Does Molinism Collapse into Determinism? A Friendly Response to Idol Killer

One of the great joys of engaging in philosophical and theological dialogue is doing so with friends who sharpen us, challenge us, and walk with us in pursuit of truth. My friend Warren McGrew (a.k.a., "Idol Killer") is one such colleague. He is a bold and thoughtful theologian who, like me, firmly rejects exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) and seeks to defend a robust view of human freedom grounded in God’s love and sovereignty. Though we part ways when it comes to Molinism and Open Theism, I deeply value Warren’s friendship, his integrity, and his voice in the broader conversation.

Recently, Warren shared the following critique of Molinism on social media:

"Molinism claims to preserve free will by saying God uses middle knowledge — His knowledge of what non-existent free creatures would choose — to actualize a world where they freely do just that. However, since these choices are ungrounded in actual beings, God is essentially imagining outcomes & ensuring they occur through creation. This makes Molinism functionally indistinct from Calvinism, where God directly decrees all events. In both views, God’s creative act fixes all future events. Though Molinism may avoid direct causation, its reliance on God’s selection of a specific world renders all choices equally determined. Thus, Molinism collapses into a form of theistic determinism, and the supposed preservation of libertarian free will is illusory."

This is a clear and concise expression of a common concern raised by Open Theists and others who fear that Molinism, despite its claims, cannot ultimately safeguard libertarian freedom. And while I appreciate the precision with which Warren presents his case, I believe the objection ultimately fails. What follows is a friendly response and clarification.

1. Does God “Imagine” Outcomes on Molinism?

Warren says that on Molinism, God is "essentially imagining outcomes and ensuring they occur through creation." This paints God's middle knowledge as speculative or fictional, but that misrepresents the heart of Molinism. God doesn’t merely imagine what creatures would do; He

knows

what they

would freely do

in any possible circumstance. This knowledge is not the result of His decree, nor is it grounded in actual beings. Rather, it is part of God’s middle knowledge: His knowledge of true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. These counterfactuals are grounded not in actualized creatures but in the essences of possible creatures within the omnipotent God’s power to create. God knows what a creature would freely do because He perfectly understands their essence and how they would respond to any given set of circumstances. To say these truths are "ungrounded" simply because they do not depend on actualized beings is to misunderstand the metaphysical commitments of Molinism. In contrast to imagination, this is

knowledge

that is part of God’s omniscience—as real, certain, and non-speculative as His knowledge of necessary truths.

2. Ensuring vs. Determining: A Crucial Distinction

Warren claims that Molinism is functionally indistinct from Calvinism because God’s creative act "fixes all future events." But this depends on what is meant by "fixes." If "fixes" means God

determines

all future events in the sense that His decree is the sufficient cause of every thought, desire, and action, then this is indeed the Calvinist picture—but it is

not

the Molinist one. On Molinism, God sovereignly chooses to actualize a world in which He knows what free creatures would do, but He does not causally determine them to do it. Their actions remain indeterministic and free in the libertarian sense. If, on the other hand, "fixes" means God

ensures

or

guarantees

that certain events will happen—then yes, Molinism affirms that. But "guarantee" is not the same as "determine." As I often say, God can guarantee and ensure an outcome

without

determining it. That’s the beauty of divine providence operating through middle knowledge.

3. Does Choosing a World Render All Choices Determined?

Warren argues that God’s choice of a specific world means that "all choices

equally determined." But again, this equivocates on the term "determined." An event—or a choice, in this case—is considered determined if

prior conditions are sufficient to necessitate it

. On Calvinism, God’s decree provides those sufficient conditions for every event—there is no room for creaturely indeterminism. But on Molinism, God’s knowledge of what a creature would freely do in a freedom-permitting circumstance is logically prior to His creative decree. God does not causally determine the creature to act; He simply knows what the creature would do freely, and He chooses to create a world in which they will freely do it. Because nothing deterministically prevents the creature from choosing otherwise, the creature could have done otherwise (even though God knew they wouldn’t), the action remains free in the libertarian sense. Molinism allows for true alternative possibilities and agent-causal freedom. The agent is not determined by external causes or internal necessity; they simply indeterministically freely choose to act in a given set of circumstances—and God, knowing this, sovereignly actualizes the freedom-permitting world.

4. Predestination ≠ Determinism

Perhaps the heart of the confusion lies in a conflation between predestination and determinism. The two are not synonymous. To predestine is to

ensure

or

ordain

something will happen. To determine (in the relevant philosophical sense) is to

necessitate

it via antecedent conditions. Molinism affirms that God predestines all that comes to pass. But it denies that He determines all that comes to pass in the necessitarian sense. This difference is not just semantic; it’s the very distinction that separates Molinism from EDD-Calvinism and gives Molinism its unique ability to affirm both divine sovereignty and human libertarian freedom.

5. Is Libertarian Freedom Under Molinism Illusory?

Warren concludes that on Molinism, libertarian freedom is illusory. But illusions are appearances that contradict reality. On Molinism, nothing contradicts reality: agents really could have done otherwise in the actual world. God knows what they would and will do, but His knowledge does not causally necessitate their actions.

5a. Certainty Is Not Necessity

This kind of objection is often rooted in a misunderstanding known as the

modal fallacy

. Some assume that if God infallibly knows how someone will freely choose, then that person must lack the ability to choose otherwise. But this confuses

certainty

with

necessity

. God is certain that Agent P will freely choose X in circumstance C at time t, but that does not mean P is

necessitated

to choose X. Certainty is an epistemic property, not a causal force. God's foreknowledge of free choices is based on His middle knowledge—what creatures

would

do freely in specific situations—not on a causal decree that necessitates their choices. Libertarian freedom, properly understood, includes:

• An agent’s choice, action, evaluation, or judgment that is not causally determined by something or someone else.

• The opportunity to exercise an ability to choose among a range of alternative options, each compatible with one’s nature in a situation where antecedent conditions are insufficient to determine the outcome.

On Molinism:

• God knows Sally would freely choose X if placed in circumstance C.

• God creates Sally in circumstance C.

• Now God knows Sally will freely choose X.

The transition from "would" to "will" does

not

eliminate the word "freely." Sally still chooses X in a libertarian sense. Some mistakenly argue that because one is not free to "trick" God—that is, to act contrary to what God foreknows—libertarian freedom is lost. But that’s a non sequitur. The impossibility of tricking an omniscient being is not the same as being determined to act a certain way. God simply knows what libertarian choices we will freely make.

Conclusion

I am grateful for Warren’s thoughtful critique, and even more grateful for his friendship and shared commitment to resist exhaustive divine determinism. I consider him to be a valued colleague. While we disagree on this point, our common ground is wide and strong. My hope is that this exchange helps clarify what Molinism actually teaches and why it remains a robust alternative to both Calvinistic determinism and the vulnerabilities of Open Theism. Let us continue to reason together, sharpen one another, and pursue truth with humility and grace. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton