Alex Malpass vs Tim Stratton: A Debate on the Free-Thinking Argument

I recently had the honor of debating the well-known philosopher and atheist Dr. Alex Malpass on the PremierUnbelievable? YouTube channel. The catalyst of this event was the debate between Ben Shapiro and Alex O'Connor which took place a few weeks prior on the same platform. The topic of their debate was "Is Religion Good for Society," but a large portion of their discussion diverged into a debate about free will. Since that topic is the primary focus of my studies, the folks at Unbelievable? reached out and asked me to discuss this issue in more depth and detail. Shortly thereafter, I was invited to take part in a debate specifically focused upon the Free-Thinking Argument. 

I have the utmost respect for Alex Malpass. Years ago he saw fit to critique some early forms of the Free-Thinking Argument (FTA) on his website, The Use of Reason. I am glad that he did! I read his two articles and took careful notes. I realized that I needed to make some changes to the argument if it was going to survive. Thus, the evolution of the FTA began to occur. If it were not for Malpass (and a couple other skeptical philosophers), then the argument would have probably died. But that which does not kill an argument makes it stronger. 

I had previously written a long response addressing Malpass's critiques. I became distracted, however, by other responsibilities and writing projects and never finished the job. This debate allowed the opportunity to respond to Malpass's constructive criticism and allow him a chance to evaluate the "new and improved" version of the FTA.  

I encourage you to evaluate the debate. Click here to view it. 

Reflections 

I have now taken part in three debates and I have learned so much from each of them. My first debate was with James White (2021). Although I believe I won that debate as far as content is concerned, after watching the "game film" (as it were), I realized that I lost a lot of "style points" during the cross-examination. I was a nervous wreck in my rookie debut and it showed! My next debate was with my good friend and colleague at Trinity College of the Bible and Theological Seminary, Chris Date (2022). That debate was mostly cross-examination (sans our opening statements), and although I was still nervous, I felt it was a bit of an improvement. I finally began to feel more comfortable and relaxed in this last debate. Although I know I have a long way to go, it seems that experience is the best teacher. 

The format for the debate with Malpass was for me to present and explain the Free-Thinking Argument, then for Malpass to offer objections to it, and then for me to respond in a back and forth manner over three 25-minute rounds. Of course, since I had the burden of proof, I did have to take ample time to offer and explain the argument. This led to a bit of lopsidedness as far as speaking time was concerned. Here is the evolved version of the Free-Thinking Argument I advanced:

1. If naturalistic determinism is true, then human beings lack libertarian freedom.

2. If human beings lack libertarian freedom, then their rational processes are unreliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

3. Human beings’ rational processes are reliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

4. Therefore, human beings have libertarian freedom.

5. Therefore, naturalistic determinism is false.

In response to this version of the FTA, it seems to me that Malpass brought forth three main counters. We spent a lot of time discussing what it means to be "reliable." He also offered the chess playing computer known as Alpha Zero as a machine that does not possess libertarian freedom, but nevertheless, is still rational. Finally, Malpass appealed to evolution over millions or billions of years as an explanation of how we became the kinds of things that possess the power to infer best explanations and truth about metaphysical matters. I will summarize and expand upon what I offered in response below.

What does it mean to be "reliable"? 

One of the points I have sought to convey -- with the help of philosophers J.P. Moreland and Jacobus Erasmus -- is that if naturalistic determinism is true (a view held by many atheists), then the entirety of human mental activity is determined by non-rational antecedent conditions. As I pointed out in the debate, this means that all of a person's metaphysical beliefs are determined by "consciousness-lacking, intelligence-lacking, wisdom-lacking, reason-lacking, morality-lacking, and, as Joshua Rasmussen would say, 'mindless stuff' that knows nothing about metaphysics."

