Tim Stratton vs Colton Carlson: Full Debate Regarding 1 Cor 10:13 and Libertarian Freedom

Introduction

This post brings together the complete written exchange between Colton Carlson (a self-described "thorough-going compatibilist") and myself (a self-described "libertarian freedom fighter") on the meaning of Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 10:13: “You are able.”

At stake in this debate is no small matter. Does Paul’s assurance point to categorical ability (C-Ability)—a genuine, here-and-now power to either sin or take the way of escape at the moment of temptation—or can it be explained in terms of wide ability (W-Ability), a compatibilist-friendly account rooted in dispositional analysis?

Over the course of five detailed responses, Colton presses the case for W-Ability while I argue that only C-Ability preserves the pastoral and theological force of Paul’s promise. Along the way, we cover:

• The Greek grammar of dunasthe (“you are able”) and its indicative present force.

• The contrast between dispositional analyses and sourcehood libertarianism.

• The question of whether determinism or randomness undermines genuine freedom.

• The pastoral implications for Christians facing temptation: is Paul’s encouragement actual assurance in the real world or merely conditional rhetoric?

What follows is not a quick back-and-forth of sound bites, but a sustained dialogue—philosophical, exegetical, and pastoral—aimed at clarity. Readers will see both sides laid out in full and can decide for themselves which view best fits the text and the reality of human freedom.

This is a one-stop resource, collecting all five rounds of our debate in one place. My prayer is that, even amid disagreement, readers will come away with a deeper appreciation for the seriousness of Paul’s words, the importance of human freedom, and the faithfulness of the God who provides “the way of escape.”

Dr. Tim Stratton

PART 1: Does 1 Corinthians 10:13 Teach Libertarian Freedom? My Conversation with Colton Carlson

Few biblical texts strike as deeply at the heart of human responsibility as Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 10:13:

“No temptation has overtaken you except what is common to mankind. And God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, he will also provide a way out so that you can endure it.”

For centuries, theologians and philosophers have debated what this verse implies about human freedom. Does Paul mean that Christians genuinely have the power to resist sin in the moment of temptation? Or is the “ability” he promises more limited—something constrained by God’s prior determination or by our strongest desires? This is not just an abstract puzzle. If Paul’s words are true, then Scripture grounds real hope in the believer’s struggle against sin. But if determinism is correct, then Paul’s promise collapses into empty comfort—or worse, deception.

Recently, I had a lively exchange in the YouTube comments section after a discussion with Dr. Leighton Flowers on the FreeThinking Ministries channel. Colton Carlson, a layman who has interacted with me in the past (see here, here, here, andhere) raised objections to my argument that 1 Corinthians 10:13 entails libertarian freedom. What followed was a lengthy back-and-forth probing the logic, exegesis, and philosophy beneath this text. For the sake of clarity, I’ve preserved our dialogue here, with Colton’s words in blue and mine in black. The debate ranges from the meaning of “able” (dunamai) to the coherence of so-called “compatibilist-indeterminism,” to whether Scripture itself rules out exhaustive divine determinism (EDD). This is no casual exchange. At stake is nothing less than whether Paul’s inspired words preserve the believer’s genuine ability to resist sin—or whether they collapse into determinism, randomness, or incoherence. So grab a cup of coffee (or three) and join us for the ride.

Carlson’s Opening:

I really don’t think that the 1 Cor 10:13 debate has anything to do with whether or not “if determinism is true, this verse doesn’t make sense; so therefore, libertarian free will is probably the best contextual stance we can have on the text.” Yet, this was a good bulk of the argumentation here in this video.

Instead, I think it’s about whether there are good reasons to think that libertarian freedom is entailed by the verse. What if one holds to compatibilist-indeterminism? That would give these proponents of the 1 Cor 10:13 argument for libertarian freedom the falsity of determinism, but it would also deny them libertarian freedom by definition.

I literally have no idea why almost everyone comes to this verse with the idea that “Well, if determinism is true…” How about, “Well, what if indeterminism is true, and libertarian free will still isn’t entailed by the verse?” That is the interesting point. Forsake the Calvinist/Molinist/non-Calvinist debate: the debate has to do with incompatibilism, or compatibilism. Full stop.

Side Note: Since Colton never defines ‘compatibilist-indeterminism,’ I will define it here in precise philosophical terms before engaging his argument. This way, we can proceed without ambiguity.

Academic Context & Definition

Compatibilism is a well-established philosophical position asserting that some kind of free will (not libertarian freedom) and/or moral responsibility can coexist with determinism.

An event is determined if antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the event.

Determinism is the view that antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all events–including all the mental and physical actions of every human all the time. I often clarify with the word “exhaustive” to highlight the fact that we are not talking about some things or most things — but that ALL things, event, and outcomes are necessitated via prior conditions.

In other words, the compatibilist affirms the thesis that a person can still act “freely” (not in a libertarian sense) and be morally responsible for their mental and physical actions even though the entirety of their mental states and physical movements are completely causally determined by something or someone else. (See, 

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

).

Let’s continue defining important terms.

Indeterminism posits that not all events—including human actions and choices—are causally determined; instead, alternative outcomes are truly possible in the actual world. This does not mean that nothing can be determined in an indeterministic world. It simply means that not everything is determined via antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate all outcomes.

From these, we can synthesize the term “compatibilist-indeterminism”, which—or so we can define it for clarity—means:

A position that affirms some kind of free will is possible even in an indeterministic setting, but still denies the need for—theorizes without—the libertarian notion of agent-causation (i.e., the agent as uncaused first-mover).

This is akin to the idea which argues that indeterminism, while true, does not in itself guarantee libertarian-style freedom. So, as we proceed, keep the following definition in mind: 

“Compatibilist-indeterminism,” as we’ll use the term, refers to the position that (a) determinism is false—i.e., not all events and outcomes are causally determined—and (b) yet moral responsibility and free will do not require the agent to be an uncaused first-mover in the libertarian sense. The agent’s choice may still be the result of prior states or causes, even if those states are not fully deterministic.

Some might suggest that what matters for freedom is not whether the world is deterministic or indeterministic, but whether an agent’s behavior is appropriately “reasons-responsive”—that is, whether their actions trace back to reasons in the right kind of causal history. But this move doesn’t solve the problem; it only pushes it back a step. If determinism is true, then the agent’s reasons themselves are wholly the product of antecedent conditions—conditions that are either (i) mindless and non-rational (like the blind laws of physics), or (ii) divinely imposed in a way that guarantees even false theological and metaphysical beliefs. In either case, the “reasons” you respond to are not trustworthy sources of rational knowledge. They are necessitated outputs of forces that don’t care about truth or, in the case of divine determinism, do care that you affirm false beliefs about reality. That creates undercutting defeaters against every conclusion—including the belief that you are “reasons-responsive” at all.

Indeterminism by itself fares no better. If undetermined sub-personal events—like quantum fluctuations—enter the causal chain, they are just as mindless and non-rational as deterministic antecedents like physics and chemistry. They cannot ground genuine rational agency, since they contribute nothing that can track truth. If your “reasons” are decided for you by random noise rather than by you, then responsibility is undermined just as surely as under determinism.

Random events can break causal chains, but they cannot ground agency. A randomizer is not an agent.

This is why mere appeals to “reasons-responsiveness” are insufficient. Unless the agent himself is the first mover—the one who actively settles which reasons to endorse and act upon—his so-called reasons are either imposed (by necessity) or imposed (by chance). Only sourcehood avoids both horns. Only when the believer, as an active agent, actively chooses which alternative live possibility becomes actual, can we say he is genuinely responsible (rationally or morally). Without this, Paul’s assurance in 1 Corinthians 10:13 collapses into either hollow determinism or meaningless randomness.

In short: without libertarian sourcehood, Paul’s assurance reduces either to necessitation or to randomness—both of which rob the text of its pastoral and theological force.

With our terms clarified, consider my first response to Colton.

Stratton 

Colton, I think you may have misunderstood the structure of my argument from 1 Corinthians 10:13. The case for libertarian freedom here doesn’t start with, “If determinism is true, this verse makes no sense.” That’s a secondary application showing why EDD-Calvinism contradicts Paul.

1. If Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose among a range of options each compatible with their regenerated nature at a given moment, then Christians possess libertarian freedom.

2. At the moment of temptation, Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between giving into temptation or taking the way of escape God promises to provide.

3. Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom.

Determinism comes up afterward only to show that it directly conflicts with (2) and the final conclusion. You ask: 

//What if one holds to compatibilist-indeterminism? That would give these proponents of the 1 Cor 10:13 argument for libertarian freedom the falsity of determinism, but it would also deny them libertarian freedom by definition.//

Great! At least we can all finally agree that determinism is unbiblical—that’s a good place to start. Now the question is: which indeterministic view makes the most sense? An agent possesses libertarian freedom if he is the first mover and nothing that actually exists or obtains prior to the choice is sufficient to causally necessitate the choice

(or deterministically prevents the agent from doing otherwise)

. When Paul encourages Christians with the knowledge that they actually have the power to resist and avoid sin—so that they do not have to sin—it sure sounds like more than the kind of impersonal and mindless indeterminism we might find in the quantum realm. 

This is indeterminism plus active agent-causation in an indeterministic setting.

 That’s exactly what I mean by libertarian freedom. You said, 

//I literally have no idea why almost everyone comes to this verse with the idea that “Well, if determinism is true…”//

Fortunately, that wasn’t my argument. I begin with a deductive syllogism from the text and then show how divine determinism is defeated by its conclusion. You ask: 

//How about, “Well, what if indeterminism is true, and libertarian free will still isn’t entailed by the verse?” That is the interesting point.//

If compatibilist-indeterminism denies agent-causation, then the “indeterminism” is merely at the level of sub-personal or external events.

 Those events may be undetermined in themselves, but they still leave the agent’s choice caused by prior sufficient random conditions.

 In that case, the indeterminism is irrelevant to moral and rational responsibility and cannot ground Paul’s assurance in Scripture. Worse yet, if such indeterministic factors are random and non-rational, then they undermine theological knowledge—

because your theological beliefs along with all of your mental and physical actions would be traceable to random, mindless events that know nothing about theological truth and don’t care if you possess theological knowledge).

 That’s clearly not what Paul is describing. He grounds moral responsibility in the believer’s genuine power to take the way of escape (1 Cor 10:13) , and to take thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5), not in luck or happenstance. You exclaimed: 

//Forsake the Calvinist/Molinist/non-Calvinist debate: the debate has to do with incompatibilism, or compatibilism. Full stop.//

That’s simply false (it’s my argument and I know what it’s about). The debate is ultimately about determinism—and what is and is not compatible with determinism. Full stop. 

I argue that rational responsibility and 1 Cor 10:13 are not compatible with determinism.

 Thus, rational responsibility and Scripture are incompatible with determinism. So, if one affirms determinism, they hold an irrational view and oppose God’s inspired Word. That’s when determinism becomes an idol (that’s a scary place to be).

Bottom line:

the question remains—when Paul says “you are able,” does he mean genuinely able in the actual moment to do otherwise—such that neither outcome is necessitated by prior sufficient conditions? If yes, libertarian freedom follows. If no, Paul’s words become a false and empty comfort. Pastoral counseling should never be deceptive, and Scripture never is.

Carlson

I think you misunderstood; I never said that my comment was geared toward your specific argument for 1 Cor 10:13. That said, and as it stands, the vast majority of the video was specifically against a deterministic reading of the verse, and *because this interpretation doesn’t work*, this gives, presumably, ancillary evidence towards a libertarian interpretation (or as you said, an application). That is my point.

And my further point is that the debate shouldn’t be structured around “determinism vs libertarian freedom”, but rather compatibilism vs incompatibilism. I never mentioned your argument in my comment, so you responding to me as if I did seems odd.

You said,

 //Great! At least we can all finally agree that determinism is unbiblical—that’s a good place to start. Now the question is: which indeterministic view makes the most sense?//

Nothing in my comment said that I agree that determinism is false, or unbiblical. In fact, nothing in my comment suggests that I either accept or deny determinism. The point is what if determinism is false, not that it actually is false.

You said,

 //An agent possesses libertarian freedom if he is the first mover and nothing that actually exists or obtains prior to the choice is sufficient to causally necessitate the choice (or deterministically prevents the agent from doing otherwise). When Paul encourages Christians with the knowledge that they actually have the power to resist and avoid sin—so that they do not have to sin—it sure sounds like more than the kind of impersonal indeterminism we might find in the quantum realm. This is indeterminism plus active agent-causation in an indeterministic setting. That’s exactly what I mean by libertarian freedom.//

Okay, so indeterminsitic agent-causation paired with ultimate sourcehood. Why does agent-causation have to necessarily be paired with ultimate sourcehood (i.e., an agent being the first-mover). Not sure why impersonal indeterminism is brought in the picture, because surely compatibilist-indeterminism does not entail some impersonal indeterminism in virtue of being compatibilist. Further, I am not sure why “indeterminism plus active agent-causation in an indeterministic setting” must entail libertarian freedom. Also not sure how that is even extrapolated from the verse specifically concerning ability (however construed).

You said,

 //Fortunately, that wasn’t my argument. I begin with a deductive syllogism from the text and then show how divine determinism is defeated by its conclusion.//

Again, I wasn’t discussing your specific argument. Still, isn’t determinism only defeated if a categorical ability is entailed by the verse? What about a dispositional ability? Seems like a dispositional ability is clearly compatible with the text, even granting determinism is false. But if a dispositional ability is compatible with the text, than libertarian freedom cannot be entailed by the text.

You said, 

//If compatibilist-indeterminism denies agent-causation, then the “indeterminism” is merely at the level of subpersonal or external events. Those events may be undetermined in themselves, but they still leave the agent’s choice caused by prior sufficient random conditions. In that case, the indeterminism is irrelevant to moral and rational responsibility and cannot ground Paul’s assurance.//

Most compatibilists (regardless of whether determinismism is true) uphold some version of agent-causation (Nelkin 2011; Sartorio 2016; McKenna 2013), so I don’t see how this follows. Clearly, then compatibilist-indeterministic may help themselves to the same resources. A compatibilist-indeterminist stance can ground the exact assurance the Apostle is discussing; it just doesn’t entail the necessity that the free will at issue is indeterministic.

You said,

 //Worse yet, if such indeterministic factors are random and non-rational, then they undermine theological knowledge—because your beliefs and actions would be traceable to random, mindless events that know nothing about theological truth and don’t care if you possess theological knowledge). That’s clearly not what Paul is describing. He grounds moral responsibility in the believer’s genuine power to take the way of escape (1 Cor 10:13) , and to take thoughts captive (2 Cor 10:5), not in luck or happenstance.//

None of the random stuff follows, as I said above. God could exist, so there is a person. Agent-causation could exist for humans as well, it just doesn’t require indeterminism to be true. We can then say indeterminism is in fact true, and that the free will that exists also doesn’t necessarily have to be indeterministic; therefore, compatibilist-indeterminism. If true, libertarian freedom is false.

You said,

 //That’s simply false (it’s my argument and I know what it’s about). The debate is ultimately about determinism—and what is and is not compatible with determinism. Full stop. I argue that rational responsibility and 1 Cor 10:13 are not compatible with determinism. Thus, rational responsibility and Scripture are incompatible with determinism.//

But divine determinism isn’t equivalent to Calvinism? And libertarian freedom is not equivalent to Molinism? So, it is true that the 1 Cor 10:13 debate has nothing to do with Calvinism or Molinism. Again, your argument has nothing to do with the 1 Cor 10:13 verse entailing libertarian freedom. You just provide the deductive syllogism. That’s fine. But so what? The debate may be about determinism being true or false, but it’s primarily about incompatibilism and compatibilism. But I can grant something further: the debate is about libertarian free will (incompatibilism) and compatibilism.

You said,

 //So, if one affirms determinism, they hold an irrational view and oppose God’s inspired Word. That’s when determinism becomes an idol (that’s a scary place to be). //

Wouldn’t this implication only work if libertarian freedom is entailed by the verse? If it isn’t then none of that matters. So, again, we are back to whether libertarian freedom is entailed by the verse, or if compatibilist-indeterminism is compatible with the verse.

You said, 

//Bottom line: the question remains—when Paul says “you are able,” does he mean genuinely able in the moment to do otherwise—such that neither outcome is necessitated by prior sufficient conditions? If yes, libertarian freedom follows. If no, Paul’s words become a false and empty comfort. Pastoral counseling should never be deceptive, and Scripture never is.//

I think this is a false dilemma, though. You haven’t shown that the “you are able” piece must necessarily be understood as a metaphysical categorical ability to do (or choose, or think) otherwise. That’s just shoved in the verse. I can grant that “you are able” as Paul instructed. But what sense of ability? Not sure, for Paul doesn’t say! And if we hold to compatibilist-indeterminism, let’s say, it gives believers the options (because indeterminism is true), but libertarian freedom, then, wouldn’t be entailed by the verse. So, in this case, Paul’s words wouldn’t be false, nor an empty comfort; pastoral counseling wouldn’t be deceptive, nor Scripture; yet, 1 Cor 10:13 wouldn’t entail libertarian freedom.

Stratton

Let me briefly press in on a few points, Colton: Your “compatibilist-indeterminism” is under-specified. At the moment of temptation, are the believer’s antecedent states (desires, psychology, providential setup) sufficient to necessitate the outcome or not? If yes, then the Christian who sins could not have done otherwise — the “escape” wasn’t categorically available, contradicting Paul’s assurance in The Bible. If no, then antecedents leave both options live, which is precisely the libertarian condition: genuine sourcehood and leeway. Either way, the middle collapses back into determinism or into libertarian freedom. You suggest Paul might mean only a dispositional (choosing based upon one’s necessitated greatest desires) or conditional ability (God could have determined you differently). But this doesn’t square with the text. Paul promises: (i) No temptation beyond what believers are able to bear. (ii) God always provides a way of escape to the follower of Christ. (iii) Christ followers may endure it. A merely conditional reading — “you could if your strongest desire were different” (or if God determined you to do otherwise) — makes God’s promise hollow in every case where the believer sins. For Paul’s comfort to hold universally, the ability must be categorical: the believer really can take the escape in the moment of temptation. Regarding Agent-Causation: sure, compatibilists do sometimes speak of “agent-causation,” but usually in a thin, so-called “reasons-responsive” sense they claim is compatible with determinism (which I have written much about). That’s not what I am talking about. Paul’s assurance requires robust sourcehood: the agent as the first mover (and thinker), not merely a conduit of antecedent conditions. Without that, “taking the escape” is not genuinely within the believer’s power. This is why, on determinism, I refer to the person as a “passive cog” since they are always subject to other powers. You asked: 

//why does agent-causation have to necessarily be paired with ultimate sourcehood?//

Here’s why. 

If the agent is not the ultimate source, then their causal role is merely derivative — it’s the unfolding of prior sufficient conditions.

But derivative causation does not ground the responsibility Paul assumes in 1 Cor 10:13. Paul’s promise is that you are able — you can resist at the actual moment you are being tempted. That makes no sense unless the believer is the genuine initiator of the resisting act. If the antecedents outside the agent fully determine which “choice” the agent will make, then the “ability” reduces to the agent being a conduit of prior conditions (nothing but a "caused cause" or a "passive cog"). That is precisely what sourcehood is meant to block. Without ultimate sourcehood, the ability to take the escape is illusory. That’s why, as Moreland and I discussed in our paper, impersonal indeterminism (say, in the quantum realm) is insufficient. Indeterminism only helps if paired with robust agent-causation — the believer as first mover, able to actively choose between live alternatives. This is what I mean by libertarian freedom, and this is why Paul’s words cannot be captured by compatibilist-indeterminism. You write: 

//Agent-causation could exist for humans as well, it just doesn’t require indeterminism to be true. We can then say indeterminism is true, and free will that exists doesn’t necessarily have to be indeterministic; therefore compatibilist-indeterminism.//

But what does “agent-causation” even mean if the so-called agent is himself nothing more than a caused cause? As Moreland and I argued in our paper, that is just event-causation wearing an “agent” mask. If the agent’s role is wholly derivative, then he is not the first thinker or mover, and he cannot be the genuine origin of resisting temptation. 

To avoid randomness, you need the agent as the active settler of alternative possibilities.

 To avoid determinism, those alternatives must not be necessitated by prior sufficient conditions. Without both indeterminism and ultimate sourcehood, the “agent” is either a passive conduit (determinism) or the subject of sub-personal and mindless randomness. Neither option grounds the robust ability Paul promises. So when I speak of agent-causation, I mean the agent as a true first cause — the thinker and mover who actively settles between alternatives and chooses to actualize one of the alternative possibilities. Anything less fails to ground the kind of assurance Paul offers in 1 Cor 10:13.

Bottom Line:

The debate really is about

determination

: whether the believer’s options are necessitated by prior sufficient conditions or not. Paul’s words make no sense unless determination is false and the believer is categorically able to do otherwise (even when he doesn’t). So the question remains: when Paul says “you are able,” does he mean genuinely able in the moment to sin or not sin? If yes, libertarian freedom follows. If no, the text reduces to an empty comfort — something Scripture never gives. P.S. One more thing on Compatibilist-Indeterminism: You’ve suggested that “compatibilist-indeterminism” could account for Paul’s words in 1 Cor 10:13. 

But when tested against the text, the option dissolves: If antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the outcome, then the believer who sins never truly had the escape available.

 Paul’s universal promise (“no temptation,” “always provides,” “you are able”) is broken right where it matters most. If antecedent conditions are not sufficient to necessitate the outcome, then the believer really does face two live alternatives at the moment of temptation. That is precisely the libertarian condition: robust leeway plus the agent’s causal role as first mover. 

So, “compatibilist-indeterminism” is not a stable third way.

It collapses back into either determination (necessitation) or libertarian freedom (leeway). Only the latter preserves Paul’s assurance without turning it into empty comfort and deceit.

Carlson

Tim, you said,

 //…this is why Paul’s words cannot be captured by compatibilist-indeterminism.//

Why not? You haven’t shown why not. If determinism is truly the issue, then fine. Indeterminism is true. That doesn’t mean LFW automatically is true.

You said,

 //But what does “agent-causation” even mean if the so-called agent is himself nothing more than a caused cause? As Moreland and I argued in our paper, that is just event-causation wearing an “agent” mask. If the agent’s role is wholly derivative, then he is not the first thinker or mover, and he cannot be the genuine origin of resisting temptation.//

Once again, what if indeterminism is true? So a caused cause means nothing here.

This entire line of argument means nothing. If agent-causation requires indeterminism, then great! A compatibilist-indeterminism may be, indeed, an agent-cause. It just doesn’t require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.

You said,

 //To avoid randomness, you need the agent as the active settler of alternatives. To avoid determinism, those alternatives must not be necessitated by prior suffficient conditions. Without both indeterminism and ultimate sourcehood, the “agent” is either a passive conduit (determinism) or the subject of sub-personal and mindless randomness. Neither option grounds the robust ability Paul promises.//

I think this is false. You still have a host of luck issues, even if agent-causation is correct, no matter the form; particularly in the form of moral luck. All parties have to deal with luck, in some form; so to me, this is irrelevant. Also, I agree that we need sourcehood and indeterminism, but why “ultimate” sourcehood? And how is that derived from the text? Does Paul say that? What translation are you using? 🙂

And again, false dilemma.

It’s not the case that if determinism is false, and libertarian freedom is also false, we therefore just get a “sub-personal and mindless randomless.” Why think that? Just because one denies ultimate sourcehood is necessary for agent-causation (while keeping some form of sourcehood still) doesn’t therefore entail randomness from the agent’s choices. What? How? Unless of course you want to say that ultimate sourcehood and sourcehood in general are synonymous; that would quite shocking, and also a very difficult claim to argue for. I can be the source, even if indeterminism is true; literally the only difference is that it doesn’t require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.

You said,

 //whether the believer’s options are necessitated by prior sufficient conditions or not. Paul’s words make no sense unless determinism is false and the believer is categorically able to do otherwise (even when he doesn’t).//

Why not? Think of a dispositional ability. I have the narrow ability to succumb or not succumb to temptation as a Christian. I have the Holy Spirit, presumably the physical and psychological know-how, spiritual resources such as the sacraments, the Word, prayer, the brethren, etc. I also have the opportunity to (especially if indeterminism is true!).

Nothing is preventing me from succumbing or not succumbing to temptation. I am not forced; there are no antecedent conditions prior to my choice to succumb or not succumb. I am free indeterministically. This seems like a very straight-forward, common-sense way of reading the text also. More specifically, Paul doesn’t rule out anything like this, unless you are using an obscure “Tim Stratton” translation.

So, a dispositional ability is compatible with the text. Now, to be clear, a categorical interpretation could be compatible with the text for sure. But that’s not the argument you are proposing, right? You are proposing that the text entails a categorical interpretation. I am saying that if the text is compatible with an alternative interpretation, one that is compatible with determinism (regardless of whether determinism is in fact true in the actual world; let’s stipulate that it is false in the actual world), then LFW in the form of a categorical ability cannot be entailed by the verse, even if it is compatible with it.

So the argument for LFW from 1 Cor 10:13 is still unsound.

Last you criticize that if compatibilist-indeterminism is true, this would be the entailed verse (supposedly): “If antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate the outcome, then the believer who sins never truly had the escape available. Paul’s universal promise (“no temptation,” “always provides,” “you are able”) is broken right where it matters most. If antecedent conditions are not sufficient to fix the outcome, then the believer really does face two live alternatives at the moment of temptation. That is precisely the libertarian condition: robust leeway plus the agent’s causal role as first mover.”

This is kind of funny; if indeterminism is true, then by definition antecedent conditions are always insufficient to necessitate the outcome. So it is truly quizzical to me why you place that first sentence in this interpretation. This is truly bizarre! Seems like compatibilist-indeterminism is compatible (though presumably not entailed) by the text; but it is compatible with the text, the text cannot entail LFW.

If compatibilist-indeterminism is true, then of course determinism is false by definition. Therefore, “the believer’s antecedent states (desires, psychology, providential setup)” are insufficient to necessitate the outcome. But, libertarian freedom would still be false because compatibilsm would be true.

You said,

 //If no, then antecedents leave both options live, which is precisely the libertarian condition: genuine sourcehood and leeway. Either way, the middle collapses back into determinism or into LFW.//

False dilemma. Determinism and LFW are not the only options in the debate, which is one of my primary contentions with the video (see my original comment). Antecedents may leave live options available (i.e., to succumb, or not to succumb to the temptation), but that does not entail libertarian freedom. Just because indeterminism is true doesn’t mean the kind of free will present necessitates indeterminism.

If the kind of free will that is posited does not require indeterminism, even if indeterminism is in fact true in the actual world (which is what I am postulating), then libertarian freedom is false precisely because indeterminism is not necessary (though actual). Just because indeterminism is actually present doesn’t entail libertarian freedom (which, I will remind you, I spend quite a bit of time detailing in my Volume 3 reply to you and the 1 Cor 10:13 argument).

Further, indeterminism being present doesn’t entail “genuine sourcehood” in the way you are thinking of it. You are most definitely thinking of it in terms of what Kane calls “ultimate sourcehood”, and the leeway you are positing is almost definitely “categorical”. But indeterminism could be true, and that doesn’t require the free will present is necessarily categorical, nor does it require that the type of sourcehood present is necessarily ultimate. None of that has been shown. You just simply assume it.

You said,

 //You suggest Paul might mean only a dispositional or conditional ability. But this doesn’t square with the text. Paul promises://

No no. I never once stated a mere “conditional” reading or entailment of the verse. I said a dispositional, which is qualitatively distinct from conditional interpretations (see Vihvelin 2013; Nelkin 2011; Cyr and Swenson 2019; Clarke 2009, etc.). Further, what do you mean by “doesn’t square with the text”? Do you mean isn’t entailed by the text, or isn’t compatible with the text? Because surely both a conditional and dispositional ability is “squared with the text” in the sense of being compatible with the text (remember, let’s stipulate determinism is false still). I never said that a dispositional reading should be entailed by the text, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t compatible with it. But if it is compatible with it, then LFW isn’t entailed by it because LFW entails incompatibilism.

You said,

 //For Paul’s comfort to hold universally, the ability must be categorical: the believer really can take the escape in the moment of temptation.//

Why? You certainly give no reason. Let’s say indeterminism is true. Okay, so the believer has live options, and access to alternatives to succumb or not. Okay, what type of free will is at play? Categorical or dispositional? The former being incompatible with determinism, and the latter being compatible with determinsim. Certainly the verse doesn’t give a single indication as to what kind of free will is at play. At best, it demonstrates that indeterminism is possible true (for the sake of argument). But how does that get you to LFW? It doesn’t.

You said,

 //Regarding Agent-Causation: sure, compatibilists do sometimes speak of “agent-causation,” but usually in a thin, so-called “reasons-responsive” sense they claim is compatible with determinism (which I have written much about). That’s not what I am talking about. Paul’s assurance requires robust sourcehood: the agent as the first mover (and thinker), not merely a conduit of antecedent conditions. Without that, “taking the escape” is not genuinely within the believer’s power. This is why, on determinism, I refer to the person as a “passive cog” since they are always subject to other powers.//

Why does Paul’s assurance require “robust sourcehood” (which I presumably think you mean something of the Kanean sort, i.e., “ultimate sourcehood”)? Does Paul say in the verse you have to be a first mover, “not merely a conduit of antecedent conditions”? And even if the latter part is correct, how is the first part entailed by what Paul says? What specifically in the verse entails that piece, step-by-step? (Remember, determinism is irrelevant here; I am assuming it is false, so any argument showing determinism is false I will just agree with here.)

You said, 

//If the agent is not the ultimate source, then their causal role is merely derivative — it’s the unfolding of prior sufficient conditions. But derivative causation does not ground the responsibility Paul assumes in 1 Cor 10:13.//

How is it the unfolding of prior sufficient conditions if we assume indeterminism is true? You are still assuming that if determinism is false, ultimate sourcehood is automatically satisfied. Why? I would argue that if the agent is not a source, simpliciter, then their causal role is merely derivative.

Finally, why does Paul, to you, seem to assume ultimate sourcehood? None of this is clear from the text. It just fits the systematic.

You said,

 //Paul’s promise is that you are able — you can resist. That makes no sense unless the believer is the genuine initiator of the resisting act. If the antecedents outside the agent fully determine which “choice” the agent will make, then the “ability” reduces to the agent being a conduit of prior conditions. That is precisely what sourcehood is meant to block. Without ultimate sourcehood, the ability to take the escape is illusory.//

Again, just because determinism is false, doesn’t mean that ultimate sourcehood is automatically true. That needs to be argued, specifically from the text. And again, determinism is false, let’s say. You are assuming that sourcehood is synonymous with libertarian free will. That is a hard claim to argue for, specifically if we say that indeterminism is true already.

Why can’t I be the source even if compatibilist-indeterminism is true? After all, determinism is false, and there are no antecedent conditions prior to my choices that necessitate those choices. Seems like I can choose between options, right? It is just the case that the kind of free will doesn’t entail (or require) indeterminism (though it’s actual).

Stratton

I want to clarify a few things, Colton: You said, 

//Once again, what if indeterminism is true? So a caused cause means nothing here. This entire line of argument means nothing.//

But “caused cause” does still mean something, even if not everything is determined.

 Think of genetics, upbringing, prior beliefs, or circumstances—they can all function as “caused causes” in a deterministic sense within a broader indeterministic framework. So the phrase isn’t meaningless; it still names a real phenomenon we must grapple with. You said, 

//If agent-causation requires indeterminism, then great! A compatibilist-indeterminism may be, indeed, an agent-cause. It just doesn’t require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.//

But if the agent is genuinely the uncaused cause at t—if he himself settles which live alternative becomes actual—then by definition he is the source in this indeterministic environment. That is what I mean by ultimate sourcehood: the agent as first mover with respect to that choice. 

If your “agent-cause” is still traceable back to sufficient antecedents, it’s not really agent-causation—it’s transmission.

 And if nothing settles it, it collapses into luck. So your distinction between “agent-causation” and “ultimate sourcehood” doesn’t hold up at the choice-point. You said, 

//I think this is false. You still have a host of luck issues, even if agent-causation is correct, no matter the form; particularly in the form of moral luck. All parties have to deal with luck, in some form; so to me, this is irrelevant.//

Yes, there are luck problems for everyone, but they are not all created equal. Some kinds of “luck” are background conditions (birth, natural endowments, moral environments) which shape but do not necessitate a particular choice. Other kinds of luck are present-luck problems—where the difference between sin and escape is entirely unowned, sub-personal randomness. That second kind is devastating, because if the movement between sin and the way of escape is not determined by antecedent conditions or determined by the agent (as first mover and source), then the movement is no better than the mindless quantum realm. That collapses rational agency into random noise. Do you really think that’s what Paul is promising his readers? A roll of the metaphysical dice when temptation comes? You said, 

//Also, I agree that we need sourcehood and indeterminism, but why “ultimate” sourcehood? And how is that derived from the text? Does Paul say that? What translation are you using?//

Wait a second! You agree that this text requires indeterminism? That’s a huge admission, because it means you’ve rejected exhaustive divine determination (EDD). We are finally making progress here, Colton! As for “ultimate” sourcehood: it is derived in the same way we derive the triune nature of God. 

No biblical author uses the term “Trinity,” but the concept is logically entailed by the data of Scripture.

 Likewise, Paul may not use the term “ultimate sourcehood,” but his universal, in-the-moment assurance entails it: unless the agent is the categorical settler of which possibility obtains, Paul’s promise is hollow and deceptive. You said, 

//And again, false dilemma. It’s not the case that if determinism is false, and libertarian freedom is also false, we therefore just get a “sub-personal and mindless randomless.” Why think that? Just because one denies ultimate sourcehood is necessary for agent-causation (while keeping some form of sourcehood still) doesn’t therefore entail randomness from the agent’s choices. What? How?//

As Moreland and I explained in our paper, the trilemma is unavoidable: (i) Antecedent necessitation (determinism) (ii) Sub-personal randomness (luck) (iii) Agent-settling as first mover (ultimate sourcehood). If you deny (iii), you are left with (i) or (ii). “Some other kind of sourcehood” collapses back into (i) if it’s reducible to antecedents, or into (ii) if it is not settled by the agent. There is no middle option that avoids both.

That’s why it is not a false dilemma—it’s a true trilemma.

You said, 

//Unless of course you want to say that ultimate sourcehood and sourcehood in general are synonymous; that would quite shocking, and also a very difficult claim to argue for.//

Hold my root beer and prepare for shock and awe! Yes, I use “ultimate” to clarify—just as I add “exhaustive” to divine determination when addressing EDD. By “ultimate sourcehood,” I simply mean: the agent is the first mover with respect to the choice at hand, not merely a transmitter of antecedents. Far from being difficult to argue for, this is the standard way libertarians articulate sourcehood. You said, 

//I can be the source, even if indeterminism is true . . .//

Amen to that! 

That’s exactly my view. 

Indeterminism is true (not all things are determined), and within that context, the agent can be—and is—the source of some of his mental and physical actions. That’s libertarian free agency, plain and simple. Welcome aboard! You said, 

//. . . literally the only difference is that it doesn’t require indeterminism, unlike ultimate sourcehood.//

This is where you need to explain with clarity and precision. If your “source” does not require indeterminism, then what stops antecedent conditions from necessitating the outcome? 

If antecedents are sufficient, then you are not truly the source—you are a conduit.

 If antecedents are insufficient and the agent does not settle, then the outcome is lucky randomness. The “only difference” you describe either (i) collapses into determinism or (ii) collapses into randomness. You said, 

//This is kind of funny; if indeterminism is true, then by definition antecedent conditions are always insufficient to necessitate the outcome. So it is truly quizzical to me why you place that first sentence in this interpretation. This is truly bizarre!//

What’s actually bizarre is the suggestion that if indeterminism is true, antecedent conditions are

always

insufficient to necessitate anything. That’s simply false! My own view is that we live in a world where not all things are determined (thus indetermin

ism

 obtains), but antecedent conditions are still sufficient to necessitate many things. To deny this is to conflate “some things aren’t determined” with “nothing at all is determined.” 

That’s a basic category error.

Think of it this way: I can grant that the movement of subatomic particles is not determined in every case (indeterminism), while also affirming that the law of gravity, the formation of ice at 0°C, and the human body’s need for oxygen are all necessitated by antecedent conditions. To suggest otherwise is not just “quirky”—it’s a massive philosophical blunder. So, Colton, either you’re equivocating on “indeterminism” or you’re confusing it with “pure randomness.” If that’s what you mean, then say so clearly, because otherwise you’ve just misrepresented the live options on the table. You said, 

//Seems like compatibilist-indeterminism is compatible (though presumably not entailed) by the text; but it is compatible with the text, the the text cannot entail LFW.//

But here’s the problem: we’ve already established that determinism and EDD (sorry, EDD-Calvinists) are ruled out by Paul’s promise.

That leaves two options:

 either (i) the believer, as an active first-mover agent, decides whether to sin or escape, or (ii) something akin to quantum indeterminacy (random, sub-personal, and mindless luck) decides it for him. Do you honestly think Paul is telling the Corinthians that their victory over temptation boils down to a coin-flip in the quantum realm? No pastor, no theologian, no serious exegete has ever read the passage this way. To call that “compatible with the text” is to empty Paul’s assurance of all pastoral weight. It’s horrible hermeneutics employed in order to avoid libertarian freedom. By contrast, the categorical reading—where the believer himself is the operative source of resisting or succumbing—fits perfectly: – It preserves Paul’s universal promise. – It maintains the meaningfulness of his pastoral exhortation. – It avoids collapsing into either antecedent necessitation (determinism) or meaningless randomness. So no, Colton. The text doesn’t leave room for your “compatibilist-indeterminism.” It forces the choice: either (i) Paul is mistaken (which you absolutely cannot accept), or (ii) he’s teaching libertarian sourcehood—where the believer, as the first mover, actively chooses and decides between alternative possibilities at the moment of temptation (which you don’t want to accept).

Those are the only live options.

Colton, you said, 

//If compatibilist-indeterminism is true, then of course determinism is false by definition. Therefore, “the believer’s antecedent states (desires, psychology, providential setup)” are insufficient to necessitate the outcome. But, libertarian freedom would still be false because compatibilsm would be true.//

What do you mean by that, Colton? Compatibilism is typically understood to be the thesis that freedom and/or moral responsibility is compatible with determinism (where antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate all mental states and physical actions). But you just admitted determinism is false. So “compatibilism” in that context collapses into incoherence. If determinism is false, then why argue about what is compatible with a false view? What you’re really saying is that determinism is false, and yet humans don’t have sourcehood agency or leeway ability. In that case, someone or something else must prevent the agent from choosing otherwise. But why should we accept that? What is that? Paul explicitly says you are able to endure and resist (1 Cor 10:13). If that’s not sourcehood agency, then Paul’s words are empty comfort at best . . . deception at worst. Colton, you said: 

//False dilemma. Determinism and LFW are not the only options in the debate, which is one of my primary contentions with the video (see my original comment). Antecedents may leave live options available (i.e., to succumb, or not to succumb to the temptation), but that does not entail libertarian freedom.//

Is something deterministically preventing the believer from exercising the ability to do otherwise? If so, then 

determination

 (via God, supernature, or physical laws) explains the choice. If not, then two options remain: – Mindless randomness (like quantum events) determines whether the believer sins or resists. – The believer as source (first-mover) rationally decides and settles which alternative possibility is actualized. If it’s the first, Paul’s words collapse into nonsense—

no pastor has ever preached “don’t worry, sometimes you’ll escape sin, sometimes you won’t, it’s a quantum coin flip.”

 If it’s the second, then that’s libertarian freedom. Those are your real live options, and the dilemma stands. You said: 

//Just because indeterminism is true doesn’t mean the kind of free will present necessitates indeterminism.//

I’m thrilled you’ve finally rejected EDD. You’re right: indeterminism is true—antecedent conditions don’t necessitate all events.

But let’s be precise.

 If the believer is the source—the first-mover agent who decides whether to sin or take the escape—then that freedom both entails and requires indeterminism (since antecedent conditions are insufficient). That’s just what libertarian freedom is: agent-causation plus leeway, not random noise. You said, 

//If the kind of free will that is posited does not require indeterminism, even if indeterminism is in fact true in the actual world (which is what I am postulating), then libertarian freedom is false precisely because indeterminism is not necessary (though actual).//

But we’ve already established that the kind of freedom Paul promises requires indeterminism: antecedent conditions are not sufficient to necessitate sin. 

Thus, when a Christian sins, it’s not traceable to prior necessity—it’s on the believer as the source. 

