Does the Free-Thinking Argument Get a "Free Pass"?

David Pallmann recently graduated with an undergraduate degree from the institution which employs me as a professor: Trinity College of the Bible and Theological Seminary. Although I never had the opportunity to teach Dave in an official capacity because I teach graduate level students, I was proud to see him get his bachelor's degree. Upon graduating, however, Pallman has been extremely vocal over the past few months expressing concern over multiple apologetics-based arguments which are advanced by many respected philosophers. It seems to me that Pallmann has been on the wrong side of several arguments. I have written two responses (Objective Morality vs David Pallmann and Reason and the Necessity of Libertarian Freedom) and recorded two videos addressing his multiple mistakes (Part 1 and Part 2). It seems, however, that he continues to be perplexed. He recently posted a long post on social media complaining about three arguments advanced by philosophers and apologists that he "dislikes." In this article, I will respond to Pallmann's comments. For the sake of clarity, Pallmann's words are blue. Pallmann begins: "Here are three arguments for theism or against atheism/naturalism which I particularly dislike:1. Presuppositional Apologetics (TAG)2. Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism3. Freethinking ArgumentThey all have something in common, namely that they attempt to weaponize epistemic skepticism against the atheist/skeptic. They all try to show that atheism/naturalism is epistemically self-defeating in some way. The problem that I have with them is the same in each case. They all depend upon a theory of knowledge which, while purporting to leave the atheist/skeptic stuck in skepticism, if consistently applied, would also leave the theist in skepticism."While this may or may not be true regarding the TAG and the EAAN, it is not true for the Free-Thinking Argument. In "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument," JP Moreland and I were careful to explain why this is not the case in the same paper that Pallmann seemingly refuses to engage (see the above videos). Pallmann writes: "They all end up giving the theist a free pass on the same skeptical questions which are supposed to ensnare the atheist/naturalist."FALSE! Moreland and I were careful to not give out any "free passes" in our paper. This is why we wrote the following:

Ultimately, a person’s metaphysical and theological beliefs are either: (i) determined by something non-rational (and thus, untrustworthy), (ii) determined by a deity of deception (and thus, untrustworthy), (iii) random (and thus, untrustworthy), or (iv) caused by an intelligently designed free-thinking agent created in the likeness of a maximally great being (God) with cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in an appropriate environment which can be aimed at truth if the agent is careful and handles his or her powers responsibly. The first three options leave us with skepticism and reason to doubt our metaphysical and theological thoughts and beliefs. Option (iv) is the best explanation and our best hope. However, the fourth option entails that one is free in a libertarian sense—not determined by something unreliable or someone who is untrustworthy.

If one believes that he or she is a rational free-thinker who is not ultimately mind-controlled by something (or someone) else, then one should reject the determinism that seems to follow from both naturalism and EDD .

Pallmann continued:

"This is not to say that the weaponization of skepticism is, by itself, a bad thing. Several of my favorite arguments for internalism, Cartesianism, and substance dualism adopt the same strategy. The difference, however, is that these arguments don't leave their defenders in skepticism because they don't end up giving their defender a free pass on the very skeptical questions which are posed to the skeptic."

If this is the case, Pallmann should be the Free-Thinking Argument's biggest fan. It's odd that Pallmann repeatedly attacks an argument that he has clearly not studied in any depth. 

He continues: "To illustrate what I mean, consider how each argument plays out. Presuppositionalists insist that there is no rational justification to be had for beliefs apart from presupposing the Christian worldview. When putative justifications are offered, the presuppositionalist will insist that such justifications are circular and question begging. But when asked for the justification for the Christian worldview, the presuppositionalist ends up appealing to a circular, self-authenticating revelation from God (they tend to be unclear on whether this revelation is Scripture itself or some sort of inner witness of the Holy Spirit). Circular reasoning is, apparently, only okay when they do it. The problem is that circular reasoning is no justification at all. And so the presuppositionalist ends up in the same boat as the non-Christian supposedly does: with no justification for their Christian beliefs. No advantage has been highlighted for the Christian."

I agree with Pallmann that this would be a problem for presuppositionalism (see, The Free-Thinking Argument vs a Presuppositionalist), but it seems to me that many presuppers have been clear about what they mean. Eli Ayala has an entire YouTube channel dedicated to promoting Christian apologetics from a presuppositional perspective.

Greg Bahnsen seems quite clear when he says:

"Hence the Christian is obligated to presuppose the word of Christ in every area of knowledge; the alternative is delusion."

With that said, I think the Free-Thinking Argument is a much better approach for those who seek to employ the TAG. This is because one can conclude what the TAG advocate often presupposes. As I've said elsewhere, "Why presuppose what one can logically conclude?" 

