The Free-Thinking Argument for Beginners

The Free-Thinking Argument has been receiving much attention as of late. J.P. Moreland recently partnered with me to explain and defend the Free-Thinking Argument (FTA) in the academic literature (2022), I had the honor of presenting the argument at the Evangelical Philosophical Society (2023), the Unbelievable? show out of the UK, invited me to debate the well-known atheist philosopher, Alex Malpass, about the topic (2024), and fifteen philosophers are contributing to a forthcoming volume with the primary focus of showing exactly why important kinds of rationality require the power to think freely in a libertarian sense.  This discussion can get extremely philosophical very quickly. Big fancy and scary terms like "antecedent conditions," "indirect doxastic voluntarism," "regulative control," "Gettier problems", "Frankfurt cases," and "epistemic responsibility" get tossed around by professional philosophers and the lay person -- who has never been introduced to these terms before -- often begins to feel lost. Indeed, some often feel as if they are immediately drowning in these deep philosophical waters as soon as they dipped their toes in just to get their feet wet. Sadly, many folks, upon hearing these big words, just give up. 

Fortunately, every once in a while a person who understands these philosophical matters also possesses the rare gift of knowing how to communicate these big ideas to the masses so that all people can grasp them (including little kids). Adam Ford, the original founder of The Babylon Bee is one of these brilliant minds. Not only does he seem to grasp the big ideas behind the Free-Thinking Argument, he also knows how to communicate these big ideas in a short comic strip. Consider the following conversation between Phil and Bill.

The guy on the left (let's call him "Phil") represents the typical atheist at the local university. More often than not, the students in the local atheist "freethinker group" espouse that only scientifically discoverable things exist and that all things can be explained by the natural sciences. Moreland and I refer to this worldview as "robust naturalism." In the footnotes of our journal article entitled, "An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument," we explain the difference between a robust naturalist and what we refer to as a "fainthearted naturalist."

"Robust naturalism is the idea that only physical things exist. A fainthearted naturalist, by contrast, is one who helps herself to non-physical or immaterial emergent properties."

The vast majority of naturalists one encounters on university campuses will not help themselves to the idea of immaterial thinking things like souls, ghosts, angels, demons, or immaterial minds. After all, those kinds of things are too similar to God, and if those things exist, why can't God exist? Since they are typically committed to their atheism, they are usually prejudiced against any kind of immaterial mind (especially immaterial minds possessing the power to cause things to happen). Indeed, these folks typically claim that evolution explains it all. This is why the last line above says, "We're just biological survival machines."  With that in mind, let's move to the next panel . . . 

The guy on the right (let's call him, "Bill") is noticing a problem with Phil's view. If robust naturalism is true, then this means that all things about humanity would be determined by the laws and events of nature (none of which is under our control). If these mindless prior conditions cause and determine the entirety of Phil's mental activity, then none of his thoughts and beliefs are free or under Phil's control. After all, it doesn't make any sense to affirm a view which entails that you are completely mind-controlled by mindless stuff, but you are still a "freethinker." 

The dialogue continues . . . 

The atheist hopes to convey that they are the ones who are free from the dogma and religious traditions in which they were raised. What Phil and his colleagues fail to account for, however, is that by making this move they are jumping out of the frying pan and directly into the fire. 

Bill explains why . . . 

Agreeing with Bill, atheist J.B.S. Haldane pointed out that, “If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true . . . and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.”

With Haldane's words in mind, it might be more accurate to say the following:

"If my mental processes which form my metaphysical beliefs are determined wholly by mindless stuff (that knows nothing of metaphysics and could care less if I know anything about metaphysics), I have no reason to suppose my beliefs about metaphysics are true . . . and hence, I have no reason for supposing my mental processes are determined by mindless stuff."

If one has no reason to think that the entirety of their mental activity is determined by mindless stuff, then the belief that the entirety of their mental activity is determined by mindless stuff is unjustified. Victor Reppert notes that “f the truth of one’s belief makes it unjustified, this surely would make the belief a prime candidate for rejection.” Thus, a rational and reasonable person ought to reject this self-defeating view.

To reiterate, if naturalistic determinism is true, then Phil’s so-called, “use of reason” is determined by no rational beings whatsoever. No, the manner in which Phil experiences sensations of reasoning is determined by consciousness-lacking, intelligence-lacking, wisdom-lacking, reason-lacking, morality-lacking, and, as Joshua Rasmussen would say, “mindless stuff” that knows nothing about metaphysics, philosophy, science, or anything else. 

Perhaps this is why Charles Darwin himself admitted: “ith me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind . . . are of any value or at all trustworthy.” After all, why should Phil (or Darwin) trust his beliefs and convictions about ultimate reality if they are ultimately determined by mindless stuff that knows nothing of ultimate reality? Moreover, why should those who affirm that mindless stuff determines the entirety of their mental activity be worthy of the name "free-thinker"?

Bill's final comment might seem to come out of left field, but he's exactly right. Moreland and I explain why this is the case in our paper:

Ultimately, a person’s metaphysical and theological beliefs are either: (i) determined by something non-rational (and thus, untrustworthy), (ii) determined by a deity of deception (and thus, untrustworthy), (iii) random (and thus, untrustworthy), or (iv) caused by an intelligently designed free-thinking agent created in the likeness of a maximally great being (God) with cognitive faculties functioning properly (subject to no dysfunction) in an appropriate environment which can be aimed at truth if the agent is careful and handles his or her powers responsibly. The first three options leave us with skepticism and reason to doubt our metaphysical and theological thoughts and beliefs. Option (iv) is the best explanation and our best hope. However, the fourth option entails that one is free in a libertarian sense—not determined by something unreliable or someone who is untrustworthy.

If one believes that he or she is a rational free-thinker who is not ultimately mind-controlled by something (or someone) else, then one should reject the determinism that seems to follow from both naturalism and . Instead, one ought to affirm that a supernatural God exists. Moreover, one ought to realize that he or she is a supernatural and immaterial active and rational free-thinking thing—a soul—created in God’s image and likeness, and who will survive the death of one’s physical body. 

Indeed, if atheism is true, we would not expect to be the kinds of things that could think free from the laws and events of nature. We would not expect to be the kinds of things that had the active power to think carefully about ultimate reality and infer -- let alone attain -- truth about ultimate reality.

If Christianity is true, however, we would expect to be the kinds of beings who have the power to think carefully about these important matters in order to infer and attain truth about ultimate reality. Indeed, if Christianity is true, then we should expect that not only has God given us the power to actively take thoughts captive (2 Corinthians 10:5), but that God wants and desires all people to know the truth about ultimate reality (1 Timothy 2:4). 

Thus, if Phil was created in the image and likeness of a Maximally Great Being (the God of truth) who desires all people to know the truth about metaphysical reality -- and makes it possible for Phil to carefully reason together (Isaiah 1:18) and actively take thoughts captive before shallow thinking takes him captive (Colossians 2:8) -- then the only reason to doubt Phil's metaphysical beliefs is if it's clear that he is not being as careful as he should have been — and could have been. 

But that entails libertarian freedom to think (which means Phil is simply wrong about determinism). 

The Free-Thinking Argument opens the door to multiple important metaphysical realities. It shows us that if we are the kinds of creatures who actually can gain knowledge about these deep philosophical matters, then we must be free to think in the libertarian sense and not determined to think by untrustworthy prior conditions. In turn, that shows us that the common atheistic view of robust naturalism is false and points us to the God described in the Bible -- the God of truth (John 14:6) who desires all people to know the truth (1 Tim 2:4) about ultimate reality. 

Let that sink in. The fact that you have the power to be reasonable is evidence of the existence of God. So, with that in mind . . . 

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18),

Dr. Tim Stratton

Notes

*For more from Adam Ford, check out his website here.

Lewis, Miracles, p.15. Lewis quoted from J.B.S. Haldane, Possible Worlds (1927, reprint, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001).

Victor Reppert, C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea, pg. 55

Charles Darwin, The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin: Including an Autobiographical Chapter, ed. Francis Darwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 316.