That’s precisely libertarian freedom: the believer is the source of his action in a world where not all things are determined. You said, 

//Just because indeterminism is actually present doesn’t entail libertarian freedom (which, I will remind you, I spend quite a bit of time detailing in my Volume 3 reply to you and the 1 Cor 10:13 argument).//

And you were just as confused then as you are now.

 I have never argued that “indeterminism entails libertarian freedom.” Quite the opposite actually: libertarian freedom entails indeterminism. My argument is this: if the agent is the uncaused cause—the source—of his act (not traceable to antecedent necessity), then libertarian freedom is true. That requires indeterminism, but it’s not reducible to it. You said: 

//Further, indeterminism being present doesn’t entail “genuine sourcehood” in the way you are thinking of it.//

I’ve never argued otherwise, Colton. 

You’re shadow-boxing here.

 My claim is this: if someone is going to be the genuine source of their actions, then indeterminism must be true. That’s not the same as saying “indeterminism = sourcehood.” Don’t misattribute to me an argument I’ve never made. You said, 

//You are most definitely thinking of it in terms of what Kane calls “ultimate sourcehood”, and the leeway you are positing is almost definitely “categorical”.//

Thanks for the news flash! You’re right: that’s exactly what I’m affirming. Ultimate sourcehood = the agent as first mover with categorical ability to actualize either alternative possibility. That’s precisely what Paul’s words entail if they are to carry real pastoral truth-telling comfort. You said, 

//But indeterminism could be true, and that doesn’t require the free will present is necessarily categorical, nor does it require that the type of sourcehood present is necessarily ultimate. None of that has been shown. You just simply assume it.//

No, Colton. 

I’ve argued for it repeatedly.

 The text itself forces it. If the ability to resist is only dispositional (the necessary action aligning with your greatest subjective desires—which are themselves determined via antecedent necessity, kicking the can down the road), then in every case of sin the believer lacked the categorical power to resist—and Paul’s promise fails. If the ability is categorical, the believer always has the power at 

t

 to resist or succumb to temptation, which alone preserves Paul’s words. That’s not a mere assumption, Colton—that’s exegesis meeting logic. So, Colton, unless you want to collapse Paul’s words into either empty compatibilist incoherence or stochastic nonsense, the only live option left is what Paul actually implies: categorical ability grounded in agent sourcehood—that is, libertarian freedom. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

PART2: 1 Corinthians 10:13 and Libertarian Freedom: Another Response to Colton Carlson

In a recent exchange, in the YouTube comments under a video featuring Leighton Flowers, Colton Carlson offered a detailed attempt to defend a compatibilist-friendly reading of 1 Corinthians 10:13. He leaned on Vihvelin’s notion of “W-Ability” (dispositional ability plus opportunity) to argue that Paul’s words need not entail categorical ability (C-Ability) or libertarian freedom (LFW).

Below, I’ll first share Mr. Carlson’s case in his own words, and then respond point by point.

Mr. Carlson’s Argument

“Now, getting back to the 1 Cor 10:13 argument. You keep providing your argument, as if that is the only 1 Cor 10:13 argument on the market. You realize that Paul Himes has the same argument right? Of course, a different syllogism, structure, etc. But it’s all the same argument: Paul’s words are preserved only if a C-Ability is entailed by the text, and if C-Ability is in the text, therefore LFW. So, if I were to look at your specific argument, I would deny premise (1). The antecedent of (1) only entails the consequence of (1) iff C-Ability is the kind of ability that is exercised by the agent. I reject that C-Ability is the only kind of ability that is compatible with the text; a dispositional analysis is just as compatible. Seeing as it is a compatibilist analysis, and not an incompatibilist analysis, libertarian freedom cannot be concluded. So I reject premise (1).

Demonstrate coherence. Why doesn’t Vihvelin’s W-Ability collapse into determinism? Well, because let’s stipulate that indeterminism is true. Vihvelin’s W-Ability is compatible with both indeterminism and determinism, so it is irrelevant if determinism is false. It also doesn’t entail sheer luck or mindless randomness because it upholds a version of agent-causation. Granted, the kind of agent-causation is not incompatibilist, entailing ultimate sourcehood. But so what? As Vihvelin explains, to agent-cause is “to act intentionally, that is, to act for a reason, and because of one’s reasons, and to act because of one’s reasons is to be caused to act by one’s reasons (one’s beliefs, desires, values, and so on)” (2013: 83). This is a working definition, but it suffices. Non-rational sub-personal events “decide” for the agent; the agent decides for themselves, for their own reasons.

Apply it to 1 Cor 10:13. First, I would like to point out that you said: //If the model can’t explain how the Christ follower genuinely has the categorical ability to resist in the moment of temptation, then it fails to do justice to Paul’s words.//

First, that’s question-begging. Just because an alternative model isn’t the C-Ability, and therefore requires indeterminism, it does not entail that all other alternatives should just be automatically ruled out. Obviously.

Second, before I begin, I want you to notice a key dialectical strategy. I do NOT need to show how the text entails a dispositional ability. I don’t even think the verse entails anything regarding metaphysics, personally (and neither do any specific commentaries either, I might add). To ask, then, for an interpretation that the text entails is silly, especially when I don’t think the text entails any form of metaphysics. Now, what I can do is to show that a competing alternative metaphysic is compatible with the text. It might be that the verse does not entail such an analysis, yet remain compatible with the chosen analysis. Moreover, compatibility claims do not, in and of themselves, demonstrate the truth of the items in which are claimed to be compatible; therefore, even if the dispositional analysis is false, it could still be true that 1 Cor 10:13 remains compatible with it. And that is what I argue: PAPDisp is compatible with 1 Cor 10:13, even if determinism were false, or even if PAPDisp is itself false.

Hence, I will argue that 1 Cor 10:13 is compatible with the dispositional analysis of free will. But notice that this invites an alternative interpretation utilizing a metaphysical analysis of the verse, one that is compatible with determinism. If the dispositional analysis is compatible with 1 Cor 10:13, then it would mean that it is metaphysically possible that the verse teaches (or entails) a dispositional analysis. If it is metaphysically possible that the verse teaches (or entails) a dispositional analysis (wholly apart from whether the verse actually teaches or entails a dispositional analysis), then it is not metaphysically possible that the verse entails libertarian free will, because if the verse entailed libertarian free will, it would mean that the verse is not compatible with any analysis that is compatible with determinism (and the dispositional analysis is, of course, compatible with determinism).

Now, look back at W-Ability, for it entails (i) and (ii). If both of these conditions are compatible with the text, then it would show that LFW cannot be entailed by the text. Further, if W-Ability is compatible with the text, then if PAPDisp is compatible with the text; and C-Ability (premise (1)) is false. Is (i) compatible with the text? Sure. Nothing in the text rules out that the Christian has a narrow ability to respond to temptation. They are psychologically sane, they have the know-how, let’s say, has what it takes, etc. So (i) is securely compatible with the text.

What about (ii)? Well, why can’t it be compatible with the text? The agent is able to decide based on their own reasons to choose to succumb or not succumb to temptation. There are no decisive obstacles that block the agent’s choosing either way; there are no masks, or finks; determinism is false, as we have stipulated, in the actual world (which, by the way, is the number argument against W-Ability; see Franklin 2018. But if determinism is false in the actual world, then this isn’t an issue).

So what would block the agent from having this opportunity to decide, for their own reasons, to succumb to or not succumb to temptation? Nothing. They therefore seem to be free. So we have everything we want: leeway (W-Ability), sourcehood (agent-causation), and we can further stipulate that both of these are necessary for responsibility. So the agent can be morally responsible. Nothing in the text, apophatically, states otherwise; any suggests otherwise would entail a weird eisegesis.

Okay, so there’s the argument.

To finish out your first comment, you say that my appeals to vague compatibilist-indeterminism don’t advance the conversation. I hope you are now satisfied! Of course, they aren’t incompatibilist, but so what? So I sure hope you don’t respond by saying that this model doesn’t work because it fails to secure the agent as the first-mover, or ultimate source, or that the C-Ability isn’t affirmed. That would be question-begging.

Now, your turn: provide independent and contrastive reason as to why the ability in the verse must mean C-Ability, and why the agent must be the first-mover. From the text, show that; exegete the text. I would love to explain the other points. I suggest that if we cannot move past this first initial post, this first “model”, then we must still move onto the other points.”

– Colton Carlson

My Response

Colton, thanks for finally putting a model on the table. Now we can examine something concrete.

1. On “Compatibility” vs. “Entailment”

You say you don’t think Paul is teaching metaphysics, only that his words can be read compatibly with Vihvelin’s W-Ability. But this misses the point, Colton. I’ve never claimed Paul is giving us a metaphysical treatise, but a theological truth (which can, of course, carry metaphysical implications). I’ve claimed his promise—“when you are tempted, you are able”—is meaningful only if the believer has genuine, categorical ability at t (in this case, t is the moment of temptation). Paul isn’t saying: “It’s metaphysically possible you might resist in some other possible world where antecedent conditions happen to be different.” He’s saying: “At the moment of temptation, God provides a way of escape, so you may endure.” That’s categorical assurance in the actual world, not dispositional possibility in counterfactual worlds. Ask yourself: what pastor has ever preached that sermon when addressing 1 Cor 10:13?

2. On Your Rejection of Premise (1)

You also claimed to reject the first premise of my argument. But Colton, this doesn’t work. My first premise says:

“If Christians have the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between genuine alternative possibilities at t (consistent with their regenerate nature), then they have libertarian freedom.”

That’s definitional. To reject it is like rejecting that a bachelor is an unmarried man. If one truly has the categorical power to choose between genuine live alternative options and actualize one of them, then by definition one possesses libertarian freedom. What you’ve really done is equivocate. You’ve swapped in your weaker notion of “ability” (W-Ability: dispositions + opportunity), and then insisted my inference doesn’t hold. But that’s just moving the goalposts. Paul uses dunasthe—a present-tense categorical “you are able.” My premise reflects that meaning. Your redefinition doesn’t refute the premise—it misses it.

3. W-Ability Collapses into Determination

Your chosen model defines ability as a bundle of dispositions plus opportunity. But under determinism (the very context compatibilism exists to defend), those dispositions and opportunities are themselves necessitated by antecedent conditions (even in a world in which not all things are determined). Which means: • At t (the moment of temptation), whether the believer sins or resists is already necessitated. • If they sin at t, they literally could not have done otherwise at that moment (contradicting Paul’s promise). That hollows out Paul’s pastoral comfort into this absurdity: “You could have resisted—if your necessitated bundle of dispositions had been different.” Even stipulating indeterminism doesn’t save you here. If the bundle of dispositions is fixed by non-determined quantum events (or something similar) outside the agent’s control, then the “choice” at t is still either determined by mindless antecedent necessity or moved by randomness which necessitates the outcome. Neither grounds sourcehood—the Christian is still a caused cause.

4. The “Coherence” Problem

You tried to defend coherence by writing:

“W-Ability is compatible with both indeterminism and determinism, so it is irrelevant if determinism is false.”

But this is not an argument, it’s an assertion. On the other hand, I’ve argued that even if indeterminism is true, the agent under W-Ability is still just a conduit of caused causes. You also asserted:

“It doesn’t entail sheer luck or mindless randomness because it upholds a version of agent-causation.”

But Colton, that’s precisely what I’ve already refuted. Without ultimate sourcehood, your so-called “agent causation” collapses into either necessitated causes or random chance. Slapping the label “agent” on it doesn’t change the metaphysics. It’s just event-causation in disguise. On your model, you are always a passive passenger, but never the pilot. This is why Moreland and I stressed that if your sensations of “reasonings” are simply produced by antecedent necessity or sub-personal randomness, then they’re not really your reasons. They are causal currents passing through you and merely happening to you (a passive cog). Calling them “your own” is question-begging. And when you shrug, “Granted, this isn’t incompatibilist agent-causation, but so what?”—that’s the whole issue! If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have the freedom entailed by Paul’s promise. You’ve conceded the game, the playoffs, and the championship trophy.

5. On the “Question-Begging” Charge

You accuse me of “question-begging” when I say that any model which fails to secure categorical ability cannot do justice to Paul’s words. But let’s be clear: I don’t “automatically rule out” alternative models because they aren’t C-Ability. I rule them out after argument, because they collapse into either determinism, randomness, or disguised event-causation. So when I say, “if the model can’t explain categorical ability, it fails to do justice to Paul’s words,” that’s not begging the question. That’s drawing a conclusion from careful exegesis of Paul’s promise (dunasthe = “you are able” at t) combined with the metaphysical implications. In short: I don’t dismiss your model because it’s not C-Ability. I dismiss it because it fails—step by step—to preserve the very thing Paul promises believers in 1 Corinthians 10:13.

6. On Your “No-Entailment / Compatibility” Strategy

You say:

“I do NOT need to show how the text entails a dispositional ability… To ask, then, for an interpretation that the text entails is silly.”

It’s not silly at all, Colton. I’ve argued that Paul’s words do entail a metaphysical truth about human ability. Whether or not commentaries side with me is irrelevant. The defeaters I’ve given stand until you actually refute them. Do not commit yet another fallacy by appealing to authority or majority. Deal with my arguments. Then you claim all you must do is show that a competing model is “compatible.” But compatibility is trivial. Everything is “compatible” with something at a thin level. What matters is explanatory adequacy and broad metaphysical compatibility. Does your dispositional analysis actually preserve Paul’s categorical assurance? No—it collapses under scrutiny. Moreover, when you appeal to Christians being “psychologically sane” and having “know-how,” you’re smuggling in assumptions your model cannot provide. If untrustworthy antecedent causes (natural laws, deities of deception, or random events) fix all of your mental states, then you are not rationally in control of your mental faculties—you are literally insane by, definitional standards. And when you say agents “decide for their own reasons,” the same problem resurfaces: if those “reasons” are the byproduct of causal antecedent necessity or sub-personal randomness, they’re not their own and they are not the right kind of reasons. They’re merely causal currents passing through (causes as opposed to rational reasons). Only if the agent is the source of their decision, choosing between live alternatives, does the description become coherent. But that just is libertarian freedom. So your compatibility move isn’t just weak—it’s self-defeating.

7. The Real Issue: Categorical Ability

Here’s the argument from 1 Corinthians 10:13 you still need to face: 1. If Christians possess the opportunity at time t to exercise an ability to choose among a range of alternative options each compatible with their regenerated state, then Christians possess libertarian freedom.2. At the moment of temptation (t), Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between either (i) giving into temptation or (ii) taking the way of escape God promises to provide.3. Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom. You deny (1) only by redefining “ability” downward into W-Ability. But W-Ability doesn’t secure what Paul promises about what they can actually do in the actual world at t – when they are actually facing temptation. This reduces Paul’s comfort to a hollow conditional. On this W-Ability reading, Paul is a horrible pastor who delivers false hope—if not deception.

8. Back to the Text

Paul grounds his readers’ hope in the present-tense assurance: “you are able.” Not “you have the right dispositions such that, in some possible world, you would resist.” His words are pastoral, not hypothetical. If your model were right, then Paul’s message becomes: “Every time you sin, you literally could not have done otherwise—but take comfort, you had the resources in other possible worlds.” That’s not pastoral encouragement based upon truth and reality. That’s despair based upon absurdity.

9. Closing the Circle

So here’s where we are: (i) W-Ability collapses into either determinism or randomness.(ii) It’s “agent-causation” is just event-causation in disguise.(iii) It fails to secure the categorical ability Paul affirms. Your move, Colton, is clear to the reader: you’ve retreated to “compatibility.” Not only have I shown why your view is not compatible with the text, Paul himself offers confidence that, in the moment of temptation, the believer genuinely can endure and avoid sin. The regenerate Christ follower can avoid sin and do otherwise—by taking the way of escape God promises to provide. It logically follows that when a regenerate Christ follower does sin, he or she could have done otherwise. That is categorical ability—and categorical ability entails libertarian freedom.

10. On Your Conclusion

You write:

“So we have everything we want: leeway (W-Ability), sourcehood (agent-causation), and we can further stipulate that both of these are necessary for responsibility.”

No, you don’t, Colton. You absolutely do not have leeway or sourcehood in any robust sense. If the regenerate Christian is not the ultimate and rational source of his actions and the actualizer of possible alternatives, then there is no leeway at all. If random and non-determined events (that are not rational) determine the mental and physical actions of the Christ follower, then when the Christian sins, he literally could not have taken the way of escape. It wasn’t up to him—it was up to causal currents or mindless randomness. Colton, you’re stealing from libertarian freedom to argue against it. You’re importing the language of leeway and sourcehood while denying the very conditions that make them meaningful. You continue:

“So the agent can be morally responsible.”

But how is an agent “morally responsible” if he’s not rationally responsible? Do we hold people responsible for the random flickers of quantum particles? Of course not. If a person’s mental activity is as arbitrary as the quantum realm—or necessitated by untrustworthy antecedents—then he has no active control over his reasoning, no ability to take thoughts captive, no rational ownership of his choices. And without rational responsibility, moral responsibility is incoherent. You add:

“Nothing in the text, apophatically, states otherwise; any suggests otherwise would entail a weird eisegesis.”

That’s not an argument—it’s an appeal to silence. Paul’s words—dunasthe—positively entail categorical ability. You can’t retreat to “the text doesn’t say otherwise” when your interpretation strips Paul’s words of their actual force. You then say:

“Of course, they aren’t incompatibilist, but so what?”

That is the whole point, Colton. If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have freedom. I’ve shown why, step by step. That’s not question-begging—that’s philosophical analysis. Finally, you say:

“Now, your turn: provide independent and contrastive reason as to why the ability in the verse must mean C-Ability, and why the agent must be the first-mover. From the text, show that; exegete the text.”

Done. Paul says dunasthe—“you are able.” Present tense. Actual world. That’s categorical assurance. That is leeway in the actual world. That is what makes his pastoral promise meaningful. And no—we’re not moving on until this is settled. If your model cannot preserve Paul’s categorical assurance in 1 Corinthians 10:13, then every further step you take is built on quicksand. So yes—I’m grateful you’ve finally put a model on the table. But it collapses under scrutiny. Back to the drawing board, Colton. Until you can show which premise of my syllogism your W-Ability actually defeats, your case fails and Paul’s words stand firmly on the side of libertarian freedom.

Sidebar:

Here’s the short version for those who have been following along: • Colton’s model (W-Ability) reduces freedom to having the right dispositions plus opportunity. • If determinism is true, those dispositions are necessitated—so you could not have done otherwise. • If indeterminism is true, the dispositions are just as external to the agent—so your “choice” comes from random luck (not rationality). Either way, Paul’s words (“you are able”) lose their force. The only way his promise works is if believers have categorical ability in the moment—which is just libertarian freedom. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

PART 3: Could the Believer Have Done Otherwise? A Response to Colton Carlson on 1 Corinthians 10:13

Introduction This written debate between Dr. Tim Stratton and Mr.Colton Carlson centers on the meaning of Paul’s promise in 1 Corinthians 10:13: that God always provides a “way of escape” when believers face temptation. At stake is whether this passage affirms categorical ability (C-Ability)—the genuine, libertarian power to do otherwise in the actual world—or whether it can be sufficiently explained by weaker notions of ability (W-Ability) consistent with compatibilism. Carlson challenges Stratton’s reading, arguing that the verse does not entail libertarian free will (LFW) and that Stratton equivocates on the meaning of “genuine alternatives.” Stratton, in turn, defends the necessity of agent-causal freedom, contending that without ultimate sourcehood, Christian responsibility, rationality, and theological knowledge collapse into determinism or randomness. What follows is an extended dialogue—sometimes technical, often pointed—that presses the foundational question: Could the believer really have done otherwise when facing temptation? This is PART 3 of their long discussion. Find PART 1 and PART 2 here.

CC: //Thanks for the continued ordering of issues; it’s organized and neat. Helpful. I will be clear, however. I can only keep up these long-winded rounds of exchange for at least a couple more volleys.//

TIM: I appreciate your willingness to continue the exchange, Colton. Written dialogue does tend to be lengthy, especially when we’re working through detailed philosophical distinctions. But I’ve been aiming for clarity and concision while making sure to respond to each of your points. If my replies are long, it’s only because your objections raise multiple issues that need to be addressed. My goal has consistently been to focus us on the foundational issue at the heart of our disagreement.

CC: //It would be MUCH better if we could sit, face-to-face, and have a virtual video discussing this issue.//

TIM: We’ve had face-to-face discussions before, and I’ve found that the written format actually works much better. Writing gives us both the chance to think carefully, avoid talking past each other, and express our arguments clearly without the pressure of an immediate response. This way, we can be more precise and ensure the conversation stays focused.

