Seven Misfires: A Molinist Response to Alan Rhoda’s Critique

Dr. Alan Rhoda recently published a blog post listing seven serious objections to Molinism. While I respect Alan and appreciate his philosophical rigor, I believe that each of his objections either misunderstands core distinctions, rests on controversial assumptions, or misrepresents what Molinists actually affirm.

In this response, I will address each of his seven critiques in turn, defending the coherence and theological power of Mere Molinism.

1. Internal Inconsistency? No. Indeterminism ≠ Epistemic Opacity

Rhoda begins by claiming that Molinism is internally inconsistent because it posits a definite outcome in an indeterministic setting. According to him, if a situation is genuinely indeterministic, then God can't know a definitive "would" statement about how an agent would choose. But this objection assumes a controversial thesis: that indeterminism entails epistemic opacity. That is, because the choice is not causally determined, there can be no fact of the matter about what the agent would freely do. However, many prominent philosophers reject this claim, including William Lane Craig, Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, and Robert Adams.

On Molinism, God’s omniscience includes knowledge of all truths—including truths about what free agents would do in hypothetical circumstances. This is what middle knowledge refers to. Certainty does not entail necessity. A person can act freely in a libertarian sense, and yet their action can still be known by an omniscient God. Epistemic certainty does not override creaturely freedom.

2. Implicit Determinism? Only If You Confuse Priority with Causality

Next, Rhoda claims that Molinism smuggles in determinism because God chooses which possible world to actualize based on what creatures would freely do. But this objection conflates

logical priority

with

causal determinism

. Molinism affirms that God’s knowledge of what creatures would freely do is logically prior to His creative decree, but the truth of those counterfactuals is grounded in the libertarian agency of the creatures. God does not determine what those agents would do—He simply knows it. Middle knowledge + divine actualization is sufficient for the

occurrence

of the free action, not for the

truth

of the counterfactual. The latter is grounded in the agent’s essence and capacity for libertarian freedom (which an omnipotent God has the power to create).

Bottom line: God’s actualization of a world explains why a free choice occurs—but it doesn’t cause the choice to happen the way it does.

3. The Grounding Objection? A Philosophical Misfire

Rhoda then raises the familiar grounding objection: If the truths in God’s middle knowledge are neither grounded in His nature, His will, nor creation, then they are grounded in nothing. This objection rests on

truthmaker maximalism

—the controversial view that every truth must have a metaphysical grounding entity. To be clear: this view is not universally accepted! Philosophers like Trenton Merricks, Ross Cameron, and Krista K. Thomason (among others) have argued that many truths (especially modal or counterfactual ones) do not require traditional truthmakers. As I explain in my forthcoming book, a proposition is true if it corresponds to the way things are, were, will be, or would be. Even if the relevant agents are never created, it can still be true that

if

they were created and placed in C, they

would

freely choose A. That’s what God knows via middle knowledge.

4. Denial of Divine Aseity or Sovereignty? Quite the Opposite

According to Rhoda, Molinism denies divine aseity because God is allegedly constrained by truths external to Himself. But this is a category error. God’s omniscience means He knows all truths—including contingent ones—necessarily. The truths themselves are not "outside" of God in a way that compromises His aseity. Rather, they are known by God necessarily, even if they are not necessary in themselves. His decision of

what to do

with those truths is entirely up to Him. In fact, Molinism

preserves

sovereignty better than Open Theism, because it affirms that God predestines all things while still preserving human agency, freedom, and responsibility. It just doesn't define sovereignty as causal deterministic control over every event.

These truths are not ‘things’ that exist apart from God, limiting Him. They are simply the way reality would be if certain free agents existed—and God knows this necessarily, even if He never creates them.

5. The Problem of Evil? Molinism Handles It Best (and it's not even close)

Rhoda argues that Molinism entails God "ordains every evil thing," making it implausible. But Molinism doesn’t teach that God

wills

evil for its own sake—only that He permits it as part of a world where greater goods (such as the best feasible freedom-permitting eternal endgame are attained), including human libertarian freedom, rational responsibility, and moral accountability are possible. Unlike Calvinism, Molinism does not teach that God

causally determines

sin. And unlike Open Theism, Molinism affirms that God is never caught off guard. It is precisely the middle knowledge of libertarian choices that allows God to sovereignly allow evil without causally determining it.