What I find extremely odd is that many of those who advance the TAG also affirm EDD. These two things are not compatible with one another. See my article "The TAG vs EDD." I digress . . . Pallmann writes:

"Similarly the EAAN asserts that the conjuction of belief in naturalism and evolution yields an undercutting defeater for all beliefs including the beliefs in naturalism and evolution. This is supposed to emerge from the observation that unguided evolution selects for survival value and not for truth value. Thought experiments where false beliefs may be beneficial for survival are brought forward to motivate this idea. The problem, again, is that if the bare possibility of unguided evolution leading to false beliefs is supposed to provide an undercutting defeater for naturalism, then the same applies to the theist since there is a bare possibility that God could endow us with cognitive favors which produce false beliefs rather than true beliefs."

I think Alvin Plantinga was on the right track with the EAAN. With that said, I think the one who employs it should laser-focus on metaphysical beliefs -- as opposed to knowledge of how to avoid tigers or how to cross a busy street. Now, Pallmann notes the "bare possibility" that God is a deity of deception. Although this is not merely a "bare possibility," it is exactly what is logically entailed by the Calvinist who affirms that God determines all things. This is a huge problem for the exhaustive divine determinist. 

Here's what I refer to as the Deity of Deception argument:

1. If  exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.

2. If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted.

3. God is not deceptive and His Word can be trusted.

4. Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.

5. Therefore, EDD is false.

This argument (and others I've crafted related to it) exposes the fact that justified theological beliefs are not compatible with divine determinism.

Thus, if one has a theological belief that God determines all of their beliefs, that belief itself is not justified. Thus, that belief is not something that can be known (since knowledge requires justification). See An Epistemic Case Against Calvinism for further details.

However, if God is a God of truth (John 14:6), who desires all people to know the truth (1 Tim 2:4) that sets us free (John 8:32), then these defeaters to which Pallmann refers do not arise. 

Pallman continues:

"This can just as easily be motivated by thought experiments where it is more loving to let someone believe false propositions than true propositions (and to object that it's hard to see how this would work at the global level, the same response is open to the naturalist with respect to the thought experiments which undergird the EAAN). Hence appeals to God's loving nature won't help the theist here."

Pallmann misses the mark. This is not necessarily an appeal to "God's loving nature." It's based upon the God of truth revealed in scripture. This is why I've made it clear on multiple occasions that even if God had morally sufficient (loving) reasons to deceive all of His followers (which seems absurd), He would still deceive all of His followers. Thus, all Christ followers would be deceived by God and would not know which of their beliefs correspond to reality. This is not necessarily an attack against God's character, it's an attack upon the determinist's epistemological position. I'll say it once more: if God is a God of truth (John 14:6), who desires all people to know the truth (1 Tim 2:4) that sets us free (John 8:32), then these defeaters to not work. 

Pallman addresses this idea:

"Of course, the theist can build the idea that God wants us to hold true beliefs into their hypothesis. But then the same move is open to the naturalist."

This is false! If robust naturalism is true, then life in the universe is an accident of nature and most likely completely determined by the laws and events of nature. These antecedent conditions are mindless stuff that do not possess true metaphysical beliefs and do not care if David Pallmann or anyone else does either. But this is not the case if Christian theism is true. 

As I've written in The Free-Thinking Argument for Beginners:

Indeed, if atheism is true, we would not expect to be the kinds of things that could think free from the laws and events of nature. We would not expect to be the kinds of things that had the active power to think carefully about ultimate reality and infer — let alone attain — truth about ultimate reality.

If Christianity is true, however, we would expect to be the kinds of beings who have the power to think carefully about these important matters in order to infer and attain truth about ultimate reality. Indeed, if Christianity is true, then we should expect that not only has God given us the power to actively take thoughts captive (2 Corinthians 10:5), but that God wants and desires all people to know the truth about ultimate reality (1 Timothy 2:4).

Pallmann continues:

"He can just say that evolution not only aims for survival value but also for truth value."

Sure, one can "just say that," but one has no reason to think it's true regarding metaphysical or theological beliefs (the kinds of topics under discussion). Indeed, why should Dave assume that mindless stuff that knows nothing about metaphysics -- and does not care if Dave does either -- has determined him to affirm true metaphysical beliefs? Pallmann seems to assume he's correct to conclude he's correct. It seems that Pallman is a presupper!

Moreover, the opposite is true! There is reason to doubt Dave's metaphysical beliefs if mindless stuff determines all of his metaphysical beliefs. 

Pallmann continues:

"The theist might ask how the naturalist knows that evolution has equipped him in this way. But the naturalist can just as easily put the question back onto the theist as to how he knows that God has equipped him to know what is true. Either way the theist and naturalist are left in equally skeptical positions with respect to the accuracy of their cognitive faculties."

Not at all. The Christian theist merely needs to offer the following conditional analysis in response:

If the God revealed in scripture exists, then -- if we are careful to handle our God-given powers responsibly, bracket our biases, and do our due diligence -- we have the power to infer truth about metaphysical reality and theological matters. If our beliefs are determined by either mindless stuff or deceptive beings, however, then we have undercutting defeaters regarding our beliefs about metaphysics and theology. 

This leads us to the Free-Thinking Argument. Pallmann writes:

"And the so-called Freethinking argument (I'm adopting the name from Tim Stratton, although other iterations of the same idea can be found) depends on the idea that libertarian free will somehow makes a difference in whether or not a belief is epistemically justified. Allegedly atheists should be determinists and determinism somehow undercuts the justification which one has for any belief because one couldn't have believed otherwise."

This is already a mess for two reasons! Although many atheists are determinists for good reasons, Pallmann's claim that "atheists should be determinists" is not a premise of any versions of the Free-Thinking Argument ever advanced. And although not being able to think otherwise (such as the power to be more careful in a deliberative circumstance) is a major issue for determinists, the primary problem is that if one rejects the libertarian freedom to think, then it follows that something or someone else determines the entirety of one's mental activity -- including all of his metaphysical and theological beliefs.

As Moreland and I explained, the list of antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate human metaphysical and/or theological beliefs cannot be trusted or relied upon to deliver truth to humanity. Thus,

defeaters are raised against any view that does not affirm the God-given gift of libertarian free-thinking. With that in mind, consider

one of my favorite versions of the Free-Thinking Argument because it's short and easy to remember. It's in

the form of the well-known Fine-Tuning Argument:

1. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is either (i) determined by mindless stuff, (ii) determined by deceptive beings, (iii) completely random, or (iv) because he possesses libertarian freedom.

2. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is not determined by mindless stuff, determined by deceptive beings, or completely random.

3. Therefore, the philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is because he possesses libertarian freedom.

For a defense of these premises, I point folks to the paper I coauthored with JP Moreland (linked above). In that paper we also explain why a "fifth option" is ruled out. With that said, this new and evolved version of the argument highlights the fact that it is self-defeating to reject the libertarian freedom to think because to do so means that one must affirm that one of these other untrustworthy options determines his metaphysical beliefs.

Now, as I mentioned above, it's true that atheists are often determinists, but the argument can be worded in such a way that it bypasses this issue. Indeed, here is how the argument was presented at the 2023 EPS conference in San Antonio and the version which was defended in my debate with Alex Malpass:

1. If naturalistic determinism is true, then human beings lack libertarian freedom.

2. If human beings lack libertarian freedom, then their rational processes are unreliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

3. Human beings’ rational processes are reliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

4. Therefore, human beings have libertarian freedom.

5. Therefore, naturalistic determinism is false.

Pallmann asks:

"But how does adding the ability to believe otherwise add any reasons to think that any given proposition is true? It doesn't."

Sure it does. If mindless stuff or deceptive deities determines the exact manner in which Dave experiences sensations of evaluatings and judgings, then it is impossible for Dave to be more careful during deliberative circumstances.

 Indeed, as CS Lewis explained, Dave would not be deliberating at all. No, if determinism is true, then sensations of deliberations are "happening to Dave." If this is the case, then Dave has no active input in the reasoning process. He's just a "passive cog," as John DePoe explains, at the mercy of mindless stuff or deceptive beings. 

That's a huge problem for Dave, but as noted above, it's not the worst problem. 

Indeed,if something or someone else determines the entirety of Dave's mental activity, then Dave is not responsible in the sense of having control over the manner in which he thinks and ultimately what he believes (in an indirect doxastic voluntarism sense). If this is the case, then Dave is not epistemically responsible for his metaphysical beliefs -- antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate his metaphysical beliefs areresponsible for that much.

Consider the following: 

1. If humans are not libertarian free-thinkers, then humans are never epistemically responsible for our metaphysical beliefs.

2. If humans are never epistemically responsible for our metaphysical beliefs, then mindless stuff or deceptive beings determine all of our metaphysical beliefs.

3. If mindless stuff or deceptive beings determine all of our metaphysical beliefs, then humans cannot infer metaphysical knowledge.