CC: //It can even be on your channel; it can even be recorded. It doesn’t even need to be a “debate”, just a discussion. If you are devoting this much time to responding to me already in written format, why not just discuss it on video?//

TIM: Several reasons: (i) writing actually saves time for me. (ii) Written dialogue is much more careful and clear (or at least it should be). (iii) In past interactions I’ve seen things that undermined my trust with you, and that makes me cautious about entering a live discussion with you. Written dialogue helps maintain clarity and accountability. (iv) Before I’d consider a video discussion, I’d want to see this written exchange reach a point where we’re both engaging rigorously and productively. Why would I waste time on video when I could be engaging with actual scholars who publish in the academic literature? No, Colton—we will continue this discussion here. And for what it’s worth, this format provides excellent content for my website as well.

CC: //1. You say that my entailment vs compatibility strategy misses the point. But how? I never said that you said (or claimed) that Paul is giving us a metaphysical treatise.//

TIM: The record above shows that you did say that you did not think Paul was teaching metaphysics in this passage. I reminded you that Paul did teach a theological truth which carries metaphysical implications. Paul teaches a theological truth, and theological truths necessarily carry metaphysical implications. To deny that is simply to avoid the consequences of Paul’s words rather than engaging them.

CC: //It may be a theological truth, which then “carry metaphysical implications”. But that is precisely my point: you want to claim that Paul is legitimately teaching that the believer has a genuine, C-Ability at t. Later, under point #6, you say: “I’ve argued that Paul’s words do entail a metaphysical truth about human ability”, and of course you mean C-Ability and nothing else. It is my contention that this is false.//

TIM: Your contention is a mere assertion that faces the defeater of my argument. That’s an irrational contention unless you can show that this theological truth Paul promises does not have metaphysical implications. By the way: theology is metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality, and God is ultimate and necessary reality and all claims about Him, what He has done, what He has created, etc. is both theology and metaphysics. So, your claim that “Paul isn’t teaching metaphysics” is nothing but a desperate attempt to avoid libertarian freedom and the categorical ability Paul describes.

CC: // Therefore, how do I miss the point?//

TIM: See above. Theology is metaphysics.

CC: //You claim the verse entails C-Ability; I don’t think it does.//

TIM: False. Replace the word “claim” with “argue and conclude,” then you will be right. But you have not argued or concluded; you merely claim, but claims are not defeaters. Here you go:

Argument from 1 Cor 10:13 to C-Ability

1. Paul promises that when Christians face temptation, “God is faithful, and He will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear, but with the temptation He will also provide a way of escape, so that you may be able (dunasthe) to endure it” (1 Cor 10:13).

2. If Paul’s promise is true, then at the actual moment of temptation (t), the Christian is able either (i) to give in to temptation or (ii) to take the way of escape.

3. To say that a Christian is able at t (dunasthe) entails that in the actual world, nothing external to the agent—whether natural laws, antecedent causes, or divine determination—prevents the Christian from exercising either option.

4. If nothing external prevents the Christian from exercising either option, then both options are genuinely open to the Christian in the categorical sense (not merely conditionally or dispositionally).

5. To have both options genuinely open in the actual world at t just is to have categorical ability (C-Ability) at t.

6. Therefore, Christians possess C-Ability at the moment of temptation (t), as promised by Paul in 1 Cor 10:13.

CC://My strategy is to grant that C-Ability is compatible with it, but also that it is compatible with W-Ability. Importantly, I don’t think the verse entails either C-Ability or W-Ability, even if it is compatible with both.//

TIM: And I have *argued* that C-Ability is not just compatible but the only coherent way to understand Paul’s assurance in this passage. W-Ability collapses into either determinism or randomness (both "decisive obstacles" to the agent), which fails to provide the categorical assurance Paul offers to Christian agents. I’ll unpack this further below.

CC: //Now, you critique the W-Ability by saying Paul isn’t saying “It’s metaphysically possible you might resist in some other possible world where antecedent conditions happen to be different.” I never said otherwise! The W-Ability doesn’t appeal to possible worlds where the antecedent conditions happen to be different. Go back and check; that’s not what the W-Ability entails.//

TIM

:

The W-Ability refers to (i) the agent having the intrinsic ability (narrow ability) and (ii) the external conditions being in place—i.e., the opportunity and absence of decisive obstacles—so that an action can actually be carried out in the world. According to this view:

“S has what it takes to X . . . and has the means and opportunity, and nothing external stands in her way.”

But here’s the problem: if the agent is not the true source of her actions, then the claim that she “has what it takes” is hollow. On W-Ability, her actions are still fixed by external factors—whether deterministic laws of nature or random fluctuations (not her rationality). In such a case, she doesn’t genuinely 

do otherwise

; things merely 

happen to her and through her

. Therefore, for W-Ability to genuinely ground rational responsibility, two conditions must be met: (a) the world must allow indeterminism, and (b) the agent herself must be the originating source of at least some of her thoughts and actions. But once you add (b), you’ve already crossed into what I mean by C-Ability: the categorical power of the agent to choose among alternatives in the actual world.

A Deductive Case Against W-Ability as Sufficient

1. Definition of W-Ability: On W-Ability, an agent has the ability to X if (a) she possesses the relevant internal dispositions and capacities, and (b) the external opportunity and absence of obstacles are in place so that she can carry out the action in the actual world.

2. Dependence on External Factors: If an agent is not the true originating source of her actions, then her actions are determined or fixed by external factors (e.g., deterministic laws of nature or random fluctuations), and thus fall outside her rational authorship.

3. Loss of Genuine Alternatives: If an agent’s actions are determined or fixed by external factors, then she cannot genuinely do otherwise in the actual world; events merely happen to her and through her rather than originatingfrom her.

4. Rational Responsibility Requires Sourcehood: Genuine rational responsibility requires that the agent herself be the originating source of at least some of her thoughts and actions, and thus able to deliberate and choose between genuine alternatives. (See the Free-Thinking Argument and Deity of Deception Argument)

5. Implication: Therefore, for W-Ability to ground rational responsibility, it must include sourcehood—that is, the agent must be the originating source of some of her actions.

6. Identity with C-Ability: But once W-Ability includes sourcehood, it has become what I mean by C-Ability: the categorical power of the agent to choose among genuine alternatives in the actual world.

7. Final Conclusion: Therefore, W-Ability by itself cannot ground rational responsibility. Either it collapses into empty event-causation without freedom, or it smuggles in sourcehood and thus becomes C-Ability.

Quick defense of each premiseP1 — Definition of W-Ability. This is the standard dispositional/opportunity analysis: internal competence + external opportunity/no decisive obstacles. It sets the target I’m evaluating without smuggling in C-Ability. P2 — Dependence on external factors. If the agent is not the originating source, then what fixes action are factors outside the agent’s rational authorship—either necessitating causes (laws + prior states) or sub-personal indeterministic (random) events. That’s a true dichotomy relative to “not sourcehood.” P3 — Loss of genuine alternatives. Once external factors fix what happens at t, the agent lacks robust alternatives at t; any “could” reduces to a counterfactual conditional (“would have if antecedents were different”), not a categorical “can now.” P4 — Rational responsibility requires sourcehood. Epistemic/moral responsibility for action or belief requires that the agent settles between live options for reasons the agent authors. If reasons are produced/selected by external necessitation or randomness, authorship (and so responsibility) is undercut. (This is exactly what my Free-Thinking Argument and Deity-of-Deception Argument show.) P5 — Implication for W-Ability. So, if W-Ability is to ground responsibility, it must include sourcehood, not just dispositions + opportunity. P6 — Collapse into C-Ability. Once you add sourcehood plus live alternatives at t, you have the categorical power to do otherwise in the actual world—i.e., C-Ability. C7 — Result. Therefore, W-Ability by itself cannot ground rational responsibility: without sourcehood it’s mere event-causation; with sourcehood it just is C-Ability. Pauline Implication When Paul assures us that God provides a way of escape such that we may endure (1 Cor 10:13), he is pointing to an actual capacity the believer has at the moment of temptation. But if this capacity reduces to W-Ability—mere dispositions plus opportunity—then when a Christian sins, that “capacity” was never actually available. They could not have done otherwise, and Paul’s promise rings hollow. By contrast, if the believer truly has the capacity to resist and take the way of escape, then even when they fail, it remains true that they could have resisted. That is precisely what I mean by C-Ability.

CC: //2. You don’t think I can reject premise (1). You think it is definitional. But I deny that just because one exercises “an ability to choose between genuine alternative possibilities” that automatically, definitionally, entails LFW. Why would it?//

TIM: Colton, if an agent is the originating source of his mental and physical actions, then he possesses libertarian freedom by definition. To be the source means that nothing external—whether deterministic conditions or impersonal forces—fixes his choice. And if nothing deterministically prevents the agent from choosing otherwise, then he truly

can

 choose otherwise. If you resist calling that “libertarian freedom,” that’s fine, but the substance remains the same. A rose by any other name smells just as sweet. If you affirm that humans are the source of some of their thoughts and actions, and that nothing deterministically blocks us from acting otherwise in those moments, then you have affirmed exactly what I mean by libertarian freedom—even if you prefer to avoid that label.

CC: //You never claimed that access to the genuine alternative possibility is in fact C-Ability. That’s not in your premise, is it?//

TIM: Colton, your objection shows some confusion about how the argument is framed. Look carefully at the structure:

1. If Christians possess the opportunity at time t to exercise an ability to choose among a range of alternative options each compatible with their regenerated state, then Christians possess libertarian freedom.

2. At the moment of temptation (t), Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between either (i) giving into temptation or (ii) taking the way of escape God promises to provide.

3. Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom.

Notice that premise (1) already defines this opportunity in terms of categorical ability (C-Ability). To make it clearer, we could reframe it explicitly:

1. If Christians possess the opportunity at time t to exercise an ability to choose among genuine alternative possibilities, then Christians possess C-Ability.

2. At the moment of temptation (t), Christians possess this opportunity (either to give in or resist).

3. Therefore, Christians possess C-Ability.

So, the conclusion follows directly. Unless you want to deny that Paul’s promise entails such an opportunity at all, the presence of C-Ability is unavoidable.

CC: //Now, having access to C-Ability (assuming we have free will), would entail LFW because we would (i) have free will, (ii) the free will is necessarily indetermined, and in virtue of (i) and (ii) we get (iii) incompatibilism.//

TIM: That depends on what you mean by 

“incompatibilism.”

 I’m a libertarian who also affirms that some of my actions are determined but still “free” in a compatibilistic sense. This is why I keep steering the conversation toward the central issue: 

are 

any

 of my thoughts and actions not determined by something or someone else?

 And if so, am I the first mover in those situations with the power to actualize one of at least two alternative possibilities? But unless you clearly define what you mean by 

“compatibilism,”

 I can’t tell what you’re affirming or denying. Some compatibilists mean only that we act freely when doing what we most want—even if those wants are determined by something or someone else. Others reduce it to moral responsibility, while still others focus on epistemic responsibility. Without clarity, we’ll just be talking past each other. For my part, I affirm compatibilist freedom in some cases. But libertarian freedom requires more: at least some of my thoughts and actions must originate by me as the first mover, not in deterministic laws or random events. That’s the core question—do agents ever have the categorical power to do otherwise in the actual world? So if by “incompatibilism” you mean a blanket denial that all compatibilist accounts are possible, that’s not exactly how I’d frame it. My point is simply this: unless some agent-causal, undetermined choices are real, Paul’s assurance in 1 Cor 10:13 collapses. Without that, 

“the way of escape”

 is either determined or random, but never truly up to the believer—making his promise hollow rather than hopeful.

CC: //That’s LFW. But your premise says none of that. It just jumps from “an ability to choose between genuine alternative possibilities” to LFW. //

TIM: Colton, just as the Kalam argument does not contain the word “God” in its premises or even its conclusion, yet rationally entails God’s existence, my premise works in a similar manner. The first premise is framed as an “if-conditional”: 

If

 Christians have the ability to choose between genuine alternatives at t, 

then

 a certain conclusion follows. Now, why does this entail libertarian freedom? Because to have genuine alternatives is to face a live possibility of doing otherwise in the actual world—something determinism rules out. And if the choice truly originates in the agent rather than in external factors, then by definition, that is libertarian freedom. So, the wording doesn’t need to say “LFW” explicitly. The entailment is in the logic, not the label—just as with Kalam and God.

CC: //Unless you are equivocating on “genuine” to entail C-Ability (which obviously you do), the consequent doesn’t follow definitionally. Why? Because surely the leeway compatibilist will also say (those advocating for W-Ability, for example) that they have a genuine alternative possibility, and obviously that doesn’t require indeterminism.//

TIM: Colton, 

the key issue isn’t simply what compatibilists 

say

 about “genuine alternatives,” but whether their account actually secures them.

 As I’ve demonstrated (as opposed to merely “said”), W-Ability collapses into either determinism or randomness. In neither case does the agent have the categorical power to actualize one of at least two alternatives as the true originating source. If determinism holds, the choice is fixed by prior causes. If randomness holds, the “choice” is just the product of sub-personal, mindless, chance events. Neither gives the agent genuine authorship. That’s why the mere claim of “genuine alternatives” under W-Ability fails—it lacks the grounding in sourcehood that C-Ability provides.

CC: //So let’s be less vague in your premises: you should say this: Premise (*1) “If Christians have the to choose between genuine alternative possibilities at t (consistent with their regenerate nature), then they have libertarian freedom.” Access to alternative possibilities does not automatically entail LFW; PAP doesn’t automatically entail LFW. You must qualify the kind of access to the alternative possibility to be necessarily incompatibilist.//

TIM: Colton, the issue here isn’t about merely having “access” to possible outcomes as things that might 

happen

 to us. 

The real question is whether the agent has the power to 

make

 one alternative actual.

On my view, libertarian freedom requires agent causation: the agent herself, as an image-of-God bearer, can (i.e., has the power to) break the causal chain and bring about an outcome. By contrast, if everything is the result of deterministic laws or random fluctuations, then the agent is reduced to a passive cog—

things simply happen 

to

 her and 

through

 her rather than 

from

 her.

That’s not genuine access to alternatives; it’s just being carried along by forces outside one’s control. This is why I keep pressing the distinction. To say “we have genuine alternatives” without sourcehood is hollow, because no actual power of choice lies with the agent. As C.S. Lewis put it, 

“Reasoning doesn’t happen to us; we do it.”

CC: //You say I am equivocating, but it’s not my premise. It’s yours! You specifically say: “You’ve swapped in your weaker notion of “ability” (W-Ability: dispositions + opportunity), and then insisted my inference doesn’t hold. But that’s just moving the goalposts. How? Because W-Ability? Where’s the argument that it’s weaker? No where. Where is the argument that “genuine” must automatically mean “C-Ability”? Definitely not in the premises! So, yes, your inference doesn’t hold. It’s not moving the goalposts; it’s goading you to be less vague in your premises. //

TIM: Colton, the issue isn’t that I’m being vague, but that you’re trying to flatten out a crucial distinction. You’re right that I draw the line between W-Ability and C-Ability, but I’ve also argued why W-Ability is 

weaker

 and insufficient to ground rational responsibility. It’s not a bare assertion—it’s tied to the logic of sourcehood. Here’s the argument in short form:

1. W-Ability is defined as dispositions + opportunity + absence of obstacles.

2. But if an agent’s “ability” is wholly fixed by external factors (determinism or randomness), then she does not genuinely originate her actions and obstacles are present.

3. Without origination, she lacks the categorical power to actualize one alternative over another in the actual world.

4. Thus, W-Ability collapses into event-causation without responsibility unless you smuggle in sourcehood.

But here’s the deal: once you add sourcehood with no deterministic or random obstacles, you’ve crossed into C-Ability. That’s why “genuine” can’t mean W-Ability. On its own, W-Ability only gives you the illusion of alternatives. For alternatives to be genuine in the sense Paul describes—an actual “way of escape” open to the believer—they must be accessible in a way that is up to the agent, not merely happening through her. That accessibility just is what I mean by C-Ability. So, it’s not moving the goalposts. It’s clarifying the stakes: either you allow for sourcehood (and thus C-Ability), or you reduce to determinism/randomness with no real “genuine” alternatives at all.

CC: //Last, honestly, I think premise (2) is false just as much.//

TIM: That’s definitely the one you 

should

 have tried to reject, since you were already committed to rejecting the deductive conclusion. It is, after all, the controversial premise—the real crux of the debate. So although you’re late to the party, better late than never. But simply denying premise (2) isn’t enough; you’ll need to provide an argument that Christians at the moment of temptation 

do not

 genuinely face a choice between giving in and taking the way of escape Paul promises. Without such an argument, rejecting (2) is just assertion.

CC: //So even if you change the necessary changes I suggest for premise (1), and subsequently change them in premise (2), then I would deny premise (2); there is no independent or contrastive reason for why Christians have the C-Ability when responding to temptation. //

TIM: Sure there is, Colton! I’ve already explained why above, but let me do it again for you.

1. Paul’s Explicit Teaching (1 Cor 10:13): Paul doesn’t just say “temptation happens.” He explicitly assures believers that God Himself is faithful to provide “the way of escape so that you may endure.” That’s not just opportunity in the W-Ability sense—it’s a divine promise that a genuine alternative to sin is available in the actual moment of temptation. To deny this is to gut the force of Paul’s encouragement to the Corinthians.

2. Theological Implication: If believers could not genuinely do otherwise in the moment, then Paul’s words are empty. Saying “there is a way of escape” would mean nothing if, metaphysically, the believer cannot take it. But if Paul’s promise is to hold, it must imply that Christians truly have the categorical power (C-Ability) to either fall or endure.

3. Contrastive Reasoning: You said there’s no “independent or contrastive reason” to affirm C-Ability here. But the contrast is right in the verse itself: (i) falling into temptation vs. (ii) taking the way of escape. That’s the contrast Paul places before the believer. And for this contrast to be meaningful, both options must be genuinely available at t. Otherwise, the “contrast” reduces to mere appearance.

4. Philosophical Consistency: W-Ability alone can’t sustain this promise. If the believer “has what it takes” but is locked in by determinism or randomness (obstacles), then they lack real authorship over which path is actualized. Only sourcehood—the believer as first mover—makes sense of Paul’s assurance.

Thus, the independent reason to affirm C-Ability in this context is both (a) the explicit theological promise of 1 Cor 10:13 and (b) the logical necessity of sourcehood if Paul’s assurance is to mean anything. Without C-Ability, Paul’s words collapse into false pastoral rhetoric with no metaphysical grounding.

CC: //3. You bring up determinism, yet again. Why? Determinism, let’s say, is flamingly false. Why bring up “But under determinism (the very context compatibilism exists to defend), those dispositions and opportunities are themselves necessitated by antecedent conditions (even in a world in which not all things are determined).” //

TIM: First, I often bring up determinism (or determination) because I want to be thorough for our readers—it’s essential to show how different views collapse under scrutiny. Second, you yourself have claimed to be a “thoroughgoing compatibilist,” which (at least in standard usage) means you’re committed to the idea that some kind of freedom or moral responsibility can exist

even if determinism is true

. So if I expose what’s not compatible with determinism (or determination), I’m engaging directly with the framework you’ve identified with. That said, you’re right that we could set 

determinism

 aside. But then the problem doesn’t vanish—it simply reappears under the name of 

determination

. Even in an indeterministic world, you can still be determined by antecedent conditions, or by non-determined but non-rational causes (e.g., random quantum events). Either way, your deliberation and action are not 

up to you

 in the sense of originating 

from

 your agency. And if your dispositions and opportunities are themselves determined in this way, then “W-Ability” collapses into either determinism or randomness. That’s why I press the point: even if determinism is false, 

determination still threatens genuine agency

. Being determined by brute randomness is no better for rational responsibility than being determined by causal necessity or a deity of deception. Either way, you’re not the source and the actual source is epistemically untrustworthy. The upshot is simple: unless the agent herself is the first mover—capable of originating a choice among real alternatives—there’s no meaningful “way of escape” in Paul’s sense (1 Cor 10:13).

CC: //Irrelevant. I am assuming indeterminism. Please, stop bringing up determinism. It does nothing for you here. //

TIM: Fine, let’s just talk about determination in a world where indeterminism is true. That does everything for me here.

CC: //But then you say “Even stipulating indeterminism doesn’t save you here. If the bundle of dispositions is fixed by non-determined quantum events (or something similar) outside the agent’s control, then the “choice” at t is still either determined by mindless antecedents or moved by randomness. Neither grounds sourcehood—the Christian is still a caused cause.”