I followed that by noting that this might have been why Charles Darwin himself admitted: “ith me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind . . . are of any value or at all trustworthy.” Now, the FTA finds the cardinal difficulty, not only in the conjunction of naturalism and evolution per se (which is a problem) . . . but primarily in determinism (and its preclusion of libertarian free-thinking) coupled with the biggest problem that the mindless stuff sufficient to necessitate all of Malpass's metaphysical beliefs knows nothing about metaphysics and could care less if anyone (including Malpass) has correct metaphysical beliefs (including those under discussion). 

That’s a huge reason to doubt Malpass's metaphysical beliefs about free will.

After all, if one's rational processes are determined by external factors (mindless stuff), then how can one be responsible for—in the sense of having the ultimate say or decision or power over—his use of reason or the manner in which he reasons? By definition, determinism entails that a person's mental activity is not up to him, and this implies that one's role in his mental performances is, at best, as a passive cog, a caused cause, or a controlled puppet. Thus, the naturalistic determinist cannot trust himself to reason correctly on metaphysical matters, but rather, he must trust mindless stuff to make him reason correctly on metaphysical matters.

This leads to what I have referred to as “epistemic meltdown,” or to what William Lane Craig refers to as a "sense of vertigo." This is the case because mindless stuff that knows nothing about metaphysics (and could care less if humans possess true metaphysical beliefs) is an unreliable source to determine a person to possess true metaphysical beliefs. This raises a huge defeater for the one who claims that (i) naturalistic determinism is true, and (ii) he knows the truth about metaphysical matters. As I noted in the debate, if a defeater is raised against one's metaphysical belief, it is not reliable. That is to say, one has reason not to trust it as there is a big reason to doubt it. This is known as an undercutting defeater. 

Much time was spent discussing the word "reliable." A source is reliable if can be trusted to deliver truth. Mindless stuff that knows nothing about metaphysics and doesn't care if you do either cannot be rationally trusted to deliver true metaphysical beliefs. Therefore, if mindless stuff determines all of one's metaphysical beliefs, one's metaphysical beliefs are not reliable. A rational person has reason to doubt said beliefs. 

The master premise of my argument was carefully worded and stated this way: "If human beings lack libertarian freedom, then their rational processes are unreliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters." What I refer to as the "pivotal premise" is stated in this manner: "Human beings’ rational processes are reliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters." So, it is clear that I am highlighting the fact that if naturalistic determinism is true, then the antecedent conditions that are the source of our metaphysical beliefs -- and sufficient to necessitate our metaphysical beliefs -- are unreliable to determine humans to hold true metaphysical beliefs. Why is this the case? Because those same mindless antecedent conditions that are the source of your metaphysical beliefs know nothing about metaphysics and could care less if you do either. Thus, if naturalistic determinism were true, we would have reason to doubt our metaphysical beliefs.

During the break between the second and third rounds, Malpass and I seemed to finally come to an agreement upon the big idea or concept I was attempting to communicate. Upon reflection, perhaps this wording might have been helpful:

1.  If naturalistic determinism is true, then mindless stuff determines all metaphysicians to affirm false metaphysical beliefs.

2. If mindless stuff determines all metaphysicians to affirm false metaphysical beliefs, then metaphysical beliefs (including those which are true by accident) are not justified.

3. If metaphysical beliefs are not justified, then metaphysicians do not possess knowledge of metaphysics.

4. Metaphysicians do possess knowledge of metaphysics.

5. Therefore, mindless stuff does not determine all metaphysicians to affirm false metaphysical beliefs.

6. Therefore, naturalistic determinism is false.

Be that as it may, Malpass finally agreed with me that humans do possess the power to reliably infer best explanations about metaphysical reality IF we painstakingly and carefully work at attaining metaphysical truth. That is to say, it is possible to attain metaphysical knowledge (we can do it). Indeed, if one were to attempt to argue otherwise, then, with that very act, they would be providing evidence that one can reliably infer truth about metaphysical matters. That's a great reason to think the pivotal premise is true. 

