Christmas, Modal Logic, and the Ontological Argument

On Christmas Eve, as I was walking into the gym, I paused for a brief moment and posted something on social media that had been on my mind:

"God > anything else that could possibly be conceived."

Many people immediately recognized this as a hat tip to Anselm’s famous definition of God: "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Others—almost certainly many who have never heard of Anselm—still understood it intuitively and seemed to appreciate it.

I went to bed that night thinking nothing more of it.

But Christmas morning, I awoke to a Scrooge!

After opening presents with my family and enjoying breakfast together, I found myself with a little downtime. That turned out to be the perfect opportunity to discuss how we know that a maximally great being (MGB) exists. Thus, it makes perfect sense that He would enter into His own creation—the Incarnation, the very heart of Christmas—to reveal the truth about ultimate reality to the creatures we call human beings. In fact, if a MGB exists, it has predictive power. We would expect Christmas!

Here’s how the exchange unfolded.

The Facebook Conversation (Charles's words in blue)

Charles Webster: //Which god? How do you know?//

Tim Stratton: //The maximally great being.

Modal logic.//

Charles: //Tim Stratton you can’t logic something into existence. Arguments may be valid but that doesn’t make them sound. Your assertion has to be consistent with external reality, not just internal reasoning.//

Tim: //I agree that we can’t “logic just anything into existence.”

Logic doesn’t create reality; it tracks it. That’s why a merely valid argument isn’t enough — soundness matters.

If an argument is sound, its conclusion is true, and truth just is correspondence with reality.

Notice, however, that we cannot logic a unicorn, a married bachelor, or a “necessary pizza” into existence. Those concepts are either incoherent or clearly contingent, and modal logic won’t get you there.

What makes the Ontological Argument unique is that it concerns a necessary being. If a maximally great being is even possible, then—by the nature of necessity—it exists in every possible world, including the actual one.

So the real question isn’t whether logic can manufacture something into existence. It can’t. The question is whether the concept of a maximally great being is logically coherent and metaphysically possible.

If it is, then the deductive conclusion follows about reality itself.

At the very least, that should get a rational person’s attention—since the same reasoning doesn’t work for anything else.

Merry Christmas!//

Charles: //Tim Stratton yet you presuppose a necessary being and then use that necessity to attempt logic it into existence.

Philosophy moved on from Anselm a long time ago. But yes, a merry Newtonmass to you too. 🙂//

Tim: //I’m not presupposing a necessary being at all. I’m simply starting with a possibility claim: "it is possible that a maximally great being exists."

That’s the first premise, and it’s open to critique. But rejecting it requires showing that the concept of a MGB is logically incoherent or metaphysically impossible. It does not work to merely assert that “philosophy has moved on.”

Also, contrary to your claim, this isn’t Anselm’s original argument. You’re right that philosophy has moved on — which is why contemporary defenders appeal to modal deductive logic (e.g., Alvin Plantinga and Phil Kallberg). The key principle is simple: if a necessary being is even possibly instantiated, then it exists in every possible world, including the actual one.

So the dispute isn’t about “logicing something into existence,” nor is it about medieval reasoning. It’s about whether the concept of a maximally great being is logically coherent and possibly exemplified. If it is, the conclusion logically follows. If it isn’t, that’s where the objection needs to land.

So, once again, Merry Christmas. 😉//

Charles: //No - rejecting your first premise only requires asking you to demonstrate the possibility of a maximally great being, and you failing to do so. Which you do.

So, go ahead. What are the conditions and parameters according to which you claim such a being is possible, and necessary? How do you demonstrate these claims?

Thanks, but I’m aware of Plantinga et al. They have done nothing to make it more possible to define something into existence - even through modal logic.

• The key premise - that such a being is possible - is asserted, not proven.

• One can just as easily argue that such a being is impossible.

Modal versions shift the problem but don’t solve it. You just kick the can down the road.

Merry Newtonmass.//

Tim: //Charles, I didn’t argue for God’s existence here (although I have elsewhere) — I merely stated a modal possibility claim: that a maximally great being (MGB) is possible. In modal logic, that premise doesn’t need to be “proven” in the way empirical claims do; it stands unless it can be shown to be logically incoherent.

If you’re familiar with Plantinga et al. (As you claim), you should already know that the burden is on the critic to show that the concept of an MGB is impossible (i.e., involves a logical contradiction).

Simply saying “one can just as easily assert impossibility” isn’t an argument—it’s a bare assertion and it doesn’t work. So feel free to identify the logical incoherence. Show it!

Good luck with that.

Merry Christmas—and happy Holy days.//

Charles: //Possibility is a positive assertion. Being familiar with Plantinga doesn’t mean I think he makes sense.

Understanding a concept does not entail its existence.

• You can conceive of unicorns, perfect triangles, or ideal societies.

• Their conceptual coherence does not guarantee real-world existence.

Logical coherence is not ontological soundness.

Again, soundness demands more than just internal consistency. So unless you can show your working, claims that a MGB is possible are just words.

My flying pink unicorn isn’t necessarily logically inconsistent with anything either. That doesn’t make it real.

That’s not even starting to address the fact that you then need to demonstrate its actual existence…beyond, yet again, just modal logic.

