Must Christians Sin? A Biblical and Logical Case for Libertarian Freedom in 1 Corinthians 10:13
- Dr. Tim Stratton

- Apr 16
- 6 min read
Updated: Nov 10

“No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it.”
— 1 Corinthians 10:13 (ESV)
One of the clearest affirmations of human freedom in Scripture is found in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthian church. Here, the apostle addresses a body of already saved believers—not unbelievers in need of regeneration, but Christians who are actively being sanctified. Paul’s purpose is pastoral, yes, but it is also theological and metaphysical. His words pack deep implications for how we understand human agency, moral responsibility, and divine sovereignty.
Put simply, Paul tells these Christians that God will not allow them to be tempted beyond what they are able to bear, and that He will always provide a way of escape—a way that they may endure the temptation and avoid sin.
If that’s true, then exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) cannot be. Here’s why.
The Argument from 1 Corinthians 10:13 for Libertarian Freedom
Here’s the argument I’ve defended for years:
If Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between a range of options—each compatible with their regenerated nature at a given moment—then they possess libertarian freedom.
At the moment of temptation, Christians have the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose either to give in to temptation or to take the way of escape that God promises to provide.
Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom.
This is a valid syllogism, and it flows directly from the biblical text. Let’s briefly defend the premises.
Premise 1: What Is Libertarian Freedom?
Libertarian freedom is often described as the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between at least two options, each compatible with one's nature, in a circumstance where the antecedent conditions are insufficient to causally determine one's choice. In other words---with sin in mind---if you sin, you really could have done otherwise and avoided sin.
If, in the moment of temptation, a Christian could have either resisted sin or indulged it—and both were live options—then they are not causally determined. That’s libertarian freedom by definition.
Premise 2: Paul’s Promise Is Not Hollow
Paul writes:
“God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it.”
This verse makes three clear claims:
Christians will never be tempted beyond their ability to resist,
God always provides a way out, and
Christians may endure it.
That word may is not deterministic. It signals real possibility, not necessity. Paul is not saying, “You’ll always do what you most want to do,” or “You’ll do what God determined you to do.” He’s saying: you can sin or you can take the way out—and you are morally responsible for the choice you make.
So Why Is This a Problem for Determinism?
Here’s where some deterministic theologies—particularly certain strands of Calvinism—run into trouble. If exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is true, then God determines not just the exact temptation, but the exact outcome of every temptation. That includes:
The temptation itself (which seems to contradict James 1:13),
The internal thoughts and desires involved,
The mental decision whether or not to resist, and
The sin that follows if one gives in.
Under this view, the so-called “way of escape” may exist in theory—but God also determines whether you will ignore it. So if you sin, then you were never actually able not to sin. You sinned because God determined you would—and you had to.
But Paul explicitly says that you don’t have to sin.
That means if EDD is true, Paul is not merely wrong—he’s misleading and deceptive. His assurance that Christians can endure temptation would be a false comfort and an outright lie.
Common Compatibilist Pushback
Many Calvinist theologians who affirm compatibilism argue that Paul’s use of the word ability (dunamai) doesn’t entail libertarian freedom. They claim it refers to a conditional ability—the kind of “freedom” where you could have done otherwise if you had wanted to, even though your wants and desires were themselves also causally determined by God.
But this collapses under scrutiny.
If your strongest desire is itself determined—and if God provides all antecedent conditions—then the “way of escape” is illusory unless God also determines you to move in that direction. That’s not moral freedom. That’s metaphysical entrapment.
The Calvinist here, operating with this so-called “conditional ability,” is ultimately forced to say: “You could have avoided sin . . . if God had determined you not to sin.” Big deal! By that same logic, one could say: “Since God determined you to sin, His power was sufficient to necessitate your sin.” That means you had to sin.