But the bundle of dispositions isn’t fixed by non-determined quantum events outside of the agent’s control. It’s chosen for the agent’s reasons. I gave a definition of Vihvelin’s agent-causation (albeit an inchoate one). Deal with that. //

TIM: What does that mean, Colton? Do “reasons” actually choose things, or do 

agents who can reason

 choose? Reasons can guide and inform, but they don’t select; only an agent has the power to actualize one of several alternatives. That’s precisely what Paul means when he exhorts believers to “take thoughts captive” (2 Cor 10:5) rather than “be taken captive” by bad thinking (Col 2:8). Those are two genuine possibilities, and the agent is the one who must decide.

You can actually choose to be more careful while engaged in deliberation.

You can choose to take thoughts captive, or not; you can choose to examine your biases, or not; you can choose to examine your emotions and if you are letting your feelings get in the way of the facts, or not. These things are

up to you

as the source of your thinking. If they aren’t, then the actual source is untrustworthy which leads to your epistemic collapse. If, as you say, the agent is not determined to reason one way or another, then the agent herself is the source of her reasoning. When she chooses to deliberate carefully or carelessly, and then chooses to act on that reasoning, we have agent-causation in action—the agent as first mover initiating a causal chain not determined by anything prior. That 

just is

 libertarian free-thinking. So if you mean that the Christian chooses for her own reasons, then you’ve already affirmed the very thing you’re resisting: the agent’s sourcehood freedom and categorical power to do otherwise in the actual world. In other words, welcome to libertarian freedom.

CC: //4. The Coherence Problem. You think you have refuted… something, but what? You cannot start the debate with saying “Without ultimate sourcehood, your “agent causation” collapses into either necessitated causes or random chance. Slapping the label “agent” on it doesn’t change the metaphysics. It’s just event-causation in disguise.” That’s just impossibility to the contrary, or a transcendental argument. It pushes the conversation nowhere. How does a compatibilist-dispositional view of indeterminism entail random chance when it is the agent choosing, intentionally, for their own reasons? Why does the sourcehood have to be “ultimate”?//

TIM: If you are not the ultimate source of your theological beliefs, then something or someone else is. But if those sources are antecedent conditions outside of your control—whether deterministic laws, random chance, or blind causal chains—then you inherit their epistemic status. And if those sources are untrustworthy, then you have undercutting defeaters for your theological beliefs, rendering them unjustified. Without justification, you do not possess theological knowledge. But here’s the crucial point: you sure assume that you 

do

 possess theological knowledge. You assume your conclusions about Scripture are not just lucky guesses or blind causal outputs, but are the result of careful reasoning for which you are rationally responsible. That assumption presupposes that you are the source of your reasoning, not merely a conduit for whatever chain of causes led up to your current beliefs. In other words, unless you are the ultimate source of your reasoning, your reasoning collapses into epistemic luck—which is not knowledge! This is why “ultimate” sourcehood matters. If your reasons are themselves necessitated by something external, then they are not 

yours

 in the relevant sense. And if they arise by mere randomness, then they are arbitrary. Either way, they fail to ground rational responsibility. By contrast, if you as the agent have the categorical power to weigh reasons and choose how to deliberate—to take thoughts captive or be taken captive—then you secure epistemic responsibility. So the issue is not just “slapping the label agent” on top of event-causation. It’s about whether the agent truly initiates reasoning and action, or whether she is merely the endpoint of an impersonal chain of antecedent links. If the latter, then theological knowledge itself becomes impossible. But if the former, then you’ve admitted the very thing you’re trying to resist: libertarian sourcehood.

CC: //I can dish the same rhetoric back: “Slapping on “random choice” doesn’t change the metaphysics.”//

TIM: I invite you to do so. But here’s the crucial difference: “slapping on ‘random choice’” really does change the metaphysics, because a random belief or action is not the same as a rational belief or action. If my belief or action is the result of sheer randomness, then I am not its source; the cause lies in impersonal chance. Such randomness can’t ground rational responsibility any more than a coin flip can ground knowledge. By contrast, when I, as an agent, deliberate, weigh reasons, and choose, 

I

am the source

 of the belief or action. Reasons may guide, but they don’t cause outcomes apart from 

my

 agency. So if you equate agent-causal choosing with randomness, you’ve erased the very distinction that makes rational responsibility possible. Without agent-causation, everything collapses into either determinism (necessitated outcomes I couldn’t help) or indeterminism (random outcomes I couldn’t help). Neither grants me authorship of my reasoning or actions. That’s why the notion of “random choice” is a category error when applied to libertarian freedom. Randomness is blind causation without ownership. Agent-causation, by contrast, is 

personal authorship

: the agent initiating a causal chain that isn’t determined by anything prior and isn’t left up to chance. It’s 

up to me

. That difference makes all the difference.

CC: // Next, you criticize event-causation? Event-causation and agent-causation are not mutually exclusive. In fact, Kane’s view literally requires both! So if you are a fan of Kane’s ultimate sourcehood, then it’s peculiar to me why forsake the event-causal piece.//

TIM: I never said event-causation and agent-causation are “mutually exclusive.” Of course I affirm that event-causation takes place. My point has always been this: 

if agent-causation is false

 (and never occurs), then all we’re left with is event-causation, and that reduces human choice to either necessitated causal chains or randomness. Neither grounds rational responsibility. That’s not a straw man; that’s the heart of my critique. You mention Kane, and I’m happy to clarify: Kane’s model explicitly combines event-causation and agent-causation, but it’s precisely the 

agent-causal component

 that does the heavy lifting in preserving ultimate sourcehood. Event-causation alone doesn’t get you responsibility—it’s the agent’s power to break causal chains and act as first-mover that makes sense of “genuine alternatives.” Without that element, Kane’s view collapses into the very determinism or indeterminism I’ve critiqued. So, yes, event-causation is real. But if you deny agent-causation, then you’ve undercut the very possibility of theological knowledge, rational deliberation, and Pauline responsibility described in Scripture.

That’s why I press the issue: the debate is not whether event-causation exists, but whether agents themselves ever truly

cause

 in the categorical sense.

CC: //Next, you say “Calling them “your own” is question-begging.” No. It’s your argument. Argue and support the premises with independent and contrastive reasons without simply asserting back that “Without ultimate or genuine sourcehood, that doesn’t work.” Great… that’s what you are trying to prove, so prove it. //

TIM: I’ve already done so, Colton. Let me refresh your memory. I’ve argued repeatedly that without the agent being the genuine originating source, her actions collapse into one of two categories:

1. Deterministic necessitation – where every choice is fixed by antecedent conditions stretching back beyond the agent’s control. In this case, the “ability” to do otherwise is only hypothetical. She could do otherwise if the past or laws were different, but since those are beyond her control, she cannot actually do otherwise.

2. Random chance – where the outcome is settled by indeterministic events (like quantum fluctuations) not directed by the agent. Here, the agent isn’t in control either; she’s just the stage upon which events randomly play out.

Neither of these options supplies rational sourcehood. They explain what happens to an agent, not what an agent does as a source. That’s why calling such outcomes “your own” simply relabels event-causation without solving the problem. By contrast, agent-causation affirms that the agent herself—rather than antecedent causes or blind chance—is the first mover in at least some of her thoughts and actions. She can deliberate and actualize one of multiple genuine alternatives. That’s not question-begging; that’s distinguishing what must be true if rational deliberation and responsibility are real. So the argument stands: unless you smuggle in ultimate sourcehood, your position reduces to determinism or randomness, neither of which grounds rational responsibility or theological knowledge. That’s why I press the point.

CC: //Lastly, you say a telling statement that somehow you think it telling for me and not you: “And when you shrug, ‘Granted, this isn’t incompatibilist agent-causation, but so what?’—that’s the whole issue! If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have freedom. You’ve conceded the game, the playoffs, and the championship trophy.” I say the kind of agent-causation is not incompatibilist. Right, because I reject incompatibilism. Then you say “that’s the whole issue!” I laughed out loud… actually. Right! That is the whole issue! It’s your argument! Shoulder your burden without just asserting “If you don’t have ultimate sourcehood, you don’t have freedom.” But notice, to all the readers, that is exactly what you. If you bring ultimate sourcehood to the table, and then interpret the verse accordingly, then no other competing view other than incompatibilism will work here—obviously. Gee, I wonder why.//

TIM: Colton, you keep saying “that’s the whole issue” as if I’m unaware of it. Of course it’s the whole issue—that’s why I’ve been driving the point home. If ultimate sourcehood is necessary for freedom, then rejecting it just 

is

 rejecting freedom in the robust, libertarian sense. You laugh, but you’re essentially conceding that you’ve traded away genuine alternative possibilities for something that may still be called “freedom” but is nothing more than compatibilist re-labeling.

Here’s the problem:

if the agent isn’t the ultimate source of at least some of her thoughts and actions, then she’s just a conduit of prior untrustworthy causes—whether deterministic chains or random fluctuations.

 Calling that “her choice” doesn’t change the metaphysics; it’s still event-causation all the way down. And if that’s all you’ve got, then you’ve abandoned the very thing Scripture seems to affirm in passages like 1 Cor 10:13: that believers 

really could have done otherwise.

You challenge me to “shoulder the burden,” but I’ve done so repeatedly (over and over again) by showing that without agent-causation—without the power to break causal chains—responsibility, rationality, and moral accountability collapse. 

Your system either yields determinism (where the agent is a puppet of antecedent conditions) or randomness (where the agent is a puppet of chance).

 Neither gives you a responsible 

agent

 at all. That’s not an empty assertion—it’s the rational consequence of tracing your view to its logical end. So yes, I unapologetically affirm that without ultimate sourcehood, there is no genuine freedom. That’s not stacking the deck—that’s showing where the definitions, metaphysics, and implications logically lead. If you want to deny that, then you’re free to do so—but you’re also left with a version of “freedom” that can’t sustain knowledge, responsibility, or Pauline exhortation. In short: you can redefine the terms, but at the end of the day, you’ve conceded the game, the playoffs, and the entire championship trophy.

Conclusion

This is what it all comes down to: if the agent herself is not the ultimate source of at least some of her thoughts, beliefs, and actions, then responsibility and rationality collapse. Event-causation, however sophisticated, will always reduce to determinism or randomness unless grounded in agent-causation. And without sourcehood, “freedom” is nothing more than a re-labeled illusion—it looks like freedom on the surface, but underneath, it is just the movement of prior causes. By contrast, libertarian freedom secures what Scripture affirms and what rational accountability requires: that agents can deliberate, reason, and choose between genuine alternatives in the actual world. This is why 1 Cor 10:13 is not hollow rhetoric but a genuine promise—that believers really 

could

 take the way of escape. That truth can only stand if we affirm C-Ability: the categorical power of the agent as first mover. So yes, ultimate sourcehood is the heart of the matter. Without it, the foundation of knowledge, moral responsibility, and Christian exhortation collapses. With it, we safeguard both rationality and responsibility under God—not to mention theological knowledge! And that’s why I will continue to press this point—not because it’s convenient, but because it’s necessary. Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

PART 4: Why Paul’s Words in 1 Cor. 10:13 Demand Libertarian Freedom: A Response to Colton Carlson

Introduction

The debate over 1 Corinthians 10:13, freedom, and responsibility continues. In this exchange, I (Dr. Tim Stratton) respond to Colton Carlson’s ongoing attempts to redefine “ability” in ways that obscure Paul’s plain assurance. Colton insists that his dispositional compatibilism can capture Paul’s promise, but as you’ll see, the very foundations of his view collapse under scrutiny. In what follows, I engage Colton point by point—addressing his appeals to authority, clarifying the difference between thin compatibility and true explanatory adequacy, and exposing the epistemic problems that arise when untrustworthy antecedent causes determine our beliefs. This isn’t just an abstract word game; it’s about whether Paul’s words offer real pastoral comfort or hollow philosophical jargon. So let’s dive in—back into the text, into the logic, and into the heart of what it means to say, with Paul: “God is faithful… you are able… He will provide a way of escape” (1 Cor. 10:13). For clarity, Colton’s comments are in 

BLUE

 and mine are in 

BLACK

.

Colton Carlson (CC): //5. Back to the entailment/compatibility strategy. You say I commit to an appeal to authority or majority. How? I didn’t appeal to commentaries to *make a point in the sense of providing evidence*. It was more of an appeal to ethos; that is, I don’t think ethos is on your side. But that’s not the same as an appeal to authority. My deliberate intention to reveal (as a side issue) that your view doesn’t align with major commentaries. That’s not a fallacy. //

TIM

:

 Colton, let’s be clear: you 

did

 appeal to authority. You said something to the effect of, “Most commentaries don’t support your view.” That’s not an argument from exegesis; that’s a numbers game. If you want to call it “ethos,” fine—but ethos doesn’t establish truth. The majority has often been wrong (just ask Athanasius standing contra mundum, or Luther at Worms). Appealing to consensus is not the same as appealing to Scripture. What matters is not how many commentators line up on your side, but whether the 

text itself

 demands your interpretation. As Paul reminds us, we are to “examine everything carefully; hold fast to that which is good” (1 Thess. 5:21). The Bereans were praised because they searched the Scriptures daily—not because they tallied the popular opinion. So yes, point to the scholars you admire, but until you actually demonstrate from the text why their view is correct, all you’ve done is commit the fallacy you deny. Truth is not decided by a show of hands.

CC: //You said,

“But compatibility is trivial. Everything is ‘compatible’ with something at a thin level. What matters is explanatory adequacy and broad metaphysical compatibility.”

It’s actually not trivial. If a compatibilist analysis of ability is compatible with the text, then that logically entails that LFW cannot be entailed by the text, even if it remains compatible with it. Think of Romans 9. Is determinism compatible with it? Perhaps. Probably. Is Molinism? Sure. Most definitely. But when I say (without endorsing this line of argument) that Romans 9 entails determinism, that means that Molinism is incompatible with the text. But, taking the modus tollens, if Molinism is compatible with the text, then determinism cannot be entailed by the text. Same thing here for 1 Cor 10:13. This is far from trivial; it’s logical.

TIM:

 Colton, not every biblical verse functions like Romans 9. Romans 9 may invite debates over whether determinism or Molinism is entailed or excluded, but 1 Cor 10:13 is 

pastoral assurance

—plain and simple. Paul isn’t speculating about logical space; he is grounding the believer’s confidence in the actual world: 

“You are able… God is faithful… He will provide a way of escape.”

 That is not thin compatibility; it is categorical assurance. And when Paul gives categorical assurance, a corresponding metaphysics is necessarily entailed. So when you claim that if compatibilism is “compatible” then LFW cannot be entailed, you miss the point entirely. Compatibility in name but not in substance is worthless if the model cannot capture the text’s promise. If your dispositional reading reduces Paul’s words to: 

“Every time you sin you literally could not have done otherwise—but take comfort, you had the resources in other possible worlds,”

 then you haven’t preserved compatibility—you’ve betrayed it.

The fact that your model makes Paul sound like a bad pastor is strong evidence it’s not truly compatible at all.

 Thin compatibility is cheap; explanatory adequacy is costly. And 1 Cor 10:13 demands the latter.

CC: //You said, “Moreover, when you appeal to Christians being “psychologically sane” and having “know-how,” you’re smuggling in assumptions your model cannot provide. If untrustworthy antecedent causes (natural laws, deities of deception, or random events) fix all their mental states, they are not rationally in control of their mental faculties—they are literally insane by definitional standards.” 

Where’s the smuggling?//

TIM: Colton, this isn’t just wordplay—it’s epistemology 101. The FreeThinking Argument and the Deity of Deception Argument both demonstrate that if untrustworthy antecedent conditions determine (even in an indeterministic world where not all things are determined) the entirety of your mental activity—including your metaphysical and theological beliefs—then your beliefs face an undercutting defeater that nullifies justification. Without justification, your so-called “theological knowledge” collapses into mere unjustified and subjective opinion.

So if you are not the true source of your reasoning, then something else is (see the law of excluded middle): the mindless laws of nature (epistemically untrustworthy), a deity of deception (epistemically untrustworthy), randomness (epistemically untrustworthy), or you—an image bearer of God, intelligently designed to aim at truth, but only if you exercise your reasoning powers carefully and responsibly. That, in essence, is libertarian free-thinking. JP Moreland and I have spelled this out in detail.

So when you claim, “But I still have know-how…,” you’re not escaping the problem—you’re borrowing from the very view you reject. You’re importing the necessary conditions for rational, justified belief from libertarian freedom while denying libertarian freedom itself. That is the smuggling. And you’ve been caught red-handed.

CC: //Where in the rulebook of logic do you get to claim a monopoly on certain words and definitions?//

TIM:

 I never claimed to have a monopoly on definitions. What I do strive to do is define my terms with precision before the conversation even starts—and to consistently remind the reader what I mean by them throughout the dialogue. 

That’s not word-policing; it’s just good analytic philosophy.

 If we are going to debate concepts like “ability,” “sourcehood,” or “freedom,” then clarity is non-negotiable.

The problem arises when you use the same terms but load them with different meanings, often without acknowledging the shift. That’s not neutral—it’s equivocation. And equivocation muddies the waters instead of bringing clarity. So when I call out a weaker or redefined notion of “ability,” it’s not because I think I own the dictionary, but because the conversation depends on us being honest about what is really at stake and what we both mean when we use a specific term.

So no, I don’t claim a monopoly—but I do insist on conceptual consistency. Otherwise, we’re not arguing against each other’s actual positions; we’re just talking past each other.

CC: //If indeterminism is true, can’t I know how to play the guitar?//

TIM:

 What a weird question. Not only do I affirm that indeterminism is true, but it’s also true that I play the bass guitar in a band. So yes—if indeterminism is true, you can know how to play the guitar. The real issue, however, isn’t about muscle memory on an instrument—it’s about whether you can rationally 

infer

 metaphysical and theological truths.

This is exactly where my arguments cut. You can pluck a guitar string deterministically, indeterministically, or even randomly and still produce sound. But knowledge—especially theological knowledge—isn’t like guitar strumming. It requires rational inference. If your reasoning process is determined by something untrustworthy (natural laws, deception, randomness) rather than you, the agent, then you’ve lost rational control over your beliefs. That’s what my FreeThinking Argument highlights.

So, yes, Colton—you can play guitar under indeterminism. But if you want to claim you know why indeterminism is true, or that compatibilism is the better metaphysic, you’re going to need libertarian free-thinking. Otherwise, you’re just assuming you can have justified beliefs while denying the very conditions that make justification possible. That’s the real “smuggling” problem.

 CC: //Seems like I can. I know how, I am psychologically sane, I have the physical capability, the mental stability, etc. Nothing about indeterminism seems to undermine these elements.//

TIM: Here you go again: attacking a position I do not hold. Colton, my argument is about when non-rational or untrustworthy antecedent conditions determine your metaphysical and theological beliefs – then you face undercutting defeaters for your metaphysical and theological beliefs. This means you cannot possess metaphysical, theological, and moral knowledge (unless your view is wrong).

Again, indeterminism can be true, and you can still have your beliefs determined by non-rational stuff or deceptive beings. Indeed, if you are not the source of your mental activity, then it logically follows that something or someone else is. If that someone or something else is untrustworthy (like mindless stuff, random events, or a deity of deception would be), then say hello to epistemic meltdown.

Notice, Colton, that this is not about whether you have the physical know-how to play guitar—that’s trivial. The issue is whether you can justifiably claim to have metaphysical and theological knowledge if your entire reasoning process is fixed by antecedent conditions outside your rational control. If your beliefs are determined by blind forces (even in an indeterministic world), then even when you land on truth, it’s accidental—you’ve blindly stumbled into it. That is not knowledge; it’s epistemic luck.

So, when you confidently assert, “But I have know-how, I’m sane, I’m capable,” you’re smuggling in the very thing your view cannot provide: trustworthy sourcehood of your reasoning. And without that, your model undercuts itself from within.

Bottom line:

 if 

you

 are not in control of your rational faculties, but something or someone else is, then you are not sane at all. 

Sanity requires being in control of one’s rational faculties.