Upon reaching an agreement on the pivotal premise, Alex brought forth a counter-example in an attempt to discredit the master premise of the Free-Thinking Argument. 

Alpha Zero

Malpass appealed to a magnificent chess-playing machine called Alpha Zero. He noted that this artificial intelligence was intelligently designed and amazingly programmed and that within a day of exposure to the rules of Chess became stronger than any other human chess player or chess engine. Malpass said that "Alpha Zero is working out a way of determining what the moves should be and it doesn't have libertarian freedom."

While this seems to be a good counter-example at face-value, upon careful analysis, we see that this attempt fails to defeat the relevant point of the FTA for several reasons:

1- Malpass used active language to describe a passive situation. As J.P. Moreland and I pointed out in our paper "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument":

It is worth noting that when determinists make their case for epistemically responsible deliberation they employ certain terminology that is both unavailable to them and provides the real intuition-pump for the adequacy of their case. The terminology in view includes “agent,” “acting,” “deliberating,” “efficacy,” and so forth. Observe that all of these are typically understood as exercises of active power and not the mere passive triggering of passive liabilities as events in a series of passive (triggered triggerers) occurrences running through, yet not involving the agency of the person. These terms are in the active and not the passive voice. For each employment of one of these terms, a reductive paraphrase is available that provides an accurate account of what is really being expressed. Consider the following:

(P1) Rae deliberated about P.(P2) A deliberating-about-P was caused to occur in Rae.

P1 employs “deliberated” in the active voice and implies that Rae was exercising her agency and active power in performing a deliberative act. But this is not the case if determinism is true. For the determinist, P2 makes clear what is actually meant by asserting P1. Though unintentional, by utilizing statements like P1 in expressing their views, determinists benefit from a rhetorical mirage that keeps hidden what is actually being asserted (P2).

Alpha Zero has zero active control or power to work things out. As C.S. Lewis would say, reasoning is happening to Alpha Zero, but Alpha Zero does not do it. Alpha Zero is a passive cog that is intelligently designed and determined to function exactly as it functions.  

2- John Searle's Chinese Room shows that machines do not reason as humans reason. With the use of reason in mind, my debate with Chat GPT on free-thinking exemplifies this fact. Artificial Intelligence has agreed with me that determined machines, unlike humans, cannot engage in indirect doxastic voluntarism. This includes what Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton has referred to as "the carefulness condition." If the entirety of one's mental activity is determined by something or someone else, then one has no active power to be careful or more careful. No, the exact manner in which one thinks -- and what one ultimately believes about ultimate reality -- is necessitated by other stuff. 

3- Most importantly, the Alpha Zero example is not relevantly analogous as the machine was created, intelligently designed, fine-tuned, and programmed by rational humans who desired it to reach true conclusions about the world. On the contrary, if naturalistic determinism is true, then non-rational and mindless antecedent conditions -- that know nothing of metaphysics -- did not program us to attain true beliefs about metaphysical matters. Which, ironically, is the very thing we are engaged in during these debates. 

This brought forth another counter-example from Malpass.

Evolution

Malpass noted that although, according to his view, we were not created for the purpose or designed with a teleological goal of attaining truth about metaphysical matters, perhaps the "blind watchmaker" (as Richard Dawkins would say) provides the missing link to explain this power we have to infer truths about ultimate reality. Malpass said the following: "Over millions of years Evolution -- maybe billions . . . my cognitive process is the end result of lots of chops and changes, and trying things out, and whatnot. So we've just got to this point not because nature wanted this to happen, at least in my view, but I think that it could have."

