Mere Molinism Remains

Recently, I had the opportunity to discuss Molinism with Ryan Mullins, Tyson James, and Josh Klein on the FreeThinking Ministries YouTube channel. The conversation was enjoyable, thought-provoking, and quite helpful. In my opinion, it really advanced the ball further to the goal of truth. It also clarified something I have been arguing for years: many objections aimed at Molinism are actually aimed at particular models used by some Molinists rather than at the essence of Molinism itself.

This distinction is precisely why I developed the concept of MERE Molinism.

What Is Mere Molinism?

Mere Molinism identifies the minimal commitments necessary for Molinism:

1. Human libertarian freedom.

2. Divine middle knowledge prior to creation.

That's it.

Many additional claims are often associated with Molinism. Molinists typically affirm divine timelessness sans creation. Ryan Mullins, however, affirms temporal succession in the life of God prior to creation. Some Molinists utilize the traditional language of logical moments. Others reject it. Some Molinists affirm transworld depravity. Other Molinists reject it.

These are important debates under the umbrella of Molinism. However, none of them belong to the essence of Molinism.

The essence of Molinism is merely that human beings possess libertarian freedom in the actual world and that God possesses middle knowledge (counterfactual knowledge of creaturely free actions) prior to creation.

It's just that simple.

Do Logical Moments Matter?

One recurring criticism is that Molinism depends upon logical moments. William Lane Craig famously explains God's knowledge in terms of logical priority:

• Natural Knowledge

• Middle Knowledge

• Creative Decree (God's choice)

• Free Knowledge

These are not temporal stages. They are explanatory relations. However, some philosophers, including Ryan Mullins, question whether logical moments are doing meaningful explanatory work. Fair enough.

Suppose we eliminate the language of logical moments entirely. What remains if God exists necessarilly and is both omnipotent and omniscient?

·  God still knows everything He could create.

·  God still knows everything that would happen if He created one way rather than another.

·  God still freely chooses whether and what to create.

·  Human beings still possess libertarian freedom.

·  The concept of middle knowledge still exists.

In other words, Mere Molinism remains.

At that point, the disagreement concerns how God's deliberation—if we use this word— should be understood, not whether Molinism is coherent.

The Difference Between Essence and Explanation

Some critics seem to think that removing logical moments is equivalent to removing the foundations of Molinism.

But this misunderstands the proposal.

Suppose someone claims that a house cannot function because the plumbing runs through the east wall. Then we discover the plumbing can run through the west wall while still delivering water to every room. The house has not been destroyed. The plumbing has simply been rerouted.

Likewise, if God's deliberation is understood dynamically rather than logically, the essential claims of Molinism remain unchanged. God still knows all possibilities prior to creation. God still knows what would happen if He created one way rather than another prior to creation. God still freely chooses whether and what to create.

The explanatory mechanism has been adjusted. The doctrine itself remains intact.

Logical Deliberation vs. Dynamic Deliberation

The discussion became particularly interesting when the concept of "schmeliberation" emerged.

The idea was simple. Suppose someone insists that deliberation necessarily requires dynamic time. Fine. Even if one disagrees, one can grant this for the sake of argument.

Thus, one can say that God possesses natural knowledge and middle knowledge in a static state of affairs (in which things have not happened and are not happening) prior to the first change. Dynamic deliberation then begins, followed by God's decision to create.

Nothing essential to Mere Molinism has changed.

Alternatively, one may maintain that God's evaluation of possibilities can be understood logically rather than temporally. Again, nothing essential to Molinism has changed.

The disagreement concerns the mechanism of deliberation, not the existence of middle knowledge.

To avoid the confusion of logical moments and the terms natural, middle, and free knowledge, all we need to say is the following:

A necessarily existing omnipotent and omniscient being (God) exists in a static state of affairs in which nothing is happening one after another prior to the first change. In this state, God simply knows all He has the power to create and all that would happen if He were to create one way instead of another.

Where is the contradiction?

I have repeatedly asked this question and have yet to receive an answer from anyone who rejects Molinism.