CC: //So it seems like I have the N-Ability. Now, there is additionally no decisive obstacles standing in my way to exercise the said action of playing guitar iff there is a guitar in my immediate vicinity, or circumstances, or dispositional environment. Let’s say the guitar is in the other room (it is). Can I play it in a real sense? Sure. I have the N-Ability. Can I play it in the actual world? Sure. It’s the other room; I can just pick it up and play! That is the dispositional PAPDisp. Indeterminism doesn’t do a single thing about that fact. (Again, stop bringing in determinism here; don’t care. Indeterminism, for the sake of argument, is true in the actual world.)//

TIM:

 Until you start focusing on the actual argument about metaphysical and theological knowledge (which includes moral knowledge), you’re going to continue to miss the point year after year. It’s not about guitars—it’s about whether you have the power, at the moment of temptation 

t

, to resist sin and take the way of escape. Is that a real option whenever you face temptation? That’s the heart of Paul’s assurance. You can parade around examples of “N-Ability” or “PAPDisp,” but those examples never touch the actual existential and pastoral stakes Paul is addressing. 

The guitar-in-the-other-room analogy is trivial; resisting lust, anger, or greed in real time is not.

 When the text says, “God is faithful; He will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear, but with the temptation will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it,” the entire comfort collapses if 

at the moment

 of temptation you literally cannot do otherwise.

Bottom line: If you are not the one in control of your rational faculties and moral responses, then someone or something else is. In that case, Paul’s words in 1 Cor 10:13 collapse into false comfort. Genuine pastoral assurance requires that the believer is the active, ultimate source of their response when temptation strikes—that they truly could do otherwise. Without that, “the way of escape” becomes an illusion, and Paul’s promise turns into despair instead of hope.

CC: //7. I faced your argument. I have shown that premise (1) is equivocating on “ability” (which by the way, is the SAME response Bignon gave you back in 2021; I don’t think you have caught on).//

TIM:

 And I explained Bignon’s problems in response and have gone on to write much more about this in depth and detail with some of the world’s leading philosophers since. In fact, the argument has progressed quite a bit since 2021. Stay tuned for the forthcoming volume on this topic—it just got picked up by an academic press.

Moreover, I present on this topic at philosophy conferences around the country and I’m doing so again this November in Boston at the EPS. I field the toughest questions from PhD philosophers who push back, and my arguments stand strong at the end of the day.

You can keep telling yourself that I’ve “never caught on,” but maybe you should look in the mirror and get out of your echo chamber.

Here’s the truth: dismissing my updated argument by parroting an old response from Bignon is not the same as refuting the current argument. At best, you’ve recycled an objection I’ve already answered. At worst, you’ve demonstrated that you’re not engaging with the argument as it stands today. If you’re serious about advancing the conversation, then interact with the most up-to-date form of the argument, not a version from years ago. Until then, the weight of evidence and reason remains on my side.

CC: //You say I “redefine ability downward into W-Ability”. I can define ability however I want. It’s your job, as it’s your argument, to show that the ability you mean is C-Ability, and that ability is necessitated by the verse (entailed, or taught, etc.). //

TIM:

 Colton, of course you 

can

 define ability however you want—but the crucial question is whether your definition maps onto what Paul is talking about in 1 Cor 10:13. You don’t get to just stipulate a definition and then act as if the verse supports you. That’s the very point in dispute. If Paul is offering 

pastoral assurance

 in the actual moment of temptation (“you are able… God is faithful… He will provide a way of escape”), then the “ability” in view must be the categorical power to actually do otherwise at 

t

, not merely the dispositional possibility that you 

could

 under different circumstances.

Your W-Ability collapses into a hollow abstraction because it says nothing about what the believer can actually do when the temptation hits. At best, it describes what would happen to the agent in some range of possible worlds, or what they could have done if conditions lined up differently. But that is not what Paul is promising. Paul grounds his assurance in God’s faithfulness in the here-and-now (in the real world)—that when temptation comes, the believer has the power to actually escape.

So yes, I’ll gladly shoulder the “burden” of showing that C-Ability is necessitated by the verse, because the verse itself requires it. If Paul’s words are reduced to W-Ability, his assurance becomes little more than a thought experiment. But if Paul’s words are taken seriously—“you are able”—then categorical ability is on the table. The believer really can do otherwise at t. That is what makes the comfort real, not hypothetical.

CC: // You said, “But W-Ability doesn’t secure what Paul promises about what they can actually do in the actual world at t – when they are actually facing temptation. This reduces Paul’s comfort to a hollow conditional. On this W-Ability reading, Paul is a horrible pastor who delivers false hope—if not deception.”

You don’t understand dispositional ability, and I say this respectfully. Dispositional abilities don’t appeal to a conditional. They are present in the actual world. Here it is again:

N-Ability: S possesses an N-Ability to A iff, in a wide range of possible worlds, holding fixed S’s intrinsic “bundle of dispositions” to exercise the necessary skills (physical or psychological), know-how, or competence in order to A, if S were to choose (or attempt) to A , then S would successfully A . //

TIM:

 Great! Let’s talk about the “necessary skills” you mention. Do you actually have the necessary skills to infer 

justified true beliefs

 about metaphysics and theology if your entire chain of thought is fixed by non-rational antecedent conditions? If blind physics, random chance, or a deceiver-god determines all your mental states, then whatever “bundle of dispositions” you think you have is irrelevant—you don’t have control of your rational faculties, and thus no genuine skill in arriving at truth. A “skill” that can never secure justified belief in reality is not a skill at all—it’s just a mechanistic reflex dressed up in philosophical jargon.

Now, let’s turn back to the real text under discussion: 1 Cor 10:13. Paul’s pastoral point is not about guitars, possible worlds, or abstract dispositions. His point is simple: when you face temptation, God provides a way of escape, and you are able to take it. That means that at the decisive moment—t—you, the believer, have the categorical power to resist. Otherwise, Paul’s words are reduced to a cruel irony: “Don’t worry, you couldn’t have done otherwise—but hey, in another possible world you had the resources.” That’s not hope; that’s despair.

If you really believe that the Christian has the N-Ability and W-Ability in every case of temptation, then you’re already halfway to conceding libertarian freedom. Because if it’s you exercising your skill, not just something happening to you, then you could have done otherwise in the actual world. And that is precisely what I mean by C-Ability.

Bottom line: dispositional talk may sound fancy, but it doesn’t secure the actual-world assurance that Paul gives believers. Only libertarian freedom does.

CC: //W-Ability: S possesses the power (or ability) to perform otherwise than action A in any non-derivative situation x at time t such that S could have freely chosen to either A or not A in x at t iff (i) S possesses the N-Ability to A at t, and (ii) there exists no decisive (intrinsic or extrinsic) obstacles to S exercising her N-Ability to A at t such that if S were to choose (or attempt) to A, then S would fail to A.//

TIM:

 If there are no obstacles preventing S from doing A or other than A, then that means that something or someone else does not determine S to do either A or not-A. That means that S is the true source and actually 

could

 do A or not-A.

That’s libertarian freedom!

Notice, Colton, that on your own formulation of W-Ability, if the agent really could do A or refrain from A in the actual moment of temptation—without decisive obstacles—then the agent must be the originator of that choice. Otherwise, what makes the difference? If “nothing” explains why one path rather than the other, then it’s random. If something else explains it, then it’s determined. But if the “image of God” agent explains it, then congratulations: you’ve stumbled right into agent-causal libertarianism.

Your definitions try to re-label the concept, but the reality bleeds through: the moment you say an agent can actually do otherwise at t without external or internal constraints, you’ve granted the very heart of libertarian freedom. W-Ability collapses into C-Ability the moment you insist that the possibility is real in the actual world.

So when Paul says, “God is faithful… you are able… He will provide the way of escape” (1 Cor 10:13), he’s not talking about skills that might cash out in some other possible world. He is giving categorical assurance that at the moment of temptation you yourself can genuinely take the way of escape. That’s libertarian, categorical, leeway freedom—no matter how you try to redefine it.

CC: //N-Ability appeals to a wide range of possible worlds in which the agent would do only to ascertain what the agent could do in the actual world. That is fundamentally different than simple conditional analyses, which you keep referencing for some odd reason, and I explained this already in my above comment.//

TIM:

 And I explained your error in my above comments. It seems you missed it. Let me say it again.

Appealing to a “wide range of possible worlds” doesn’t magically deliver what you think it does. You can dress it up in modal language, but if in every actual temptation a person is determined (by antecedent conditions) to fail, then all your talk of “what they could do” collapses into a vacuous hypothetical. That’s the difference between real categorical ability and hollow dispositional descriptions.

Paul is not writing to assure the Corinthians that in some abstract modal survey they would succeed under different circumstances. He assures them that when they face temptation in the real, lived world—this world, at this moment—they are able to take the way of escape. That’s why dispositional glosses fail: they reduce pastoral assurance to philosophical hand-waving.

Bottom line: Your model makes Paul say, “You couldn’t have done otherwise in the moment, but cheer up—if things were different, you could have.” I’ve never heard a pastor give that sermon.

CC: //The agent can in fact have the N-Ability to respond to temptation; they have the know-how, the spiritual resources let’s say, and the psychological capability. They also have the opportunity in a real sense, for both (i) and (ii) of a W-Ability are satisfied. Can you please show me how either (i) or (ii) of W-Ability aren’t satisfied from the verse, without appealing to incompatibilism, thus resulting in an independent and contrastive reason to prefer incompatibilism over compatibilism?//

TIM:

 I don’t know how many times I have to repeat myself, but here we go again:

• Supposed “know-how” regarding theological/moral issues already faces an undercutting defeater if one does not possess libertarian free-thinking (see the Free-Thinking Argument and the Deity of Deception Argument).

• What are these “spiritual resources” you claim to possess if either a deity of deception or mindless sub-personal random events determine what thoughts you have about them and how you interpret those thoughts? If that’s the case, you are not using resources—you are merely being moved by them and through them.

• Tell me about this so-called “opportunity.” Is it an opportunity YOU as an agent actively possess (one that arises from you, not merely something that happens to you) to exercise a genuine ability to choose between alternative possibilities—making only one of them actual? If yes, then you’ve just affirmed libertarian freedom. If no, then so much for Paul’s pastoral comfort.

If not, then—even in an indeterministic world—stuff is simply happening to you. You may have the “ability” for different stuff to happen to you (like a puppet being jerked left or right), but there is no active agency in that picture. If this is what you think you are, then you have a profoundly low view of human persons. Your own beliefs entail that you are nothing more than a passive cog with passive states of consciousness. You don’t actively do anything.

In conclusion:

Colton, your entire strategy depends on redefining “ability” into something that looks compatible on paper but collapses in practice.

 You speak of 

know-how,

resources,

 and 

opportunity,

but when those terms are traced back to their metaphysical ground, they evaporate. If mindless laws, random events, or deceptive forces determine the content and use of your mental states, then your “resources” are not truly yours, your “opportunity” is not genuinely an option as decisive obstacles prevent you from doing otherwise, and your “ability” is reduced to a hollow formality.

Paul’s pastoral promise in 1 Cor. 10:13, however, is not hollow. He assures believers that they are able—in the actual moment of temptation—to take the way of escape God provides. That requires more than passive dispositions or thin compatibility; it requires categorical ability rooted in real sourcehood and genuine leeway. Anything less makes Paul’s comfort a cruel joke, and his counsel an empty shell.

This is why W-Ability and N-Ability, when pressed, either smuggle in libertarian freedom or else collapse into despair. Only libertarian freedom preserves Paul’s pastoral assurance, secures rational responsibility, and grounds true hope. Without it, you may speak the language of ability, but you have stripped the word of its very meaning.

Stay reasonable (Isaiah 1:18), Dr. Tim Stratton

PART 5: "You Are Able": A Written Exchange on 1 Corinthians 10:13 and the Nature of Human Freedom with Colton Carlson

Introduction

This dialogue brings together Colton Carlson and Dr. Tim Stratton in an extended written exchange about the meaning of Paul’s assurance in 1 Corinthians 10:13. At issue is whether the apostle’s statement—“you are able”—supports a libertarian understanding of human freedom (C-Ability) or whether it can be explained within a compatibilist framework (W-Ability).

Across the discussion, Carlson presses Stratton to demonstrate why libertarian freedom is the stronger reading, while Stratton argues that only categorical ability makes sense of Paul’s pastoral promise. Along the way, the conversation ranges over Greek grammar, dispositional analyses of ability, the logic of sourcehood, and broader questions of method in both philosophy and theology.

What follows is not a quick debate of sound bites but a detailed written dialogue. The hope is that, even amid disagreement, readers will find clarity on the key issues and encouragement to wrestle deeply with the biblical text.

This is the fifth and final installment in the written debate between Stratton (words in BLACK) and Carlson (words in BLUE). Grab some popcorn—or your Greek lexicon—and enjoy the show!

The Debate

Colton Carlson (CC): //Finally, here I see an independent and contrastive reason for why we should prefer the C-Ability over other competing views, such as W-Ability. You say that Paul grounds hope in the word Greek word “*dunasthe*—“you are able.” Present tense. Actual world. That’s categorical assurance.” Now you think this entails C-Ability:

C-Ability: S possesses the power (or ability) to perform otherwise than action A in any non-derivative situation x at time t such that S could have freely chosen to either A or not A in x at t iff there exists a possible world W*, holding fixed the laws of nature and the past in the actual world W, where W* is identical to W up until t in which S does otherwise than A at t.

The word means, roughly, to be able to, or to have power. It is used to convey the thought that something is capable or possible, in relation to authority. So far, I see nothing that entails C-Ability, for W-Ability holds to ability and “power”. Now, on present tense, you think this somehow conveys actual world assurance. How?//

TIM

: The Greek word 

dunasthe

 carries the straightforward sense of being “able,” having power or capacity. But notice Paul’s use of the present tense: “You are able.” He grounds assurance in the believer’s live, actual-world capacity, not in hypothetical scenarios where conditions align differently. 

This is categorical assurance—actual power in the actual moment in the actual world.

Now, what does that mean? If a believer is “able” in Paul’s sense, then at the moment of temptation it’s genuinely within their power either to resist and escape or to give in and sin. Otherwise, Paul’s words become deceptive comfort: 

“You are able” would amount to “You couldn’t have done otherwise in the actual world, but somewhere in modal space you had resources.”

 That is not pastoral assurance—it’s absurdity.

Your view of W-Ability boils down to: “You could do otherwise if something were different.” But Paul doesn’t say, “You would be able if circumstances were otherwise.” He says, “You are able”—because God is faithful and provides the way of escape. That is not thin compatibility but categorical assurance.

Thus, when Paul promises that believers “are able,” he affirms their real power to do otherwise in the actual world, in the actual moment of temptation. That is to say, when you are tempted to sin, you do not have to sin because you could have chosen otherwise. Thus, it follows that when you do sin, Colton, you could have done otherwise. That is C-Ability. That is libertarian freedom. Anything less drains Paul’s words of their hope.

CC: In English, as well as Greek, present tense means an on-going, or continued action. Where is the C-Ability in that such that “S possesses the power (or ability) to perform otherwise than action A in any non-derivative situation x at time t such that S could have freely chosen to either A or not A in x at t iff there exists a possible world W*, holding fixed the laws of nature and the past in the actual world W, where W* is identical to W up until t in which S does otherwise than A at t”? Present tense conveys habitual actions such as I play guitar everyday; actions from the past going into the future. Now, importantly, unlike English simple present, Greek present tense portrays moments of time that are not necessarily restricted to the “just now”. But it seems clear you want to mean it like that when you say “at t”. All of this is relatively elementary. //

TIM

: Although I make no claim to be an expert in Greek, I am careful to surround myself with people who are. My colleague Josh Klein—a proud alum of Grace University, currently pursuing his PhD—has taken more graduate-level Greek than most pastors will ever see. I asked him to weigh in, and here’s what he said:

“Colton is making an understandable error in understanding the Greek here and misapplying it to his own argument. However, even IF he is right then I believe it strengthens Dr. Stratton’s case, not Colton’s on C-Ability vs W-Ability.  First, let me explain where Colton goes wrong. Colton makes this claim, 

“In English, as well as Greek, present tense means an on-going, or continued action… present tense portrays moments of time that are not necessarily restricted to the ‘just now.’”

But this is only partially correct. The present tense is usually an imperfect aspect but this particular word “δύνασθε” is in the 

Present

Middle Indicative

. Why is this important? Well, in the indicative mood the meaning is a reference to the present time. In other words, it is a reference to what is actually the case 

right now

. Colton is partially correct, but he overplays his hand by downplaying the default force of the indicative present in this verse.

“When an author or speaker uses an indicative verb, he portrays the verb’s action as a reality.” – Dan Wallace (

https://equip.biblearc.com/course/greek-iii/)

Context indicates how a word ought to be understood and translated in every situation. In this case, the context is very clear and strongly favors a present assurance. When temptations come, God ensures you are able to endure. While Colton is correct that present tense does not automatically indicate “just now, categorical ability” he either fails to realize or does not understand the default force of the indicative mood. However, it is true that the word can bear a “gnomic” or timeless sense, but again, context is key in how we discern that. To what is the author referencing? In this case the Apostle Paul is referencing a pastoral counsel concerning sin in the real world this means that even in a gnomic sense this power is meant to be understood as real and active in reality. So it is unlikely, given the context, that the gnomic sense of “general habit” that Colton argues is a good translative or interpretative choice. Given both Bill Mounce’s and Dan Wallace’s work on the subject of the indicative Dr. Stratton’s interpretation is on stronger footing when accounting for context and the grammatical defaults of the indicative mood. Finally, even if I were to grant Colton’s argument it might even bolster Dr. Stratton’s view, not Colton’s. Even if there is some sort of gnomic sense to the term it would imply that every time a Christian is tempted, it remains true that they “are able.” And given the context it would then extend out to the ongoing reality of temptation. Whenever temptations occur, not just at time 

t

 but at every single moment a time 

t

 will occur that one is able, categorically, to respond to God’s provision of a way out. Paul isn’t restricting ability to a single moment, but he is affirming a timeless pastoral reality: whenever temptation occurs, the believer has the ability. That’s basically C-Ability universalized across all temptations. So, either way, the grammar and the context work against Colton’s attempt to weaken the text. Stratton’s reading aligns more closely with both the indicative’s default force and the pastoral setting of the passage. The burden is on Colton to show that Paul meant only a weaker, dispositional sense of ability, something the grammar and the context together make very difficult to sustain. Bottom line: What we learn from this is that our English translations are very good. Generally, they are able to communicate not only the word but the intent, in context, of how the word is used in the letter. While understanding the correct translation of δύνασθε may not prove C-Ability (though it does show that the ability is REALLY REAL, Colton may say that W-Ability is also “really real” but then the rest of the argument is to be considered) Colton’s view certainly isn’t justified and when all other factors are considered, the context of the book of 1 Corinthians in general, the pastoral tone of this particular part of the letter, and what we know about the translative history if Present Middle Indicatives it seems Dr. Stratton’s argument remains on solid ground.” – Josh Klein

TIM: Thank you, Josh! (Read more about this from Josh Klein here) Here’s the point: Paul’s intent in 1 Corinthians 10:13 is not abstract modal theorizing. He is assuring real believers facing real temptations in the real world that God’s faithfulness ensures they are genuinely able—here and now—to resist. This is not hypothetical power located in some alternate scenario, nor dispositional ability that collapses under determinism. It is live, categorical assurance: the believer can resist temptation, or they can sin.

Colton, if you are right, then Paul’s words become deceptive comfort: “You couldn’t have done otherwise, but take heart—there was some possible world where you might have.” That’s not pastoral assurance. That’s pastoral malpractice.

So whether we press the indicative for its default present force or (charitably) allow a gnomic sense, the upshot is the same: Paul grounds real hope in libertarian freedom. This is not W-Ability, which always pushes the power off into what “could have been” if the past or dispositions were different. This is C-Ability—the categorical ability and power that the regenerate spirit-filled Christ follower has to do otherwise in the actual moment of temptation.

CC: //So, while I think this is your best attempt at providing an independent and contrastive reason for why C-Ability must be entailed by the verse, I think it fails because nothing about dunasthe entails, specifically C-Ability such that present tense means an on-going, or continued action. Where is the C-Ability in that such that “S possesses the power (or ability) to perform otherwise than action A in any non-derivative situation x at time t such that S could have freely chosen to either A or not A in x at t iff there exists a possible world W*, holding fixed the laws of nature and the past in the actual world W, where W* is identical to W up until t in which S does otherwise than A at t”. In addition, the appeal to the present tense of dunasthe fails because present tense also does not entail present tense means an on-going, or continued action. Where is the C-Ability in that such that “S possesses the power (or ability) to perform otherwise than action A in any non-derivative situation x at time t such that S could have freely chosen to either A or not A in x at t iff there exists a possible world W*, holding fixed the laws of nature and the past in the actual world W, where W* is identical to W up until t in which S does otherwise than A at t”.

