why these souls rather than others? Why does reality contain this particular collection of necessary beings?

Classical Christian theology offers a remarkably simple answer: necessary existence belongs uniquely to the maximally great being. Mormonism, by contrast, appears to distribute necessary existence across a vast plurality of distinct entities. Even if coherent, this significantly increases the metaphysical cost of the worldview.

A Crucial Difference

As I continued thinking through the issue, I became convinced that there is a significant difference between a maximally great being and a human soul.

The difference concerns the possibility of annihilation (even if annihilationism were false). A necessary being cannot fail to exist. That is what necessity means by definition.

However, if a maximally great being exists, then it seems entirely reasonable to conclude that such a being possesses the power to annihilate any non-maximally great being. Indeed, Scripture itself uses language suggesting that God can destroy both body and soul (Matthew 10:28).

Whether one interprets such texts as annihilationism is beside the point. The modal issue is simpler.

The possibility that a maximally great being could annihilate an imperfect soul gives us reason to question whether souls are genuinely necessary beings. At minimum, the burden shifts to the defender of eternal intelligences to explain why even an omnipotent maximally great being lacks the power to terminate their existence.

If God has the power to annihilate a soul, then there is at least a possible state of affairs in which that soul no longer exists. If that is possible, then the soul is not a necessary being.

The soul may be everlasting. The soul may be eternal without beginning. The soul may even exist prior to the creation and fine-tuning of any physical universe. Yet it would remain contingent, and therefore, not necessary because its continued existence would depend upon the will and power of a maximally great being.

Necessary existence and eternal existence are not the same thing.

The Wetness Analogy

Consider an analogy.

Suppose H2O exists necessarily. Even if that were true, it would not follow that wetness exists necessarily.

Wetness depends upon H2O. Wetness may exist wherever H2O is appropriately instantiated, but wetness is not itself a necessary feature of reality. It's contingent upon H2O.

Likewise, even if human souls existed eternally alongside God, it would not follow that souls are necessary beings. Their existence would remain contingent upon the power of the maximally great being who possesses authority over all reality.

A Reverse Modal Challenge

As I continued reflecting on this issue, another thought occurred to me.

Suppose the defender of eternal intelligences argues that because necessary souls appear coherent, we should regard their necessary existence as possible.

But why should we grant that possibility premise?

After all, I can just as easily conceive of a state of affairs in which a maximally great being exists necessarily while all human souls remain contingent upon Him. Indeed, this is precisely what classical Christian theology has traditionally affirmed.

God exists necessarily.

Souls do not.

Souls are intentionally created by God and continue to exist only because God freely chooses to create and sustain their existence.

At first glance, this scenario appears entirely coherent. But if such a scenario is genuinely possible, then the modal argument for necessary souls immediately encounters a problem. For if there is even one possible world in which souls are contingent rather than necessary, then souls do not exist necessarily in every possible world.

And if souls do not exist necessarily in every possible world, then it is false that souls possess necessary existence.

This shifts the burden of proof. The defender of eternal intelligences must do more than assert that necessary souls are conceivable. He must explain exactly why contingent souls are impossible. And that is a much more difficult task.

In fact, the classical Christian account appears to enjoy significant explanatory advantages. Instead of populating reality with billions of distinct necessary beings, it posits a single necessary being who serves as the ultimate explanation for everything else.

The result is both metaphysically simpler and explanatorily stronger. Thus, even if one grants that the Mormon picture is coherent, coherence alone is not enough.

The relevant question is not whether necessary souls can be imagined. The relevant question is whether there is any reason to think contingent souls are impossible.

At present, I see no reason to affirm such a conclusion.

Contingent Souls and the Possibility Premise

Ultimately, human souls are either contingent or necessary. Based upon the logical law of excluded middle, there is no middle ground. It's simply one or the other.

If souls are contingent, then there exists at least one possible world in which they fail to exist. If there is even one possible world in which souls fail to exist, then souls do not possess necessary existence.

This means that anyone who already believes souls are contingent—whether through creationism, traducianism, or some other account—possesses a principled reason to reject the premise that necessarily existing intelligences are possible.

The burden therefore rests upon the defender of eternal intelligences to provide an argument that souls are necessary rather than contingent. Merely asserting that souls have always existed does not establish that they could not have failed to exist.

A Biblical Reason to Reject Necessary Souls

Up to this point I have focused primarily upon modal logic and metaphysical reasoning.

However, those committed to Scripture possess another source of evidence that bears directly upon this question.

Suppose one is persuaded by the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ. If Jesus truly rose from the dead, then we possess good reason to trust His teachings and His view of Scripture. In that case, the biblical witness becomes relevant to the discussion. Jesus taught out of the Old Testament and hand-picked those who would provide source material for the soon to be written apostolic New Testament.

Since God raised Jesus from the dead, we seem to have a divine stamp of approval upon everything that Jesus said, taught, and exemplified. Since Jesus provides a stamp of approval upon the Old and New Testaments, and we have a divine stamp of approval upon the teachings of Jesus, we have fantastic reason to trust Scripture.

And Scripture consistently portrays God as uniquely self-existent while all other beings ultimately depend upon Him.

Consider a few examples:

• Exodus 3:14: "I AM WHO I AM."
  

  God's self-identification emphasizes His unique mode of existence. Unlike creatures who derive their existence from another, God simply is. For this reason, Christian theologians have long regarded this passage as a foundational text supporting divine aseity.

  If this were not the case, Jesus might have said, "I am who I am, and you are who you are."

  
  

• Acts 17:24-25: God is not served by human hands "as though He needed anything, since He Himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything." Paul presents God not as one being among many, but as the ultimate source of all life and existence. If God gives "life and breath and everything" to all mankind, then human persons appear dependent upon God rather than existing independently and necessarilly alongside Him.
  

• Acts 17:28: "In Him we live and move and have our being." This is one of the strongest biblical statements of creaturely dependence. Paul does not merely say that God created us. He says that our very being is grounded in Him. Such language sits uneasily with the notion of independently necessary intelligences existing alongside God.
  

• Revelation 4:11: "For You created all things, and by Your will they existed and were created." The heavenly worshipers attribute the existence of all things to the will of God. If all things exist because God willed them to exist, then it is difficult to see how human intelligences could be uncreated realities existing independently of Him. Indeed, they would not be necessarily existing kinds of things.
  

• Colossians 1:16-17: "For by Him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible ... all things were created through Him and for Him. And He is before all things, and in Him all things hold together."

  If Paul means what he says, all things—whether physical or immaterial, visible or invisible—ultimately derive their existence from and depend upon Jesus Christ. Thus, nothing else that exists, other than a maximally great being Himself, exists necessarily. Since LDS theology affirms the writings of Paul in the New Testament, Paul's words present a significant challenge to the Mormon's claim that human intelligences exist necessarily and independently alongside God.

Consider the following argument:

1. If Jesus created all things, visible and invisible, then human intelligences cannot belong to an uncreated class of beings existing independently alongside God.
   

2. Paul teaches that Jesus created all things, visible and invisible.
   

3. Therefore, human intelligences cannot belong to an uncreated class of beings existing independently alongside God.

Paul does not merely say that Jesus created physical realities. He explicitly includes all things "visible and invisible." Since human souls or intelligences belong to the category of invisible realities, then they fall within the scope of things created through Christ and sustained by Him.

If Paul means what he says, all things—whether physical or immaterial, visible or invisible—ultimately derive their existence from and depend upon Jesus Christ. That presents a significant challenge to the claim that human intelligences exist necessarily and independently alongside God.

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As a brief aside, this passage also has implications for the doctrine of the Trinity. If Christ created all things, visible and invisible, then Christ Himself cannot belong to the class of created things, for it's metaphysically impossible for a thing to create itself. Moreover, if Christ created all things and yet did not create the Father, then the Father likewise cannot belong to the category of created things.

Thus, both the Father and the Son appear on the Creator side of the Creator-creature distinction rather than among created beings. While a full defense of the Trinity lies beyond the scope of this article, passages such as Colossians 1 provide significant reason to affirm that the Father and the Son share the unique divine nature rather than existing as merely two exalted beings among many.

