The Evolution of the Free-Thinking Argument

While sitting next to Timothy Fox in Dr. Scott Smith's classroom at Biola University the summer of 2012, something Smith said sparked a thought. I quickly scribbled down a three-step syllogism in the margins of my notebook and got back to paying attention to his lecture. After class I approached Smith to show him this syllogism and he invited me to walk with him to the cafeteria for lunch. Shortly after that discussion I started sharing an expanded version of what I had initially scribbled down in my notes. Dr. Smith and I discussed this matter for the next two years as it became the focus of my Master's thesis which he supervised with the help of Sean McDowell. 

While many folks, from PhD philosophers to laymen in the church pew, loved the case I was advancing, many folks seemed to lose their minds over it (I've described it as "weeping and gnashing of teeth"). The argument deductively concluded that humans possess libertarian freedom, that human nature includes an immaterial soul, and that there is more to reality than simply nature (the kinds of stuff scientists test and discover). It also abductively concluded the existence of God. Because of these multiple conclusions, I expected atheists to oppose the argument with vigor, what I did not expect, however, was to see the vitriolic reaction from many Christians. In fact, most of the pushback the argument has received has been from either Calvinists -- who oppose the idea of libertarian freedom -- and typically younger Christian laymen who see themselves as the arbiters and gatekeepers of online apologetics. 

In all sincerity, I want to take a moment to thank all of the vocal detractors of the Free-Thinking Argument. This is the case because they have actually helped to produce so many versions of this argument over the past dozen years. Although they might personally despise the conclusions, my interlocutors have helped me to strengthen the Free-Thinking Argument as it has evolved over time. Typically, it seems that most opponents of this argument fail to interact with the big ideas behind the argument, but are content to complain about certain words used to describe the driving force of the argument. This has led to pedantic complaints that do not scathe the big ideas of the argument, but merely sweep them under the rug. 

The problem might be under the rug, but the big problem still remains for those who reject libertarian free-thinking. Since these complaints merely focus on the dialectic, the words can easily be ever-so-slightly tweaked to accommodate the concerns of those who oppose the Free-Thinking Argument. To use evolutionary language, these mutations occur without benefit to the host argument, but its descendants are stronger.  

Although the early versions of the Free-Thinking Argument are still sound (if one defends the premises accurately), the updated versions do not require as much defense as terms are clarified and premises are fine-tuned. I first started advancing an early version on Facebook in 2012. I focused upon this version of the FTA in my master's thesis at Biola University (2014), produced a YouTube video about it (2016), and shared it again in a co-authored journal article with Jacobus Erasmus (2018). Although the FTA was not the focus of my doctoral dissertation, I did briefly appeal to an updated version of the FTA to support the thesis of my dissertation (written in 2019) and published in my book Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism (2020). A couple of years later the argument adapted to further criticism as J.P. Moreland co-authored a journal article with me entitled, "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument" (2022). In November of 2023 I offered yet another modified version of the argument at the Evangelical Philosophical Society to a room full of philosophers and offered it again in my debate with atheist philosopher Alex Malpass on the Unbelievable? show (which was recorded the last week of 2023, but released to the public the first week of 2024). 

To be clear: the basic concepts and the big ideas that provide the force of the Free-Thinking Argument have not changed in the face of criticism. Yes, many critics have voiced pedantic objections, but critiques that do not kill an argument can actually make it stronger. Consider a few different versions of the Free-Thinking Argument and choose your favorite. 

2012 - 2018

1. If naturalism is true, the immaterial human soul does not exist.2. If the soul does not exist, libertarian free will does not exist.3. If libertarian free will does not exist, rationality and knowledge do not exist.4. Rationality and knowledge exist.5. Therefore, libertarian free will exists.6. Therefore, the soul exists.7. Therefore, naturalism is false.8. The best explanation for the existence of the soul is God

The primary criticism of the first version of the Free-Thinking Argument focused upon the words "rationality and knowledge." This is the case because I had one view of rationality in mind, and detractors often had another view in mind. Many of my interlocutors were focused upon a rational set of beliefs (that is, a set of beliefs where each belief is consistent and does not contradict any of the other beliefs in the set). That was not what I had in mind. I was thinking about what it means to rationally infer best explanations of possessed data. 

Of course, this version of the argument is still sound, but it requires the one advancing this argument to defend the key premise by carefully explaining what he means by the word "rationality." 

Six years after the birth of the Free-Thinking Argument, it experienced its first mutation. 

2019-2021

1. If naturalism is true, human nature does not include an immaterial soul.

2. If human nature does not include an immaterial soul, then humans do not possess libertarian freedom.

3. If humans do not possess libertarian freedom, then humans do not possess the ability to rationally infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims.

4. Humans do possess the ability to rationally infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims.

5. Therefore, humans possess libertarian freedom.

6. Therefore, human nature includes an immaterial soul.

7. Therefore, naturalism is false. 

After these adaptations, the Free-Thinking Argument's critics largely focused upon what I meant by "naturalism." Many also continued to push against the third premise and counter with objections like this one: "I can be determined to infer my wife has baked bread in the kitchen if I walk into my house and smell what I perceive to be baked bread." These kinds of counters missed the point I was attempting to advance. I had much deeper things in mind.

Thus, the Free-Thinking Argument continued to evolve. 

2022

1. If robust naturalism is true, God or things like God do not exist.

2. If God or things like God do not exist, humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense.

3. If humanity does not freely think in the libertarian sense, then humanity is never epistemically responsible.

4. Humanity is occasionally epistemically responsible.

5. Therefore, humanity freely thinks in the libertarian sense.

6. Therefore, God or things like God exist.

7. Therefore, robust naturalism is false.

8. The best explanation of God, things like God, and the libertarian freedom of humanity is the biblical account of reality.

J.P. Moreland suggested the use of the word "robust" to distinguish what I had always had in mind from what he refers to as "fainthearted naturalism." Here's the footnote written by Moreland in our 2022 paper:

"Robust naturalism is the idea that only physical things exist. A fainthearted naturalist, by contrast, is one who helps herself to non-physical or immaterial emergent properties."

While we personally do not think "fainthearted naturalism" is worthy of the label "naturalism," there are a minority of philosophers who disagree. Thus, the argument adapted for the sake of clarity. 

We also decided to focus on epistemic responsibility since so much of the literature and conversation regarding free will today revolves around the term "moral responsibility." The Free-Thinking Argument is focused upon something deeper and arguably more important. After all, if one is not epistemically or rationally responsible for any of their thoughts and beliefs, how can they rightly be held morally responsible for acting upon their determined thoughts and beliefs?

Although our goal was not to answer that important question (that essay is forthcoming), the evolution of the Free-Thinking Argument now stopped distracting conversations about moral responsibility being compatible with determinism. Moreland and I highlighted the fact that epistemic responsibility is not compatible with determinism (even if we currently grant -- only for the sake of argument -- that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism). 

This is because the reworded premises expose the fact that if humans are not epistemically responsible for our beliefs, then something or someone else is. If that something or someone else can be shown to be an untrustworthy or unreliable source of metaphysical or theological beliefs, then a determinist's metaphysical and theological beliefs face a defeater and are not justified. 

This led to a "spin-off" argument in the same journal article known as the Deity of Deception Argument:

1. If  exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.

2. If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive and His Word (the Bible) cannot be trusted.

3. God is not deceptive and His Word can be trusted.

4. Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs.

5. Therefore, EDD is false.

This argument exposes the fact that justified theological beliefs are not compatible with divine determinism. Thus, if one has a theological belief that God determines all of their beliefs, that belief itself is not justified. Thus, that belief is not something that can be known (since knowledge requires justification). 

See An Epistemic Case Against Calvinism for further details. 

2023

1. If naturalistic determinism is true, then human beings lack libertarian freedom.

2. If human beings lack libertarian freedom, then their rational processes are unreliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

3. Human beings’ rational processes are reliable to attain truth about metaphysical matters.

4. Therefore, human beings have libertarian freedom.

5. Therefore, naturalistic determinism is false.

Jacobus Erasmus and I realized that we could avoid all of the unnecessary discussions about "what do you mean by naturalism?" by simply going after "naturalistic determinism" in the first premise (it also makes the argument shorter and easier to remember). That is, just point out what follows from the idea that some form of naturalism is true, and that humans do not possess libertarian freedom. Moreover, to avoid objections about "baked bread in the kitchen," we decided to laser-focus upon the ability of humans to attain truth about ultimate reality and possess metaphysical knowledge -- which is what all who are engaged in attempting to discredit the Free-Thinking Argument are attempting to accomplish. 

As I've been walking down memory lane, carefully thinking about the big ideas driving the Free-Thinking Argument, and writing this article, a new version has just sprung to mind. It seems the evolution of the argument never stops. 

2024

1. If humans are not libertarian free-thinkers, then humans are never epistemically responsible for our metaphysical beliefs. 

2. If humans are never epistemically responsible for our metaphysical beliefs, then mindless stuff or deceptive beings determine all of our metaphysical beliefs. 

3. If mindless stuff or deceptive beings determine all of our metaphysical beliefs, then humans cannot infer metaphysical knowledge. 

4. Humans can infer metaphysical knowledge. 

5. Therefore, mindless stuff or deceptive beings do not determine all our metaphysical beliefs.

6. Therefore, humans are epistemically responsible for (at least some of) our metaphysical beliefs. 

7. Therefore, humans are libertarian free-thinkers. 

This version is great because it kills two birds with one stone, but does not mention any birds by name. That is to say, naturalism, Calvinism, or divine determinism are not explicitly called out in the premises (of course, those ideas need to be addressed in the defense of the premises). Now, one might complain that this argument is weak in that it does not show that God exists, that human souls exist, or that naturalism is false. That's true, but the Kalam Cosmological Argument says nothing about these issues either, but the rational inferences from the conclusion of the Kalam show that whatever caused the universe to exist is a supernatural, immaterial, timeless, beginning-less, enormously powerful, personal being with libertarian freedom. That sure seems like an apt description of the God described in the Bible. 

Similarly, with the latest versions of the Free-Thinking Argument in mind, if we have deductively concluded that humans are the kinds of beings who are not always determined by mindless or deceptive antecedent conditions, that we possess the libertarian freedom to think, and that we can infer truth about metaphysical reality (gaining metaphysical knowledge), then what view of reality makes the most sense? What is the best explanation of these deductive conclusions?  As I've noted in "The Free-Thinking Argument for Beginners" . . .

atheism is true, we would not expect to be the kinds of things that could think free from the laws and events of nature. We would not expect to be the kinds of things that had the active power to think carefully about ultimate reality and infer — let alone attain — truth about ultimate reality.

If Christianity is true, however, we would expect to be the kinds of beings who have the power to think carefully about these important matters in order to infer and attain truth about ultimate reality. Indeed, if Christianity is true, then we should expect that not only has God given us the power to actively take thoughts captive (2 Corinthians 10:5), but that God wants and desires all people to know the truth about ultimate reality (1 Timothy 2:4). 

Thus, if was created in the image and likeness of a Maximally Great Being (the God of truth) who desires all people to know the truth about metaphysical reality — and makes it possible for to carefully reason together (Isaiah 1:18) and actively take thoughts captive before shallow thinking takes him captive (Colossians 2:8) — then the only reason to doubt metaphysical beliefs is if it’s clear that he is not being as careful as he should have been — and could have been. 

But that entails libertarian freedom to think (which means is simply wrong about determinism). 

The Free-Thinking Argument opens the door to multiple important metaphysical realities. It shows us that if we are the kinds of creatures who actually can gain knowledge about these deep philosophical matters, then we must be free to think in the libertarian sense and not determined to think by untrustworthy prior conditions. In turn, that shows us that the common atheistic view of robust naturalism is false and points us to the God described in the Bible — the God of truth (John 14:6) who desires all people to know the truth (1 Tim 2:4) about ultimate reality. 

Let that sink in. The fact that you have the power to be reasonable is evidence of the existence of God. So, with that in mind . . . 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Postscript

Here's one more for good measure:

1. If naturalistic determinism is true, then human mental activity is exhaustively determined by mindless stuff. 

2. If human mental activity is exhaustively determined by mindless stuff, then humans do not freely think in a libertarian sense.

3. If humans do not freely think in a libertarian sense, then humans are not epistemically responsible and cannot infer metaphysical knowledge. 

4. Humans are occasionally epistemically responsible and can infer metaphysical knowledge. 

5. Therefore, humans do freely think in a libertarian sense.

6. Therefore, human mental activity is not exhaustively determined by mindless stuff.

7. Therefore, naturalistic determinism is false. 

Stay tuned for more versions of the Free-Thinking Argument. 

EDIT (3-25-24): Here's one more that just sprung to mind:

1. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is either (i) determined by mindless stuff, (ii) determined by deceptive beings, (iii) completely random, or (iv) because he possesses libertarian freedom.

2. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is not determined by mindless stuff, determined by deceptive beings, or completely random.

3. Therefore, the philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is because he possesses libertarian freedom.