Your Tim Stratton version of the text is straight wildin’!//

TIM

: Well, I’ll let you take that up with Greek experts, but thus far, it seems that I am the one handling the text with care in this conversation. You can call my reading “wildin’” if you like, but dismissive rhetoric doesn’t change the fact that (i) the indicative present tense carries real-time force, (ii) the pastoral context of Paul’s words demands real assurance, not hypothetical comfort, and (iii) the lexical and grammatical evidence provided by recognized scholars (Mounce, Wallace, etc.) strengthens—not weakens—my interpretation.

I’ll say it again: if Paul’s words in 1 Cor. 10:13 don’t entail that the believer has the actual, categorical ability to resist temptation when it strikes, then Paul is offering false comfort. That would be unthinkable. A weaker “ability” (like your W-Ability) that never cashes out in real moments of choice is not pastoral hope because it’s not based in reality (a power one has to avoid sin in all moments of temptation in the actual world).

The bottom line is this: you can attempt to soften “dunasthe” into something less than categorical ability, but the grammar, context, and pastoral thrust all pull in the opposite direction. When Paul says, “you are able,” he means it. And if he means it, then the believer truly could do otherwise at the moment of temptation. That’s libertarian freedom, full stop.

CC: //You finally say “If your model were right, then Paul’s message becomes: “Every time you sin, you literally could not have done otherwise—but take comfort, you had the resources in other possible worlds.” That’s not encouragement. That’s despair.”

Straw-man. Not Vihvelin’s model; not my problem. Please, understand the dispositional analysis before critiquing it. Otherwise we are wasting our time. //

TIM:

 I don’t think you’re the one understanding here, Colton. You keep insisting I’m misrepresenting Vihvelin, but let’s lay the cards on the table. Vihvelin’s dispositional account says:

“S has the ability to A iff S has the intrinsic properties (skills, know-how, etc.) and the opportunity (no decisive obstacles) such that if S were to choose to A, S would succeed in A.”

That’s her line. And here’s the problem: dispositional analyses still cash out as conditionalized. The “if” is always lurking in the background: if S were to try, if S were to choose differently, if circumstances aligned, then S would succeed. Or, if one’s bundle of dispositions would have been different, if random events would have happened differently, and so on. That is exactly the hollowness I’ve been pointing out.

Again, if S is not the 

source

 who actualizes to A or not-A, then something or someone else is. This something or someone else could be random meaningless events, the laws of nature, or a supernatural being (all “decisive obstacles” which prevent S from doing otherwise). 

But, if these are not present, then there are no obstacles deterministically preventing S from Aing or not-Aing.

 Thus, if there is nothing deterministically preventing S from Aing or not-Aing, then—S actualizes the Aing or not-Aing . . . and whatever S did, S had the power to do otherwise (since absolutely nothing deterministically prevented S from doing otherwise). This simply is libertarian freedom. This is a categorical ability (C-ability) to do otherwise.

By contrast, Paul’s assurance in 1 Corinthians 10:13 is categorical and present: “You are able.”It is tethered to God’s faithfulness and to an actual way of escape. That’s not thin, counterfactual possibility—it’s a live power in the actual world, at the actual moment of temptation.

Here’s the crux: even if you adopt Vihvelin’s dispositionalism, it never secures genuine alternatives at t. It only repackages compatibilism in modal dress. On your reading, Paul’s comfort reduces to: “Every time you sin, you literally could not have done otherwise—but take comfort, you had dispositions that might have helped if other conditions had been different.” That’s absurd and certainly anything but true pastoral comfort.

So no, this isn’t a straw man. These are the entailments of the dispositional analysis. If I’m wrong, then show—within your model—how the believer has a live, categorical power at that moment either to sin or to take the way of escape, not merely that she would have succeeded if she had chosen or tried. Until then, my charge stands.

And that’s the decisive point: Paul’s words promise a freedom that is real, categorical, and grounded in God’s faithfulness. Your model, however dressed up, never escapes the conditional “if.” That is why it collapses under the weight of the text.

CC: //9. Closing the Circle. Here’s where we are *now*:

(i) is false. (ii) is false. (iii) question-begging (it’s your argument; where is the independent reason? Though the exegesis is close, but off contextually)//

TIM:

 Hardly, Colton. Let’s look at it one last time:

1. If Christians possess the opportunity at time t to exercise an ability to choose among a range of alternative options each compatible with their regenerated state, then Christians possess libertarian freedom.

2. At the moment of temptation (t), Christians possess the opportunity to exercise an ability to choose between either (i) giving into temptation or (ii) taking the way of escape God promises to provide.

3. Therefore, Christians possess libertarian freedom.

(i) is true by definition. If you concede that Christians possess an opportunity in the actual world to exercise an ability to either succumb to temptation or take the God-provided way of escape, then by definition that is a categorical power to do otherwise. Otherwise, “opportunity” becomes an empty shell word — like telling someone they have the “opportunity” to breathe underwater without gills. The concept loses all substance unless there is a live, available alternative within the agent’s power.

(ii) has been defended and stands strong. Paul explicitly says “God is faithful; he will not let you be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, he will also provide a way out so that you can endure it.”The text is clear: at the moment of temptation, believers are faced with two options, both live: (i) endure/escape, or (ii) fall into sin. The “way of escape” is not a hypothetical mirage in modal space — it is concretely present. Thus, both options are genuinely open and available to the believer at t.

(iii) is a deductive conclusion that follows logically from the premises. This is not question-begging; it’s valid reasoning. If you deny the conclusion, you must reject one of the premises — but as I just showed, neither can be denied without collapsing into contradiction or undermining Paul’s pastoral assurance.

And here’s the kicker: if your model reduces the “opportunity” to a mere conditional (“you would have avoided sin if other things were different”), then it guts Paul’s comfort. What believers need in temptation is not the reassurance that if only things had been different, they could have resisted. What they need — and what Paul promises — is the assurance that here and now, by God’s faithfulness, they can resist. That is categorical ability.

So no, Colton, the argument isn’t question-begging. It’s a valid deduction from biblical premises. And unless you can show that Paul’s words mean something weaker than they plainly say, libertarian freedom stands as the only model that preserves the force of 1 Cor 10:13.

CC: //Conclusion.

Tim, you said that I “don’t have leeway or sourcehood in any robust sense.”

Well, not in any incompatibilist sense, sure, but “robust”? Do you have a monopoly on what “robust” means? What does this mean? Does it mean “ultimate sourcehood”? You have to prove that, right? //

TIM

: Colton, I don’t claim a monopoly on the word 

robust

. But let’s be clear about what’s at stake. When I say you don’t have leeway or sourcehood in any robust sense, I mean that—on your model—the agent never truly originates her actions as the source in a way that grounds moral or rational responsibility.

If every mental and physical action is either (a) determined by antecedent conditions outside the agent’s control, or (b) the product of random factors, then the agent herself is not the source but a passive conduit. That isn’t robust agency; it’s mechanisms happening to her, not from her.She becomes a victim of conditions or chance, with no ultimate control. This is the difference between being a pilot and a passenger.

By contrast, robust sourcehood means that at least some choices genuinely arise from the agent’s own power of origination. She doesn’t merely experience prior conditions happening to her; she contributes something irreducibly hers in bringing about A rather than not-A. This is precisely what libertarian agency and C-Ability secures, and precisely what your view cannot secure.

And this matters: Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 10:13 presuppose exactly this kind of freedom. When Paul says, “You are able,” he is assuring believers that in the actual moment of temptation, they—not fate, not random chance, not external determinants—possess the live, categorical power either to sin or to take the way of escape. On your reading, however, Paul’s assurance collapses into absurdity: “Every time you sin, you could not have done otherwise—but take comfort, if things were different than the actual world you could have.” That is not pastoral hope. This is not handling the Bible responsibly.

So no, I don’t have a monopoly on “robust.” But the text, the logic of responsibility, and the very nature of assurance demand that robust means ultimate sourcehood—libertarian freedom. Anything less collapses under the weight of both Scripture and reason.

CC: //Tim, you said, “If the regenerate Christian is not the ultimate and rational source of his actions and the actualizer of possible alternatives, then there is no leeway at all.”

There’s no C-Ability, sure. But no W-Ability? You can’t just say no W-Ability because C-Ability is true when you haven’t produced a viable independent and contrastive reason as to why C-Ability is preferred. //

TIM:

 Again, let’s define what we mean.

W-Ability (Wide Ability, per Vihvelin): On this view, an agent is said to be “able” if two conditions are met:

1. The agent possesses the N-Ability — the intrinsic skills, know-how, dispositions, and psychological/physical competence to A.

2. No decisive obstacles (internal or external) prevent the agent from exercising that ability, such that if the agent were to choose or try to A, she would succeed in A.

Now, on paper, that sounds a lot like what I mean by C-Ability: if no obstacles block the exercise of the power, then the agent should have a live opportunity to actualize one of multiple alternatives. But here’s the problem: on Vihvelin’s model, the actual choice is never from the agent as the ultimate source.

• If the agent’s “choosing/trying” is determined by prior conditions, then she literally cannot do otherwise in the actual world.

• If it’s left to randomness in an indeterministic world, then the outcome doesn’t arise from her rational agency either. In that case, the randomness itself functions as a decisive obstacle to exercising ability, since it severs authorship from the agent and gives it to randomness. The actual exercise of ability is blocked by random events. Either way, the agent’s so-called opportunity collapses.

So even though W-Ability borrows the language of “opportunity,” it never secures genuine sourcehood. The supposed opportunity collapses either into determinism (no leeway) or randomness (no authorship). In both determinism and randomness, the so-called agent is reduced to a conduit of forces outside her control—less an originator, more a passive puppet.

C-Ability (Categorical Ability): By contrast, C-Ability says that at time t, in the actual world, the agent herself possesses the live power to either A or not-A. Nothing — not prior conditions, not laws of nature, not hidden determinative or random factors — overrides her rational agency. That is why she can be held responsible: she is the ultimate source who settles which alternative possibility becomes actual.

This isn’t just a philosophical quibble—it matters because Paul’s assurance rests on the believer’s genuine, agent-sourced ability in the actual moment of temptation.

The Text (1 Cor. 10:13): Paul does not say, “God is faithful, who will sometimes give you resources that might have been effective if your dispositions were different.” He says: “You are able … God will provide a way of escape … so that you may endure it.” This is categorical assurance in the actual moment of temptation, not conditionalized possibility.

The Reasoning, Step by Step:

1. If Carlson’s W-Ability is all Paul meant, then “you are able” reduces to: “You could not do otherwise now, but you could have if conditions were different.” That’s absurd as pastoral encouragement.

2. The indicative present of dunasthe (as Klein showed) points to what is actually true right now, not hypothetically true under altered circumstances.

3. The pastoral logic demands genuine alternatives from the agent. Paul’s promise is that when a Christian sins, she really could have taken the way of escape. Without that, moral responsibility and pastoral hope evaporate.

So here’s the dilemma for you, Colton: if your definition of W-Ability really does secure an unblocked opportunity for the agent, then you have basically affirmed C-Ability. If it doesn’t, then you’re left with determinism or randomness — both of which function as decisive obstacles preventing one from doing otherwise.

So either way, Colton, the text itself points to libertarian freedom: the believer truly is able.

CC: //Tim, you said, “Colton, you’re stealing from libertarian freedom to argue against it. You’re importing the language of leeway and sourcehood while denying the very conditions that make them meaningful.”

Do you have a textbook of libertarian language so I can be sure to avoid those certain words in the future? I suppose I should be more careful. Is careful a word to avoid, too? I guess I am not too sure. I wasn’t aware that libertarians own the dictionary. I apologize.//

TIM

: Colton, I’m not suggesting libertarians own the dictionary. I’m pointing out that certain terms—

leeway

, 

sourcehood

, 

could have done otherwise

—carry technical meanings in the philosophy of free will. If you use them while stripping away the very conditions that make them intelligible, you’re not simply redefining words; you’re smuggling in the appearance of libertarian freedom without the reality of it.

Think of it like this: if a determinist insists “I believe in genuine alternatives,” but by “genuine alternatives” he means, “I could have acted differently if the past and laws of nature had been different,” then he hasn’t actually preserved alternatives—he’s redefined them away. The language sounds libertarian, but the metaphysics isn’t. That’s why I called it “stealing” from libertarianism: it borrows the vocabulary of freedom while denying the ontology that gives it content.

So no, the issue isn’t about banning words from your vocabulary. The issue is about conceptual clarity. If you want to reject libertarian freedom, that’s fair—but then it’s also fair to insist that you not use libertarian categories to make your model sound freer (and better) than it actually is. Otherwise, it’s like selling tainted tap water in a bottle labeled “spring water.”

At the end of the day, Paul’s words in 1 Corinthians 10:13 promise believers something far richer than your dispositional “if.” They promise real leeway, real sourcehood, real alternatives, real power to actively fight sin in the real world—categorical assurance that you are able. You can fight. You can win! To deny that and yet keep using the language of “choice,” “ability,” or “opportunity” is precisely what I’m calling out.

Words without the substance behind them are just rhetoric.

CC: //The fact is I never imported ultimate sourcehood in describing a dispositional agent causation. I never imported C-Ability in describing W-Ability or N-Ability. C-Ability and ultimate sourcehood are the kinds of elements that are necessarily incompatible with determinism; W-Ability and N-Ability are not. Deal with the issues; resist the temptation to fall into cheap rhetoric! (Pun intended)//

TIM

: I love good puns, Colton (it did make me smile)—but if “resisting temptation” is something I can 

actually

 do, then every time I fail to do so, it follows that I 

could

 have done otherwise. And that’s the very thing you’re trying to avoid affirming.

This is precisely the problem: your W-Ability never secures that live, categorical “could have done otherwise” in the actual moment of temptation. It always retreats into conditionalized language: if my dispositions were different, if the past were different, if the causal chain ran another way, if things would randomly happen otherwise, then I would have acted differently. But again, that’s simply not pastoral assurance nor is it what Paul is communicating.

If I’m wrong, you should be able to find a good pastor preaching that sermon. 

Good luck with that!

 I doubt hard-core Calvinist pastors would ever preach that sermon Why? Because it’s absurd and makes a mockery of the text in God’s inspired Word.

By contrast, Paul’s teaching is not about hypothetical scenarios—it’s about real options in the real moment: “God is faithful… youare able… He will also provide the way of escape.” That’s categorical assurance, not counterfactual possibility.

That’s the sermon your pastor will preach!

So I’ll happily “deal with the issues,” as you say: the issue is that your model leaves us with no real leeway in the actual world. And if that’s the case, then Paul’s promise in 1 Cor. 10:13 evaporates into illusion. Libertarian freedom isn’t a cheap rhetorical flourish—it’s the only framework that preserves the integrity of Paul’s words, the seriousness of moral responsibility, and the hope that temptation can truly be resisted.

CC: //We can remain on this “model” issue, but I am not too confident that we will get past it. But I suppose we shall see.

I don’t know why you would give out 7 parts as a response. I cannot, on God’s good green Earth, reply to 7 parts. If you have more, then you can either cancel them or I suppose post them. But this will be my last response.//

TIM

: I find it odd that you are complaining about thoroughness when you are the one who wrote a 500-page glorified blog in response to my 300-page published book. Let’s be clear: you are the one who came to my platform to disagree with me. I simply quoted your words (which account for about half of the length of my replies) and then responded line by line so you couldn’t later claim: “Stratton cherry-picks” or “Stratton dodges my main arguments.” Thoroughness is fairness. If you don’t want me to respond to everything you say, then don’t say it in the first place. I’m not the one seeking you out—you continually seek to engage me. 

I finally took the time to answer comprehensively, and now that the full weight of the exchange is clear, you’re backing away.

 That’s not how serious dialogue works. So let’s set the record straight:

• You initiated the debate.

• You wrote prolifically against my work.

• I gave you the courtesy of a complete, careful response.

If that level of engagement is “too much,” then perhaps it reveals that you didn’t actually want a fair fight—you wanted sound bites. But theology and philosophy deserve more than sound bites. And here’s the irony: if you truly believe your position is strong, then you should welcome a thorough, point-by-point reply. Instead, your complaint about “7 YouTube comments” comes across as fatigue in the face of arguments that cut deeper than you expected. In short: I’m not burying you with length; I’m simply matching your words and holding them accountable. If that feels overwhelming, perhaps the issue isn’t my thoroughness but your position’s fragility.

CC: //I will highlight two issues:

On video vs written dialogue. Tim, you said the following: “Writing gives us both the chance to think carefully, avoid talking past each other, and express our arguments clearly without the pressure of an immediate response. This way, we can be more precise and ensure the conversation stays focused… (i) writing actually saves time for me. (ii) Written dialogue is much more careful and clear (or at least it should be). (iii) In past interactions I’ve seen things that undermined my trust with you, and that makes me cautious about entering a live discussion with you. Written dialogue helps maintain clarity and accountability. (iv) Before I’d consider a video discussion, I’d want to see this written exchange reach a point where we’re both engaging rigorously and productively. Why would I waste time on video when I could be engaging with actual scholars who publish in the academic literature?”

First, it is proven that people tend to talk past each other in written format rather than verbal format. This is a known fact. I get the fact that you don’t want to be pressured to give an immediate response, etc. but that’s just good discussion and dialogue. We can be more precise on written format, but I think we tend to get bogged down with the issues so much more on written format than with verbal. I just don’t have the time to write out a response to 7 parts… to a YouTube comment. THAT to me isn’t productive for us. I am stunned that apparently you have that time. And maybe you do, and that’s great. I have a daughter who is 4 years old; a lovely wife to love and help around the house; a full-time job that actually takes up close to around 11 hours per day on the weekdays. I just don’t have this time. Verbal/video format is much better for me. So, if writing saves you time, I suppose. But that’s shocking for me. //

TIM: I made the time because I was tired of seeing your friends and colleagues on FB, YouTube, and X responding to my work with, “Colton Carlson has refuted your argument!” When I ask them if they’ve read your 500-page Magnum Opus blog, I’ve yet to meet a single person who has. And when I press them to explain 

how

 you’ve supposedly refuted me, the response is always the same: silence.

So I finally decided to clear the decks and respond to you thoroughly. Not because I enjoy long back-and-forths in YouTube comments (I don’t), but because it was necessary to show that the blind confidence people place in your work is misplaced.

If that looks like “seven parts” to you, then so be it, but you can’t launch a 500-page blog and then complain when my reply to you is comprehensive. You started this, Colton. I’m just finishing what you began.

CC: //I requested a very informal, recorded dialogue, on your channel, at your convenience. I even asked to see if you were available this summer in June and messaged you twice about meeting up in Kearney, NE (I was passing through); perhaps you didn’t see it. We had only one 1-on-1 face-to-face discussion. And it was good. Informal. What I am requesting is not outlandish; it’s not obscure; it’s not weird. //

TIM: Did I not respond to you over FB messenger? I apologize if I missed it, my band has been touring quite a bit this summer and some things inevitably fall through the cracks (ask Johnathan Pritchett). Regarding our video call, sure, we were cordial, but we got absolutely nowhere! I left that call frustrated, realizing that a live, informal back-and-forth wasn’t going to produce clarity. That’s one reason why I shifted to this written dialogue: it forces precision, keeps the record public, and prevents either of us from rewriting history after the fact.

And let’s be real here: I’ve also seen the kinds of things you’ve said about me on social media and in places you thought were private. People send me screenshots, Colton. I’ve read your slander against me and my ministry. That doesn’t just undermine the spirit of Christian debate—it undermines trust.

Bottom line: you’ve not only lost this argument, you’ve lost my trust. And trust matters. I can debate hard with open theists like Warren McGrew, yet he still respects me enough to recommend my work to others. That mutual respect allows ongoing dialogue. I trust Warren! You, by contrast, have offered no such courtesy.

So yes—it is “weird” that you would invite yourself onto my platform after scorning and mocking me in other settings. Platforms aren’t neutral; they reflect credibility, and I don’t owe mine to someone who undermines my work, my ministry, my scholarship, and my character elsewhere. If you want dialogue, this is the context: written, careful, public, and accountable.

And let’s not pretend that this is unfair. You’ve had your say—thousands upon thousands of words worth of say. I’ve simply answered you line by line so that no one can accuse me of cherry-picking or dodging. If you don’t want me to respond thoroughly, then don’t make sweeping claims to begin with.