But consider the implications of Open Theism for a moment. On this view, God may have been caught off guard by Hitler and the Nazis. Perhaps the horrors of the Holocaust—the gas chambers, the death camps—only gradually became clear to Him as events unfolded.

But once this deity did finally realize what was happening and fully grasped what the Nazis were doing, what kind of being worthy of worship would permit such atrocities to continue, resulting in the horrific murders of six million Jews?

That’s the deity of Open Theism. And frankly, it’s not much better than the deity of deception posited by Calvinism—one who causally determines every detail of the Holocaust, from Hitler’s intentions to the final breath of each victim.

Molinism, by contrast, offers the most coherent and theologically satisfying account of how God can permit evil without being its author. It allows for the genuine freedom of moral agents while preserving God’s sovereign plan for redemption. In fact, as I argue elsewhere in the literature, Molinism explains all instances of evil as part of the one feasible, freedom-permitting world in which evil is ultimately defeated—and in which everyone who is not transworld damned is freely saved.

And God could only know this if He possessed middle knowledge—the very thing Open Theism denies.

6. Biblical Implausibility? Not at All

Rhoda claims that Molinism cannot account for divine emotion or responsiveness, since God cannot be influenced by creaturely actions. But this objection fails on both theological and exegetical grounds. Molinism affirms that God knows, in advance, how creatures will respond in all circumstances—and that He interacts with them in real time. God does not learn new relevant facts, but He can still

respond

in real time, just as Doctor Strange still had emotional reactions to Tony Stark's death although he knew it was going to happen. Heck, I knew my dog Rondo was on his last legs months in advance. In fact, I took him to the vet to actively bring his suffering and his life to an end. I knew Rondo was going to die, and I've never been so emotional about anything in my life. I'm still struggling months later.

Foreknowledge does not preclude emotion. We grieve even when we foresee or foreknow loss. Molinism allows God to genuinely feel and respond in time, even though He eternally knows all outcomes.

Moreover, Molinism

better

explains divine warnings, conditional prophecies, and passages like 1 Samuel 23 or Matthew 11:21–23 than Open Theism or Calvinism.

7. Christological Heresy? That Charge Is Absurd

The final charge—that Molinism entails Monophysitism—is completely baseless. Rhoda, echoing Warren McGrew, suggests that if God ordains every detail, then Christ’s human nature is overridden by His divine nature. But this objection targets theological determinism, not Molinism. Molinism explicitly

rejects

determinism and affirms libertarian freedom. Molinism explains how God can "ordain" all things without determining all things.

In fact, Molinism requires that Christ’s human nature possess libertarian freedom—otherwise, He could not be genuinely tempted as we are (Hebrews 4:15) or serve as our moral exemplar. Far from undermining Christology, Molinism preserves the integrity of both natures of Christ in the Incarnation.

Moreover, this concern isn’t new. William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland addressed it years ago through their Neo-Apollinarian Christology, as outlined in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Their model maintains the unity of Christ’s person while preserving the libertarian freedom essential to His genuine humanity. The objection, therefore, has already been met with a robust philosophical and theological response.

Bottom line: if any view risks collapsing Christ’s humanity into divine determinism, it’s Calvinism—not Molinism.

Conclusion: Sound and Biblical

None of Rhoda’s seven objections succeed. Some rely on questionable metaphysical assumptions which one is under no obligation to accept; others confuse categories or attack strawmen. Molinism remains a powerful, biblically grounded, and philosophically coherent model that preserves God's sovereignty, human freedom, and the integrity of the Gospel. Mere Molinism affirms just two things: (1) God has middle knowledge, and (2) humans possess libertarian freedom. From these simple premises flow robust theodicy, rational epistemology, and a maximally great view of God.

I respect Alan’s work and appreciate that we both seek to honor God’s Word and character. But I’m convinced that Molinism—especially Mere Molinism—offers the most God-honoring and biblically faithful path forward.

Thanks to Alan for continuing the dialogue. Iron sharpens iron (Prov 27:17) and we are both advancing the ball closer to Truth. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton