Philosophy

In the last article we covered the Genetic Fallacy in some detail so I would refer the reader back to that article for a more in depth explanation of it rather than spend time rehashing it here. For those who have been following along, you will recall that I mentioned th at as we encounter the Genetic Fallacy we can approach it either defensively or offensively when dealing with the notion of Christianity being the white man’s religion. In that article we primarily discus

“Would you be interested in debating Matt Dillahunty?” That was the question I received in July of 2018, from one of the organizers for the Texas Baptist Unapologetics Conference. “Hmm . . . I don’t know,” was all I could say. I’d seen the scathing videos from Matt’s show, The Atheist Experience , and was aware of his Hitchensesque rhetorical ability. “Well, it’s okay if you’re not interested. I’m sure Frank Turek or Mary Jo Sharp would be willing.” This passing opportunity

In my experience, not only do I find myself defending Molinism from the likes of Calvinists and Open Theists, but I am amazed to see the vigor in which atheists also oppose Molina’s doctrine of middle knowledge. After all, why should the atheist care what view a Christian holds of divine sovereignty and human responsibility? It comes down to the fact that while other views fail, Molinism destroys (as the Apostle Paul would say in 2 Corinthians 10:5) their favorite argument

In a forthcoming paper entitled Does the Purpose Theory of the Meaning of Life Entail an Irrational God , I defend the Purpose Theory (PT) of the meaning of human life. PT is the position that God’s telic creation of human beings is a necessary condition for human life to be objectively meaningful. My defense of PT suggests a new argument for Molinism. The argument is implicit throughout the paper, although it is somewhat more explicit in my response to the final objection t

Note: Originally, I wrote this as a sister article to a piece I put out on MLK last year entitled, “Dr. King: Freedom & Free Thinking” ; however, it ended up not being released at that time. So, I figured I would dust this article off and put it out there. Enjoy! When I was a kid my parents were very serious about us being grounded in God’s Word and knowledgeable of black history. I remember being around 11 years old and hearing my dad lecture me about how no matter what th

So, it’s been way too long since I dropped my last article here at FTM; “Ethnic Epistemology Part 1”. My bad for leaving y’all hanging. When I initially outlined the points I wanted to cover in my Ethnic Epistemology series, I’d intended to keep it pretty simple. My goal was to address a few common objections to Christianity that have been gaining traction amongst African Americans and provide a few user-friendly rebuttals to them. With that being said, I think putting some d

Why think that Mere Molinism is true? If this view corresponds to reality, then two other propositions must also be true: (i) Logically prior to God’s decision to create the world, God knew everything that would happen in any possible scenario He could create (entails God’s middle knowledge). (ii) As beings created in God's image, humans, like God, possess the categorical ability to choose between a range of options, each of which is consistent with their nature. If the

Question Dear Tim, I recently watched a short interview where you were asked for the "main indicator" of libertarian free will. You mentioned that you had several reasons to think humans possess this kind of freedom but you only elaborated on one of them. Can you please describe exactly what libertarian freedom is, provide more reasons to think we possess this kind of freedom, and also explain why you believe it is so important? Also, can you please keep it as simple as po

Abstract: In this paper, I critique Professor Asma’s article What Religion Gives Us (That Science Can’t) . I raise a three-fold objection to his claim that religion is irrational, followed by three related points of assessment. In short, I argue that his claim that religion is irrational is unwarranted. Introduction In What Religion Gives Us (That Science Can’t) , Professor Asma argues that, although irrational, religion is a needed and time-tested means for managing emoti

One of the primary objections raised against Molinism is based on a misunderstanding of what it entails. The typical objection is that Molinism somehow entails that God is “dependent upon” or “limited” by the libertarian freedom of man.<1> This is simply not a view that a Molinist must affirm, and thus a bad (irrational) reason to object to Molinism. This is the case because Molinists affirm that man’s existence -- if man has libertarian freedom or not -- is completely dep

It has become trendy in some circles to refer to people with certain political views as NPCs . In video game lingo, an NPC is a “nonplayable character,” a character that is not controlled by any player. They can be extremely simple or intricate and complex, but they are still mindless characters who solely follow their programming. Thus, to call someone an NPC means they have no mind of their own but are merely repeating slogans and talking points according to their social/cu

The Freethinking Argument Against Naturalism is a staple at FreeThinking Ministries and a great way to show naturalists that we have good reason to think there is more to reality than just the stuff scientists can test and discover. The original 8-step argument is also a good conversation starter about free will. Several versions of the Freethinking Argument have been offered dealing with the problems arising on any deterministic view -- naturalistic or divine determinism.

J. P. Moreland is one of the most prominent Christian thinkers of our time and I’ve been greatly impacted by his works, such as and . In his latest popular-level work, (Crossway, 2018) , Moreland addresses one of the most dangerous ideologies facing our culture and church. But the true danger of scientism is not that is necessarily being argued for, it is simply to be true. So Moreland’s task in this book is not just to refute scientism but to first expose it and how it h

Perhaps the most common objection to Molinism is the so called Grounding Objection . Molinism, you may recall, asserts that God's knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) is explanatory prior to God's creative decree. A CCF is a counterfactual that has the form: 'If person P were in circumstances C , P would freely execute action A .' (Note that refraining from executing some action A is itself an action). Hence, according to Molinism, before God chos

Abstract: The outgrowth of the truthmaker theory is due in part to the realist conception of truth that has been endorsed more prominently in recent years. Supplementing this realism is the notion of truthmaking—that truth depends upon the world. As a ‘cheater-catching’ business, the truthmaking enterprise has been celebrated to exclude ontologically groundless metaphysical systems. Some of these ‘purported’ ontologically groundless propositions that truthmaker theory should

I. Preliminaries Once again, I’d like to begin by stating further concessions I can give to clear the periphery of the debate. First, within this dialogue, my arguments shall operate under the presumption of A-theory of time. Second, I concede that if Andrew can successfully argue that correlation is a form causation, that then (MT 2 ) would still be incompatible with Molinism. Besides conceding, I would also like to point out several points of contentions, that if I were to

1. Preliminary Remarks In their forthcoming exchange, Andrew and John will focus their attention on a narrowly framed articulation of the “Grounding Objection” to the Molinist account of Middle Knowledge. The two are conscious that, unless they are cautious to avoid doing so, they risk either clouding the discussion with peripheral matters, or talking past one-another. It is with a view to mitigating these risks that they have agreed to issue a joint statement that clarifies

1. Preliminaries In avoiding unintended off-tracking, it is necessary for me to state the points I concede in Andrew’s essay. First, I concede that there may be some ways in construing (DT) that should not bother Molinists (Andrew’s formulation of <(dt)> does not necessarily entail his conclusion as I will argue later). Second, I concede that in the Frankfurtian example he gives, William is not morally culpable for the voting of Hillary if the chip activates. Although, I wil

By Andrew Harland-Smith 1. Preliminary Remarks This exchange between John and myself concerns a narrowly framed articulation of the grounding objection. Mine is not an argument founded on any universal theory of truth; not truthmaker maximalism, not atomic truthmaker, not even truth-supervenes on being. Rather, mine is a much narrower claim. It is only that a small but significant subset of truths, the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom (‘ CCFs ’), require truthmakers.

1. A Re-Cap of My Argument It will be recalled, that in my first essay, I developed an argument from what I called “The Dependence Thesis” (‘ DT ’) which held: (DT). For any person S and CCF C, if C is true, S has made it true that C As I noted in part 3 of my first essay, if (‘ DT ’) is true, the Counterfactuals of Creaturely Freedom (‘ CCFs ’) do not wont for truthmakers. That is, they are true; and what’s more their truth is grounded in the causal powers of the relev