The bottom line is this: you’ve invited yourself into this conversation, you’ve raised the objections, and now that they’ve been met head-on, you don’t get to dictate the terms or cut off the exchange when the weight of rebuttal hits.

CC: //And I think we are engaging productively and rigorously. Why wouldn’t we be here? We disagree, but it’s helpful to see where our commitments lie. And you say “Why would I waste time on video when I could be engaging with actual scholars who publish in the academic literature?” Are you saying a (maybe) 2 hour video discussion would take up far LESS time than these written responses over the last few days? That’s wholly bizarre to me! Unless you are an extreme prodigy typer, using AI to help format the discussion and adding in details or whatever, I have literally no idea how that is possible.//

TIM

: I am an extreme prodigy typer (ask my wife)! I also have the gift (or a curse) of laser-focus when I decide to commit (ask my wife about that too)! Colton, you find it “bizarre” that ,I would commit this much time to writing, but the truth is simple: written dialogue is the only format that preserves clarity, accountability, and precision. A video call gets lost in the ether—misremembered, reinterpreted, and spun later on social media. A written exchange, however, leaves a public record where every argument can be weighed on its merits, every claim tested, every misrepresentation exposed. That’s not wasted time—that’s responsible dialogue.

You say you don’t have time for seven parts, but you had time to write a 500-page blog responding to my book and make countless 3-hour videos on YouTube criticizing my work. The irony isn’t lost on anyone. If you prefer brevity, you could have offered it from the start. But once you decided to engage in such depth, I had every right—and every responsibility—to respond with equal thoroughness. Anything less would have allowed you to claim I “cherry-picked.”

So here’s the bottom line: the medium you prefer is the one that shields you from the full weight of critique. The medium I insist on is the one that holds both of us accountable. Written dialogue doesn’t just save time (I don’t have to watch your multiple 3-hour long videos with Tyler Vela)—it saves truth from distortion. And if truth really matters here, then this is exactly where the conversation belongs.

CC: // But hey, to each his own. I have spent, maybe, on average, these last few nights, about 1 hour in response to you each day. That’s more than a 2 hour discussion. So, to me these written responses are wasting my time, then. Next, you say “published scholars in the academic literature”. Okay, spend time with them then. You didn’t have to respond. You didn’t have to engage. Go for it! Honestly, we are already spending ALL this time dialoguing on written format, might as well be a video which I would assume takes LESS time. But for you, perhaps it’s not less time. You keep going on about scholars, and publishing, etc. I don’t see you cite anyone of those scholars to make your case.//

TIM:

 It’s clear you have not carefully read my academic published work, Colton. If you had, you would have seen that it’s packed with citations and careful engagement with the scholarly literature. That’s the place where footnotes belong. Do I offer footnotes on YouTube or Facebook? No—and I don’t need to. That’s not the medium.

But let’s be clear: I’m not advancing someone else’s arguments second-hand (as you are attempting to do). I’m advancing my own. The same arguments that I publish in peer-reviewed academic journals and books, I put into play here. The difference is that I don’t always weigh them down with footnotes when the context doesn’t require it.

So if you’re missing “scholars” in my responses, it’s because you’re overlooking the obvious fact that I’m citing myself—my own work, my own arguments, my own contributions to the literature. 😉

And here’s the irony: the very fact that you keep pressing me in long-form writing shows that my work has forced you to engage. You wrote a 500-page blog trying to refute a 300-page book. If that doesn’t testify to substance, I don’t know what does.

CC: // I cite plenty of scholars to make my case. So if you really cared about which scholars you engage with, I would see them cited in your work (but we don’t). I see Moreland, sure. Kane here and there; sure. But I am going out of my way to provide publication dates, with page and chapter numbers often. Instead I get ridiculed for appealing to them because I don’t expound on them, or whatever in an informal setting. It’s quite unsettling, my friend.//

TIM:

 Colton, I’m not ridiculing you for citing scholars. I’m calling out the 

way

 you use those citations. Listing publication dates and page numbers doesn’t mean you’ve actually done the hard work of showing how those scholars directly support your claim in the context of our debate. Anyone can footnote-drop, but real engagement requires explaining the argument, showing its relevance, and defending why it applies here.

When I cite thinkers like Moreland, Craig, Kane, or Plantinga, it’s not just to name-drop—it’s because their reasoning dovetails with the point I’m advancing, and I take the time to unpack it. That’s what makes it substantive instead of merely cosmetic.

So yes, you cite “plenty of scholars,” but quantity doesn’t substitute for quality or clarity. If you really want the weight of scholarship behind you, the key isn’t piling up references—it’s demonstrating exactly why this particular argument from this scholar decisively helps your case and undercuts mine. Otherwise, it looks less like scholarship and more like smoke and mirrors.

And let’s not forget: I’ve produced peer-reviewed work where engagement with scholars is at the highest level of rigor. In these debates, though, the onus is on you and I to spell things out, not hide behind bibliographies.

Bottom line: I’m not unsettled by your appeals to scholars—I’m unsettled by the lack of explanatory power in how you wield them.

CC: // Finally, for the record, it’s not like I have this flaming trust for you either. But I am literally going out of my way to discuss issues with you; writing tons upon tons upon tons, specifically your work (or work surrounding your work). I think trust is wholly irrelevant to verbal discussion, personally. We are brothers in Christ; we have been forgiven; we have forgiven. To me, this is sufficient to let the past be forgotten in my mind. I will leave it at that.

TIM

: Colton, I want to believe you, but I literally saw you mocking me two days ago on FB. I even took a screenshot.

I do forgive you, but I do not trust you. Trust is earned, and you’ve worked against it too many times. Forgiveness is commanded, and I freely give it. But relational trust is something else — it’s built on truth, consistency, and respect, and that’s what has been missing.

That’s why I prefer a written dialogue like this: it holds us accountable to the words we actually write, not to shifting memories or impressions. It keeps the focus on arguments and ideas rather than personalities. And at the end of the day, that’s what I care about: the truth of the gospel, the integrity of Scripture, and the hope of genuine freedom in Christ.

CC: //2. Ultimate Sourcehood. I will pull only one quote because a lot of it is repetitious: You said, “At the end of the day, Colton, this is what it all comes down to: if the agent herself is not the ultimate source of at least some of her thoughts, beliefs, and actions, then responsibility and rationality collapse.”

I think you are right that in all comes down to this. This is why I don’t find this discussion fruitful any longer. I realize you have a  methodological approach to this issue that is fundamentally distinct to mine. I am asking you to prove C-Ability from the verse, and you response by something along the lines of “without ultimate sourcehood… without C-Ability… the agent cannot be free.” I usually respond by saying, “right… they cannot be free in the *incompatibilist sense*, but so what? That needs to be proved”. You respond back by saying something like, “You have conceded the playoffs, the game, whatever.”//

TIM:

 Colton, I have applied logic to the text of Scripture. Full stop. You keep treating this as if I’m smuggling in C-Ability arbitrarily, but the inference is clear:

1. Paul explicitly promises ability — “you are able” (1 Cor. 10:13). That’s categorical language, not hypothetical.

2. That ability entails genuine alternatives — the believer can either give in to temptation or take the way of escape in the actual world. That’s leeway, not just dispositional “if”s.

3. If every choice is determined by prior causes outside the believer’s control, then this categorical assurance collapses into illusion. Paul’s words become empty rhetoric.

So when I say “without ultimate sourcehood… without C-Ability… the agent cannot be free,” I’m not begging the question. I’m unpacking the necessary conditions that make Paul’s assurance coherent. If you grant the text, you grant the conclusion.

You want me to “prove” incompatibilist freedom from the verse. But that’s exactly what the verse, coupled with logical analysis, already delivers: an assurance that makes no sense unless the agent is the originating source with categorical power. Otherwise, Paul’s comfort becomes: “Every time you sin, you could not have done otherwise—but cheer up, you had dispositions that might have succeeded if circumstances had been different.” That’s not biblical hope; that’s pastoral malpractice that leads to despair. What hope is to be found in that horrible interpretation?

So yes, we’ve reached the playoffs and the championship game. If the regenerate believer is not the ultimate and rational source of their action in the moment of temptation, then Paul’s words evaporate. If they are, then libertarian freedom follows. That’s the logic, that’s the text, and that’s why I stand firm.

CC: //Here’s the rub: you are arguing based on the impossibility to the contrary. You are proving what you want based on the fact that nothing else works. This is a glorified transcendental argument, or in my mind, a negative line of argumentation. I disagree with this methodology.//

TIM

: First, tell 

Sye Ten Bruggencate

 that I employ transcendental argumentation in a presuppositional sense! He has publicly made it clear that my arguments don’t belong to that category. Moreover, your friend and colleague Eli Ayala – who has an entire YouTube channel dedicated to transcendental argumentation – rejects both the Free-Thinking Argument and the Deity of Deception Argument (

although he shouldn’t

). But let’s be fair: 

one of the best ways to establish what is probably true is to rule out the alternatives. That’s not a “cheap negative strategy”—that’s the way science operates every single day.

 And science has a pretty impressive track record of getting to the truth by eliminating what doesn’t work.

The same principle holds in analytic philosophy. J.P. Moreland and I demonstrated this in our peer-reviewed article (and forthcoming book): we systematically ruled out naturalistic determinism, supernatural determinism, and randomness. When those collapse, what’s left standing is sourcehood libertarian freedom. That’s not sleight of hand; that’s careful reasoning.

Now, if you want to call this a “negative methodology,” fine—but then you have to explain why this same basic method is acceptable in physics, biology, and philosophy of science, but suddenly objectionable when it threatens your subjective greatest desire of compatibilism.

What’s your alternative?

And here’s the decisive point (sorry to beat this dead horse): Paul isn’t offering a hypothetical “if-then” possibility that collapses into determinism or randomness. He’s offering categorical assurance—“You are able… God will provide a way of escape.” If your framework cannot make sense of that in the actual moment of temptation, then it is your methodology—not mine—that breaks down.

So yes, I’m happy to “argue from the impossibility of the contrary.” That’s not a weakness. It’s exactly how rational inquiry works. And until you can show how your method provides the believer with real leeway at the moment of temptation, your objection is just smoke.

CC: // I think we should prove things positively, not through the impossibility to the contrary. So, when you have given the Greek word for power, or able, that is pretty close to what I have been asking for: how, from the text, can we get C-Ability, for example. But then you stop short and quickly back-fire into the impossibility to the contrary proof. So I say “You haven’t proved incompatibilism!” and you say “I have!” Two different methods. //

TIM:

 Colton, I think you’ve misunderstood my method. I 

do

 give a positive argument from the text itself. The Greek word 

dunamis

 (“power,” “able”) is categorical, not conditional. Paul doesn’t say, “If things had been different, you would have had a chance.” He says, “You are able.” That is a positive exegetical foundation: Paul grounds a believer’s actual, present capacity in God’s faithfulness and the provided way of escape (1 Cor. 10:13).

Now, once we’ve established that positive claim from the text, the philosophical question follows: what model of freedom actually makes sense of Paul’s categorical assurance? And this is where methodology matters.

Compatibilist models always reduce ability to a counterfactual or different possible world (“if something was different, then . . .”). But that’s not what Paul promises. He promises 

real power in the actual moment in the actual world.

So yes, I supplement the positive exegesis with philosophical reasoning. And that reasoning shows that without ultimate sourcehood—without categorical ability—Paul’s words collapse into either determinism or randomness. In other words, the impossibility of the contrary isn’t a “shortcut” I retreat into; it’s part of the logical demonstration that only libertarian freedom fits both the grammar of the text and the lived reality Paul is describing.

So, when you say “You haven’t proved incompatibilism,” I reply: I have—both from the direct language of the passage (dunamis) and by showing how every competing account fails to preserve its meaning (not to mention theological knowledge). That’s a positive case and a transcendental one working hand in hand. It’s called a cumulative case and philosophers employ this methodology every day. 

CC: //Because of this, I fail to see how progress can be made. I fundamentally disagree that we should approach this text (or really any view of philosophy) with an impossibility-to-the-contrary proof. I don’t like when pressupositionalists use it; and I don’t like when you are using here. I think it’s question-begging with a cherry on top. You will disagree. And that is fine. And so, the debate between evidentialists and presuppositionalists continue; and so will ours for literally, from what I can ascertain, the same reason (or similar reason).

TIM:

 Why think a thing like that, Colton? Can you actually show where I’ve begged the question? You’ve tried, but each and every time I’ve demonstrated why the charge doesn’t stick. The only thing I’ve presupposed is that you and I are rational agents who have the power to infer metaphysical and theological truth. That’s what is “presupposed” in the Free-Thinking Argument. Be that as it may, I also do provide a defense for the pivotal premise, but it’s not needed because if you reject that premise, then it means that you do not have the power to infer theological truth — which is precisely what we are striving to do in these discussions. So, I presuppose that we are the kinds of creatures who have the power to do metaphysics and theology and infer knowledge of these things.

Anyway, how do you justify your conclusion that I’m “question-begging with a cherry on top”? You simply assert it, but assertion is not argument. You’re doing the very thing you accuse me of doing—making a claim without support. That’s ironic, brother.

Here’s the deeper issue: eliminating false alternatives isn’t question-begging, it’s just sound reasoning. That’s how logic works, that’s how philosophy works, it’s how the historical method works, and that’s how science works. If you can show that every competing model fails, then the one left standing isn’t guilty by default—it’s the best explanation available (which means it’s probably true). Unless you can demonstrate that I’ve misapplied that method, the charge of question-begging collapses.

So instead of repeating the rhetoric, give reasons. Otherwise, you’re simply name-calling while sidestepping the actual arguments.

CC: //That’s my issue: you cannot import incompatibilism in the text, and then when I reply with a different kind of ability (one that is compatible with determinism), you often say “That’s a redefinition; it’s not genuine freedom, or whatever.” And I’m like… “Okay? But incompatibilist C-Ability needs to be shown why it’s “genuine freedom”” blah blah blah. We will never, then, get to the bottom of it. //

TIM:

 Let me remind you (and those following along) of what actually happened. I didn’t smuggle in some foreign notion of “incompatibilism” to the text. What I did was take Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 10:13—“you are able”—and asked what kind of ability that language naturally conveys. 

On its face, it’s categorical and present: in the very moment of temptation, the believer truly has the power either to give in or to take the way of escape.

 The conditionalized, dispositional reading—“you would have succeeded if you had other things would have been different”—doesn’t arise from the text; it gets imported into it. That’s the real issue. Indeed, it is you, Colton, who is starting with your philosophical presuppositions and pressing them upon scripture. Now, when you respond by offering W-Ability or some other compatibilist-friendly sense of ability, the issue isn’t that I arbitrarily dismiss it. 

The issue is that those models 

redefine

 ability in a way that removes the live, categorical power Paul explicitly affirms.

 They exchange actual alternatives for counterfactual hypotheticals. They trade a real way of escape for a “you would have if you had wanted to.” And when I point that out, you call it rhetoric. But it’s not rhetoric—it’s exegesis plus logic.

So yes, the burden is on incompatibilism to show why its account secures “genuine freedom.” But in this case, it’s the compatibilist who bears the heavier burden—because you’re the one offering a reading of 1 Corinthians 10:13 that empties Paul’s pastoral assurance of its substance. You want to say believers could not have done otherwise in the actual world, while Paul tells them in the actual world, in the actual moment of temptation: “You are able.” Those two cannot be reconciled.

This is why I keep pressing the point. Because at the end of the day, it’s not just philosophy on the line—it’s whether Paul’s promise is meaningful. The Bible is on the line! And unless you secure categorical alternatives, your model collapses under the very text you’re trying to explain.

CC: //Just know, I think the 1 Cor 10:13 argument for LFW is horrendously eisegeting the text. I will divulge your multiple shot-gunning argument in the 7 parts. But I think they all fail for some reason or another. We are just repeating ourselves at this point.

God bless. Have a great day, my friend! Thanks for the communication and dialogue.//

TIM: Colton, thank you again for the dialogue. Though we continue to disagree, I remain justified and confident that 1 Corinthians 10:13 offers real, categorical assurance—that in the moment of temptation, the believer truly “is able,” and that this points to libertarian freedom rather than undermines it. I don’t see that as eisegesis, but as a faithful reading of Paul’s pastoral promise.

This conviction isn’t abstract for me. When I take teenagers on Maven Immersive Experience trips, I tell them that the next time they face temptation, they really do have the power to resist, fight, and overcome sin. THey don’t have to sin! I’ve watched lives change when young men and women finally realize that God has equipped them with what it takes to fight in this spiritual war. They are not passive victims; they are empowered warriors.

That’s why this debate matters—it’s not just academic. It shapes how we encourage real believers in real moments of struggle, in the real world.

I’m grateful for the time, thought, and energy you’ve given here, Colton. Even if we remain at an impasse, I trust God can use exchanges like this to sharpen both of us (and those following along).

So may the Lord bless you, grant wisdom, and fill your home with joy. At the end of the day, those gifts far outweigh any dispute over Calvinism, compatibilism, libertarianism (or any other “ism”).

Conclusion

At the end of this extended exchange, the central issue comes into sharp focus: what kind of ability does Paul mean when he writes “you are able” in 1 Corinthians 10:13?

Colton Carlson pressed for a reading compatible with dispositional W-Ability, arguing that it avoids both simple conditionalism and libertarian implications. I have contended, however, that such a view ultimately fails to secure what Paul’s words require. On examination, W-Ability either collapses into determinism (no genuine leeway) or randomness (no genuine authorship)—both of which function as decisive obstacles. And if W-Ability somehow avoids those outcomes, it essentially becomes indistinguishable from C-Ability, which affirms the categorical power to do otherwise here and now.

That is precisely the force of Paul’s pastoral assurance: in the moment of temptation, God’s faithfulness guarantees not just hypothetical or dispositional resources, but a live, agent-sourced ability to endure. Paul is not mocking the Corinthians with an empty imperative; he is equipping them with real hope.

But the implications extend even further. The Free-Thinking Argument demonstrates that without libertarian freedom, even the belief in determinism itself collapses into irrationality.

The Free-Thinking Argument (FTA)

1. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is either (i) determined by mindless stuff, (ii) determined by a deceptive being, (iii) random, or (iv) because he possesses libertarian freedom.

2. The philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is not determined by mindless stuff, not determined by a deceptive being, or random.

3. Therefore, the philosopher’s belief that he does not possess libertarian freedom is because he possesses libertarian freedom.

If our thoughts and beliefs are determined by blind causes, deceptive powers, or random events, then rational trust collapses. Only if we are genuine sources of our thoughts and choices can we rationally affirm our beliefs—including our theological convictions.

The 1 Corinthians 10:13 Argument

That same logic applies directly to Paul’s assurance:

1. The source of the Christian’s action in the moment of temptation is either: (a) external natural causes, (b) God’s determinative decree, (c) mere chance, or (d) the Christian herself as the ultimate source.

2. The source of the Christian’s action in the moment of temptation is not (a), (b), or (c).

   • (a) is excluded because Paul is addressing regenerate believers, not biological puppets. “God is faithful … you are able” presupposes divine empowerment, not blind physics.

   • (b) is excluded because if God determined the fall and each and every one of our sins, then Paul’s words about a “way of escape” amount to mockery.

   • (c) is excluded because randomness is not authorship; chance severs agency and functions as a decisive obstacle.

3. Therefore, the source of the Christian’s action in the moment of temptation is (d): the Christian herself as the ultimate source.

It follows that if the Christian is the ultimate source of her actions, and nothing deterministically prevents her from doing otherwise, then she truly has the power to choose otherwise in the moment of temptation. In the case of 1 Cor. 10:13, she has the categorical ability either to sin or to take the way of escape.

Theological and Pastoral Implications

Thus, philosophy and Scripture converge with a cumulative case: without libertarian freedom, both rational thought and Paul’s pastoral promise collapse. But with it, we can make sense of both our reasoning and our responsibility. If Christianity is true, then God has created us—in His image and likeness—as creatures capable of taking thoughts captive (2 Cor. 10:5), taking the way of escape (1 Cor. 10:13), and reasoning together (Isa. 1:18).

So the debate leaves us with a simple but profound truth: in Christ, you are able. This means not only that believers can resist temptation, but also that we can think carefully, reason responsibly, and trust that our pursuit of truth is no empty chase. For without libertarian freedom, rationality itself collapses—but with it, we can stand firm, endure, and know that God’s promise in 1 Cor. 10:13 is no illusion.

Stay reasonable—“Come now, let us reason together,” says the Lord (Isaiah 1:18).

—Dr. Tim Stratton