There is no problem here, or so it seems to me. This is simply what logical moments of natural and middle knowledge are attempting to describe. But if one finds these logical moments bothersome, they need not be used. The concept of what philosophers and theologians refer to as middle knowledge remains.

Future Truths and Fatalism

One of the earliest challenges raised in the conversation with Mullins concerned truths about what God would freely do prior to His doing them.

The concern was that if there is already a truth about what God would freely choose, then some form of fatalism seems to follow.

But this immediately raises an important question:

What exactly is meant by "fatalism"?

I explicitly distinguished fatalism from determinism. Dr. Mullins agreed with me that the two should not be conflated. An event is determined if antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate said event. Determinism (what I often describe as exhaustive determination) is the thesis that antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all future events.

Fatalism is often understood as the thesis that future events are somehow "fixed" (whatever that means) or unavoidable.

However, if fatalism by definition is not determinism, then we need to understand why it is supposed to be a problem for libertarian freedom. After all, the mere existence of a truth about a future event does not determine that event. This point is crucial.

Throughout my work, I have argued that truths and propositions—if they exist at all—are abstract objects. As abstract objects, they are causally effete. They possess no causal power. They do not make anything happen. They do not force decisions. They do not bring events about.

A proposition cannot cause a choice any more than the number seven can cause a hurricane.

Suppose it is true that Peter would deny Christ three times. Does that proposition determine Peter's action? Of course not. The proposition is true because Peter would freely deny Christ. Peter does not freely deny Christ because the proposition exists.

Likewise, suppose it is true that God would create a particular world. Does that proposition determine God's choice? Again, no. The proposition is true because of what God would freely choose. God's free choice is not produced by the proposition.

The order of explanation runs in one direction:

• The proposition is true because of the free choice.

• The free choice is not free because of the proposition.

This distinction is frequently overlooked.

Many objections implicitly assume that if there is a truth about what an agent would or will do, then that truth somehow necessitates the action. But why think that?

Truths describe reality. They do not produce reality. Facts reflect what agents freely do. They do not force agents to do it.

Consequently, even if one wishes to call the existence of future truths "fatalism," it remains unclear why libertarians should be troubled by it. The burden is on the critic to show how a causally inert truth or proposition can function as an antecedent condition sufficient to determine an event.

Until that burden is met, the objection lacks force.

Indeed, this is one reason why I have never found the mere existence of future truths to be a threat to libertarian freedom. The existence of a truth about a future free action does not imply that the action is determined. It merely implies that there is a fact of the matter regarding what the free agent would freely choose in a non-deterministic scenario.

And if that is all that "fatalism" amounts to, then libertarian freedom and middle knowledge remain entirely unscathed.

Notice what follows from this distinction.

If fatalism simply means that there is a fact of the matter regarding what a free agent would choose, then every Molinist already affirms it. Indeed, many non-Molinists affirm it as well.

The real threat to libertarian freedom is not the existence of truths about future actions. The real threat would be the existence of antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate those actions.

But truths, propositions, and facts are not the kinds of things that necessitate events. They are abstract and causally inert. They describe what agents freely do; they do not force agents to do it.

Thus, even if one insists on calling the existence of future truths "fatalism," it remains unclear why libertarians should be troubled by it. The existence of a truth is not the existence of a determining cause.

Libertarian freedom remains.

Truthmaker Maximalism and Molinism

Another issue emerged concerning truthmaker maximalism. Truthmaker maximalism claims that every truth requires a corresponding truthmaker. At first glance, this may sound harmless.

However, several difficulties quickly arise.

Past Truths

Suppose God annihilates all creation so that only God remains. Would it still be true that Abraham existed? Would it still be true that Peter denied Christ three times? Would it still be true that Caesar crossed the Rubicon? Would it still be true that Tim Stratton wrote a book entitled Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism?

Most people answer yes.

But Abraham no longer exists. Peter no longer exists. Caesar no longer exists. Tim Stratton no longer exists. Books no longer exist. The world itself no longer exists.