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The passages above have historically been understood to support the doctrine of divine aseity—the teaching that God alone possesses existence in and of Himself, while all finite beings ultimately depend upon Him. If this biblical case is correct, then independently necessary souls are ruled out from the outset.

To be clear, the modal argument of this article does not depend upon accepting divine aseity. One may reject the premise of necessary intelligences simply by affirming the contingency of souls.

Nevertheless, for those persuaded by the historical case for Christianity and the authority of Scripture, divine aseity provides an additional reason to reject the claim that human intelligences exist necessarily and independently alongside God.

A Friendly Suggestion for My LDS Friends

Ironically, if Latter-day Saints are committed to the existence of necessary intelligences, then they may have stronger reason to embrace the modal ontological argument than many protestant and Catholic Christians.

After all, if it is possible that human intelligences exist necessarily, then the S5 modal framework immediately yields the conclusion that they do, in fact, exist necessarily.

But notice what follows.

The same modal logic that supports necessarily existing intelligences also supports the existence of a necessarily existing maximally great being. And if Dr. Kirk MacGregor's deductive argument for the Trinity is sound—as I believe it is—then a careful analysis of maximal greatness points not toward the Mormon conception of God, but deductively demonstrates the one triune God.

This does not eliminate all disagreements between traditional Christians and Latter-day Saints. Far from it.

However, it may bring us closer together than either side initially realizes.

For if LDS thinkers are willing to affirm the possibility of necessarily existing souls, then they already possess much of the modal machinery required to affirm the existence of a necessarily existing maximally great being.

The remaining question is not whether necessary beings exist. The remaining question is which necessary being serves as the ultimate foundation of reality.

The Lesson

Ironically, Mormonism helped me think more carefully about the soul.

I remain unconvinced that human souls exist eternally in the Mormon sense. I remain open to either traducianism or creationism. However, this thought experiment has strengthened my conviction that human souls are contingent rather than necessary.

More importantly, it has clarified what makes God unique.

God is not merely one eternal being among many eternal beings. According to Scripture, He is the one being who possesses life in Himself, while everything else ultimately depends upon Him. God is the one being whose nonexistence is impossible. Everything else—even if beginningless—depends upon Him, the one and only maximally great being!

That is an important distinction worth preserving.

Perhaps the lesson is not that Mormonism is true. Far from it. The lesson here is that defenders of the ontological argument must do more than appeal to mere conceivability. If the argument succeeds, it succeeds because maximal greatness uniquely entails necessary existence—not because any coherent candidate for necessary existence automatically qualifies.

The same standards we apply to the possibility premise of the ontological argument must also be applied to every other claim of necessary existence. If human souls are contingent—as both creationists and traducianists maintain—then one possesses a principled reason to reject the premise that necessarily existing intelligences are possible.

In the end, the central question is not whether necessary beings exist. The deeper question is which being serves as the ultimate foundation of reality.

And here the classical Christian and the Latter-day Saint part ways. The question is not whether the existence of necessary souls can be asserted. The question is whether the possibility premise can be justified.

Stay reasonable (James 3:17),

Dr. Tim Stratton

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P.S. The Challenge for Defenders of the Ontological Argument

 This entire exercise revealed a weakness in simplistic defenses of the ontological argument. Mere imagination is not enough. Human beings routinely imagine things that are incoherent.

The relevant question is not whether one can picture a proposition in the mind. The relevant question is whether the proposition is genuinely free from contradiction and contrary. That is a much higher standard—and often a much more difficult one to establish. Indeed, it is usually easier to identify contradictions than to demonstrate their complete absence.

Thus, the burden falls not merely upon critics of the ontological argument, but also upon defenders of necessary souls. Both sides must do more than appeal to intuition. They must provide reasons for thinking that their proposed possibility is genuinely coherent.

If "I can imagine it" were sufficient, then necessarily existing souls might seem as plausible as a necessarily existing God. The defender of the ontological argument must therefore explain why necessary existence belongs uniquely to maximal greatness rather than merely to any coherent object whatsoever.