If that sounds absurd, join the club—and reject the Calvinistic view of EDD.
Furthermore, some suggest that we shouldn’t read metaphysics into a “pastoral” passage. But that misses the point. Pastoral encouragement only works if it’s grounded in metaphysical truth. You don’t comfort someone by offering a false hope. If you can’t resist sin, then it’s not helpful to be told you can.
A pastoral response should not include deception.
Responsibility Requires Real Possibility
Some Calvinist compatibilists appeal to Frankfurt-style cases, claiming that you can be morally responsible even if you couldn’t have done otherwise. I’ve argued that Frankfurt cases actually assume libertarian free thinking and mental actions (even if physical actions could not have been otherwise) —the opportunity to exercise an ability to at least think otherwise. Be that as it may, God’s inspired Word never assumes that kind of accountability when it is compatible with being determined by another personal agent (a deity, in the case of EDD). Scripture commands repentance, issues warnings, and exhorts us to flee sin—none of which make sense if God causally determines all the mental and physical actions of humanity.
If you couldn’t have done otherwise, then rebuke becomes nonsense. Praise and blame become misdirected. Accountability evaporates. And God ends up punishing people for sins they were deterministically decreed to commit and had no power to avoid.
That’s not divine justice. That’s divine puppeteering. It’s absurdity.
A common counter-illustration is the drunk driver scenario:
“The drunk driver who hits a pedestrian couldn’t have done otherwise at the moment of the crash—but he’s still morally responsible.”
Fair enough. But why is he responsible?
He’s responsible not because he had control at the moment of the crash—he didn’t—but because he had control earlier in the evening. He had libertarian freedom when he took his third, fourth, and fifth double shot of whiskey. With each drink, he freely surrendered his rational faculties and voluntarily gave up control. He freely chose to tarnish the image and likeness of God—specifically his God-given rationality and volitional freedom—in which he was created to exemplify. He freely chose to forfeit his freedom and his image of God.
That’s exactly why he’s accountable. He freely chose to relinquish his agency. He wasn’t determined by some external force—he determined himself to get drunk. That’s why we blame him. If he were determined by someone else to get drunk and cause harm, we wouldn’t blame him—we’d pity him, and blame the someone else.
This is how our justice system works. It reflects our moral intuitions. And it’s how Scripture operates.
You are responsible for sin because you could have done otherwise.
What About Other Passages That Sound Deterministic?
Of course, some texts—like the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart or Acts 4:27–28—are often cited to support determinism. Although I believe Molinism better explains these passages—and preserves human libertarian freedom—let’s suppose for the sake of argument that they support a deterministic reading. What follows? Not much, because exceptional cases don’t overturn normative patterns. God can override human freedom in redemptive history when necessary, but this doesn’t mean He always does.
1 Corinthians 10:13 is not exceptional. It’s normative. It applies to every Christian, in every temptation, at every moment. It is a standing promise of divine faithfulness—and it makes no sense unless Christians genuinely have the ability to take the way of escape.
What’s at Stake?
Let’s spell it out:
If EDD is true, then God provides the antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate each and every sin the Christian commits.
If God provides those sufficient conditions, then the Christian must sin each and every time.
Paul is clear that Christians do not have to sin (1 Cor. 10:13).
Therefore, if EDD is true, Paul is wrong.
If Paul is wrong, the Bible is not inerrant.
If the Bible is not inerrant, the foundation of Christianity—let alone Reformed theology—collapses.
This isn’t just about free will. It’s about the integrity of Scripture and the character of God.
Conclusion: Libertarian Freedom Is Biblical
1 Corinthians 10:13 isn’t abstract theology. It’s real-world pastoral guidance. And it only makes sense if libertarian freedom is real.
God is not the author of sin. God does not determine all the mental and physical actions of Christians. Christians are not puppets—mentally or physically. And Paul is not a liar.
If Christians really have a “way of escape,” then they really have the power to take it—or not. And that means the Bible affirms libertarian freedom. That means that EDD-Calvinism is incompatible with the Word of God.
Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),
Dr. Tim Stratton




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