What, then, is the existing truthmaker?

More questions are raised.

Pre-Creation Truths

Before creation, was it true that God could create a finely tuned universe? Was it true that if gravity were significantly weaker, stars and embodied life would never emerge?

The fine-tuning argument appears to assume such truths. Yet before creation:

• no gravity existed,

• no stars existed,

• no planets existed,

• no physical constants existed.

What material reality did these truths correspond to? What state of affairs do these correspond to?

Past reality cannot do the work here because there was no past universe. There was no gravity, no stars, no planets, and no physical constants. Only God existed.

If truths about possible universes can be true before universes exist, then it is not obvious why truths about possible free choices cannot be true before creatures exist.

This places the burden back upon the truthmaker maximalist.

The problem becomes even sharper when truthmaker maximalism itself is considered. If it is true that every truth requires a truthmaker, what is the truthmaker for that proposition? The burden is not merely to assert truthmaker maximalism. The burden is to actually defend it.

The Real Disagreement

Some critics argue that if libertarian freedom is true, then there can be no fact of the matter regarding what a person would freely choose.

But why think a thing like that? Why can't both of the following be true?

1. I possess libertarian freedom and could choose otherwise.

2. If I were in non-deterministic circumstance C, I would freely choose X.

I see no contradiction.

The proposition does not cause the choice. The proposition reflects the choice. The proposition is true because of the free choice. The free choice is not free because of the proposition. Truth corresponds to reality (the way things are, were, could be, would be, and will be). Reality does not follow truth. Reality is not caused by truth.

This is the same point I have made repeatedly in response to critics of Molinism. The existence of a truth about a future free action does not entail determinism or fatalism (they are not the same thing). The existence of a truth about what a person would freely do does not eliminate libertarian freedom.

What requires proof is the claim that libertarian freedom and true counterfactuals are incompatible. That argument is often assumed, but not demonstrated.

Indeed, this appears to be the common thread running through many objections to Molinism. Whether the issue is logical moments, truthmaker maximalism, future truths, or counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, critics often assume that Molinism contains a contradiction. Yet once the assumptions are carefully examined, the alleged contradiction tends to disappear. What remains are important debates regarding explanation, not demonstrations of incoherence.

Conclusion

The conversation ultimately reinforced three conclusions.

First, Mere Molinism remains untouched by debates concerning logical moments. Whether one prefers logical ordering, temporal ordering, or some combination of the two, the essential claims of Molinism remain intact. Human libertarian freedom and divine middle knowledge survive regardless of how one chooses to describe God's deliberation.

Second, the existence of future truths does not entail determinism. Truths, propositions, and facts are not determining causes. If they exist at all, they are abstract and causally inert. Thus, even if there is "a fact of the matter" regarding what God or a free creature would freely choose, it does not follow that those choices are not freely chosen. It does not follow that they were determined. The proposition is true because of the free choice. Not the other way around.

Third, truthmaker maximalism faces significant philosophical challenges of its own. Before it can be deployed as an objection to Molinism, it must first be established and defended. Yet considerations involving past truths, pre-creation truths, and truthmaker maximalism itself suggest that the theory is far less obvious than its proponents often assume. Thus, one is under no obligation to accept such a controversial theory.

Taken together, these observations reveal a common pattern. Critics often assume that Molinism contains a hidden contradiction. Yet when the assumptions underlying these objections are carefully examined, the alleged contradictions tend to disappear. What remains are important debates regarding explanation, not demonstrations of incoherence.

Mere Molinism stands or falls on two claims:

1. Human beings possess libertarian freedom.

2. God possesses middle knowledge prior to creation.

Everything else concerns how these truths are best explained. And despite the objections raised, I have yet to see a contradiction in either.

In short, Mere Molinism remains.

To read more about these issues, be sure to check out the second edition of Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism.

To discuss these issues and more with other Molinists, please check out the official Mere Molinism Facebook group.

Stay reasonable (James 3:17),

Dr. Tim Stratton