Despite your protestations you really are just trying to argue something into existence by asserting possibility and then making a leap to actual existence with zero evidence of anything substantial.//

Tim: //Charles, you really don’t get it.

You’re still running together contingent concepts with necessary beings.

Unicorns, ideal societies, and pink flying animals are contingent, Their coherence never implies existence, and no one claims otherwise.

A maximally great being, on the other hand, is different by definition: it includes necessary existence, not contingent existence.

That’s why the modal move applies here and nowhere else. If a necessary being is even possible, then it exists in every possible world —including the actual one.

Logical coherence doesn’t guarantee existence for contingent things—I agree. But for a necessary being, possibility just is the dividing line between impossibility and actuality.

So the issue isn’t “show me more evidence beyond logic.” The issue is whether the concept of a maximally great being is logically incoherent. If it is, point out the contradiction. If not, modal logic does the rest.

If you tell me “a triangle with four corners possibly exists,” I can show you the incoherence. So, since the first premise says “it’s possible that a maximally great being exists,” if you disagree, you have to SHOW why the premise is false — at least if you want me and those following along to consider you to be a rational interlocutor who actually understands philosophy.//

Charles: //No - it’s you not getting it. You define your putative being as “necessary” and then use that definition to reach the conclusion that it exists. The problem with that is mind-bogglingly obvious.

Demonstrate that it’s necessary. Demonstrate that it’s possible. Demonstrate that it comports to reality.

Until you do, you have nothing worth addressing.

The rest is ontological, obfuscatory fluff - and displays the very definition of what I’ve said from the start: that you’re trying to logic something into existence from your armchair of motivated reasoning.

“But for a necessary being, possibility just is the dividing line between impossibility and actuality.”

The idea that possibility entails actuality for anything is just nonsense - especially when the presuppositions behind the claim are vacuous. Again: Demonstrate that it’s necessary. Demonstrate that it’s possible. Demonstrate that it comports to reality.

Your whole chain of reasoning is based on unjustified presupposition, flaws of form, smuggling in of concepts, ontological abuse of logical coherence to claim an entailment of existence, question-begging and bald unjustified assertions.

I’m finding this discussion tedious and disingenuous now. You seem a nice chap, but I’m done with the dishonest apologetics.

Have a great Saturnalia.//

Tim: //Charles, I’m not defining anything into existence. I’m distinguishing kinds of beings.

Contingent beings require empirical demonstration; necessary beings do not.

For a necessary being, the modal space is binary: either it is impossible (logically incoherent) or actual. That’s not a semantic trick—it’s a standard modal truth.

“Demonstrate necessity” or “demonstrate possibility” here does not mean offering empirical evidence (that’s like trying to use a metal detector to find plastic); it means showing logical incoherence if one denies possibility. Absent a logical contradiction, the possibility premise stands.

Simply demanding a different kind of demonstration is a category error, not a rebuttal.

You’re free to reject modal metaphysics altogether, but then the disagreement is methodological. It’s not a refutation of the argument. At that point, there’s nowhere productive left to go.

I appreciate the exchange. Enjoy the holidays.//

Conclusion: Why This Matters — and Why Christmas Makes Sense

The exchange above is instructive—not because it’s unusual, but because it reveals several very common misunderstandings about the Ontological Argument, especially in its contemporary modal form.

First, notice the persistent category mistake: treating a necessary being as though it were a contingent object. Unicorns, ideal societies, and flying pink animals are contingent. Their coherence never implies existence, and no defender of the Ontological Argument claims otherwise. A maximally great being, however, is not offered as a contingent entity. By definition, maximal greatness includes necessary existence. That is why modal reasoning applies here and nowhere else.

Second, there is repeated burden shifting occurring in the debate from Charles. In modal metaphysics, a possibility claim does not require empirical proof. To deny that something is possible is to claim that it is impossible—and impossibility must be demonstrated by identifying a logical contradiction. Simply demanding empirical evidence for a necessary being is like demanding a telescope to see mathematical truths. This is the epitome of a category error.

Third, the argument itself is often misunderstood. The modal ontological argument does not claim that coherence entails existence for everything. It claims that for a necessary being, the modal space is binary: either the being is logically impossible, or it exists in every possible world—including the actual one. Rejecting that principle requires rejecting modal metaphysics altogether.

Once these confusions are cleared away, the argument is straightforward:

1. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then it is possible that a necessarily existing maximally great being exists.

2. If it is possible that a necessarily existing maximally great being exists, then that being exists in every possible world, including the actual world.

3. It is possible that a maximally great being exists (i.e., the concept is not logically incoherent).

4. Therefore, a maximally great being exists in the actual world.

One may still reject the argument—but rationally doing so requires showing that the very concept of a maximally great being is logically incoherent. That work was never done.

And now, finally, Christmas.

If a maximally great being exists, we should expect intentional creation, moral meaning, rational creatures, and revelation. We should expect a God who does not remain distant, but who enters into His creation to reveal the truth about ultimate reality and invite His creatures into an eternal loving relationship with Him. In that sense, Christmas is not an arbitrary add-on to classical theism—it is exactly what we should expect if the Ontological Argument is sound.

God > anything else that could possibly be conceived.

And if that’s true, then Christmas—and later, Easter—are not fictional stories.

They are historical revelations.

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton