The Free-Thinking Argument: The Evolution Continues

Question

Dear Dr. Stratton, Consider the following valid argument: 1. Those who think otherwise about our having libertarian free will, use libertarian free will to think otherwise. 2. If this is so, then we have libertarian free will. 3. Therefore, we have libertarian free will. Yes, it's deductively valid, but is it sound? Only if you beg the question on premise 1. Which is why I've never found any of your versions of the Free-Thinking Argument persuasive. But do you *really* need an argument to prove there is LFW

? I think it's a mistake to think the LFW believer needs to defend their commitment with an argument. I think it's fair to assume we have it (by reference of our own experience) and that the anti LFW-er needs to show otherwise. In other words, the burden of of proof is on the *determinist* to show that LFW is false and the compatiblist that determinism is true *and* that we have "free will.". None of their arguments are any good. None of them. What they do, actually, is presume the LFW believer has to think determinism is the "default" position and that LFW needs to be proved. But that is *too quick* (yes there is evidence of determinism, but is it decisive? Far from it, I think). What you need is an intellectually virtuous way to assume what you believe and have objectors show you otherwise. Too many LFW proponents assume the compatiblist is entitled to presume their view is true and that it has to be proven otherwise. No reason to do that, though. Certainly, the compatiblists haven't earned that privilege. Our own experience of how our thoughts work is prima facie evidence enough in LFW's favor. The compatiblist has to say it's all deceptive for reasons that aren't as plausible as what we directly experience (btw, that's always how I've interpreted JP Moreland's take on this). Also, on the "mindless stuff" clause, isn't it your view that being a "passive cog" in the process of knowing is just unacceptable? My defense of determinists on that point is just to say it can be acceptable. Knowledge, even about metaphysical matters, can arise passively in someone--and it is a good thing too! - Adam

Dr. Tim's Response:

Thanks for your thoughtful comments, brother. Please allow me to respond point by point. First, let's look at the syllogism you offered above:

1. Those who think otherwise about our having libertarian free will, use libertarian free will to think otherwise.

2. If this is so, then we have libertarian free will.

3. Therefore, we have libertarian free will.

You said,

//Deductively valid, but is it sound? Only if you beg the question on premise 1. Which is why I've never found any of your versions of the Free-Thinking Argument persuasive.//

I would never offer this kind of argument, so it's weird to compare this kind of an argument to my own. I would rephrase the first premise in the following manner:

1*. Those who think otherwise about our having libertarian free will, either use libertarian free will to think otherwise or are determined to think otherwise by mindless stuff or deceptive beings.

This formulation of the first premise changes everything. At that point, as I've done elsewhere, I show the undercutting defeaters of being determined by mindless stuff or deceptive beings. This leaves only one option, which is what J.P. Moreland and I called "option (iv)" which entails libertarian freedom. With that in mind, allow me to advance a new version of the Free-Thinking Argument in the form of the well-known Fine-Tuning Argument.

1. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is either (i) determined by mindless stuff, (ii) determined by deceptive beings, (iii) completely random, or (iv) because he possesses libertarian freedom. 2. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is not determined by mindless stuff, determined by deceptive beings, or completely random. 3. Therefore, the philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is because he possesses libertarian freedom.

For a defense of these premises, I point you to the paper I coauthored with J.P. Moreland entitled,

"

An Explanation and Defense of the Free-Thinking Argument

."

With that said, this new and evolved version of the argument highlights the fact that it is self-defeating to reject the libertarian freedom to think. Indeed, the conclusion of this argument is virtually the same as the first premise in the argument you offered: "Those who think otherwise about our having libertarian free will, use libertarian free will to think otherwise." The argument you offered starts with a premise that must be assumed. On the other hand, a proper Free-Thinking Argument does no such thing and reaches your seemingly assumed first premise as a deductive conclusion. The FTA I've offered avoids the charge of question begging. You said,

//But do you *really* need an argument to prove there is LFW?//

I don't know if we

need

an argument, but we've certainly got one. That's like asking if we need the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Of course we do not

need

it, but it's sure nice to have it. You said, //I think it's a mistake to think the LFW believer needs to defend their commitment with an argument. I think it's fair to assume we have it (by reference of our own experience) and that the anti LFW-er needs to show otherwise. In other words, the burden of of proof is on the *determinist* to show that LFW is false and the compatibilist that determinism is true *and* that we have "free will.".// Again, if it's a "mistake" to think we "need" an argument or not does nothing to change the fact that we do have a valid argument with premises that are defensible and seem plausibly true. With that said, I agree with you and also think it's fair to say that we can start with the assumption that humans do possess libertarian freedom since we seem to have a direct acquaintance with the fact that something or someone else is not always determining our thoughts and actions. We have direct acquaintance between passive and active thinking. So, we have a cumulative case for libertarian freedom (including other arguments I've advanced not discussed here). It's nice to have multiple lines of justification to support the belief in libertarian free-thinking. Regarding determinism, you wrote,

//None of their

arguments are any good. None of them.//

Amen to that! I completely agree. I have never seen a good argument for determinism . . . and, given all the pushback I regularly receive from Calvinists, I have never even seen an argument for exhaustive divine determinism based upon Scripture. That's because the concept is actually opposed to scripture (as I discuss here)! You said,

//What they do, actually, is presume the LFW believer has to think determinism is the "default" position and that LFW needs to be proved. But that is *too quick* (yes there is evidence of determinism, but is it decisive? Far from it, I think).//

I think there is decisive evidence that

some

things are determined, but also decisive evidence that

not all things

about humanity are determined. This is why I argue against the *exhaustive* determination of humanity. This leaves room for humans to possess limited libertarian freedom. You said,

//What you need is an intellectually virtuous way to assume what you believe and have objectors show you otherwise. Too many LFW proponents assume the compatiblist is entitled to presume their view is true and that it has to be proven otherwise. No reason to do that, though. Certainly, the compatiblists haven't earned that privilege. Our own experience of how our thoughts work is prima facie evidence enough in LFW's favor. The compatiblist has to say it's all deceptive for reasons that aren't as plausible as what we directly experience (btw, that's always how I've interpreted JP Moreland's take on this).//

I completely agree that this is one excellent line of argumentation. Moreland and I have both incorporated this tactic in the past and I encourage you (and others) to continue advancing it. As I noted above, however, it's nice to have a cumulative case for libertarian freedom. You concluded,

//Also, on the "mindless stuff" clause, isn't it your view that being a "passive cog" in the process of knowing is just unacceptable? My defense of determinists on that point is just to say it can be acceptable. Knowledge, even about metaphysical matters, can arise passively in someone--and it is a good thing too!//

No, I do not merely assume that "passive cogness" is unacceptable. What Moreland and I have done, however, is offer good reasons for why being a passive cog in a naturalistic or divinely determined world provides a defeater against inferred metaphysical and theological knowledge. As we have demonstrated in our aforementioned journal article, justified theological beliefs are incompatible with determinism. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), - Dr. Tim Stratton