I responded by saying that appealing to evolution is not going to make a difference. This is because, as Graham Oppy has noted, if there's one thing that's true about professional metaphysicians there's no majority agreement on almost any metaphysical matter. These highly trained epistemic peers are all over the place. This is why I noted that if naturalistic determinism is true, then these mindless antecedent conditions are rather clumsy at delivering true metaphysical beliefs to humanity. So, although evolution might help us cross the street or possess tiger avoidance behavior, once the conjunction of evolution and determinism is coupled with mindless antecedent conditions that know nothing about metaphysics -- and could care less if we possess true beliefs about metaphysics -- then epistemic meltdown occurs. After all, why should we think that evolution provides you with true metaphysical beliefs and those who disagree with you to have false metaphysical beliefs? What is it about these antecedent conditions and evolution that makes you more special than them? Why think that those things would give you true metaphysical beliefs, but not me or the person who disagrees with you?

Given the fact that there is so much disagreement on metaphysical issues among epistemic peers, I also noted that it's begging the question to proclaim, "Well I know that these mindless conditions -- that know nothing about metaphysics -- have determined me to get right this time, but they've definitely determined you to get things wrong!"

The Best Explanation

Toward the end of our debate, Malpass noted that it was rather egregious to conflate atheism with naturalistic determinism. He noted that there is no strict contradiction between the propositions (i) God does not exist and (ii) humans possess libertarian freedom. 

While I think there is a broad metaphysical contradiction to tease out (see Moreland's forthcoming essay), Malpass is quite right that there is no strict contradiction. I responded by making it clear that I have made no such claim. In fact, I noted the paper I coauthored with Moreland mentions atheist philosophers such as Evan Fales and John Searle who affirm the libertarian free-thinking of humanity. As we say in the paper, "they are closer to truth."

Be that as it may, the question raised is the following: what should we expect?

What view makes the most sense out of the fact that we are libertarian free-thinkers who have the active power to attain truth about metaphysics and ultimate reality? Moreland and I have pointed out that this concept is much more at home with Christianity than it is with atheism. Indeed, if atheism is true, we would not expect to be the kinds of things that could freely think from the deterministic laws and events of nature. We would not expect to be the kinds of things that had the active power to think carefully and infer best explanations about ultimate reality -- let alone to actually gain knowledge about metaphysical matters.

If Christianity is true, however, we would expect to be the kinds of beings who have the power to think carefully about these important issues in order to infer and attain truth about ultimate reality. Indeed, if Christianity is true, then we should expect that not only has God given us the power to actively take thoughts captive (2 Corinthians 10:5), but that God wants and desires all people to know the truth about ultimate reality (1 Timothy 2:4).

Thus, if you are created in the image and likeness of a Maximally Great Being (the God of truth) who desires all people to know the truth about metaphysical reality — and makes it possible for each of us to carefully reason together (Isaiah 1:18) and actively take thoughts captive before shallow thinking takes us captive (Colossians 2:8) — then the only reason to doubt your metaphysical beliefs is if it’s clear that you are not being as careful as you should have been — and could have been.

But that entails libertarian freedom to think (which means one is simply wrong about determinism).

The Free-Thinking Argument opens the door to multiple important metaphysical realities. It shows us that if we are the kinds of creatures who actually can practice active analysis and gain knowledge about these deep philosophical topics, then we must be free to think in the libertarian sense and not determined to think by untrustworthy prior conditions. In turn, that shows us that the common atheistic view of robust naturalism is false and points us to the God described in the Bible — the God of truth (John 14:6) who desires all people to know the truth (1 Timothy 2:4) about ultimate reality.

Let that sink in. The fact that you have the power to be reasonable is evidence pointing to the existence of God.

Conclusion

Alex Malpass was a pleasure to engage. I have watched him debate many others whom I hold in high regard -- including William Lane Craig! In our exchange Malpass was sharp, respectful, and professional. Although Malpass is an atheist, he was much more pleasant to debate than many so-called Christ followers who disagree with me. Unlike what I often experience on social media, Malpass offered zero attack on my scholarship, my intellect, or my character. In fact, by the end of the conversation, we both gained some common ground and each gained a new friend. When atheists are more Christ-like than those who claim to follow Christ, then those claiming to follow Christ need to re-evaluate a few things. Since we are not determined by antecedent conditions, we can all do better.  Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton