Two Birds with One Stone: How My Early Insights Have Been Vindicated

There was a time, back in 2017, when I wrote a blog article that stirred up some controversy — especially among my Calvinist brothers and sisters. It was called “A Revised Free Thinking Argument: Two Birds with One Stone.” At the time, I wasn’t yet a PhD or trained to have philosophical precision. I was an eager apologist, deeply convinced that both naturalistic determinism and theological determinism posed serious problems for rationality.

What I lacked in philosophical precision back then, I made up for in raw insight and conviction. Looking back, I now see that my central thesis was sound — even if my articulation was a bit rough around the edges.

In fact, what the younger Tim Stratton argued in 2017 has since been refined and defended in formal academic contexts, including the older Dr. Timothy A. Stratton's doctoral dissertation and multiple published articles — one of which was coauthored with J.P. Moreland. And so, it seems like the right time to revisit that old blog — to honor its core insights, confess its youthful imprecision, and now state the case with greater clarity and force.

The 2017 Insight: Two Birds, One Stone

Here’s what I wrote back then:

“With this backstory in mind, I have now modified the original Freethinking Argument Against Naturalism to kill two birds with one stone (so-to-speak).”

I was referring to a sharpened version of an early form of the FreeThinking Argument — one that, I argued, refuted both atheistic naturalism and the Calvinist view of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD). Here’s the version I shared:

A Revised FreeThinking Argument (2017)

1. If naturalistic or divine determinism is true, then libertarian free will (LFW) does not exist.

2. If LFW does not exist, then libertarian free thinking (LFT) does not exist.

3. If LFT does not exist, then the process of rationality is determined by an untrustworthy cause.

4. If the process of rationality is determined by an untrustworthy cause, then one cannot rationally affirm one’s claims of inferential knowledge.

5. One can rationally affirm claims of inferential knowledge.

6. Therefore, LFT exists.

7. Therefore, LFW exists.

8. Therefore, both naturalistic and divine determinism are false.

At the time, I summarized the problem like this: if your thoughts are determined by something or someone external to you — whether that’s physics and chemistry (naturalism) or the divine decree (EDD-Calvinism) — then you have no rational control over your own thinking. And if you can’t rationally affirm your beliefs, then you’re not in a position to claim knowledge of anything — including determinism.

That’s the core idea. And today, I stand by it — but now with deeper philosophical tools to sharpen and defend the claim.

What I Got Right — and What I Needed to Grow In

Even in 2017, I saw the symmetry between naturalism and theological determinism: both systems deny that humans are the ultimate source of their thoughts. Both reduce human cognition to a causal chain that lies outside the agent’s control. In both views, rationality itself becomes a kind of illusion — something that happens to you, not something you actively perform.

That insight was correct. But what I didn’t yet have was the philosophical vocabulary to explain exactly why this matters — or how to anticipate objections from more careful compatibilists and determinists.

Back then, I described external causation as an “untrustworthy cause.” Today, I’d explain that more precisely: if a belief-forming process is non-rationally determined by the agent — even by a perfectly good deity — then the agent has no epistemic grounds for believing that any metaphysical belief is true rather than false. If you were determined to believe it, you’re not in a position to evaluate it.

What’s more, I’ve since come to see that the argument I offered isn’t just an argument for libertarian freedom — it’s also a form of what philosophers call an epistemic self-defeat argument. That is, if a worldview undermines the very conditions required to rationally affirm that worldview, then it refutes itself. And this is exactly what happens with both naturalism and exhaustive divine determinism (EDD).

From Two Birds to Two Sides of the Same Coin

Let’s make the symmetry clearer. Consider:

• Atheistic naturalism holds that your metaphysical beliefs are determined by mindless physical processes (that know nothing about metaphysics and don't care if you do either). You believe what you do about metaphysics because mindless molecules moved that way.

• EDD-Calvinism holds that your beliefs are determined by God’s eternal decree. You believe what you do because God intentionally and causally determined that you would — including all of your false metaphysical and theological beliefs.

Now, these systems differ in the source of causation — the mindless laws and events of nature versus a supernatural deity. But the structure is the same: in both cases, your thoughts are ultimately not up to you. You are not the source of your own thinking. You do not have the ability to think otherwise. You cannot choose between competing ideas. You cannot even choose to be more careful during the process of deliberation. You are not actively reasoning — you are passively being reasoned through.

That’s the heart of the FreeThinking Argument. And it means that both naturalistic determinism and theological determinism undermine rationality. They’re not just false — they’re self-defeating.

As one colleague put it in conversation: “It’s not just two birds with one stone — it’s two sides of the same coin.”

Updated Philosophical Framework

Since 2017, my immersion in the academic literature has equipped me with clearer terminology and firmer grounding. These tools help us pinpoint what exactly is going wrong in deterministic systems:

1. Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism

Philosophers like Joshua Rasmussen have emphasized that while we may not have direct control over our beliefs, we do have indirect control — by evaluating evidence, attending to arguments, or deciding to investigate further. But such rational engagement presupposes that one could have thought otherwise. Under determinism, even that indirect rational freedom vanishes.

2. Epistemic Self-Defeat

As Alvin Plantinga argued in Warrant and Proper Function, if your cognitive faculties aren’t aimed at truth, then you have no reason to trust them. On naturalism, beliefs are shaped by evolutionary pressures — not truth-tracking, but survival and reproduction. As Plantinga quipped, if false beliefs help propagate the species, then they win. For example, most of my audience believe that both Mormons and Muslims possess false metaphysical beliefs. Be that as it may, these false metaphysical beliefs do a remarkable job of promoting survival and the propagation of one’s DNA.

On theological determinism, your beliefs are aimed not at truth but at the sovereign will of a God who, by design, intentionally determines His followers to affirm false theological beliefs. In both cases, the process is disconnected from truth — and that’s epistemically catastrophic. Epistemic justification requires an intentional, truth-directed cognitive process under the agent’s rational control. But determinism, by its nature, makes such control impossible.

To say, “God determines my beliefs and He is trustworthy” is to assume the very belief-determining system whose trustworthiness is in question. Even if God is good, you were determined to affirm that — and you cannot rationally evaluate it. Thus, the belief becomes epistemically circular and unjustified.

While Plantinga directed his evolutionary argument against naturalism, the same principle applies here: if beliefs are not aimed at truth — whether by evolution or divine decree — they are epistemically undercut. In both systems, the belief-forming mechanism is external to the agent and not rationally self-governed.

3. Guidance Control Isn’t Enough

Some semi-compatibilists (like John Martin Fischer) argue that agents can be responsible if their actions flow from their own "mechanism." But this only works if the mechanism is genuinely yours — and if it's sensitive to reasons.

Even guidance control fails under determinism. If your reasoning mechanism was ultimately formed and directed by something external, you never actively “took ownership” of your cognitive faculties in a meaningful sense. Thus, even if your beliefs appear responsive to reasons, you were determined to interpret and accept those reasons as you did. That’s not rational control — that’s controlled reasoning.

Under exhaustive determinism you inherit your reasoning mechanism from something outside yourself. If it’s not ultimately you actively doing the reasoning, then you’re not responsible for what is passively concluded through you. You’re just a conduit for someone else’s thoughts.

The FreeThinking Argument Against Determinism (2025 Edition)

Let’s now restate the argument with greater clarity and rigor.

Libertarian freedom is typically understood to include at least one of two key components: (i) the ability to do or think otherwise (often called the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, or PAP), and (ii) being the ultimate source or originator of one’s actions or beliefs (sourcehood). Exhaustive determinism undermines both. If determinism is true, then agents are neither the source of their beliefs nor ever able to consider alternatives — they simply believe whatever they were determined to believe.

To be clear, this argument targets libertarian freedom because only this robust kind of freedom provides a sufficient foundation for rational responsibility and epistemic justification. Compatibilist freedom — the ability to do what one desires, even if those desires are determined — is insufficient for genuine evaluation or ownership of beliefs. In fact, basing one’s beliefs on one’s strongest desires — rather than on reasons and evidence one has the power to assess — is the very definition of irrationality. As Ben Shapiro famously quipped, “Facts don’t care about your feelings.” And if beliefs are formed merely in response to desires (which are themselves determined), then those beliefs are not aimed at truth — they’re aimed at emotional compulsion. That’s not rationality. That’s conditioning.

And even if a determinist claims to “experience” deliberation, the problem remains: they are not actively engaging in rational evaluation. Rather, they are passively undergoing the appearance of deliberation — a series of determined mental sensations moving through them, caused by something or someone else. But that’s not reasoning. That’s puppetry.

With that in mind, here’s the refined version of the FreeThinking Argument:

1. If exhaustive determinism (naturalistic or divine) is true, then all beliefs are ultimately causally determined by factors external to the agent.

2. If all beliefs are determined by external causes, then agents lack libertarian freedom with respect to those beliefs.

3. If agents lack libertarian freedom with respect to their beliefs, then agents lack rational responsibility for holding those beliefs.

4. If agents lack rational responsibility for their beliefs, then they cannot possess knowledge of those beliefs (since knowledge requires epistemic justification via rational evaluation).<1>

5. If determinism is true, then agents cannot possess knowledge of metaphysical beliefs — including the belief in determinism itself.

6. But some agents do possess metaphysical knowledge (e.g., that determinism is false, or that God exists, or that naturalism is inadequate).

7. Therefore, determinism (of any kind) is false.

8. Therefore, some agents must possess libertarian freedom and rational responsibility.<2>

This refined argument directly challenges both atheistic naturalism and deterministic Calvinism (not to mention the vast majority of Islamic thought). These systems — despite their theological and metaphysical differences — leave no room for genuine free thinking.

And that’s not just a problem for philosophy. It’s a problem for anyone who wants to preach, persuade, reason, or evangelize — because all of those acts depend on the assumption that the hearer can actively reason, be a more careful thinker, and think otherwise.

A Word to My Calvinist Friends

Back in 2017, I noted with surprise how strongly Calvinists reacted against the FreeThinking Argument — sometimes even more intensely than atheists. I now understand why: it struck at the heart of their commitment to exhaustive divine sovereignty.

But let me be clear: I am not denying God’s sovereignty. I affirm it. In fact, Molinism provides a powerful and biblically sound account of sovereignty that preserves human responsibility and rationality. That’s why I’ve devoted the past several years to defending Mere Molinism (stay tuned for the forthcoming second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism).

If you’re a Calvinist who affirms exhaustive divine determinism, I challenge you with this question: If God causally determines all of your thoughts, and you have no ability to actively evaluate them, how do you know your theology is true?

If you say, “Because God determined it to be true,” that’s circular and question-begging. If you say, “Because Scripture teaches it,” then I ask: how did you rationally infer that from Scripture if your interpretation was determined as well?

At the end of the day, determinism leaves no room for reason. And as Isaiah 1:18 reminds us, the Lord calls us to reason together. That requires the ability to be more careful — and to think otherwise.

Conclusion: A Vindicated Vision

Looking back, I’m grateful for that fiery little blog from 2017. It may not have been polished. It may have lacked footnotes and formal definitions. But the heart of the insight was there — and it’s now been vindicated.

The problem of determinism is not just a metaphysical puzzle. It’s an existential and epistemic crisis. It undermines rationality itself. And that means it undermines the very tools we need to know whether determinism is true.

The FreeThinking Argument and the Deity of Deception Argument are two sides of the same coin. When they are properly understood, they expose this fatal flaw. To be clear, this is not just a problem for naturalists. It also confronts any Christian tempted by the siren song of exhaustive divine determinism (EDD).

So yes — it kills two birds with one stone. Let us therefore stay free, stay sharp, and above all . . .

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

<1> This is not an arbitrary assumption. Rational responsibility requires the capacity to evaluate reasons and adopt beliefs in light of them. Under determinism, however, the process of belief formation is causally determined and thus bypasses that evaluative step — which is why epistemic justification collapses.

<2> For the more philosophically inclined, the argument can also be stated in symbolic form:

Let the following abbreviations represent propositions:

• D = Exhaustive determinism is true (naturalistic or divine)

• C = All beliefs are causally determined by external factors

• ¬L = Agents lack libertarian freedom regarding their beliefs

• ¬R = Agents lack rational responsibility for their beliefs

• ¬K = Agents cannot possess knowledge of their beliefs

• K = Some agents do possess metaphysical knowledge

• ¬D = Determinism is false

• L ∧ R = Some agents possess libertarian freedom and rational responsibility

Then the argument proceeds as follows:

1. D → C

2. C → ¬L

3. ¬L → ¬R

4. ¬R → ¬K

5. ∴ D → ¬K (from 1–4 by hypothetical syllogism)

6. K (some agents possess metaphysical knowledge)

7. ∴ ¬D (from 5 and 6 by modus tollens)

8. ∴ L ∧ R (from 3 and 4 contraposed and combined with 6)