4. Humans can infer metaphysical knowledge .

5. Therefore, mindless stuff or deceptive beings do not determine all our inferred metaphysical beliefs.

6. Therefore, humans are (at least occasionally) epistemically responsible for our inferred metaphysical beliefs.

7. Therefore, humans are libertarian free-thinkers.

This version of the Free-Thinking Argument kills two birds with one stone, but does not mention any birds by name. That is to say, naturalism, Calvinism, or divine determinism are not explicitly called out in the premises (of course, those ideas need to be addressed in the defense of the premises). Now, one might complain that this argument is weak as far as apologetics goes since it does not show that God exists, that human souls exist, or that naturalism is false. That’s true, but the Kalam Cosmological Argument says nothing about these issues either. However, the rational inferences from the conclusion of the Kalam show that whatever caused the universe to exist is a supernatural, immaterial, timeless, beginning-less, enormously powerful, personal being with libertarian freedom. That sure seems like an apt description of the God described in the Bible. Similarly, with this version of the Free-Thinking Argument in mind, if we have deductively concluded that humans are the kinds of beings who are not always determined by mindless or deceptive antecedent conditions, that we possess the libertarian freedom to think, and that we can infer truth about metaphysical reality (gaining metaphysical knowledge), then what view of reality makes the most sense? What is the best explanation of these deductive conclusions? As I’ve noted in “

The Free-Thinking Argument for Beginners

” . . .

. . . if was created in the image and likeness of a Maximally Great Being (the God of truth) who desires all people to know the truth about metaphysical reality — and makes it possible for to carefully reason together (Isaiah 1:18) and actively take thoughts captive before shallow thinking takes him captive (Colossians 2:8) — then the only reason to doubt metaphysical beliefs is if it’s clear that he is not being as careful as he should have been — and could have been.

But that entails libertarian freedom to think (which means is simply wrong about determinism).

The Free-Thinking Argument opens the door to multiple important metaphysical realities. It shows us that if we are the kinds of creatures who actually can gain knowledge about these deep philosophical matters, then we must be free to think in the libertarian sense and not determined to think by untrustworthy prior conditions. In turn, that shows us that the common atheistic view of robust naturalism is false and points us to the God described in the Bible — the God of truth (John 14:6) who desires all people to know the truth (1 Tim 2:4) about ultimate reality.

Let that sink in. The fact that you have the power to be reasonable is evidence of the existence of God.

Here’s another argument for good measure:

1. If naturalistic determinism is true, then human mental activity is exhaustively determined by mindless stuff.

2. If human mental activity is exhaustively determined by mindless stuff, then humans do not freely think in a libertarian sense.

3. If humans do not freely think in a libertarian sense, then humans are not epistemically responsible and cannot infer metaphysical knowledge.

4. Humans are occasionally epistemically responsible and can infer metaphysical knowledge.

5. Therefore, humans do freely think in a libertarian sense.

6. Therefore, human mental activity is not exhaustively determined by mindless stuff.

7. Therefore, naturalistic determinism is false.

Pallmann concludes:

"And if one's reasons for believing some proposition can remain identical regardless of their ability to believe otherwise, if those reasons are insufficient in the deterministic case, then they will also be insufficient in the indeterministic case. Hence the libertarian and the determinist are left in equally skeptical positions.

The moral of the story is that if you're going to try to utilize epistemic skepticism, make sure that you can actually beat it. Make sure that you are able answer whatever skeptical challenges which you are foisting upon your interlocutor."

It is clear that Pallmann has not been as careful as he could have been and should have been. It would help if Pallmann *carefully* read the paper I co-authored with JP Moreland. We explain why we don't have the same problems on Christian theism. Indeed, we had Pallmann's "moral of the story" in mind and preemptively dealt with it. I also addressed it in more detail at last year's Evangelical Philosophical Society meeting (here) and explained it further in my debate with Alex Malpass on this topic (here).

Bottom line: the reason why Christian theists do not have the same problems as atheists or naturalistic determinists is because the position that mindless stuff that does not know anything about metaphysics -- and could care less if you do either -- determines your metaphysical beliefs faces an undercutting defeater to the determinist's metaphysical beliefs (which includes the belief in determinism itself). However, if the God of truth (John 14:6) created you in His image and likeness (Genesis 1:26) with the power to reason together (Isaiah 1:18) and the power to take bad thinking captive (2 Cor 10:5) before bad thinking takes you captive (Col 2:8), so that you can know the truth that sets you free (John 8:32), then -- if you are responsible to think carefully and have reason to believe you have done your due diligence -- these defeaters do not threaten your metaphysical beliefs. 

With that in mind . . . 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton