Why Can’t There Be Multiple Necessary Beings?
- Phil Kallberg

- Apr 4, 2024
- 3 min read
Updated: Nov 11
Why can't there be multiple necessary beings? There is a good a reason why no professional philosophers make this objection to ontological arguments (I’ll add the caveat that it’s possible that there is one somewhere who has made this objection, but I’ve studied this argument and its objections for years, so I should have found it if anyone has). Basically a maximally great being (MGB) is what a valid ontological argument needs to work and by definition a MGB is one thing and one thing only. To be the greatest in a collection is to be at the top of the hierarchy of that group and as such there is only one singular thing at the top. This is pretty easy to see if you just think about who the greatest athlete is in a particular sport. There is a greatest baseball player, football player, soccer player, powerlifter, etc. Of course with these examples who is the greatest athlete changes over time as younger ones get stronger and better, current ones get older and weaker and so on. Likewise people may disagree about who is the greatest as the criteria are varied and shift as well. But the point is at any given time there is only one athlete who is the greatest. Likewise, where you are talking about the greatest of all beings, there can only be one by definition. Now someone might object that we can imagine two beings who are exactly alike in knowledge, power, morality, etc and that these beings are tied for the top of the hierarchy. This certainly seems broadly possible. But this scenario will collapse into one of these beings being greater. If the two beings are really distinct then they will do different things, and it’s impossible that all of the different things they do will equal out over time so one will become greater in virtue of the actions it takes. i.e. god1 and god2 are both MGBs. god1 creates a multiverse where god2 only creates a single universe, god1 is now greater. They both create multiverses, but god1 creates more sentient species so god1 is now greater. So even if you want to postulate multiple MGBs (which is odd and unneeded, more on that below) over time one will simple emerge as better (“over time” is simply an expression here and this will still be true even if they are outside of and/or transcend time). It is possible to have multiple necessary things (that’s just Platonism) but not multiple MGBs. An MGB is a singular thing by definition. If abstract objects are metaphysically necessary (Platonism) then there are a near infinite number of metaphysically necessary things, but only one of those will be an MGB and you need an MGB to make a sound ontological argument. Further the principal of simplicity (loosely Ockham’s razor) says that as a rule of thumb don’t multiply causation beyond necessity. Sometimes this is loosely expressed as the simplest explanation is true. But the idea here is if you have a simple and singular explanation don’t complicate it by looking for further explanations that are not needed. If the presence of virus A explains the symptoms of your disease, good and wise doctors won’t waste time and resources looking for other types of viruses, they will treat you for virus A. So likewise since a single MGB explains the issue that ontological arguments are attempting to solve, positing multiple MGBs is unneeded and foolish. Why speculate about 2, 5, or 10 MGBs when 1 fits the bill? The principle at work here is that the more complex a thing is the more chances it has to break and or go wrong. So, per simplicity, it’s good rule of reasoning to posit only one MGB for ontological arguments and a MGB is by definition just one thing. I strongly suspect that this is why I’ve never come across a professional philosopher who makes this objection. Where they do object is by claiming that MGBs are impossible/incoherent (like a square circle), attempting to make reductio ad absurdum parodies of the argument, and (very rarely) objecting to the modal logic of s5 (this is extremely uncommon as the vast majority recognize modal axiom s5 is valid). Bottom line: no you cannot have more than one MGB. This is not a reasonable objection.




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